



Unraveling an RPC Thread

Abusing RPC server calls for code execution





Whoami

bsi

WHOAMI



 **Alessandro Magnosi**

  **KlezVirus**



KLEZ VIRUS



Managing Consultant – R&D Lead
Red Teaming, Medical Device Security, Code Review



Bug Bounty Hunter
Hunting bugs for fun and a little profit



FOSS Developer
Not very active maintainer of several tools



Agenda

Intro

RPC Overview

RPC Server Calls

Uses and Abuses of RPC server calls


RpcCraft and RpcExec

Local/Remote Code Execution Libraries


Caveats and Limitations

When arbitrary execution is not enough

Conclusion / Demo




Introduction




RPC Infrastructure


Windows RPC (Remote Procedure Call) facilitates the execution of distributed client/server function calls. With Windows RPC, a client can invoke server functions just as if they were local function calls.



Unmarshalling – The function reads the incoming data packet and converts the serialized parameters into their native in-memory representation




Dispatching – It then calls the server-side function with these parameters



Marshalling – Converts the function's return values and output parameters back into a network-friendly format to send back to the client.

RPC Protocol Sequences



RPC Protocol Sequences

The RPC Protocol Sequence is a predefined string that specifies the protocol the RPC runtime will use to transfer messages, including the transport and network protocol.

Microsoft supports several RPC protocols, such as:

- Network Computing Architecture connection-oriented protocol (NCACN)
- Network Computing Architecture datagram protocol (NCADG)
- Network Computing Architecture local remote procedure call (NCALRPC)

Common protocol sequences include:

- **ncacn_ip_tcp**: Connection-oriented TCP/IP
- **ncacn_http**: Connection-oriented TCP/IP using HTTP proxy
- **ncacn_np**: Connection-oriented named pipes
- **ncadg_ip_udp**: Datagram-based UDP/IP
- **ncalrpc**: Local Procedure Calls

```
/* client application */
char * pszUuid = "6B29FC40-CA47-1067-B31D-00DD010662DA";
char * pszProtocol = "ncacn_np";
char * pszNetworkAddress = "\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\servername";
char * pszEndpoint = "\\\\\\\\pipe\\\\\\\\pipename";
char * pszString;

int len = 0;

len = sprintf_s(pszString, strlen(pszUuid), "%s", pszUuid);
len += sprintf_s(pszString + len, strlen(pszProtocolSequence) + 2, "@%s:",
    pszProtocolSequence);
if (pszNetworkAddress != NULL)
    len += sprintf_s(pszString + len, strlen(pszNetworkAddress), "%s",
        pszNetworkAddress);
len += sprintf_s(pszString + len, strlen(pszEndpoint) + 2, "[%s]", pszEndpoint);
```


Binding Handles




Automatic: Simplest. The server exports its binding information to a namespace, and the client stub handles the binding management automatically.




Implicit: The client application retrieves the server's binding information and assigns a server binding handle to a global variable before making any remote procedure calls.



Explicit: The client application supplies the binding handle as a parameter to each remote procedure call, enabling clients to manage bindings on a per-call basis to meet specialized requirements.



RPC Bindings





```
// Registration Flags Example
RPC_STATUS status;
status = RpcServerRegisterIf2(
    Iface_spec_s,           // Interface to register.
    NULL,                   // NULL type UUID
    NULL,                   // Use the MIDL generated entry-point vector.
    RPC_IF_ALLOW_LOCAL_ONLY, // Only allow local connections.
    RPC_C_LISTEN_MAX_CALLS_DEFAULT, // Use default number of concurrent calls.
    (unsigned)-1,           // Infinite max size of incoming data blocks.
    NULL                    // No security callback.
);

// Security Callback Example
RPC_STATUS CALLBACK XSecurityCallback(RPC_IF_HANDLE hInterface, void* pBindingHandle) {
    return RPC_S_OK; // In this case, allows anyone.
}

status = RpcServerRegisterIf2(
    Iface_spec_s,           // Interface to register.
    NULL,                   // NULL type UUID.
    NULL,                   // Use the MIDL generated entry-point vector.
    RPC_IF_ALLOW_LOCAL_ONLY, // Only allow local connections.
    RPC_C_LISTEN_MAX_CALLS_DEFAULT, // Use default number of concurrent calls.
    (unsigned)-1,           // Infinite max size of incoming data blocks.
    XSecurityCallback        // Security callback function.
);

// Server-side Authentication Example
RPC_STATUS serverStatus;
serverStatus = RpcServerRegisterAuthInfo(
    pszServerPrincipalName, // Server principal name.
    RPC_C_AUTHN_WINNT,       // Using NTLM as authentication service provider.
    NULL,                   // Use default key function, which is ignored for NTLM SSP.
    NULL                    // No arg for key function.
);
```


Protect RPC Endpoints



Registration Flags: These flags can be specified when registering the server interface to control access. `RPC_IF_ALLOW_LOCAL_ONLY`, as example, restricts connections to local clients only.



Security Callbacks: It is possible to implement custom security callback to determine whether a requesting client should be allowed or denied. This callback can be included as a parameter in `RpcServerRegisterIf2`.




Authenticated Bindings: Authenticate bindings on both the server and client sides to ensure secure communication. `RpcServerRegisterAuthInfo` registers authentication details server-side. On the client side, `RpcBindingSetAuthInfoEx` provides the binding handle and authentication information.



RPC Server Calls

RPC Server Calls

- RPCRT4.dll implements numerous RPC infrastructure functions as wrappers to dynamically invoke server functionalities.
- Many functions ends up in calling the Invoke function to execute a specific interface function.
- **NdrServerCall2** (synchronous), **NdrServerCallAll**, and **NdrServerCallNdr64** (alias of NdrServerCallAll, asynchronous).
- These functions take one argument, a pointer to an **RPC_MESSAGE** structure.



Execution Sequence

```

RPCRT4!Invoke:
00007ffb`7dd977f0 4883ec38      sub     rsp,38h
00007ffb`7dd977f4 48896c2420     mov     qword ptr [rsp+20h],rbp
00007ffb`7dd977f9 4889742428     mov     qword ptr [rsp+28h],rsi
00007ffb`7dd977fe 48897c2430     mov     qword ptr [rsp+30h],rdi
00007ffb`7dd97803 488bec        mov     rbp,rsp
00007ffb`7dd97806 418bc1        mov     eax,r9d
00007ffb`7dd97809 ffc0          inc     eax
00007ffb`7dd9780b 83e0fe        and     eax,0FFFFFFEh
00007ffb`7dd9780e c1e003        shl     eax,3
00007ffb`7dd97811 e8dadfffff    call    RPCRT4!_chkstk (00007ffb`7dd957f0)
00007ffb`7dd97816 482be0        sub     rsp,rax
00007ffb`7dd97819 4c8bd1        mov     r10,rcx
00007ffb`7dd9781c 488bf2        mov     rsi,rdx
00007ffb`7dd9781f 488bfc        mov     rdi,rsp
00007ffb`7dd97822 418bc9        mov     ecx,r9d
00007ffb`7dd97825 f348a5        rep movs qword ptr [rdi],qword ptr [rsi]
00007ffb`7dd97828 498bfa        mov     rdi,r10
00007ffb`7dd9782b 498bca        mov     rcx,r10
00007ffb`7dd9782e e89dffffff    call    RPCRT4!RpcInvokeCheckICall (00007ffb`7dd977d0)
00007ffb`7dd97833 4c8bd7        mov     r10,rdi
00007ffb`7dd97836 488b0c24      mov     rcx,qword ptr [rsp]
00007ffb`7dd9783a f30f7e0424    movq    xmm0,mmword ptr [rsp]
00007ffb`7dd9783f 488b542408    mov     rdx,qword ptr [rsp+8]
00007ffb`7dd97844 f30f7e4c2408 movq    xmm1,mmword ptr [rsp+8]
00007ffb`7dd9784a 4c8b442410    mov     r8,qword ptr [rsp+10h]
00007ffb`7dd9784f f30f7e542410 movq    xmm2,mmword ptr [rsp+10h]
00007ffb`7dd97855 4c8b4c2418    mov     r9,qword ptr [rsp+18h]
00007ffb`7dd9785a f30f7e5c2418 movq    xmm3,mmword ptr [rsp+18h]
00007ffb`7dd97860 41ffd2        call    r10
00007ffb`7dd97863 488b7528      mov     rsi,qword ptr [rbp+28h]
00007ffb`7dd97867 488b7d30      mov     rdi,qword ptr [rbp+30h]
00007ffb`7dd9786b 488be5        mov     rsp,rbp

```



Abuse in the Wild

ring 内核	00007FFA1238BF80	VirtualProtect
	00007FFA12388810	VirtualAlloc
	00007FFA1238A440	VirtualFree
	00007FFA1252F640	NdrProxyForwardingFunction4
	00007FFA12B6E460	CallWindowProc
	00007FFA12B80B50	SendMessageTimeout
ring 应用	00007FFA12E1BA90	RpcAsyncRegisterInfo
	00007FFA12E0BE40	NdrServerCallAll
	00007FFA12DC1C90	I_RpcAllocate
	00007FFA12E068F0	I_RpcFree
	00007FFA12E62180	I_RpcFreePipeBuffer
	00007FFA12E0A140	IUnknown_Release_Proxy
	00007FFA12E18DE0	RpcNetworkIsProtseqValid
	00007FFA13711750	RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler
	00007FFA137122E0	RtlRemoveVectoredExceptionHandler
	00007FFA1370D9A0	RtlImageDirectoryEntryToData

Abuse in the Wild

ShellcodeA起始地址
0x0000020279011098

```
void __stdcall NdrServerCallAll(PRPC_MESSAGE pRpcMsg)
{
    struct _MIDL_SERVER_INFO_ **RpcInterfaceInformation; // rax
    unsigned int v2; // [rsp+50h] [rbp+8h] BYREF

    RpcInterfaceInformation = (struct _MIDL_SERVER_INFO_ **)pRpcMsg->RpcInterfaceInformation;
    v2 = 0;
    Ndr64StubWorker(
        0i64,
        0i64,
        (__int64)pRpcMsg,
        RpcInterfaceInformation[10],
        RpcInterfaceInformation[10]->DispatchTable,
        RpcInterfaceInformation[10]->pSyntaxInfo + 1,
        &v2);
}
```

0x0000020279026D70

ShellcodeB

hellCodeB)



RpcCraft and RpcExec




All starts from a message

```
void NdrServerCall2(  
    PRPC_MESSAGE pRpcMsg  
);
```

```
typedef struct _RPC_MESSAGE {  
    RPC_BINDING_HANDLE      Handle;  
    unsigned long           DataRepresentation;  
    void                    *Buffer;  
    unsigned int            BufferLength;  
    unsigned int            ProcNum;  
    PRPC_SYNTAX_IDENTIFIER TransferSyntax;  
    void                    *RpcInterfaceInformation;  
    void                    *ReservedForRuntime;  
    RPC_MGR_EPV             *ManagerEpv;  
    void                    *ImportContext;  
    unsigned long           RpcFlags;  
} RPC_MESSAGE, *PRPC_MESSAGE;
```

Potential RPC_MESSAGE Structure





Dissecting the RPC_MESSAGE structure

```
void *RpcInterfaceInformation;
```

```
typedef struct _RPC_SERVER_INTERFACE
{
    unsigned int Length;
    RPC_SYNTAX_IDENTIFIER InterfaceId;
    RPC_SYNTAX_IDENTIFIER TransferSyntax;
    PRPC_DISPATCH_TABLE DispatchTable;
    unsigned int RpcProtseqEndpointCount;
    PRPC_PROTSEQ_ENDPOINT RpcProtseqEndpoint;
    RPC_MGR_EPV __RPC_FAR * DefaultManagerEpv;
    void const __RPC_FAR * InterpreterInfo;
    unsigned int Flags ;
} RPC_SERVER_INTERFACE, __RPC_FAR * PRPC_SERVER_INTERFACE;
```

```
typedef struct _RPC_CLIENT_INTERFACE
{
    unsigned int Length;
    RPC_SYNTAX_IDENTIFIER InterfaceId;
    RPC_SYNTAX_IDENTIFIER TransferSyntax;
    PRPC_DISPATCH_TABLE DispatchTable;
    unsigned int RpcProtseqEndpointCount;
    PRPC_PROTSEQ_ENDPOINT RpcProtseqEndpoint;
    ULONG_PTR Reserved;
    void const __RPC_FAR * InterpreterInfo;
    unsigned int Flags ;
} RPC_CLIENT_INTERFACE, __RPC_FAR * PRPC_CLIENT_INTERFACE;
```


Dissecting the RPC_MESSAGE structure

```
typedef struct _MIDL_SERVER_INFO_  
{  
    PMIDL_STUB_DESC                pStubDesc;  
    const SERVER_ROUTINE *         DispatchTable;  
    PFORMAT_STRING                 ProcString;  
    const unsigned short *         FmtStringOffset;  
    const STUB_THUNK *             ThunkTable;  
    PRPC_SYNTAX_IDENTIFIER         pTransferSyntax;  
    ULONG_PTR                     nCount;  
    PMIDL_SYNTAX_INFO              pSyntaxInfo;  
} MIDL_SERVER_INFO, *PMIDL_SERVER_INFO;
```

Dissecting the RPC_MESSAGE structure

```
typedef struct _MIDL_STUB_DESC
{
    void *                                RpcInterfaceInformation;
    void *                                ( __RPC_API * pfnAllocate)(size_t);
    void *                                ( __RPC_API * pfnFree)(void *);
    union
    {
        handle_t *                        pAutoHandle;
        handle_t *                        pPrimitiveHandle;
        PGENERIC_BINDING_INFO             pGenericBindingInfo;
    } IMPLICIT_HANDLE_INFO;
    const NDR_RUNDOWN *                   apfnNdrRundownRoutines;
    const GENERIC_BINDING_ROUTINE_PAIR *  aGenericBindingRoutinePairs;
    const EXPR_EVAL *                     apfnExprEval;
    const XMIT_ROUTINE_QUINTUPLE *        aXmitQuintuple;
    const unsigned char *                 pFormatTypes;
    int                                    fCheckBounds;
    /* Ndr library version. */
    unsigned long                          Version;
    MALLOC_FREE_STRUCT *                   pMallocFreeStruct;
    long                                    MIDLVersion;
    const COMM_FAULT_OFFSETS *             CommFaultOffsets;
    // New fields for version 3.0+
    const USER_MARSHAL_ROUTINE_QUADRUPLE * aUserMarshalQuadruple;
    // Notify routines - added for NT5, MIDL 5.0
    const NDR_NOTIFY_ROUTINE *             NotifyRoutineTable;
    //Reserved for future use.
    ULONG_PTR                              mFlags;
    // International support routines - added for 64bit post NT5
    const NDR_CS_ROUTINES *                 CsRoutineTables;
    void *                                 ProxyServerInfo;
    const NDR_EXPR_DESC *                   pExprInfo;
    // Fields up to now present in win2000 release.
} MIDL_STUB_DESC;
```

Dissecting the RPC_MESSAGE structure

```
0x32,      /* FC_BIND_PRIMITIVE */
0x48,      /* Old Flags: */
/* 2 */ NdrFcLong( 0x0 ), /* 0 */
/* 6 */ NdrFcShort( 0x0 ), /* 0 */
/* 8 */ NdrFcShort( 0x?? ), /* X64 Stack size/offset = n_param * 8 */
/* 10 */ NdrFcShort( 0x60 ), /* 96 */
/* 12 */ NdrFcShort( 0x10 ), /* 16 */
/* 14 */ 0x44,      /* Oi2 Flags: has return, has ext, */
0x?,      /* n_param + 1 (return value) */
/* 16 */ 0xa,      /* 10 */
0x1,      /* Ext Flags: new corr desc, */
/* 18 */ NdrFcShort( 0x0 ), /* 0 */
/* 20 */ NdrFcShort( 0x0 ), /* 0 */
/* 22 */ NdrFcShort( 0x0 ), /* 0 */
/* 24 */ NdrFcShort( 0x0 ), /* 0 */
```

Dissecting the RPC_MESSAGE structure

Input parameter definition:

```
/* 26 */    NdrFcShort( 0x48 ), /* Flags: in, base type, */  
/* 28 */    NdrFcShort( 0x0 ), /* X64 Stack size/offset = 0 */  
/* 30 */    0xb, /* FC_HYPER */  
            0x0, /* 0 */
```

Return value definition:

```
/* 62 */    NdrFcShort( 0x70 ), /* Flags: out, return, base type, */  
/* 64 */    NdrFcShort( 0x30 ), /* X64 Stack size/offset = 48 */  
/* 66 */    0xb, /* FC_HYPER */  
            0x0, /* 0 */  
  
            0x0
```




Dissecting the RPC_MESSAGE structure

```
(generator) C:\>python rpcpsgen.py -n 6  
int length = 69;  
unsigned char stack_proc_string[] = {  
    0x32, 0x48, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x38, 0x00, 0x60, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x44,  
    0x07, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,  
    0x0b, 0x00, 0x48, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x0b, 0x00, 0x48, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x0b, 0x00, 0x48,  
    0x00, 0x18, 0x00, 0x0b, 0x00, 0x48, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x0b, 0x00, 0x48, 0x00, 0x28, 0x00,  
    0x0b, 0x00, 0x70, 0x00, 0x30, 0x00, 0x0b, 0x00, 0x00  
};
```

<https://gist.github.com/klezVirus/cd1617904f96830f1cae65b350c8109b>



Final Message Structure





But we have a crash

```
(9bb8.f640): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
```

First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.

This exception may be expected and handled.

```
ntdll!RtlAllocateHeap+0x20:
```

```
00007ff9`0b54cb10 817b10eeddeedd cmp     dword ptr [rbx+10h],0DDEEDDEEh ds:00000000`00000010=????????
```

```
0:000> k
```

#	Child-SP	RetAddr	Call Site
00	00000003`ad12edd0	00007ff9`0a1826cc	ntdll!RtlAllocateHeap+0x20
01	00000003`ad12ee10	00007ff9`0a1b2df0	RPCRT4!AllocWrapper+0x2c
02	00000003`ad12ee60	00007ff9`0a19c905	RPCRT4!I_RpcBCacheAllocate+0x20
03	00000003`ad12ee90	00007ff9`0a1c3bba	RPCRT4!NdrStubCall2+0x65
04	00000003`ad12f170	00007ff7`eb54230a	RPCRT4!NdrServerCall2+0x1a
05	00000003`ad12f1a0	00007ff7`eb5436e2	RpcCraft!craft_rpc_message+0x72a
06	00000003`ad12f430	00007ff7`eb544369	RpcCraft!main+0x312
07	00000003`ad12f6b0	00007ff7`eb54420e	RpcCraft!invoke_main+0x39
08	00000003`ad12f700	00007ff7`eb5440ce	RpcCraft!__scrt_common_main_seh+0x12e
09	00000003`ad12f770	00007ff7`eb5443fe	RpcCraft!__scrt_common_main+0xe
0a	00000003`ad12f7a0	00007ff9`0a4e257d	RpcCraft!mainCRTStartup+0xe
0b	00000003`ad12f7d0	00007ff9`0b56af28	KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x1d
0c	00000003`ad12f800	00000000`00000000	ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart+0x28

We're missing initialization!

Finding the initialization routine

```
1
2 long RpcBindingFromStringBindingA(char *param_1,BINDING_HANDLE **param_2)
3
4 {
5     int iVar1;
6     short local_18 [4];
7     ushort *local_10;
8
9     /* 0x5be70 1379 RpcBindingFromStringBindingA */
10    local_10 = (ushort *)0x0;
11    local_18[0] = -1;
12    if (((RpcHasBeenInitialized == 0) && (iVar1 = PerformRpcInitialization(), iVar1 != 0)) ||
13        (iVar1 = CHeapUnicode::Attach((CHeapUnicode *)local_18,param_1), iVar1 != 0)) {
14        CHeapUnicode::~~CHeapUnicode((CHeapUnicode *)local_18);
15    }
16    else {
17        iVar1 = RpcBindingFromStringBindingW(local_10,param_2);
18        if (local_18[0] != -1) {
19            RtlFreeUnicodeString(local_18);
20        }
21    }
22    return iVar1;
23 }
24
```


CAVEAT

Caveats and Limitations



Missing Binding Handle

```
RPCRT4!RpcRaiseException:
```

```
00007ffb`7dd78fd0 4053          push     rbx
```

```
0:000> k
```

#	Child-SP	RetAddr	Call Site
00	000000de`0d6ff498	00007ffb`7dd98978	RPCRT4!RpcRaiseException
01	000000de`0d6ff4a0	00007ffb`7dd5cee4	RPCRT4!NdrGetBuffer+0x4e9f8
02	000000de`0d6ff4d0	00007ffb`7dd83bba	RPCRT4!NdrStubCall2+0x644
03	000000de`0d6ff7b0	00007ff7`8d4c2319	RPCRT4!NdrServerCall2+0x1a
04	000000de`0d6ff7e0	00007ff7`8d4c343b	RpcCraft!craft_rpc_message+0x729
05	000000de`0d6ffa70	00007ff7`8d4c4079	RpcCraft!main+0x22b
06	000000de`0d6ffcb0	00007ff7`8d4c3f1e	RpcCraft!invoke_main+0x39
07	000000de`0d6ffd00	00007ff7`8d4c3dde	RpcCraft!__srt_common_main_seh+0x12e
08	000000de`0d6ffd70	00007ff7`8d4c410e	RpcCraft!__srt_common_main+0xe
09	000000de`0d6ffda0	00007ffb`7cac257d	RpcCraft!mainCRTStartup+0xe
0a	000000de`0d6ffdd0	00007ffb`7deaaa48	KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x1d
0b	000000de`0d6ffe00	00000000`00000000	ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart+0x28

Missing Binding Handle

```
1
2 void NdrGetBuffer(RPC_MESSAGE *param_1,int param_2,longlong *param_3)
3
4 {
5     ushort *puVar1;
6     undefined8 uVar2;
7     ulonglong uVar3;
8
9     /* 0x19f80 1242 NdrGetBuffer */
10    if (*(char *)&param_1->ManagerEpv != '\0') {
11        param_1[2].Handle = param_3;
12        *(longlong **)&param_1->Handle = param_3;
13    }
14    *(uint *) ((longlong)param_1->Handle + 0x18) = param_2 + 3U & 0xffffffffc;
15    uVar3 = I_RpcGetBufferWithObject((BINDING_HANDLE **)&param_1->Handle,(int *)0x0);
16    if ((uint)uVar3 == 0) {
17        uVar2 = *(undefined8 *) ((longlong)param_1->Handle + 0x10);
18        *(uint *)&param_1[2].TransferSyntax = *(uint *)&param_1[2].TransferSyntax | 0x200;
19        *(undefined8 *)&param_1->DataRepresentation = uVar2;
20        return;
21    }
22    if ((param_1[3].ReservedForRuntime != (void *)0x0) && (*(char *)&param_1->ManagerEpv != '\0')) {
23        puVar1 = (ushort *) ((longlong)param_1[3].ReservedForRuntime + 0x10);
24        *puVar1 = *puVar1 | 8;
25    }
26    /* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */
27    RpcRaiseException((uint)uVar3);
28 }
29
```

Possible Solutions



RPC_BINDING_HANDLE: The ideal solution would be to craft or reuse a valid handle, capable of passing all the checks performed on it.



C++ Style Exception: Surrounding the faulting call within a `__try/__except` block is enough to prevent a crash, but useless to recover the return value.



C++ Exception + VEH: This is the common ground, where we are both able to recover the value and prevent crashes.

~~0:004> ? RPCRT4!OSF_ADDRESS::'vftable' - RPCRT4
Evaluate expression: 882552 = 00000000`000d7778~~

```
__try {  
    NdrServerCall2(rpc_message);  
}  
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {  
    printf("Exception occurred\n");  
}
```

```
int FetchReturnValue(const PEXCEPTION_POINTERS ExceptionInfo)  
{  
    ExceptionInfo->ContextRecord->EFlags |= (1 << 16);  
    g_ReturnValue = (PVOID)ExceptionInfo->ContextRecord->Rax;  
    return EXCEPTION_CONTINUE_EXECUTION;  
}
```

And Remotely?



Patching CFG: RPC calls are subject to CFG control checks. From Win11 the check is performed by `RpcInvokeCheckICall`.



Remote Initialization: The RPC initialization needs to be performed remotely. As the function doesn't take parameters, it is simply invoked.



Redirect Exception to Thread Exit: As the call is invoked as a remote thread, redirecting the exception to the thread exit will prevent crashes.

```

4 void Invoke(undefined *param_1,undefined8 *param_2,undefined8 param_3,uint param_4)
5 {
6 {
7     longlong lVar1;
8     ulonglong uVar2;
9     undefined8 *puVar3;
10    undefined8 auStack_48 [6];
11
12    auStack_48[1] = 0x180067816;
13    lVar1 = -(ulonglong)((param_4 + 1 & 0xffffffff) << 3);
14    puVar3 = (undefined8 *)((longlong)auStack_48 + lVar1 + 8);
15    for (uVar2 = (ulonglong)param_4; uVar2 != 0; uVar2 = uVar2 - 1) {
16        *puVar3 = *param_2;
17        param_2 = param_2 + 1;
18        puVar3 = puVar3 + 1;
19    }
20    *(undefined8 *)((longlong)auStack_48 + lVar1) = 0x180067833;
21    RpcInvokeCheckICall();
22    *(undefined8 *)((longlong)auStack_48 + lVar1) = 0x180067863;
23    (*(code *)param_1) (*(undefined8 *)((longlong)auStack_48 + lVar1 + 8),
24                        *(undefined8 *)((longlong)auStack_48 + lVar1 + 0x10),
25                        *(undefined8 *)((longlong)auStack_48 + lVar1 + 0x18),
26                        *(undefined8 *)((longlong)auStack_48 + lVar1 + 0x20));
27    return;
28 }

```


Patching – Thread Exit

```
C:\Windows\System32>'dumpbin.exe' -IMPORTS:api-ms-win-core-errorhandling-l1-1-0.dll rpcrt4.dll
Microsoft (R) COFF/PE Dumper Version 14.36.32534.0
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
```

```
Dump of file rpcrt4.dll
```

```
File Type: DLL
```

```
Section contains the following imports:
```

```
api-ms-win-core-errorhandling-l1-1-0.dll
```

```
1800E1C00 Import Address Table
```

```
1800FB568 Import Name Table
```

```
0 time date stamp
```

```
0 Index of first forwarder reference
```

```
11 UnhandledExceptionFilter
```

```
F SetUnhandledExceptionFilter
```

```
7 RaiseException
```

```
D SetLastError
```

```
5 GetLastError
```

```
}
```

Patching – CFG Check

```
Listing: rpart4.dll

PVOID HuntForCall(PVOID startAddress, SIZE_T size, BOOL backward) {
    UINT64 currentAddress = (UINT64)startAddress;
    UINT64 endAddress = currentAddress + size;
    if (backward) {
        currentAddress = currentAddress - size:
    }
    UINT64 CalculateCallTarget(HMODULE hMod, UINT64 callAddress) {
        DWORD offset = *(DWORD*)(callAddress + 1) + 5;
        DWORD relativeCallAddress = (DWORD)(callAddress - (UINT64)hMod);

        DWORD targetRva = (relativeCallAddress + offset) & 0xffffffff;
        return (UINT64)hMod + targetRva;
    }
    return (PVOID)currentAddress;
}
currentAddress++;
}
return NULL;
}
```



Operation Sequence



Find RpcInitialization Routine: Find and execute the RPC initialization routine to populate RPC Runtime global variables.



Find and Patch RpcRaiseException: Search and patch this function to avoid exception-derived crashes in remote processes.



Find and Patch RpcInvokeCheckICall: Use COP hunting strategies to locate this call and patch it to defeat CFG.




Craft RPC_MESSAGE: Generate a valid RPC message to be passed to the RPC server call.



Profit: Simply invoke the call directly or via Thread Creation.

Finally, try it - Local



The screenshot shows a Windows Command Prompt window with a dark background. The title bar reads "Command Prompt - C:\Users\d3adc0de". The text in the window shows the execution of a program with various error messages and memory addresses. Overlaid on the bottom right of the Command Prompt is a standard Windows message box titled "RpcCraft". The message box contains the text "Hello from RpcCraft" and an "OK" button.

```
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.22621.3737]
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\d3adc0de>C:\Users\d3adc0de\source\repos\SimpleExec\x64\Debug\RpcCraft.exe
Failed to get PerformRpcInitialization function address: 0000007f
Using hardcoded offset address: 0x7ff90a17759c
Function 'MessageBoxA' address: 0x7ff909a8abd0
rpc_message: 000001D303FA0000
rpc_dispatch_table: 000001D303FB0000
midl_stub_desc: 000001D303FC0000
midl_server_info: 000001D303FD0000
rpc_client_interface: 000001D303FE0000
rpc_syntax_identifrier: 000001D303FF0000
rpc_version: 000001D304000000
proc_string: 000001D304010000
```


RpcCraft

Hello from RpcCraft

OK



Finally, try it - Remote



Conclusion





Key Takeaways



Callstack: The RPC fake call invocation can be used as a proxy to masquerade the callstack of calls that are originating from a new thread.



Remote Threads: This system allows to execute calls within a remote thread with arbitrary parameters, without requiring custom structures or handlers, offering an option to the widely used/abused NtContinue.



Railgun: This implementation can ultimately be extended to create an alternative version of the popular Railgun library by Metasploit.



Detection: The library, as of now, still suffers from the need of remotely patching RPCRT4 for stability, which offers a chance for detection by security solutions.



Thank you!