

Creating a Hidden Prefetch File to Bypass Normal Forensic Analysis

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While doing more experiments of running EXEs and Malicious EXEs from ADS and Stealthy ADS to continue my previous work “[Can We Say Farewell to Hiding Malicious EXEs in Stealth ADS](#)“, and in order to create a forensic image and share it with the community as I mentioned [here](#), I found some unusual findings!

When creating a forensic image, I also create a list of files and directories within that image, as seen in Figure 1, just for further checking and verification purposes. So, as usual, was doing the image to share and I noticed the following:

WELCOME.TXT	Windows	10 [NTFS][root]Windows\Prefetch\WELCOME.TXT\
WELCOME2.TXT	Windows	10 [NTFS][root]Windows\Prefetch\WELCOME2.TXT\
WINDOWS-KB890830-X64-V5.70.EX-E982F4E4.pf	Windows	10 [NTFS][root]Windows\Prefetch\WINDOWS-KB890830-X64-V5.70.EX-E982F4E4.pf
WINDOWSINTERNAL.COMPOSABLESHE-EE394D7A.pf	Windows	10 [NTFS][root]Windows\Prefetch\WINDOWSINTERNAL.COMPOSABLESHE-EE394D7A.pf
WINLOGON.EXE-8163EECC.pf	Windows	10 [NTFS][root]Windows\Prefetch\WINLOGON.EXE-8163EECC.pf
WLRMDR.EXE-DDA57653.pf	Windows	10 [NTFS][root]Windows\Prefetch\WLRMDR.EXE-DDA57653.pf
WMIADAP.EXE-369DF1CD.pf	Windows	10 [NTFS][root]Windows\Prefetch\WMIADAP.EXE-369DF1CD.pf
WMIAPSRV.EXE-576286C3.pf	Windows	10 [NTFS][root]Windows\Prefetch\WMIAPSRV.EXE-576286C3.pf
WMIC.EXE-B77E8CD6.pf	Windows	10 [NTFS][root]Windows\Prefetch\WMIC.EXE-B77E8CD6.pf
WMIPRVSE.EXE-43972D0F.pf	Windows	10 [NTFS][root]Windows\Prefetch\WMIPRVSE.EXE-43972D0F.pf
WOWREG32.EXE-6F22B7D7.pf	Windows	10 [NTFS][root]Windows\Prefetch\WOWREG32.EXE-6F22B7D7.pf
WSCRIPT.EXE-65A9658F.pf	Windows	10 [NTFS][root]Windows\Prefetch\WSCRIPT.EXE-65A9658F.pf
WUAUCLT.EXE-830BCC14.pf	Windows	10 [NTFS][root]Windows\Prefetch\WUAUCLT.EXE-830BCC14.pf
WWAHOST.EXE-2084B319.pf	Windows	10 [NTFS][root]Windows\Prefetch\WWAHOST.EXE-2084B319.pf
PUTTY.EXE-A6BB0639.pf	Windows	10 [NTFS][root]Windows\Prefetch\WELCOME.TXT\PUTTY.EXE-A6BB0639.pf
REVSHELL.EXE-41B5A636.pf	Windows	10 [NTFS][root]Windows\Prefetch\WELCOME2.TXT\REVSHELL.EXE-41B5A636.pf

Figure 1: List of files found in a Forensic Image

I’ve highlighted the four entries which are totally weird. What does this mean? That is what we are going to find out in this post and prove too. Now from the screenshot above, it seems that there are two text files created WELCOME.TXT and WELCOME2.TXT. These are the files I created on the desktop inside a directory named “creepy” and used to hide putty (PUTTY.EXE) in the first and a reverse shell (REVSHELL.EXE) in the second. Therefore, I decided to run some Prefetch analysis against these two files and see what’s going on.

The first quick tool I used was [WinPrefetchView](#), just to have a visual idea of the entries. I was surprised that there is nothing about the two files we saw in the previous screenshot as you can see in Figure 2 below:

Filename	Created Time	Modified Time	File Size	Process EXE	Process Path	Run Counter	Last Run Time
UPDATEPLATFORM.EXE-5D23AF63.pf	3/19/2019 1:08:2...	3/19/2019 1:08:2...	8,401	UPDATEPLATFOR...	WA\WINDOWS\SOFTWAREDISTRIBUTION...	1	3/19/2019 1:08:11 PM
VCREDIST_X64.EXE-33C40083.pf	3/19/2019 1:24:4...	3/19/2019 1:24:4...	8,846	VCREDIST_X64.EXE	WA\USERS\IEUSER\APPDATA\LOCAL\TEMP...	1	3/19/2019 1:24:36 PM
VCREDIST_X86.EXE-25545807.pf	3/19/2019 1:24:3...	3/19/2019 1:24:3...	8,755	VCREDIST_X86.EXE	WA\USERS\IEUSER\APPDATA\LOCAL\TEMP...	1	3/19/2019 1:24:30 PM
VERCLSID.EXE-4D95F5A7.pf	3/19/2019 1:01:5...	3/19/2019 1:01:5...	3,724	VERCLSID.EXE	WA\Windows\System32\verclsid.exe	1	3/19/2019 1:01:34 PM
VGAUTHSERVICE.EXE-41501B8F.pf	3/19/2019 1:25:0...	3/19/2019 1:25:0...	8,424	VGAUTHSERVICE	WA\PROGRAM FILES\VMware\VMWARE TO...	1	3/19/2019 1:24:57 PM
VMACTHLP.EXE-4A77F661.pf	3/19/2019 1:25:0...	3/19/2019 1:25:0...	5,138	VMACTHLP.EXE	WA\PROGRAM FILES\VMware\VMWARE TO...	1	3/19/2019 1:24:56 PM
VMTOOLSD.EXE-0AD357E6.pf	3/19/2019 1:25:2...	5/26/2019 8:50:2...	30,837	VMTOOLSD.EXE	WA\PROGRAM FILES\VMware\VMWARE TO...	3	5/26/2019 8:50:08 AM, 3/19/2019 1:25:11 P...
VSSVC.EXE-04D079CC.pf	3/19/2019 1:03:1...	3/19/2019 1:23:4...	6,570	VSSVC.EXE	WA\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe	3	3/19/2019 1:23:30 PM, 3/19/2019 1:17:17 P...
WINDOWS-KB890830-X64-V5-70.EXE-E982F4E4.pf	3/19/2019 1:04:4...	3/19/2019 1:04:4...	2,250			1	3/19/2019 1:04:41 PM
WINDOWSINTERNAL-COMPOSABLESHE-E394D7A	5/26/2019 8:32:5...	5/26/2019 8:51:1...	20,470	WINDOWSINTER...	WA\Windows\TEXTINPUT\WINDOWSINTER...	2	5/26/2019 8:51:07 AM, 5/26/2019 8:32:42 AM
WINLOGON.EXE-8163ECC6.pf	3/19/2019 1:00:2...	3/19/2019 1:00:2...	7,492	WINLOGON.EXE	WA\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe	1	3/19/2019 1:00:07 PM
WLMRDR.EXE-DDA57653.pf	3/19/2019 1:29:3...	3/19/2019 1:29:3...	11,072	WLMRDR.EXE	WA\Windows\System32\wlmrdr.exe	1	3/19/2019 1:29:25 PM
WMIADAP.EXE-369DF1CD.pf	3/19/2019 1:05:2...	5/26/2019 8:53:4...	6,306	WMIADAP.EXE	WA\Windows\System32\wbem\WMIADAP.	6	5/26/2019 8:53:32 AM, 5/26/2019 8:31:13 A...
WMIAPSRV.EXE-576286C3.pf	3/19/2019 1:06:0...	3/19/2019 1:25:4...	5,664	WMIAPSRV.EXE	WA\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiApSrv.	2	3/19/2019 1:25:33 PM, 3/19/2019 1:05:51 PM
WMIC.EXE-877E8CD6.pf	5/26/2019 8:37:5...	5/26/2019 8:41:5...	7,122	WMIC.EXE	WA\Windows\System32\wbem\WMIC.exe	6	5/26/2019 8:41:51 AM, 5/26/2019 8:41:32 A...
WMIPIVSE.EXE-43972D0F.pf	3/19/2019 1:00:1...	5/26/2019 8:30:4...	20,355	WMIPIVSE.EXE	WA\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPvSE.e	10	5/26/2019 8:30:32 AM, 3/19/2019 1:25:32 P...
WOWREG32.EXE-6F22B7D7.pf	3/19/2019 1:25:1...	3/19/2019 1:25:1...	4,065	WOWREG32.EXE	WA\Windows\SysWOW64\wowreg32.exe	1	3/19/2019 1:25:09 PM
WSCRIPT.EXE-65A9658F.pf	3/19/2019 1:00:4...	3/19/2019 1:00:4...	12,078	WSCRIPT.EXE	WA\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	1	3/19/2019 1:00:41 PM
WUAUCLT.EXE-830BC14.pf	3/19/2019 1:03:0...	3/19/2019 1:18:5...	14,789	WUAUCLT.EXE	WA\Windows\System32\wuaucvt.exe	6	3/19/2019 1:18:56 PM, 3/19/2019 1:13:01 P...
WVAHOST.EXE-2084B319.pf	3/19/2019 1:00:1...	3/19/2019 1:00:1...	43,662	WVAHOST.EXE	WA\Windows\System32\WVAHost.exe	1	3/19/2019 12:59:41 PM

Figure 2: WinPrefetch Results

But that's not enough, I went to use Eric Zimmerman's tool Prefetch Parser ([PECmd](#)) and run the test again. So ran the tool against the whole directory and generated a CSV file:

```
PECmd.exe -d W:\Windows\Prefetch --csv C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\sleuthADS\
```

Then I loaded the CSV file generated into Eric's Time Line Explorer, as you can see in Figure 3:

Line	Tag	Note	Source Filename	Executable Name	Run Count	Hash	Size	Version	Last Run	Directories	Files Loaded
179			W:\Windows\Prefetch\SYSTEMSETTINGS.EXE-45ASEC0B...	SYSTEMSETTINGS.EXE	1	45ASEC0B	16654	Windows 10 2019-03...		PROGRAMDATA, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\PROGRAMDATA, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
180			W:\Windows\Prefetch\TASKHOST.EXE-4DB99E1B.pf	TASKHOST.EXE	16	4DB99E1B	49352	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
181			W:\Windows\Prefetch\TASKMGR.EXE-723980C0.pf	TASKMGR.EXE	1	723980C0	127674	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\EXTEND, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
182			W:\Windows\Prefetch\TIMERKER.EXE-10F9E981.pf	TIMERKER.EXE	4	10F9E981	130296	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\EXTEND, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
183			W:\Windows\Prefetch\TIMERKER.EXE-9961D998.pf	TIMERKER.EXE	2	9961D998	26524	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\EXTEND, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
184			W:\Windows\Prefetch\TPAUTOCONNSVC.EXE-3F58EC59...	TPAUTOCONNSVC.EXE	1	3F58EC59	36298	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\PROGRAM FILES, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
185			W:\Windows\Prefetch\TPVCGATEWAY.EXE-0BBE6A89.pf	TPVCGATEWAY.EXE	1	0BBE6A89	35182	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\PROGRAM FILES, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
186			W:\Windows\Prefetch\TRUSTEDINSTALLER.EXE-031864...	TRUSTEDINSTALLER.EXE	4	3186478	23302	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
187			W:\Windows\Prefetch\UDFRAG.EXE-8F692AC4.pf	UDFRAG.EXE	1	8F692AC4	34198	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\EXTEND, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
188			W:\Windows\Prefetch\UNREGSP2.EXE-4307C3D3.pf	UNREGSP2.EXE	1	F307C3D3	18436	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\USERS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
189			W:\Windows\Prefetch\UPDATEPLATFORM.EXE-5D23AF63...	UPDATEPLATFORM.EXE	1	5D23AF63	54566	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\EXTEND, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
190			W:\Windows\Prefetch\VCREDIST_X64.EXE-33C40083.pf	VCREDIST_X64.EXE	1	33C40083	54696	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\USERS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
191			W:\Windows\Prefetch\VCREDIST_X86.EXE-25545807.pf	VCREDIST_X86.EXE	1	25545807	52416	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\USERS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
192			W:\Windows\Prefetch\VERCLSID.EXE-4D95F5A7.pf	VERCLSID.EXE	1	4D95F5A7	15536	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
193			W:\Windows\Prefetch\VGAUTHSERVICE.EXE-41501B8F...	VGAUTHSERVICE.EXE	1	41501B8F	39296	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\PROGRAM FILES, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
194			W:\Windows\Prefetch\VMACTHLP.EXE-4A77F661.pf	VMACTHLP.EXE	1	4A77F661	21528	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\EXTEND, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
195			W:\Windows\Prefetch\VMTOOLSD.EXE-0AD357E6.pf	VMTOOLSD.EXE	3	AD357E6	138328	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\PROGRAM FILES, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
196			W:\Windows\Prefetch\VSSVC.EXE-04D079CC.pf	VSSVC.EXE	3	4D079CC	24798	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
198			W:\Windows\Prefetch\WINDOWSINTERNAL-COMPOSABLES...	WINDOWSINTERNAL-COMPOSABLESHE	2	E394D7A	91434	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\PROGRAMDATA, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
197			W:\Windows\Prefetch\WINDOWS-KB890830-X64-V5-70...	WINDOWS-KB890830-X64-V5-70.EXE	1	E982F4E4	8422	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
199			W:\Windows\Prefetch\WINLOGON.EXE-8163ECC6.pf	WINLOGON.EXE	1	8163ECC6	37146	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
200			W:\Windows\Prefetch\WLMRDR.EXE-DDA57653.pf	WLMRDR.EXE	1	DDA57653	98614	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
201			W:\Windows\Prefetch\WMIADAP.EXE-369DF1CD.pf	WMIADAP.EXE	6	369DF1CD	22296	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
202			W:\Windows\Prefetch\WMIAPSRV.EXE-576286C3.pf	WMIAPSRV.EXE	2	576286C3	21078	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
203			W:\Windows\Prefetch\WMIC.EXE-877E8CD6.pf	WMIC.EXE	6	877E8CD6	31086	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
204			W:\Windows\Prefetch\WMIPIVSE.EXE-43972D0F.pf	WMIPIVSE.EXE	10	43972D0F	85608	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
205			W:\Windows\Prefetch\WOWREG32.EXE-6F22B7D7.pf	WOWREG32.EXE	1	6F22B7D7	18742	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
206			W:\Windows\Prefetch\WSCRIPT.EXE-65A9658F.pf	WSCRIPT.EXE	1	65A9658F	54632	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\PROGRAM FILES, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
207			W:\Windows\Prefetch\WUAUCLT.EXE-830BC14.pf	WUAUCLT.EXE	6	830BC14	64522	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\EXTEND, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	
208			W:\Windows\Prefetch\WVAHOST.EXE-2084B319.pf	WVAHOST.EXE	1	2084B319	220392	Windows 10 2019-03...		\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\EXTEND, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS, \VOLUME{01d4de9e89d44c1a-b0097a9}\WINDOWS\S...	

Figure 3: PECmd Results in Timeline Explorer

I was shocked that now I have two tools that are unable to see the two WELCOME.TXT and WELCOME2.TXT prefetch files or whatever these files are!!!

Therefore, time to do some manual sifting through the image and see what is going on.

When browsing the Prefetch directory, I noticed the following in Figure 4:

The screenshot shows an 'Evidence Tree' on the left and a 'File List' on the right. The 'Evidence Tree' shows a folder structure with 'ReadyRoot' containing 'WELCOME.TXT' and 'WELCOME2.TXT'. The 'File List' table shows the following data:

Name	Size	Type	Date Modified
VMTOOLS.D.EXE-0AD357E6.pf	31	Regular File	5/26/2019 8:50:24 AM
VMTOOLS.D.EXE-0AD357E6.pf.FileSlack	2	File Slack	
VSSVC.EXE-04D079CC.pf	7	Regular File	3/19/2019 1:23:40 PM
VSSVC.EXE-04D079CC.pf.FileSlack	2	File Slack	
WELCOME.TXT	0	Regular File	5/26/2019 8:41:41 AM
WELCOME2.TXT	0	Regular File	5/26/2019 8:41:57 AM
WINDOWS-KB890830-X64-V5.70.EX-E982F4E4.pf	3	Regular File	3/19/2019 1:04:43 PM
WINDOWSINTERNAL.COMPOSCABLESHE.FE30A7A...	20	Regular File	5/26/2019 8:51:17 AM

Figure 4: Welcome Files in Prefetch Directory

Yes, we can see that they are listed exactly as normal files but with an ADS, as we saw in my previous post.

Let's check each one of them. So, when accessing the first WELCOME.TXT file, we can see the details in Figure 5:

The screenshot displays the FTK interface with the following components:

- Evidence Tree:** A hierarchical view of files. The 'ReadyBoot' folder is expanded, showing 'WELCOME.TXT' and 'WELCOME2.TXT' highlighted with a red box.
- File List:** A table listing files. The entry 'PUTTY.EXE-A6BB0639....' is selected, showing a size of 7 and type 'Alternate Data ...'. Below it, another entry shows a size of 2 and type 'File Slack'.
- Hex Dump:** A table showing the raw data of the selected file. The first few bytes are 'MAM', which is highlighted with a red box. The dump includes hexadecimal values and their corresponding ASCII characters.
- Custom Content Sources:** A pane at the bottom left showing the file's path: 'Evidence:File System|Path|File'.

Name	Size	Type	Date Modified
PUTTY.EXE-A6BB0639....	7	Alternate Data ...	5/26/2019 8:41:...
PUTTY.EXE-A6BB0639....	2	File Slack	

Offset	Hex	ASCII
0000	4D 41 4D 04 92 78 00 00-B5 B7 C6 CA A9 A7 BA BB	MAM . x . p . EE@S°»
0010	B9 B7 BB CB A9 B7 AA CB-A9 C7 AB BB B9 A7 A9 B9	° . » Ee . ° Ee Ç « » ° S e °
0020	98 B7 9A A9 99 B7 AA AA-89 87 89 99 98 A7 88 89	° ° S . .
0030	B8 86 98 99 A8 07 B8 AB-A9 B7 AC BB A9 07 AC BA	° ° °
0040	B9 C7 CC BA B9 C7 BB AA-B9 B7 CB BB A9 B7 CB CB	° Ç i ° Ç » ° ° . E » e . EE
0050	A9 C7 0A BB A9 C7 BB CA-B9 B7 AA 0B B9 B7 AB 0A	° Ç » ° Ç » ° E ° . ° . °
0060	C9 B7 CC 0B C9 B7 CB CA-C9 C7 CB BA B9 C7 00 BB	E . i . E . EEÉÇE ° i Ç »
0070	A9 C7 AA 0A BA B8 BB BA-B9 C7 CC BA CA 07 00 0B	° Ç ° . ° ° ° Ç i ° E . . .
0080	C9 C8 0C 0B C9 C8 0B AA-0C 00 00 00 00 00 00	EE . EE . °
0090	0C 00 00 00 00 00 0C 00-79 00 0B 00 00 00 00	° y
00a0	98 A7 C2 00 00 00 00 B0-A7 AA C7 0C 00 00 00 C0	° S Å ° S ° Ç Å
00b0	A6 AC B9 00 0A 00 B0 A0-98 AB AA BC AC B0 99 90	! . - ° ° . °
00c0	A8 AA 98 C0 AB C0 8A 80-A7 99 88 BC B0 C0 8B 8C	° ° . Å Å . ° . S . ° . Å ° . . .
00d0	97 A9 77 BC AB 00 80 8C-87 99 A8 0B B0 0B 90 8C	° e ° ° Å °
00e0	A8 A9 98 C0 C0 0A B0 90-A0 A9 AA 0B 0C 0B C0 90	° e . Å Å . ° . ° Å .
00f0	A0 CB B0 0B B0 0B C0 B0-A0 0B C0 00 C0 00 00 C0	E ° . ° . Å ° . Å . Å . Å
0100	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-A8 F1 29 42 28 E8 FC 27	° ° ° ñ) B (è ü '
0110	70 3D 96 77 32 42 A1 48-1A 45 11 28 8A 4A E5 4A	p = ° w 2 B ; H ° E . (° J Å J
0120	45 84 2A 42 A3 74 53 14-21 23 2A 5C C2 11 09 23	E ° * B ð t S ° ! # * \ Å . ° #
0130	2A 22 A2 74 FE 91 27 7E-F6 72 BF BE 39 A4 04 EF	* ° ° e t p ° ° ~ ° r ; ° 9 M ° i
0140	62 84 8D 6B F9 35 F7 08-52 DA 95 7A F4 08 F4 75	b ° . k u 5 ° + ° R U ° z ô ° ð u
0150	71 D3 44 48 43 8B 68 25-85 47 1A 50 CE 69 F0 5F	q Ô D H C ° h % ° G ° P i i ð _
0160	F9 90 11 2F E9 CD A4 9E-8F EF 04 F5 24 3C C6 9F	ù ° . / ° é í h ° . i ° ð ° < ° E °
0170	1A 2E FD 08 25 3A F5 FA-B1 72 AB 24 3A D2 0B D3	° . y ° % : ° ó ú r « ° \$: ° Ó °
0180	31 80 97 FC 8C DD D7 60-24 24 E4 CF 63 0F D7 0A	l ° . ü ° Y * ° ç ç a i c ° * °
0190	92 09 B9 FC BC 49 63 31-5C 90 5A 92 3F 5F 40 30	° . ° ü ° I c l \ ° Z ° ? ° @
01a0	BE BD E2 92 8F 07 0F 37-21 01 B5 F8 18 50 BD 92	% ° s Å ° 7 ! ° µ ° ° P ° s °
01b0	30 01 D4 12 8C 13 84 54-3A 70 3C 98 8D 94 09 FC	0 ° Ö ° T : p < ° ü
01c0	18 09 AA F8 55 03 FA 06-33 A0 02 6A C6 31 45 4A	° . ° ø U ° ú ° 3 ° j E I E J
01d0	81 B2 28 CD D4 04 62 04-40 B5 D4 32 E3 C1 D4 EB	° ° (í Ö ° b ° µ Ö 2 Å Å Ö ð e
01e0	12 F1 31 12 4B 97 01 B1-FF 20 43 C5 5D 13 DA 77	° ñ l ° K ° ° i y ° Ç Å] ° Ú w
01f0	18 ED 54 E8 05 07 03 A9-50 89 BC 1B 8C 84 96 71	° i T è ° . ° e P ° . ° q

Figure 5: Hidden Prefetch File for Putty using FTK

And the second file, WELCOME2.TXT resulted as seen in Figure 6:




Figure 6: Hidden Prefetch File for Reverse Shell using FTK

They both have an alternate data stream (ADS), exactly how I created them, and the result of running these commands from within the ADS, resulted in creating a Prefetch file within an ADS too! We can prove that these are prefetch files, first by looking at the header (first 3 bytes), which shows the value is MAM. Based on the Prefetch File Format found [here](#), we know that this is for a Windows 10 prefetch file:

As of Windows 10 the PF is stored in compressed form in a MAM file similar to SuperFetch

Again, what happened is, when I ran the EXEs from the ADS of each text file, the system did not generate a normal Prefetch file, but created a file with the same name of the original, and the true prefetch file was inside the ADS of that file. That is the reason why the tools WinPrefetchView and PECmd, were unable to analyze those files, since they are not prefetch files and both of these tools were designed for analyzing prefetch files.

Let's try PECmd again, but by pointing to the file directly "WELCOME.TXT:PUTTY.EXE-A6BB0639.pf" and "WELCOME2.TXT:REVSHELL.EXE-41B5A636.pf". Unfortunately, while trying different ways to run PECmd directly as you can see in the Figure 7 below, I was unable to achieve my goal.

```
Administrator: Command Prompt
C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\Tools>dir /r "W:\Windows\Prefetch\WELCOME.TXT"
Volume in drive W is Windows 10
Volume Serial Number is B009-E7A9

Directory of W:\Windows\Prefetch

05/26/2019  01:41 AM                0 WELCOME.TXT
                6,462 WELCOME.TXT:PUTTY.EXE-A6BB0639.pf:$DATA
                1 File(s)                0 bytes
                0 Dir(s) 28,022,304,768 bytes free

C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\Tools>PECmd.exe -f W:\Windows\Prefetch\WELCOME.TXT\PUTTY.EXE-A6BB0639.pf
File 'W:\Windows\Prefetch\WELCOME.TXT\PUTTY.EXE-A6BB0639.pf' not found. Exiting

C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\Tools>PECmd.exe -f W:\Windows\Prefetch\WELCOME.TXT:PUTTY.EXE-A6BB0639.pf
File 'W:\Windows\Prefetch\WELCOME.TXT:PUTTY.EXE-A6BB0639.pf' not found. Exiting

C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\Tools>
```

Figure 7: Failed Prefetch Analysis using PECmd "Test1"

And the second file as seen in Figure 8:

```
Administrator: Command Prompt
C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\Tools>dir /r W:\Windows\Prefetch\WELCOME2.TXT
Volume in drive W is Windows 10
Volume Serial Number is B009-E7A9

Directory of W:\Windows\Prefetch

05/26/2019  01:41 AM                0 WELCOME2.TXT
                2,703 WELCOME2.TXT:REVSHELL.EXE-41B5A636.pf:$DATA
                1 File(s)                0 bytes
                0 Dir(s) 28,022,304,768 bytes free

C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\Tools>PECmd.exe -f W:\Windows\Prefetch\WELCOME2.TXT\REVSHELL.EXE-41B5A636.pf
File 'W:\Windows\Prefetch\WELCOME2.TXT\REVSHELL.EXE-41B5A636.pf' not found. Exiting

C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\Tools>PECmd.exe -f W:\Windows\Prefetch\WELCOME2.TXT:REVSHELL.EXE-41B5A636.pf
File 'W:\Windows\Prefetch\WELCOME2.TXT:REVSHELL.EXE-41B5A636.pf' not found. Exiting

C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\Tools>
```

Figure 8: Failed Prefetch Analysis using PECmd “Test2”

Not even approaching it as in Figure 9:

```
Administrator: Command Prompt
C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\Tools>PECmd.exe -f \\?\W:\Windows\Prefetch\WELCOME2.TXT\REVSHELL.EXE-41B5A636.pf
File '\\?\W:\Windows\Prefetch\WELCOME2.TXT\REVSHELL.EXE-41B5A636.pf' not found. Exiting
C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\Tools>PECmd.exe -f \\?\W:\Windows\Prefetch\WELCOME2.TXT:REVSHELL.EXE-41B5A636.pf
File '\\?\W:\Windows\Prefetch\WELCOME2.TXT:REVSHELL.EXE-41B5A636.pf' not found. Exiting
```

Figure 9: Failed Prefetch Analysis using PECmd “Test3”

The solution was to extract the alternate data stream from each welcome file and run the tool again. This time, we managed to get the results we expected, as you can see in Figure 10 below:

```
C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\Tools>PECmd.exe -f C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\stealthADS\hidden-prefetch\PUTTY.EXE-A6BB0639.pf
PECmd version 1.2.0.1

Author: Eric Zimmerman (saericzimmerman@gmail.com)
https://github.com/EricZimmerman/PECmd

Command line: -f C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\stealthADS\hidden-prefetch\PUTTY.EXE-A6BB0639.pf

Keywords: temp, tmp

Processing 'C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\stealthADS\hidden-prefetch\PUTTY.EXE-A6BB0639.pf'

Created on: 2019-05-26 08:41:41
Modified on: 2019-05-26 08:41:41
Last accessed on: 2019-05-26 07:43:00

Executable name: WELCOME.TXT:PUTTY.EXE
Hash: A6BB0639
File size (bytes): 30,866
Version: Windows 10

Run count: 1
Last run: 2019-05-26 08:41:32
```

Figure 10: PECmd Results for Hidden Putty Prefetch File (Putty)

And the second hidden prefetch file as seen in Figure 11:

```
C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\Tools>PECmd.exe -f C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\stealthADS\hidden-prefetch\REVSHELL.EXE-41B5A636.pf
PECmd version 1.2.0.1

Author: Eric Zimmerman (saericzimmerman@gmail.com)
https://github.com/EricZimmerman/PECmd

Command line: -f C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\stealthADS\hidden-prefetch\REVSHELL.EXE-41B5A636.pf

Keywords: temp, tmp

Processing 'C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\stealthADS\hidden-prefetch\REVSHELL.EXE-41B5A636.pf'

Created on: 2019-05-26 08:41:57
Modified on: 2019-05-26 08:41:57
Last accessed on: 2019-05-26 07:44:26

Executable name: WELCOME2.TXT:REVSHELL.EXE
Hash: 41B5A636
File size (bytes): 12,020
Version: Windows 10

Run count: 1
Last run: 2019-05-26 08:41:52
```

Figure 11: PECmd Results for Hidden Putty Prefetch File (RevShell)

As you can see, if you just depend on running your tools, then you might miss something, it is always good to sift through the data you have, check stuff manually. I know this takes time, but it will help you make sure you did not miss something. Oh, and before I forget, I'm going to write another post showing how we can detect executables that were launched from alternate data streams could be detected, even if you did not have any event logs configured! More on that later...

So there you go, the post covered how to go under the radar and also how to find this sort of unusual activity.

See you in the next post...

Note(s):

1. Both Putty.exe and RevShell.exe were hidden in a normal ADS and stealth ADS (more on the later in the next post).
2. Both were executed from normal and stealth ADS
3. Putty has a manually injected payload, while RevShell.exe is a normal reverse shell meterpreter.

Good readings:

1. [Forensic Riddle #3 – Answer](#)
2. [“Hidden” Prefetch File Analysis and Alternate Data Sources](#)
3. [Prefetch folder is empty](#)