Correlating Vidar Stealer Build IDs Based on Loader Tasks

insights.loaderinsight.agency/posts/vidar-build-id-correlation/

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By *LIA*
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Botnet Identifiers

When running a botnet, threat actors typically want to group bots together to keep track of campaigns or separate access in the administrative panel between users. This is the case in Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offerings where the malware author is providing threat actors access to existing infrastructure to manage bots and access information specific to their botnets. When a bot contacts its configured command and control (C2) server needs to notify the C2 server to which group/botnet it belongs to.

The type of identifier used to differentiate between the various botnets varies between malware families where SmokeLoader uses a plain string such as `pub1` or `pub2` while other families like Bokbot uses a binary identifier (referred to as `project ID`) which is mapped to a readable string in the backend for the threat actor's convenience. That said, there are families who does not have any identifiers and thus operate as one big botnet.

Vidar stealer uses a 32 byte hexadecimal string which is referred to internally as `build_id`, shown in the below screeshot.



```
POST / HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----DHCGIDHDAKJECBFHCBAA
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:130.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/130.0
Host: 49.12.197.9
Content-Length: 256
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache

------DHCGIDHDAKJECBFHCBAA
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="hwid"

[redacted]
------DHCGIDHDAKJECBFHCBAA
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="build_id"

a669a86f8433a1e88901711c0f772c97
------DHCGIDHDAKJECBFHCBAA--
```

The name hints that a when a threat actor receives a new build from the malware author it comes with a new unique identifier that is mapped to the threat actor's profile in the Vidar backend. This presents a problem from a researcher's perspective as two samples with two different build IDs cannot be grouped together without having access to the Vidar backend. However, with access to historical tasking associated with each `build_id`, it is possible to correlate multiple build IDs over time and build a larger picture of the actor's campaign.

Vidar Build IDs & Lumma Stealer Tasks

During our tracking of Vidar we have gathered data on not only tasks threat actors distribute but also their build IDs making it possible to correlate build IDs with their respective tasks and subsequently tie a group of build IDs to the same threat actor.

At the beginning of October we saw an increased amount of activity with a larger number of build IDs being used. The below graph shows the build IDs and the unique number of payloads that were collected as a result of the tasks that were distributed by threat actors.



Out of the 31 build IDs in the graph, 28 of them demonstrate a pattern where a large amount of unique payloads are distributed. A closer look at the tasks associated with these build IDs showes that only two types of tasks are being distributed, as shown in the below table.

Task URL	Unique Payloads
http://nsdm.cumpar-auto-orice-tip.ro/ldms/a43486128347.exe	63 payloads
http://jask.powerforxes.shop/ldms/a43486128347.exe	68 payloads

The two tasks have resulted in a total of 131 unique payloads, identified by UnpacMe as Lumma Stealer. In addition, the same two tasks have been observed distributed by StealC with botnet identifiers `default` and `us_test`, potentially providing a pivot point in tracking the threat actor in question. The amount of payloads over the course of the campaign suggests that the threat actor likely had automation in place to update the payload as an attempt to evade detection. An example of this type of automation was documented by RussianPanda in connection with DolphinLoader.

Notes From the Trenches

The above insights are made possible by LIA's continuous intelligence collection. We track malware loaders in real time, and over time, producing timely IOCs, and enabling big-picture analysis. All the shared data (and more) is available in the LIA platform for researchers to work with. It is possible to search for botnet identifiers such as Vidar build IDs in LIA which can provide analysts and researchers a glimpse into historical tasks for that have been distributed and subsequently be able to provide more context to an ongoing investigation.

Indicators of Compromise

Lumma Stealer Payloads (SHA256)

SHA256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SHA256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d0c8e84e22df417a0a20578f1adfa1f12720acb9880c599355be82bb0c6659a8
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5403c33d339c9dad1444ad85d86fe8acfc22c8e95c39ca269606210431aa365d
96e22dd2341c0b8c1967aeeaeae7157485cb987c0f82e166f037c35059eeea65
4e33df055827829444910db4e73d33fa9315cc24e0be89467abf8cb2c1fcfb87
2f4fef756205a42d7c431631fcb2f2cd8b336c504b5360b39d81cc52a3a625ec
302de22282260881f8ff0ecfd710943bb6f80418fe63e1607522f84b83a5a40d
7e822f2c628b3919b08d9971d8f32bb03e1944df06ae3e0306975b1609e6f35e

SHA256
b64ac8b37344d0d295fb522c83247aad117a5d963c0bc2d3867f8744d8d34f0a
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503ae54f5e87835c5e96838c63e6bbdfcfb9cad9246375a283074f68af8dcdb4
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9c04149a55f07d041f4abbfd4a1ed84cea5e2cbb47d87399f33c6e3d7f76f228
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SHA256
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SHA256
f44d05e3b61f4690782ce7e72ff24209abeea31013e50dd8233ef9c2e5f3a6a4
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d485784fa9dc14aa2885f703a400b89256caf36fe85a9a5f2c30496bc204af1c
6a1da56f0f9c29264a5537e81d3f90a6785c5ebd36d3428094d66e708bf80c7e
7fa92a341696337fbcf5b0ac834b143373a4aa59afbfa838c0d8e8368568c904
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567383e7b9842a00300af751e9a92a88c8ec1347d5795a0ffb9cc7c488bff51b
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9765a5d34338ac761f08823314d7f9d54fe72e5c98440ce80780c9b49fd5026a
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e8c8996a0fa7dbafa5864502b953c4c0b60dcc189acdcd5d019ae30d411c9375
7137aa46422d4df9531daa8beb0636bb86ac15aacfad74f73ee35155373d2a49
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ab3b23e3154fcf362b142153c5f334b5a565ff85cd59d95b1d498d50d740ed8e
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74d77b22d6fcefb7cb013835fdc25bb67b20f5eef2b2b58df91bf1b3342bcf1e
aceaeb8e3cfce22c78b502938310ead45cf0ce225bc5163d280ef71a27fed91f

SHA256
3133ec7f157cc16c4096df439faceb6995e1e0b5ede3668eadb8cfc24fed98ce
dee89b739072d5bf4c3389e562fe1c8fe63d33ddc8990517f7e8ea5a3c852522
d8e5f380c483313146d4998747db659e530198a9ddfabc47cf87e0562201dd93
917939ceb07cacd6a5960d799d9c4de954a07b93c135b54c39e1fc4a798d1566
d6303a71ac1f6fd6ddeab804764cbcd46fd53f8ec8f258238dd60c0c1f2fca4c
fd8c183d915e1412e491848342473fd26cb6e9543a1679acd15f85bb7f3dafa6
28ac2684af5fc6519b3af6424f5603e0a398ab4422f6b5f05e5d786fc596902e
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1a068d24b243557ed75d71e6d5866ca1a1d6a63fadcd672ddec9e836b83444d2
c07557cc8cf976f2f0d093d193fa1901bd0010261555a7f3624dbead45ad8f9a
6ad1c9a514dd9a2e2213d52f6c943451c9eb8f2a074913fa98c68d644fd3466b

Vidar Build IDs

Build ID
0a6eb69ecac8780e90fe30762716c187
851a571734f99bc6b99c23ec833c0bb8
433cd71b7a2bdd3668a493b00ee95630
0076b6a02eb028dde461f6494f955b49
3c2b9e69b31bab816bc6aaf265216d69

Build ID
514d77849a01ff8ab7dd99d5f0a2e19e
6c8ce6f422a1d9cf34f23d1c2168e754
8b4d47586874b08947203f03e4db3962
bfbc20dd73d4c0ce3af06c489f797a4e
b26735cbe8ca9e75712ffe3aa40c4a60
b74ef0d8ce56e494b0d83e1d5be9dbeb
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8a5f3a9817555d8b0b805aaf007d558d
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