Reversing DISGOMOJI with Malcat like a BOSS

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Cover: BOSS is an Indian-based Linux distribution used by the Indian government

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Introduction

It has been a while since I last wrote an anchored narrative on my substack; the reason for it is that I have been quite busy with my Volexity job. The past year, I was part of the investigation team that led to the discovery of the Ivanti <u>zero-day</u>, and a bit later, the investigation led to the <u>zero-day</u> detection of the Palo Alto GlobalProtect firewalls. In April 20204, ForensicFocus interviewed me about the importance of memory forensics. In June, I

wrote a peer-reviewed <u>article</u> for the IT-Auditor organization, NOREA, about the significance of memory forensics for auditors in determining the maturity of the CyberDefence capabilities of organizations. So, it was a pretty busy time.

But since the beginning of February 2024, I have found a new tool called Malcat, which has made my job much more convenient. It's a binary analysis software for threat analysts and reversers. It provides all the features I need for my daily work, including analyzing malware and creating Yara rules or other detection opportunities. I favor Malcat over disassemblers like IDA or Ghidra because it has many built-in features and fits me like a glove.

Recently, our threat intelligence team published an excellent <u>investigation</u> into a Pakistani threat actor that successfully compromised multiple Linux BOSS systems of the Indian government. BOSS stands for Bharat Operating System Solutions and is a custom version of Linux widely used by the Indian government. The investigation was fascinating, as the Linux GO malware, dubbed DISGOMOJI, listens for new messages in the command channel on the Discord server as the C2 server. Communication with it takes place using an emoji-based protocol. The attacker sends commands to the malware by sending emojis to the command channel, with additional parameters following the emoji where applicable.

This anchored narrative briefly demonstrates some Malcat features on a Go Linux malware sample that these threat actors used. Why this sample? It is a Linux sample and not a Windows sample, highlighting some of the features of Malcat discussed in this article. This anchored narrative is based on a lightning talk about Malcat and DISGOMOJI during a threat meetup at Google/Mandiant I presented in Amsterdam on July 18, 2024. I asked a filled room of threat analysts/reversers (70 or 80 folks) if they were familiar with Malcat, but nobody knew about this tool, and that has to change. Are you interested in the tool's capabilities? Let's go!

Disclaimer: I have no financial interest in the tool; I am just a Malcat fan!

Case Background

The threat actor that developed DISGOMOJI is currently being tracked as UTA0137 and seen as a Pakistani threat actor. After compromising multiple BOSS systems, the threat actors used an old privilege escalation exploit called DirtyPipe to gain root access. NIST tracked the vulnerability under <u>CVE-2022-0847</u>. Once exploited, they would exfiltrate relevant information from the BOSS systems via the DISGOMOJI malware. From an outside perspective, it appears that the cyber maturity of the Indian government has some opportunities, namely vulnerability management, but also the unrestricted access of BOSS users who can connect to Discord services from their network.

What is Malcat?



Screenshot 1: The logo of Malcat

According to its <u>website</u>, Malcat is a feature-rich hexadecimal editor/disassembler for Windows and Linux targeted at IT security professionals. For me, that does not cut it. It is a complete binary analysis platform that can be used in an isolated network without the Internet. Malcat runs natively on Linux and Windows, where its reversing power lies. It's not that great at reversing macOS binaries. One of the things I enjoy is the tremendous amount of binary file support. For example, when you want to reverse a malicious Microsoft installer package, it is natively supported, and you can navigate to the malicious stuff immediately. But here it comes: Malcat has full support from Yara. This means you can use your Yara rule base to determine if rules already cover a piece of malware or if you need to write an intelligent rule to cover the new sample.

Malcat also has built-in Python support, handy for writing a config extractor for certain malware families. A great example of Qakbot can be found <u>here</u>.

Recently, a new feature called Kesakode has been implemented, a remote hash lookup service that checks unpacked malware samples against an indexed library of known malware samples from Malcat and Malpedia. The following information is listed about it on the Malcat website:

"a remote hash lookup service exclusive to Malcat users and tightly integrated inside Malcat's UI. It can be used to match known functions, strings and constant sets against a database of known clean, malware and library files. The Kesakode service can be used in various situation, such as:

- identify unpacked (e.g. a memory/sandbox dump) malware samples
- show similarities shared between malware families
- assist in the creation of better Yara rules

speed up reverse engineering by identifying know libraries / runtime code"

One of the other things I often use in Malcat is the ability to look up pieces of data (bytes or string patterns) in a defined corpus with your own or public repositories of malware samples. I use the samples I encounter in my daily casework and the VXunderground dataset.

Malcat also has code decompilation and built-in support for threat intelligence providers like Intezer, Malware Bazar, VirusTotal, and others.

Malcat has many features, but we will only focus on Transforms today. Transforms is a builtin CyberChef functionality where you can stack recipes and manipulate or convert data to strings.

Who is behind Malcat?

<u>Renaud Tabary</u> is a French person who actively develops Malcat. Since I'm an active user of Malcat, I have been in touch several times. He responded to my questions quickly and fixed a Yara error immediately, where our Yara dataset would match very slowly against a sample.

Malcat into action on DISGOMOJI

The sample we will examine, India_Emerging_Global_Economy, with Malcat, has been uploaded from the Netherlands to VirusTotal since May 2024 and can be found <u>here</u>. As of the writing of this anchored narrative in August 2024, the sample is still not detected by any of the leading anti-virus engines.

	⊘ No security vend	lors flagged this file as malicious	$\hat{\mu}$ Follow \lor C Reanalyz	te 🛃 Download \checkmark 🗢 Similar \checkmark More \checkmark
 ✓ 66 Community Score 	44504a847b36d8c76d India_Emerging_Glob elf 64bits	lbe9e1bdc63fd7e4cac41fa93f392317abfcabdt Ial_Economy	bb6044de	Size Last Analysis Date 5.06 MB 1 month ago
DETECTION DET.	AILS RELATIONS	BEHAVIOR CONTENT TEL	EMETRY COMMUNITY 1	
First seen ① INETHERLANDS 2024-05-07 09:36:44 UT	c	Last seen ①	Distinct submitters ① 1	Total submissions $ \mathbb{O} $ 1
Submissions Uploads of the file being stu	udied. Reanalysis reques	ts do not generate a submission.		
Date	Region	Name		Source
2024-05-07 09:36:44 UTC	NETHERLANDS	India_Emerging_Global_Economy		aa941f15 - community

Screenshot 2: Zero anti-virus detection in August 2024

Now, let's load the sample in Malcat. You can configure Malcat to integrate it into the Explorer context menu.

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Version	0x1										
Reserved	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	_									
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Version	0x1	_	segment3								
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ProgramHeaderOffset	0x40	_	segments								
SectionHeaderOffset	Av100	_									
Flage	0100	_									
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SectionHeaderEntrySize	0x40	_		SpaghettiF	unction(23),	SequentialFunction(50),	HighXrefLoop	pingFunction(72)			
SectionHeaderNum	0x10			entropy: B	igBufferNoXre	fMediumToHighEntropy(19)					
SectionHeaderStringIndex	(0xD		gap	strings: H	ugeStringBase	64, StringBase64(2), Dvn	amicString(4	4), BigStringHiS	core(4)		

Screenshot 3: DISGOMOJI loaded into Malcat

Once you've loaded the sample, you'll see the above screen, where files embedded in the sample will be presented on the left upper side. On the left bottom side, relevant code sections will be displayed. In this example, the sample is not loaded with a custom Yara rule base but only those supported in Malcat. On the top right, you can easily navigate between different tool functionalities. There is a hexadecimal view, assembly, code decompilation, strings, Kesakode, threat intelligence, etc. Malcat also detects strings pushed on the stack during runtime in the strings view and has very decent string support for GO-lang binaries.

During the sample's loading, Malcat also detects relevant anomalies and presents them to the user in the "Anomalies" section of the initial screen. In the screenshot above, "HugeStringBase64" is detected. The anomaly will be displayed on the bottom left screen if you click on it.

HugeStringBase64

strings

keep

string has more than 256 characters and base64 encoding

type	error
category	strings
name	HugeStringBase64
1 location(s)	
<pre>0x006b7f5c (.rodata:82f5c)</pre>	2928 bytes
	7

R N

Screenshot 4: A large block of Base64 is automatically detected

By clicking on the bytes, the entire selection will be displayed in the hexadecimal view, as seen below.

[] files (0 + 0)	_	📧 🔓 🔂 🗇 disgor	moji_sample.mlwr	1) 😋 🕶 🖬 🔚 🔛 i
 ✓ Nirtual File System ✓ A Carved Files 		.rodata 0006b7f5c: .rodata 0006b7f5c: .rodata 0006b7f6c: .rodata 0006b7f8c: .rodata 0006b7f8c: .rodata 0006b7f8c: .rodata 0006b7f6c: .rodata 0006b7f6c: .rodata 0006b7f6c: .rodata 0006b7f6c: .rodata 0006b7f6c: .rodata 0006b7f6c: .rodata 0006b7f6c: .rodata 0006b7801c: .rodata 0006b801c: .rodata 0006b801c: .rodata 0006b801c: .rodata 0006b801c: .rodata 0006b801c: .rodata 0006b801c: .rodata 0006b803c:	43 79 45 76 59 60 6C 75 4C 32 4A 68 63 32 67 49 43 52 37 48 69 39 51 48 33 68 56 66 53 41 57 96 76 63 69 30 85 56 44 52 13 68 53 41 67 49 43 52 43 52 43 51 56 45 44 52 53 15 66 64 47 73 59 54 42 48 52 57 87 69 66 53 41 67 49 43 72 50 43 41 67 49 43 52 43 44 77 50 43 41 67 49 43 52 44 43 42 77 49 45 <th>B TyEvYmlul23hc2gK B TCR7K19QK3hXF5ak B TCR7K19QK3hXF5ak B CCR7K19QK3hXF5ak B QMprXtB91CRCQMIT B QMprXtB91CRCQMIT B TTBRKNsysFsagIDw8 B TCR7QH591CBW1BR7 Q CCR7QH591CBW1BR7 Q CCR1p2nW01xgF5Jy 33 SQnb1x1MbA3NCdc 22 LipUV1dHdFB1a0FB 22 RXmz20V5d2Vv018F 2 LyBvL21k1y8VJYVV QVhahT1mIANxeF8V</th>	B TyEvYmlul23hc2gK B TCR7K19QK3hXF5ak B TCR7K19QK3hXF5ak B CCR7K19QK3hXF5ak B QMprXtB91CRCQMIT B QMprXtB91CRCQMIT B TTBRKNsysFsagIDw8 B TCR7QH591CBW1BR7 Q CCR7QH591CBW1BR7 Q CCR1p2nW01xgF5Jy 33 SQnb1x1MbA3NCdc 22 LipUV1dHdFB1a0FB 22 RXmz20V5d2Vv018F 2 LyBvL21k1y8VJYVV QVhahT1mIANxeF8V
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f(x) code (5185)	+	.rodata 0006b809c:	53 32 46 49 63 55 46 4E 62 6E 46 48 5A 30 45	77 S2 🌮 Magic mask
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name	HugeStringBase64	.rodata 0006b812c:	63 55 46 48 55 55 52 68 61 6B 46 42 52 45 52 4	IF CL BIO Search III Colpus
<pre>= 1 location(s)</pre>		.rodata 0006b813c:	54 6C 68 57 4D 6D 6B 7A 4B 32 56 44 4D 55 4A 6	Download selected url and Analyze
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		.rodata 0006b816c:	56 6B 31 7A 51 31 56 53 61 56 4A 44 61 6A 64	6 Vk Copy Bytes
		.rodata 0006b818c:	59 6C 52 31 5A 6D 68 30 62 6B 64 56 59 6B 74 4	12 Y] Copy as >
		.rodata 0006b819c:	51 58 46 4A 54 30 31 33 61 30 78 4D 56 32 56 3	3 Q C Dump to file
		.rodata 0006b81ac:	55 47 70 6B 51 6E 5A 34 52 30 68 43 64 56 42 3	
		.rodata 0006b81bc:	57 6C 4E 36 61 48 4E 6D 52 6B 74 73 57 6B 39 9	6 W OStatistics
		.rodata 0006b81cc:	52 33 63 32 56 30 70 59 61 60 64 75 40 68 78 1	D Pi AB Transform
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		.rodata 0006b821c:	53 6B 4D 32 57 46 46 69 64 32 46 53 61 30 31 9	A Sk 🛒 Goto end
			7	
			V	

Screenshot 5: Transform the selected base64

Once the bytes have automatically been selected, you can right-click to display Malcat's context menu. In this case, I have chosen Transform because we want to decode the base64-encoded blob.

Sec Transform selection		– 🗆 X
C Transform selection C base C base C compress C co	Transforms chain Preview base64 decode ? automatically_add_padding:	
	٣.	

Screenshot 6: Base64 decode

As you can see in the screenshot above, the selected data is automatically decoded, and you can see a piece of a bash script with some base64 encoded data. Then, you can choose to have the file presented "In Place" or as a "New File." If you enabled your own Yara rule set, the rule set is matched against the new file. In this case I will choose for "New File".

Walcat Professional - transformed [#2b7f5c-#2b8acc]		- 0 ×
File Edit Analysis View Help		
[_] files (0 + 0)	- 💽 🔓 📴 transformed [#2b7f5c-#2b8acc]	1) G - O - D 2 2 5 6 6 6 8 6 8 6 8 6 7
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	1 #1/bin/bash 2 \${^/Pexi} \${t^c*RQCW/Ajk_0}\$\$RASH \${*//cDVR5/a07E\}} <<< "\${ §§ \${g^c*}} 2 \${_{1}poDTFBMSTTMG5FukAAEtfgEbsf/v/+///94/MS/a07E\}} <<< "\${ §§ \${g^c*}} 2 \${_{1}poDTFBMSTTMG5FukAAEtfgEbsf/v/+///94/MS/a07E\}} <	<pre>} p*\${@##?3U;\`}~ri\$'n\u8074'\f ekn6K2NUHDIDNEGh02XANHq3Y05QiGinqn6BTIPKaHqAHnq6gA0NAANHB6B3JqR dxqakonq4Q0p34D4D0NX0213+CEISHnbH7Z-ZVUILL+218q591KEIn=hmH7pC6F NJX}7A2LfYNnHparlivCvBQLHJq2ISNL4LpPCYNnjFICSQDynARdFVASHpmd3 agJ\u00e3CyANTTArk/X6SLL4LggANNhAFG2BAFAB5V17EFXBATKYryPHRija gynahard5s4JpnvgHrm1PwcVbvC5BffaH8J72F7FXFTC15654PJA685076gD MgUsq47bH6BAFG1TI/vS65QiDH10VJ4704cLf597FXHq2VFXH7F1F41E121E01 F0511231260C4WTVD1F9H16D141CV05SFf4H85v17F2FXH7FH7Hig1F1E12E01 F0511231260C4WTVD1F9H16D141EV05SF7H6H027745LWF3F4EK2CDH9I mSEsecC52+H0001519140D14854J9EinpV6F15Q0J9H745540UFF15Q02HE15g05ALEj81MRAANK 6c558F5w0cLC4cLfYzmkcyDkde4v0PE1JeuHgcK4RXjmL801CrXJg0mb7UH605 C558F5w0cLC4cLfYzmkcyDkde4v0PE1JeuHgcK4RXjmL801CrXJg0mb7UH605 C558F5w0cLC4cLfYzmkcyDkde4v0PE1JeuHgcK4RXjmL801CrXH01504 C558F5w0cLC4cLfYzmkcyDkde4v0PE1JeuHgcK4RXjmL801CrXH01504 C558F5w0cLC4cLfYzmkcyDkde4v0PE1JeuHgcK4RXjmL801CrXH050 C558F5w0cLC4cLfYzmkcyDkde4v0PE1JeuHgcK4RXjmL801CrXH015 D7 **{6}{0} ***********************************</pre>
	× ۲	

Screenshot 7: Transformed file in Malcat

If you examine the obfuscated bash script, you'll see that it's base64 encoded data which is then piped against "bu""'n'zip". Let's select the base64 data and transform it once more.

Sec Transform selection			- 🗆 X
Q base	Transforms chain Preview Auto preview	51 6C 70 6F 4F 54 46 42 57 53 5A 54 57 57 47 74	Q1poOTFBWSZTWWGt
Compress Compre	Transforms chain Preview base64 decode automatically_add_padding: ignore_invalid_characters:	51 6C 70 6F 4F 54 46 42 57 53 5A 54 57 57 47 74 150 75 66 14 14 45 74 66 67 45 52 77 66 27 76 27 12 27 27 27 27 39 71 27 27 27 27 28 55 41 58 5A 160 39 46 16 45 17 78 44 56 49 37 59 47 75 47 75 47 18 2F 2F 2F 2F 27 39 71 2F 27 27 27 28 55 41 58 64 91 50 54 15 65 66 61 36 44 61 65 17 78 71 48 66 68 30 43 65 68 66 23 64 61 53 56 65 13 53 51 69 47 69 67 21 66 67 32 66 41 44 44 55 47 61 66 47 69 66 71 66 73 44 11 44 44 45 47 152 45 23 46 41 11 41 44 64 75 27 66 66 17 16 65 36 71 66 28 71 62 55 41 41 61 41 41 41 42 55 34 64 14 13 44 44 64 55 14 63 71 61 55 34 64 14 30 47 60 66 28 71 62 55 41 41 61 44 14 14 44 55 53 46 41 41 41 44 64 51 51 46 45 76 66 66 71 66 71 46 66 79 41 40 51 44 54 54 43 53 46 56 68 79 41 41 41 47 52 76 68 61 42 68 44 94 56 69 52 43 44 64 51 44 64 54 46 45 64 54 35 43 65 68 39 48 65 68 77 11 62 55 32 66 73 71 61 48 67 66 71 41 47 51 47 51 44 49 46 56 56 52 33 69 33 28 65 43 31 42 66 68 60 46 60 37 5A 72 55 A7 56 66 87 46 65 77 59 6A 64 42 76 78 47 48 42 75 59 77 5A 53 7A Input size: 1896 bytes 10 0ut 42 5A 66 39 31 41 59 26 53 59 61 AJ 36 26 90 69 60 69 68 54 34 64 76 75 75 75 96 A6 44 27 67 76 47 48 42 75 59 77 5A 53 7A Input size: 1896 bytes 0 0ut 42 5A 66 39 31 41 59 26 53 59 61 AJ 36 26 90 69 60 60 60 60 67 54 61 73 64 72 64 74 64 44 44 64 64 84 66 86 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66	QlpoTFBWSZTWME PukAAEtEREKF/// +////94///+UAXZ mond2x0XTYGULB JKajQxqKfk0ckn6 k2NUN1DIDNEGho2k ANHqaYmgSQlGidnqn GBT1PKaHqAMnqGgA AOGM1+qbUAAAAAB QNAAANNBOSIQRESN AOGM1+qbUAAAAAB AAGMTAJXAAAGRpkaBhO LERCNYMPKHTQOI anhkyAAAGRpkaBhO LERCNYMPKHTQOI anhkyAAAGRpkaBhO LERCNYMPKHTQOI anhkyAAAGRJSADDNHXV 213+eC18fhmHm7ZT ZVUILL218g5NKE Im+DHHPCGF/1VMs CURIRCJ7UDTuftht QUBKAAQTONVKLLLW wPjdBvXGHBuPWZSZ Put size: 1421 bytes BZh91AV&SYaj30 K_CDPOV PI 4/bulCLAB+J SdC-bA-MgJ1-6cf PJQ+∈ fniefi &b2x0g]c4cz* ch I KaSig0Jc4cz* ch H Bhd& +dhtC H= 4cII: 6/64660 4ff7-mx-Awile/k
outor accounty		73 E9 08 41 7F 95 53 2C 09 44 62 44 28 F8 51 B4 EE 7E 1B 67 19 46 CA 09 0A 88 38 CC 24 2C B5 9E C0 F8 DD 06 FC 46 1C 18 8F C1 94 B3 86 C7 C5 2A 56 4E 52 99 68 CA A9 4C A9 C7 10 CC 66 3A 55 95 E3 EE 70 88 7F 23 6F 9C 7A 6C AF 58 AF B3 F8 B4	505AΔΔδS,ODbD(√Q ε∧eg↓F [⊥] 268↓S, †8 L° ↑∩FL∈Å [⊥] ö å +* VNRÖk [⊥] -L- ++1:X∂ πε}ĭΔ#ofz1×X √
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neip	7		1 0 11 - 11

Screenshot 8: BZip2 header revealed

Now, we can see that after decoding the base64, the data is still encoded, but it is now bzip2 compressed data, as the header starts with "BZh9". The next step would be decompressing the data with another Transform in Malcat.

AB SAC Transform selection			- 🗆 X
Q deco	Transforms chain Preview Auto preview	51 6C 70 6F 4F 54 46 42 57 53 5A 54 57 57 47 74	QlpoOTFBWSZTWWGt
V = comproso		50 75 6B 41 41 45 74 66 67 45 52 77 66 2F 76 2F	PukAAEtfgERwf/v/
Compress	🖍 base64 decode 🛛 😯 🚺 💟 🗙	28 2F 2F 2F 2F 2F 39 71 2F 2F 2F 2F 2B 55 41 58 5A	+////9q////+UAX2
hz2 decompress	automatically add padding:	40 48 61 60 51 78 71 48 66 68 30 43 65 68 66 36	1KajOvoKfk0Cekn6
La lzma decompress	automatically_add_padding.	6B 32 4E 55 4E 6C 44 31 44 4E 45 47 68 6F 32 6B	k2NUN1D1DNEGho2k
Iznt1 compress	ignore invalid characters:	41 4E 48 71 61 59 6D 51 53 51 69 47 69 6E 71 6E	ANHgaYmQSQiGingn
Iznt1 decompress		36 42 54 31 50 4B 61 48 71 41 4D 6E 71 47 67 41	6BT1PKaHqAMnqGgA
Izo compress		30 4E 41 41 41 4E 4E 42 6F 42 4A 71 52 45 53 4E	ØNAAANNBoBJqRESN
Lzo decompress	V	41 30 47 6D 68 2B 71 62 55 41 41 61 41 41 41 42	A0Gmh+qbUAAaAAAB
zlib decompress	🔓 bz2 decompress 🛛 ? 🔨 🚺 💽 🗶	6B 41 41 41 44 6D 6D 49 79 4D 6D 6D 54 51 44 49	kAAADmmIyMmmTQDI
✓ = encoding		61 4D 68 6B 79 41 41 41 47 52 70 6B 61 42 68 44	aMnkyAAAGRpkaBhD
A) base64 decode	// no parameter	49 45 09 52 45 4E 4D 51 4E 45 4E 4A 55 45 05 0D	0Kekvehil2e0vezHe
{} hex decode		6F 71 41 47 51 44 61 64 41 41 44 44 4F 4F 58 56	ngAGODajAADDNNXV
E list decode		32 69 33 28 65 43 31 42 66 68 6D 4E 6D 37 54 72	2i3+eC1BfhmNm77r
✓ = text / scripts		5A 76 55 31 74 4C 2B 32 6C 38 71 53 39 31 4B 45	ZvU1tL+218aS91KE
G rot13		31 6D 2B 44 6D 48 50 70 43 30 46 2F 6C 56 4D 73	1m+DmHPpC0F/1VMs
		43 55 52 69 52 43 6A 37 55 62 54 75 66 68 74 6E	CURiRCj7UbTufhtn
		47 55 62 4B 41 41 71 49 4F 4D 77 6B 4C 4C 57 65	GUbKAAqIOMwkLLWe
		77 50 6A 64 42 76 78 47 48 42 75 50 77 5A 53 7A	wPjdBvxGHBuPwZSz
		Input size: 1896 bytes	
		V Ou	tput size: 3879 bytes
		0A 23 20 44 65 66 69 6E 65 20 66 69 6C 65 20 6E	S# Define file n
		61 6D 65 73 0A 76 6D 63 6F 72 65 69 6E 66 6F 4E	amessvmcoreinfoN
		61 6D 65 3D 22 76 6D 63 6F 72 65 69 6E 66 6F 22	ame="vmcoreinfo"
		0A 75 65 76 65 6E 74 53 63 72 69 70 74 4E 61 6D	SueventScriptNam
		65 3D 22 47 54 4B 2D 54 68 65 6D 65 2D 50 61 72	e="GTK-Theme-Par
		73 65 2E 73 68 22 0A 77 61 6E 43 6F 6E 66 4E 61	se.sh"@wanConfNa
		6D 65 3D 22 57 61 6E 5F 43 6F 6E 66 22 0A 63 6F	me="Wan_Conf"Eco
		72 65 44 65 73 68 74 6F 70 46 69 6C 65 3D 22 47	reDesktopFile="G
×		4E 4F 4D 45 5F 45 6F 72 65 2E 64 65 75 6D 74 6F	nume_core.deskto
< >		65 3D 22 47 4F 4F 4D 45 5F 47 4F 55 2F 64 65 73	e="GNOME_GNU.des
		6B 74 6F 70 22 0A 0A 23 20 44 65 66 69 6E 65 20	ktop"38# Define
Decompress a stream using bzip2		64 69 72 65 63 74 6F 72 69 65 73 0A 74 61 72 67	directoriesstarg
		65 74 44 69 72 3D 22 24 48 4F 4D 45 2F 2E 78 38	etDir="\$HOME/.x8
		36 5F 36 34 2D 6C 69 6E 75 78 2D 67 6E 75 22 0A	6_64-linux-gnu"E
		61 75 74 6F 73 74 61 72 74 44 69 72 3D 22 24 48	autostartDir="\$H
		4F 4D 45 2F 2E 63 6F 6E 66 69 67 2F 61 75 74 6F	OME/.config/auto
1		73 74 61 72 74 22 0A 63 6F 6E 66 69 67 44 69 72	start SconfigDir
View python file compress.pv		DU 22 24 48 4F 4U 45 2F 2E 53 6F 6E 66 69 67 22	= pHUME/.config"
Halp		74 68 3D 22 24 48 4F 4D 45 2F 2E 57 50 41 5F 43	th="\$HOME/.WPA C
пер	7		
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Screenshot 9: The final bash payload is displayed in Malcat

As you can see in the screenshot above, you can stack decoding recipes just like in CyberChef. Malcat also provides Transform functionality for AES and RC4 decoding, for example. The next step is to display the entire configuration of the DISGOMOJI malware.



Screenshot 10: The final payload configuration of DISGOMOJI

With a few simple actions, Malcat transforms data to display the final configuration of the DISGOMOJI malware. Let's briefly zoom in on some of the features if you customize Malcat with your Yara rule set.

Yara rule sets enabled

Malcat's documentation clearly describes how you can leverage your own Yara rule set. I have configured the rule set on my host system to update it with new Yara rules.

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			Metadata				
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			network		apt_malware	_golang_tj_loader_may24	
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v code (5185)		gap			susp golane	strinned build id	
LF 0x004 ELF Magic	00000 kee	p .rodata (967.1 KB)			general_elf		_url
Class	ELFCLASS64						- 2
DataEncoding	LSB	segment3			susp_elt_ob	fuscated_strings	
Version	0x1	.typelink			compiler		
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Туре	EXEC	segment3			Golang		
Machine	AMD x86-64						
Version	0x1						
Entry Descention	0x400500	-					
Programmeaderottset	0.100	.gopclntab	Anonalia				
Flags	01190	(1.5 MB)	Anomalies				7 A
Fldgs	0×10		code: XorInLoon(24	3). StackArravInitialisationX6	4(3), ManyUniqueTmmedi	ateBytes(24), ManyHighVa	lueImme
ProgramHeaderEntryCize	9×38	-	SpaghettiFunction(23), SequentialFunction(50), H	lighXrefLoopingFunction	(72)	
ProgramHeaderNum	9×6	-	entropy: BigBuffer	NoXrefMediumToHighEntropy(19)			
SectionHeaderEntrySize	0x40	gap	strings: HugeStrin	gBase64, StringBase64(2), Dyna	micString(44), BigStri	ngHiScore(6)	
SectionHeaderNum	0,10	.go.buildin					
SectionWeaderStringToday	0x10	.noptrdata	Report				

Screenshot 11: Own Yara dataset enabled

Once I have enabled the custom Yara rule base, all relevant detections will be displayed in the "Other" view under "Yara signatures," as seen in the screenshot above.

Corpus lookup

Another feature I would like to share is the ability to look up relevant strings or byte patterns of a new sample against a corpus of malware samples.

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Screenshot 12: Configuration of the Malware Corpus

In the screenshot above, you can see that I have enabled the VXUnderground dataset and my own dataset.

ng		Address		Danger	Туре	Codec	Tag
ync/mutex/wait/total:seco	onds	0x006ac7d9 (.rodata:777d9)		_	META	Ascii	PAT
c/heap/objects:objects		0x006a9ca5	(.rodata:74ca5)		META	Ascii	PAT
ched/latencies:seconds		0x006a9cbd	(.rodata:74cbd)		META	Ascii	PAT
s: unsupported certificate:	pev, expected ed25519.PrivateKey	0x006b746c	(.rodata:8246c)		META	Ascii	
c/stack/starting-size:byte	s	0x006ac07c	(.rodata:7707c)		META	Ascii	PAT
c/heap/tiny/allocs:objects	2	0v006ab895	(.rodata:76895)		META	Ascii	PAT
c/heap/allocs-by-si	"main.downloadFile.deferwrap2"		.rodata:7705f)		META	Ascii	PAT
ain.downloadFile.de			trings.symtab>+287cf)	apt malr may24	SCAN	Ascii	
ched/gomaxprocs:t	Open string		(.rodata:75327)	/	META	Ascii	PAT
ain.downloadFile.de	Open string in new tab		trings.symtab>+287ec)	apt malr mav24	SCAN	Ascii	
ain.downloadFile.de	Dump string		(.gopcIntab:3551d)	apt malr may24	SCAN	Ascii	
roc/sys/kernel/host	out in string		(.rodata:75133)		META	Ascii	PA
c/scan/globals:byte	Search in current file		rodata:73ff7)		META	Ascii	PA
ain.downloadFile.de	Search in corpus		(.gopcIntab:3553a)	apt malr may24	SCAN	Ascii	
c/heap/frees-by-siz			(.rodata:76879)		META	Ascii	PA
/gc/heap/allocs:objec Download and Analyze			(.rodata:746bd)		META	Ascii	PA
c/scan/stack:bytes 🥒	Vara rule ant malware golang ti loader m	av24 >	(.rodata:733a5)		META	Ascii	PA
intime.main init do 👗	A LEAST AND A LEAS		trings.symtab>+2b428)	susp golbuild id	SCAN	Ascii	
c/scan/total:bytes	Add string to Yara	>	(.rodata:733b9)	120 2	META	Ascii	PA
flectlite.Set	Copy String		(.rodata:71877)		META	Ascii	PA
IIThreadsSyscall6 r	copy string		(.rodata:81461)		META	Ascii	
vpto/rand: blocked	Copy as	>	.rodata:81fd3)		META	Ascii	
c/heap/allocs:bytes 🕀	Quick view		(.rodata:7393b)		META	Ascii	PA
tp2: Transport rece	6		(.rodata:812c9)		META	Ascii	
c/gomemlimit:bytes 🛡	Statistics		(.rodata:733e1)		META	Ascii	PA
c/gogc:percent AB	Transform		(.rodata:71bcb)		META	Ascii	PA
s: certificate RSA k			.rodata:81af9)		META	Ascii	
nsolicited response	Apply last transform chain		(.rodata:81b43)		META	Ascii	
c/heap/frees:object	Scripting	>	(.rodata:7400d)		META	Ascii	PA
b/time/zoneinfo.zip			(.rodata:73de7)		META	Ascii	PA
c/pauses:seconds	Select		.rodata:726df)		META	Ascii	PA
5.4.5 🛪	Goto		(.rodata:6f4d6)		META	Ascii	IF
509: certificate relie 🛄	Cata and		(.rodata:8179a)		META	Ascii	
ntime: internal erroi 🏹	Goto ena		(.rodata:80ab7)		META	Ascii	
tc/services		0x006a5cb1	(.rodata:70cb1)		META	Ascii	PA
tc/protocols		0x006a6178	(.rodata:71178)		META	Ascii	PA
package net: cgo resolv	er norted; using Go's DNS resolverna	0x006b641d	(.rodata:8141d)		META	Ascii	

Whenever you find interesting strings or byte patterns that you want to check against your configured malware corpora, you can select the strings and select "Search in corpus" via the context menu of Malcat. If a sample is matched, it will be displayed in the search results.

Conclusion

I have highlighted some of Malcat's great functionalities in this anchored narrative based on a known DISGOMOJI sample we encountered in an active breach of the Indian government by Pakistani hackers. If you cannot find your way in IDA or Ghidra, Malcat might be yours. It will also increase the quality of your Yara signature writing as it has some great features I have not yet highlighted. Malcat is a time saver as it drastically improved my static analysis speed.

I will update you on the Bhima Koregaon case in the subsequent anchored narrative. The defendants are still in jail because a hacker group dubbed ModifiedElephant planted manipulated digital evidence on their computers.

A la prochaine!

Thanks for reading Anchored Narratives on Threat Intelligence and Geopolitics! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.

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