QakBOT v5 Deep Malware Analysis

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May 26, 2024



17 minute read

Meet Qakbot

QakBot, also recognized as QBot, QuackBot, and Pinkslipbot, has been operational for years, initially as a financial malware targeting governments and businesses for financial fraud by pilfering user credentials and keystrokes.

Over time, it has evolved into a malware dropper, spreading sensitive information to other network systems. The threat group has updated its code-base to support 64-bit versions of Windows, enhanced encryption algorithms, and added further obfuscation techniques. With the release of Qakbot version 5.0, the string encryption algorithm underwent a significant change. While strings are still encrypted using a simple XOR key, the key is no longer hard-coded in the data section. Instead, it is encrypted with AES.

Technical in Points

- 1. Qakbot uses API hashing to hide its imports. It uses CRC32 hashing, along with another layer of XORing with a hard-coded key. It's parsing the loaded DLLs in memory and getting its export tables. As a result, Qakbot can resolve imported APIs and build its IAT.
- 2. Qakbot comes with encrypted strings inside the **.data section**, These strings <u>are encrypted using a</u> <u>XOR key and that key is encrypted using AES algorithm</u>.
- 3. Environment Detection: Qakbot includes checks to detect if it is running in a virtual machine or sandbox environment, commonly used tools for malware analysis. If such conditions are detected, Qakbot may change its behavior or terminate itself to avoid detection.
- 4. **Configuration Extraction:** Qakbot comes with **AES** encrypted configuration. This configuration contains details related to the malicious campaign and the C2 which the malware will communicate with for further commands.
- 5. **C2 Communication**: After extracting its C2, Qakbot establishes a connection with its C2 servers to receive commands for downloading, executing additional modules, updating configuration values, and exfiltrating gathered information from the infected system.
- 6. Qakbot gathers comprehensive information about the compromised host to send to its C2 server and create a unique victim fingerprint. This includes OS version, domain trusts, computer name, username, screen resolution, system time, system uptime, and bot uptime. It mainly relies on Windows Management Instrumentation(WMI) to collect details such as hardware ID, installed languages, and installed programs.

SHA-256	af6a9b7e7aefeb903c76417ed2b8399b73657440ad5f8b48a25cfe5e97ff868f
File type	Win DLL
Target Machine	x64
Creation Time	2024-01-29 13:43:37 UTC
First Seen In The Wild	2024-02-07 10:12:50 UTC

Sample Basic Information

56	() 56/72 security vendors and 2 sandboxes flagged this file as malici	ous	C Reanalyze \implies Similar \lor More \lor
Af6a9b7e7aefeb903c76417ed2b8399b73657440ad5f8b48a25cfe5e97ff868f unknown pedl detect-debug-environment long-sleeps idle calls-wm 64bits che			Size Last Modification Date 169.00 KB a moment ago
DETECTION DETAILS RELATIONS BEHAVIOR COMMUNITY 8			
Join our Community a	nd enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections, plus	an API key to <u>automate checks.</u>	
Popular threat label 🤅) trojan.qbot/qakbot Threat categories trojan	banker	Family labels qbot qakbot bdvl
Security vendors' analy	rsis ①		Do you want to automate checks?
		Alibaba	() TrojanBanker:Win64/BankerX.99de6d32
AhnLab-V3	() Trojan/Win.Qakbot.C5567480	Alibaba	O Tojanbanker.wino4/banker.s5deod52
AhnLab-V3 AliCloud	(†) Trojan/Win.Qakbot.C5567480 (†) Trojan[stealer]:Win/Qbot.K	ALYac	Trojan.Agent.QakBot
AliCloud	() Trojan[stealer]:Win/Qbot.K	ALYac	() Trojan.Agent.QakBot
AliCloud Antiy-AVL	Trojan[stealer]:Win/Qbot.K Trojan/Win64.Qbot	ALYac Arcabit	Trojan.Agent.QakBot Trojan.Generic.D452ADB3
AliCloud Antiy-AVL Avast	Trojan[stealer]:Win/Qbot.K Trojan/Win64.Qbot Win32:Agent-BDVL [Trj]	ALYac Arcabit AVG	Trojan.Agent.QakBot Trojan.Generic.D452ADB3 Win32:Agent-BDVL [Trj]
AliCloud Antiy-AVL Avast Avira (no cloud)	Trojan[stealer]:Win/Qbot.K Trojan/Win64.Qbot Win32:Agent-BDVL [Trj] TR/Qbot.uumtf	ALYac Arcabit AVG BitDefender	Trojan.Agent.QakBot Trojan.Generic.D452ADB3 Win32:Agent-BDVL [Trj] Trojan.GenericKD.72527283

Figure(1): sample on VirusTotal

Anti Analysis

API Resolution

QakBot uses Windows API Hashing (Dynamic API Resolution) to evade signature-based anti-malware scanners and make static analysis harder.

	rd_180024F20 dd 47A53C64h	; DATA XREF: DllEntryPoint+7	1	_QWORD *mw_build_IAT()
0000000180024F20				
0000000180024F24				_QWORD *result; // rax
0000000180024F28				
0000000180024F2C			95	<pre>qword_18002B0D8 = mw_api_resolving(&dword_180024DD0, 664i64, 5u);</pre>
0000000180024F30	dd 9358E22Ch		0 6	<pre>qword_18002B158 = mw_api_resolving(dword_180025020, 128i64, 9u);</pre>
0000000180024F34			07	<pre>qword_18002B118 = mw_api_resolving(dword_180025070, 224i64, 0xFu);</pre>
0000000180024F38			8	<pre>qword_18002B148 = mw_api_resolving(dword_1800250E8, 72i64, 3u);</pre>
0000000180024F3C	dd 0B1CCAA4h		9	<pre>qword_18002B130 = mw_api_resolving(dword_180025110, 48i64, 8u);</pre>
0000000180024F40			0 10	<pre>qword_18002B0D0 = mw_api_resolving(dword_180024F20, 464i64, 0);</pre>
0000000180024F44	dd 4E99887Dh		0 11	<pre>qword_18002B150 = mw_api_resolving(dword_180025130, 96i64, 0xDu);</pre>
0000000180024F48	dd 2FD5FB50h	Encrypted API hashes	0 12	<pre>qword_18002B100 = mw_api_resolving(dword_180025168, 16i64, 0xCu);</pre>
0000000180024F4C	dd 0ED386008h		0 13	<pre>qword_18002B138 = mw_api_resolving(dword_180025174, 8i64, 0x10u);</pre>
0000000180024F50	dd 43810B02h		0 14	<pre>result = mw_api_resolving(dword_180025180, 32i64, 0x13u);</pre>
0000000180024F54			0 15	<pre>qword_18002B0F0 = result;</pre>
0000000180024F58			0 16	
0000000180024F5C	dd 8F66A2DDh		0 17	}
0000000180024F60	dd 23815A24h			
0000000180024F64	dd 8B8CE6CBh			
0000000180024F68				
0000000180024F6C				
0000000180024F70	dd 7D0C637Dh			
0000000180024F74	dd 64D64A81h			
0000000180024F78	dd 45F6F9A1h			
0000000180024F7C	dd 0A75F15Fh			
0000000180024F80	dd 4FCFEE12h			
0000000180024F84				
0000000180024F88				
0000000180024F8C	dd 67F38053h			
0000000180024F90	dd 0F2A8BF53h			
0000000180024F94	dd 3E184424h			
0000000180024F98	dd 0A423597Eh			
000000180024F9C	dd 0F2226C9Ch			
0000000180024FA0	dd @F9@23A79h			

Figure(2): API hashes

We can see based on algorithm constants that Qakbot uses the CRC32 hash algorithm, also there is another layer of XORing, and here are the steps in some detail :

The DIIName is decrypted by XORing with a hard-coded key 0xA235CB91. After decryption, a handle to the DLL is obtained. This handle is then passed to a function that iterates over the DLL's exported functions. A function resolves the addresses of the exports by iterating over the export table of the module, hashing the name of each export using CRC32, and comparing the result with a hard-coded CRC32 hash to determine if it has found the correct address.




Figure(3): API resolving Steps

With knowledge of the algorithm name and XOR key, we can use the awesome <u>hashdb</u> plugin from OALabs that performs string hash lookup against a remote database.

	ptr_AdjustTokenPrivileges dd AdjustTokenPrivileges_0
180024F28	ptr_SetEntriesInAclA dd SetEntriesInAclA_0
180024F2C	<pre>ptr_AllocateAndInitializeSid dd AllocateAndInitializeSid_0</pre>
180024F30	ptr_FreeSid dd FreeSid_0
180024F34	ptr_RegOpenKeyExA dd RegOpenKeyExA_0
	<pre>ptr_RegQueryValueExA dd RegQueryValueExA_0</pre>
180024F3C	ptr_RegCloseKey dd RegCloseKey_0
180024F40	<pre>ptr_ConvertSidToStringSidA dd ConvertSidToStringSidA_0</pre>
180024F44	<pre>ptr_ConvertSidToStringSidW dd ConvertSidToStringSidW_0</pre>
	<pre>ptr_RegCreateKeyA dd RegCreateKeyA_0</pre>
	<pre>ptr_RegSetValueExA dd RegSetValueExA_0</pre>
	ptr_RegLoadKeyW dd RegLoadKeyW_0
180024F54	ptr_RegUnLoadKeyW dd RegUnLoadKeyW_0
	ptr_OpenSCManagerW dd OpenSCManagerW_0
180024F5C	<pre>ptr_CreateServiceW dd CreateServiceW_0</pre>
180024F60	ptr_StartServiceW dd StartServiceW_0
	<pre>ptr_DeleteService dd DeleteService_0</pre>
180024F68	<pre>ptr_CloseServiceHandle dd CloseServiceHandle_0</pre>
180024F6C	ptr_CryptAcquireContextA dd CryptAcquireContextA_0
180024F70	ptr_CryptCreateHash dd CryptCreateHash_0
180024F74	ptr_CryptHashData dd CryptHashData_0
180024F78	<pre>ptr_CryptVerifySignatureA dd CryptVerifySignatureA_0</pre>
180024F7C	<pre>ptr_CryptReleaseContext dd CryptReleaseContext_0</pre>
180024F80	ptr_CryptDestroyKey dd CryptDestroyKey_0
	ptr_CryptDestroyHash dd CryptDestroyHash_0
180024F88	ptr_CryptDeriveKey dd CryptDeriveKey_0
180024F8C	ptr_CryptSetKeyParam dd CryptSetKeyParam_0
	ptr_CryptEncrypt dd CryptEncrypt_0
180024F94	ptr_CryptDecrypt dd CryptDecrypt_0
	ptr_CryptGetHashParam dd CryptGetHashParam_0
	ptr_EqualSid dd EqualSid_0
180024FA0	<pre>ptr_LookupAccountSidW dd LookupAccountSidW_0</pre>

Once the HashDB plugin decrypts all API names, we create structures to store the API lists from each DLL. This simplifies our workflow and make our life easier while analysis .




Figure(5): populated IAT

Defeating encrypted Strings

Qakbot strings are obfuscated, making the analysis more difficult, so the next step is to decrypt them.

Decryption routine

This version decrypts the strings with an XOR key just like the earlier versions but this XOR key is encrypted using the AES algorithm.



It first Calculates a SHA256 hash for aes_key_ref and uses the calculated hash as the AES Key then decrypts the enc_xor_key blob using AES in CBC mode to have the dec_xor_key.



Figure(6): The XOR key decryption process

The final step is to use the dec_xor_key to decrypt the string array.



<u>Figure(7)</u>: <u>String decryption process</u> Writing a decryption script

We now can write an IDAPython script to decrypt the strings and add comments to the code, making analysis easier here are some notes before the script :

- The first 16 bytes of the enc_xor_key are used as the AES IV.
- There are two encrypted string tables used.
- There are two decryption functions with 4 wraps.
- The wrap function decrypts the string array and selects the string based on an index [the only argument].



Figure(8): Index pattern used in script

```
#-----#
import hashlib
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto.Util.Padding import unpad
import idautils
#-----#
def hex_to_int(x):
   if type(x) == int :
       return x
   return (int(x[:-1], 16))
def search_by_index(table , ind):
   return(table[ind:].split('\x00')[0])
#----- IDA pv -----#
def read_data_ida(address,size):
  data = idc.get_bytes(address, size)
 return data
def set_comment(address, text):
   idc.set_cmt(address, text,0)
#----- Decryption -----#
def calculate_sha256(input_data):
   sha256 hash = hashlib.sha256()
   sha256_hash.update(input_data)
   hash_hex = sha256_hash.digest()
   return hash hex
def aes_decrypt(ciphertext, key, iv):
   cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
   plaintext = cipher.decrypt(ciphertext)
   unpadded_plaintext = unpad(plaintext, AES.block_size)
   return unpadded_plaintext
def xor_decrypt(data,key):
 dec_data = ''
  for i in range(len(data)):
     dec_data += chr(data[i] ^ key[i % len(key)])
  return dec_data
def full_dec(enc_str , enc_xor_key , aes_key_init):
   aes_key = calculate_sha256(aes_key_init)
   dec_xor_key = aes_decrypt(enc_xor_key[16:], aes_key, enc_xor_key[:16])
   dec_str = xor_decrypt(enc_str,dec_xor_key)
   return dec_str
#----- Decrypt enc str tbl 1 -----#
enc_str_1 , enc_xor_key_1 , aes_key_init_1 = read_data_ida(0x1800297A0 , 0x1836) ,
read_data_ida(0x18002AFE0,0xA0) , read_data_ida(0x180029700,0x9F) #read our data .
tbl_1 = full_dec(enc_str_1, enc_xor_key_1, aes_key_init_1)
#----- Decrypt enc str tbl 2 -----#
enc_str_2 , enc_xor_key_2 , aes_key_init_2 = read_data_ida(0x1800282A0 , 0x5AD) ,
\label{eq:read_data_ida(0x1800281C0,0xD0) \ , \ read_data_ida(0x180028150,0x63) \ \#read \ our \ data \ .
tbl_2 = full_dec(enc_str_2, enc_xor_key_2, aes_key_init_2)
#--> pattern used: mov ecx , immediate_val
def do_magic(table,references):
   for ref in references:
       prev_instruction_address = idc.prev_head(ref)
       if (idc.print_insn_mnem(prev_instruction_address) == 'mov' and
idc.print_operand(prev_instruction_address,0) == 'ecx' and
idc.get_operand_type(prev_instruction_address,1) == 5):
           ind = print_operand(prev_instruction_address,1)
           set_comment(ref,search_by_index(table,hex_to_int(ind)))
       else :
           prev_instruction_address = idc.prev_head(prev_instruction_address)
           if (idc.print_insn_mnem(prev_instruction_address) == 'mov' and
idc.print_operand(prev_instruction_address,0) == 'ecx' and
```

```
idc.get_operand_type(prev_instruction_address,1) == 5):
                ind = print_operand(prev_instruction_address,1)
                set_comment(ref,search_by_index(table,hex_to_int(ind)))
            else:
                prev_instruction_address = idc.prev_head(prev_instruction_address)
                if (idc.print_insn_mnem(prev_instruction_address) == 'mov' and
idc.print_operand(prev_instruction_address,0) == 'ecx' and
idc.get_operand_type(prev_instruction_address,1) == 5):
                    ind = print_operand(prev_instruction_address,1)
                    set_comment(ref,search_by_index(table,hex_to_int(ind)))
                else:
                    print('not working' , hex(ref))
reference_1 = list(idautils.CodeRefsTo(idc.get_name_ea_simple("wrap_mw_decrpyion_fun_1"), 0))
#codeRefs-to need "ea" as arguemt .
reference_1 = reference_1 +
list(idautils.CodeRefsTo(idc.get_name_ea_simple('wrap_2_mw_decrpyion_fun_1') , 0))
reference_2 = list(idautils.CodeRefsTo(idc.get_name_ea_simple('wrap_2_mw_decrpyion_fun_2'), 0))
reference_2 = reference_2 +
list(idautils.CodeRefsTo(idc.get_name_ea_simple('wrap_mw_decrpyion_fun_2'), 0))
def main():
   do_magic(tbl_1, reference_1)
   do_magic(tbl_2,reference_2)
```

if __name__ == '__main__':
 main()

xrefs to wrap_2_mw_decrpyion_fun_1


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Directio	Туре	Address	Text
型 Up 型 Up 型 Up 型 Up 型 Up 型 Up	P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P	sub_1800014C4+B mw_start_http+9E mw_get_config_f_global_r get_info_security_product mw_create_GUID+7F	call wrap_2_mw_decrpyion_fun_1; c:\\ call wrap_2_mw_decrpyion_fun_1; https call wrap_2_mw_decrpyion_fun_1; Software\Classes call wrap_2_mw_decrpyion_fun_1 call wrap_2_mw_decrpyion_fun_1; {%02X%02X%02X-%02X%02X-%02X%02X-%02X%02X call wrap_2_mw_decrpyion_fun_1; vmnat.exe
Line 25 o	of 25		
			OK Cancel Search Help

Figure(9): IDA python script result

Emulation Check


Qakbot uses the **GetFileAttributesW** function to check for a folder <u>"C:\INTERNAL_empty."</u> If this directory exists, it suggests that the environment might be used for analysis, such as Microsoft Defender emulation or sandbox, and then the process will be terminated.



Figure(10): emulation check

Checking Processes

Qakbot loops through running processes on the system and compares their executable names against wellknown static and dynamic malware analysis tools.



<u>Figure(11)</u>: <u>Qakbot search for tool's process</u> full processes list

 Expand to see more wireshark.exe filemon.exe procmon.exe idaq64.exe tcpview.exe

Anti VM

Qakbot exploits Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a system management technology used to administer remote systems and provide comprehensive data about the operating system, hardware, and installed software and applications on a computer.

It uses WMI queries to gather system information, including details about virtualization. It queries classes such as Win32_ComputerSystem, Win32_Bios, Win32_DiskDrive, or Win32_PhysicalMemory, then check for patterns indicative of virtualized environments. These patterns include known manufacturer or model strings associated with virtualization platforms.

Below are the classes and their corresponding checked values :

Class	Checked Values
Win32_ComputerSystem	MS_VM_CERT, VMware, Virtual Machine
Win32_Bios	VRTUAL, VMware, VMW, Xen
Win32_DiskDrive	VMware, PROD_VIRTUAL_DISK, VIRTUAL-DISK, XENSRC, 20202020
Win32_PhysicalMemory	VMware, VMW, QEMU
Win32_PnPEntity	QEMU, VMware Pointing, VMware Accelerated, VMware SCSI,

Qakbot also searches for 'vmnat', a process initiated by VMware upon startup. 'vmnat' manages communication in the Network Address Translation (NAT) set up with the guest machine .

Qakbot's C2 Functionality

Malware needs to connect to C2 servers to execute remote commands, update its code, and exfiltrate stolen data. Before doing so, it needs to extract its C2 from an encrypted configuration.


Configuration Extraction

Qakbot, in this version, contains an embedded AES encrypted configuration within its .data section.

<pre>enc_campaign_info_len dw 51h ; DATA XREF: decrypted_config_campaign+Ffr ; BYTE enc campaign info[510]</pre>	<pre>enc_c2_list_size dw 51h ; DATA XREF: mw_w_decrypt_c2+A1tr ; BYTE enc c2_list[1998]</pre>
enc_campaign_info db 08h, 0FDh, 16h, 0A6h, 27h, 0C9h, 57h, 92h, 1Fh, 23h	enc_c2_list db 8, 75h, 0CBh, 43h, 8Fh, 0EBh, 1, 97h, 32h, 0B6h, 51h
; DATA XREF: decrypted config campaign+2Ato	; DATA XREF: mw w decrypt c2+BBto
db 0A1h, 6Ah, 5Eh, 0E4h, 0Eh, 4Ah, 31h, 7, 0D7h, 2 dup(0FBh)	db 0CCh, 0B3h, 8Fh, 9Ch, 0B1h, 1Fh, 65h, 6Ch, 0AFh, 8Ah
db 16h, 0CDh, 0B4h, 1Ch, 4, 41h, 1Eh, 99h, 3Ah, 73h, 4	db 15h, 0ABh, 3Eh, 4Bh, 8, 0FEh, 0A3h, 0E3h, 0D3h, 2Fh
db 59h, 50h, 0D3h, 0DDh, 0A4h, 0Bh, 19h, 82h, 7, 2Eh, 0C0h	db 0FCh, 0C9h, 0C3h, 10h, 0DBh, 0FEh, 0FFh, 0Dh, 45h, 56h
db 0ADh, 65h, 6, 58h, 39h, 96h, 0D4h, 72h, 82h, 0BFh, 3Dh	db 66h, 1Fh, 39h, 18h, 0Ah, 3Ah, 9Fh, 52h, 0D2h, 0B5h
db 0C6h, 9Ch, 0AFh, 0E7h, 0B0h, 95h, 53h, 11h, 40h, 5Eh	db 90h, 0A3h, 22h, 1Bh, 0BDh, 7Eh, 28h, 46h, 0E5h, 0F2h
db 27h, 0B3h, 69h, 3Fh, 0E2h, 0B1h, 0Ah, 3Eh, 1, 0D1h	db 1Bh, 78h, 7, 7Fh, 0FAh, 10h, 3Fh, 90h, 0C5h, 0F7h, 22h
db 84h, 1Ch, 0E5h, 37h, 4Ch, 24h, 0D2h, 65h, 7Eh, 92h	db 00Fh, 0Ch, 0FDh, 5Ch, 81h, 00Fh, 38h, 0C0h, 0ACh, 4Eh
db 2Dh, 7, 0E7h, 0AEh, 11h, 0F4h, 95h, 82h, 3Eh, 0B3h	db 4, 2Fh, 0F8h, 31h, 7Dh, 0A4h, 39h, 2 dup(0CDh), 86h
db 0C8h, 0DAh, 9Eh, 94h, 5Dh, 0B2h, 92h, 89h, 50h, 0A6h	db 62h, 27h, 7Ah, 8Fh, 51h, 7Ch, 5Ah, 92h, 9Fh, 0CAh, 4
db 91h, 37h, 7Fh, 0AAh, 13h, 4Dh, 0B1h, 0FBh, 0ADh, 15h	db 1Ah, 08Dh, 92h, 84h, 4Eh, 43h, 0DCh, 53h, 17h, 84h
db 006h, 56h, 7Dh, 49h, 91h, 67h, 0C8h, 27h, 0F3h, 84h db 0E2h, 0C7h, 8Ah, 9Bh, 4Eh, 0Abh, 9Ah, 69h, 27h, 9Bh	db 70h, 86h, 85h, 66h, 95h, 45h, 6Fh, 71h, 58h, 7Fh, 5Ah db 25h, 10h, 00Ch, 9Ch, 91h, 82h, 0F3h, 0C2h, 21h, 13h db 08ch, 2Eh, 08gh, 0F9h, 4Ah, 5, 0FEh, 8, 083h, 48h, 0FCh
db 0AAh, 0EDh, 0BEh, 0A8h, 42h, 1Dh, 85h, 96h, 0F4h, 0D7h db 2Ch, 61h, 99h, 1Ah, 9, 14h, 0DDh, 76h, 08Dh, 06h, 0FEh	db 05Ch, 22h, 05Ch, 05Sh, 47Sh, 28h, 28h, 37h, 7Eh, 08Ah, 0Ech db 05Ch, 50h, 40h, 0Ech, 4, 28h, 28h, 37h, 7Eh, 08Ah, 0Ech db 3, 0, 08ch, 82h, 89h, 9Fh, 89h, 3Ah, 9, 68h, 8Ah, 4Dh
db 0Clh, 15h, 6Fh, 0D0h, 0Ch, 2Eh, 76h, 5, 0D5h, 0D0h db 8Ah, 0ABh, 7Fh, 4Dh, 34h, 0F6h, 0FFh, 0EAh, 47h, 40h db 0D7h, 7Eh, 7lh, 4Eh, 48h, 9Ah, 1lh, 0D5h, 0C3h, 3Bh	db 005h, 39h, 008h, 006h, 049h, 046h, 0, 074h, 37h, 58h db 00Ch, 28h, 1Fh, 87h, 17h, 0FEh, 085h, 08Ch, 0D4h, 0F0h
db 48h, 3Ch, 0A2h, 9Eh, 53h, 0A4h, 15h, 86h, 18h, 26h	db 0A5h, 0D9h, 0EFh, 87h, 63h, 5Ah, 84h, 0C3h, 0FEh, 0DAh
db 5Fh, 78h, 0FEh, 58h, 42h, 86h, 2, 22h, 087h, 0Ah, 8	db 50h, 08Dh, 3Ch, 0D9h, 65h, 88h, 0ECh, 08Ch, 21h, 64h
db 9h, 08h, 08h, 06h, 6h, 7bh, 47h, 08h, 067h, 80h, 37h	db 78h, 15h, 60h, 4, 08Ah, 25h, 0F1h, 52h, 10h, 0A0h, 47h
db 8h, 87h, 37h, 8bh, 47h, 1Ah, 00h, 96h, 90h, 08Ah, 85h	db 41h, 083h, 0AFh, 71h, 0F4h, 44h, 38h, 4Dh, 25h, 0A8h
db 6Dh, 0CBh, 0Alh, 0C3h, 1Fh, 0Blh, 3Bh, 4Eh, 0AFh, 0ADh	db 69h, 0F8h, 0C7h, 16h, 61h, 88h, 0EAh, 6Eh, 54h, 0FEh
db 7Fh, 14h, 0E3h, 0BFh, 80h, 0AFh, 7Fh, 0EBh, 3Fh, 0EGh	db 0E0h, 0CDh, 0BDh, 76h, 9Eh, 5Eh, 0E7h, 0A1h, 64h, 73h
db 088h, 0DFh, 0C4h, 77h, 0E8h, 0D6h, 6Dh, 14h, 8Fh, 0BCh	db 0AFh, 75h, 0A1h, 0D4h, 8Bh, 23h, 11h, 56h, 0CBh, 4Ah
db 85h, 0A8h, 69h, 93h, 18h, 0EAh, 0FEh, 15h, 6, 3, 4Eh	db 28h, 0B0h, 1Fh, 6Ah, 0B3h, 8Bh, 5Ah, 9Bh, 0BDh, 0D8h
db 98h, 57h, 0ACh, 08Fh, 3Dh, 0CEh, 6Ah, 58h, 3Bh, 0C1h	db 75h, 7Fh, 0AFh, 66h, 0D7h, 75h, 0BCh, 0B4h, 0D3h, 0Fh
db 10h, 2Fh, 9Ch, 28h, 82h, 25h, 14h, 0F3h, 08Fh, 0D0h	db 7Ch, 4, 73h, 0C7h, 0D7h, 0B0h, 74h, 0EDh, 25h, 0C1h
db 28h, 0A1h, 1Fh, 0B9h, 9Ch, 0Eh, 0D9h, 0C8h, 0FBh, 8Ch	db 91h, 0E4h, 93h, 08Eh, 5, 8Eh, 0C9h, 0C2h, 48h, 5, 0CAh
db 0C7h, 0FCh, 9Bh, 36h, 6Eh, 5Fh, 0AFh, 81h, 39h, 3Ah	db 001h, 28h, 8Ch, 18h, 6Ch, 0E8h, 0C5h, 27h, 63h, 0F4h


Figure(12): Encrypted configuration

The AES decryption method used is the same as the one we've seen for decrypting strings. The key will be **SHA-256** hashed before attempting the decryption, the first 16 bytes of the encrypted string used as IV. Then use the final key to decrypt the rest encrypted data.



Figure(13): Decrypt the campaign INFO

With the same method and key, Qakbot will decrypt its C2 list .



Figure(14): Decrypt the C2 list

With this information, we can reuse our string decryption script with some edits to have the configuration . notice that :

The first 32 bytes in the decrypted data represent the SHA-256 validation, a cryptographic process used for data integrity verification. These bytes serve as a hash value that allows systems to confirm the authenticity and integrity of the data being processed.

We can see the output of the script (configuration).

enter the file path: sample.dll
####
sha256 : b'560b887ca054e53b2dbf3601b1e518c9b40e96802c2e76b6e54f7879aad9bbfd'
##
Botnet ID : b'tchk08''
b'40' : b'1''
Campaign Timestamp : 2024-01-31 14:22:34+00:00
####
sha256 : b'd640008cc859069dddc5b2869488ba83675e5f66a6ca19730b625ce900a830f0'
##
IP[0] = 31.210.173.10:443
IP[1] = 185.156.172.62:443
IP[2] = 185.113.8.123:443


Figure(15): the Decrypted configuration the malware use

C2 communication

QakBot mainly uses HTTP for C2 communication. The malware communicates with its C2 servers through encrypted AES payloads and then encodes the result in Base64.



Figure(16): C2 communication fun




Figure(17): AES Encryption and the key used while C2 communication

Gather system INFO

Part of QakBOT communication with its command and control is sending information about the computer. QakBot gathers computer information using a combination of Windows API calls, shell commands, and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) commands. This approach allows it to collect various details about the system, including hardware, software, and configuration data. By using these methods together, QakBot obtains a comprehensive overview of the target computer's setup and specifications.

VMI Queries Used

Qakbot builds a WMI query by concatenating strings to form It then executes these queries to retrieve critical data and obtain a comprehensive overview of the system's configuration and installed security measures.



Figure(18): Qakbot create VMI queries


Here are the WMI classes targeted and the information they retrieve:

Class	Properties	Result
Win32_OperatingSystem	Caption	OS Info [name and version]
AntiVirusProduct	*	Information about antivirus products installed on a system
Win32_Processor	*	Information about the processor
Win32_ComputerSystem	*	Information about the computer system, including its hardware configuration, such as the manufacturer, model, system type, number of processors, memory
Win32_Bios	*	Details about a computer's BIOS, like its version, manufacturer, and release date
Win32_DiskDrive	*	Information about the disk drives installed on a computer, including their model, manufacturer, interface type, capacity
Win32_PhysicalMemory	*	Details about the physical memory modules in use, including their capacity, speed, manufacturer

Class	Properties	Result
Win32_Product	Caption, Description, Vendor, Version, InstallDate, InstallSource, PackageName	Information about installed software, including its name, description, vendor, version, installation date, installation source, and package name
Win32_PnPEntity	Caption, Description, DeviceID, Manufacturer, Name, PNPDeviceID, Service, Status	Details about Plug and Play devices, such as their name, description, device ID, manufacturer, name, PnP device ID, service, and status

Windows command line

Qakbot creates anonymous pipes to execute various built-in command-line tools processes, enabling it to retrieve information about the compromised system's environment effectively.



Figure(19): execute command-line tools

Here is the list of commands that can be used to gather information about the system:

Windows Command	Output
ipconfig /all	Displays detailed configuration information about all network interfaces.
whoami /all	Displays user, group, and privileges information for the current user.

Windows Command	Output
nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts	Lists all domain trusts established with the current domain.
qwinsta	Lists information about all Remote Desktop sessions on the local system.
nslookup -querytype=ALL -timeout=12 _ldaptcp.dcmsdcs.%s	Performs a DNS lookup for LDAP service records for the specified domain controller.
net share	Lists information about shared resources on the local system.
net localgroup	Lists information about local groups on the local system.
netstat -nao	Lists active network connections and associated processes.
net view	Lists information about shared resources on remote systems.
route print	Displays the IP routing table for the local system.
arp -a	Displays the ARP cache, which contains mappings of IP addresses to MAC addresses.

Additionally, it will use Windows API calls to get different system details like computer name, screen size, AD domain info, user name, processor details, whether it's a 32-bit or 64-bit Windows, and the operating system version, along with its respective full paths.

Collect AntiViruses Information

Qakbot checks for specific antivirus programs like Kaspersky, Avast, Norton, etc to see if any antivirus software is active on the system. It does this by scanning running programs and looking for related processes from these vendors.

This list shows which antivirus vendors are associated with each process :

processes	Related Vendor
ccSvcHst.exe;NortonSecurity.exe;nsWscSvc.exe	Norton Security
avgcsrvx.exe;avgsvcx.exe;avgcsrva.exe	AVG Antivirus
MsMpEng.exe	Microsoft Defender Antivirus
avp.exe;kavtray.exe	Kaspersky Antivirus
coreServiceShell.exe;PccNTMon.exe;NTRTScan.exe	Trend Micro Antivirus
fshoster32.exe	F-Secure Antivirus
fmon.exe	FortiClient Antivirus

processes	Related Vendor
egui.exe;ekrn.exe	ESET
bdagent.exe;vsserv.exe;vsservppl.exe	Bitdefender
AvastSvc.exe;aswEngSrv.exe;aswToolsSvc.exe;afwServ.exe;aswidsagent.exe;AvastUI.exe	Avast
Sophos UI.exe;SophosUI.exe;SAVAdminService.exe;SavService.exe	Sophos
WRSA.exe	Webroot SecureAnywhere
vkise.exe;isesrv.exe;cmdagent.exe	Kaspersky
ByteFence.exe	ByteFence
MBAMService.exe;mbamgui.exe	Malwarebytes
mcshield.exe	McAfee
dwengine.exe;dwarkdaemon.exe;dwwatcher.exe	Datawatch
SentinelServiceHost.exe;SentinelStaticEngine.exe;SentinelAgent.exe;	SentinelOne
SonicWallClientProtectionService.exe;SWDash.exe	SonicWall
CynetEPS.exe;CynetMS.exe;CynetConsole.exe	Cynet
CSFalconService.exe;CSFalconContainer.exe	CrowdStrike Falcon

Executing C2 Commands

After establishing communication, the C2 server will send commands to be executed. These commands are represented as integer values or indexes.

<pre>comm_parse(1, 0, c2_communicate);</pre>	
comm_parse(0x15, 0, sub_1800055A8);	
	// Enable the Value 0x14 on Global Registry Configuration
	// Disable the Value 0x14 on Global Registry Configuration
<pre>comm_parse(0xA, 1, command_TerminateProcess);</pre>	
	:// set values from Global Registry config , trigger an event
	<pre>// set , delete values from Global Registry config , trigger an event</pre>
<pre>comm_parse(0xE, 1, may_make_move);</pre>	<pre>// make a copy of itself , run it and gain persistence</pre>
<pre>comm_parse(0x19, 1, ProcessFile_Execute);</pre>	// load an exe binary and run it .
<pre>comm_parse(0x21, 1, mw_w_create_process);</pre>	// execute cmd .
<pre>comm_parse(0x1A, 1, mw_up_injection);</pre>	// load then do dll injection
<pre>comm_parse(0x1B, 1, w_process_injection);</pre>	<pre>// do process injection by hashed Str</pre>
<pre>comm_parse(0x1C, 1, kill_process);</pre>	// Kill the Injected Process
comm_parse(0x1D, 1, sub_18000570C);	
<pre>comm_parse(0x23, 1, alloc_injection);</pre>	// load and do process hollowing
	<pre>// kill the previous injected process and do process hollowing again .</pre>
<pre>comm_parse(0x1F, 1, do_Dll_injection);</pre>	// do process hollowing on specific proceses based on anti virus info and its arch
<pre>comm_parse(0x12, 1, no_command_0);</pre>	// do nothing
<pre>comm_parse(0x13, 1, update_and_run);</pre>	<pre>// load an updated version and run it from the export "CfGetPlatformInfo"</pre>
<pre>comm_parse(0x24, 1, run_sample);</pre>	// load a sample and run
comm_parse(0x14, 1, sub_180005198);	
	;// Add Value to Global Registry Configuration
	<pre>// remove value from the global registry configuration</pre>
<pre>comm_parse(0x27, 1, execute_b64_encoded_powers</pre>	<pre>shell_cmd);// execute an command using powershell</pre>
<pre>comm_parse(0x28, 1, run_dll_Regsvr32);</pre>	// load and run with regsvr32
	// load and run with rundll32
<pre>comm_parse(0x2A, 1, no_command);</pre>	// do nothing
comm_parse(0x2B, 1, sub_18000580C);	
and the second	

Figure(20): The list of the C2 commands used by Qakbot

Process Hollowing

QakBot selects a system process for process hollowing based on the machine's architecture (32-bit or 64-bit) and the installed antivirus software.

This list includes the following system processes:


 Expand to see more %SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\AtBroker.exe %SystemRoot%\System32\AtBroker.exe %SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\xwizard.exe %SystemRoot%\System32\xwizard.exe %SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\explorer.exe

It first calls the CreateProcessW() API with the CREATE_SUSPENDED flag to start a new process, making it suspended at the beginning.



Figure(21): create a suspended process

Then it allocates virtual memory in a target process, writes data into the allocated region, and then modifies the memory protection to allow execution.



Next, it retrieves the context of the thread to modify it to set the instruction pointer (EIP/RIP register) to point to the entry point of the injected code.

It finally calls the API ResumeThread() to resume the new processes.

Persistence

QakBot sets itself to run on system reboot through a registry entry or Scheduled Task.



Figure(22): Persistence function

Conclusion

Qakbot is an advanced malware with regular updates and powerful anti-analysis actions, ensuring it remains a persistent threat with a wide range of capabilities and techniques.

YARA Rule

```
rule detect_Qakbot_v5
{
   meta:
        description = "just a rule for Qakbot v5"
        author = "Mohamed Ezzat (@ZW01f)"
        hash1 = "af6a9b7e7aefeb903c76417ed2b8399b73657440ad5f8b48a25cfe5e97ff868f"
        hash2 = "59559e97962e40a15adb2237c4d01cfead03623aff1725616caeaa5a8d273a35"
   strings:
       $s1 = "\\u%04X\\u%04X" ascii wide
        $s2 = "%u;%u;%u" ascii wide
        $s3 = "CfGetPlatformInfo" ascii wide
        $p1 = {45 33 C0 E8 ?? ?? ?? 35 91 CB 35 A2 41 3B C7}
        $p2 = { OF B6 01 48 FF C1 44 33 C0 41 8B C0 41 C1 E8 04 83 E0 0F 44 33 04 82 41 8B C0 41 C1
E8 04 83 E0 0F 44 33 04 82 49 83 E9 01 75 ?? 41 F7 D041 8B C0 C3}
   condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and all of (p^*) and (2 of (s^*)) and filesize < 500KB
}
```

Python Automated Configuration Extraction

This python script is used to extract the configuration of the Qakbot malware :

- Open the binary file.
- Get the .data section.
- Extract the the key and the encrypted configuration data .
- SHA-256 hash the extracted key to get the final key.
- Use the key to decrypt the configurations.
- Parse the decrypted configurations to extract useful information.

```
#-----#
import hashlib
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto.Util.Padding import unpad
import socket
from datetime import datetime
import pytz
#-----#
def extract_data(filename): #finds the content of the ".data" section. .
   import pefile
   pe = pefile.PE(filename)
   for section in pe.sections:
       if '.data' in section.Name.decode(encoding='utf-8').rstrip('x00'):
           return (section.get_data(section.VirtualAddress, section.SizeOfRawData))
def tohex(data):
   import binascii
   if type(data) == str:
       return binascii.hexlify(data.encode('utf-8'))
   else:
       return binascii.hexlify(data)
def get_ip(ip_binary):
   # Convert the binary network format to a human-readable string format
   ip_str = socket.inet_ntoa(ip_binary)
   return ip_str
#----- Decryption -----#
def calculate_sha256(input_data):
   sha256_hash = hashlib.sha256()
   sha256_hash.update(input_data)
   hash_hex = sha256_hash.digest()
   return hash_hex
def aes_decrypt(ciphertext, key, iv):
   cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
   plaintext = cipher.decrypt(ciphertext)
   unpadded_plaintext = unpad(plaintext, AES.block_size)
   return unpadded_plaintext
def full_dec(enc_str , aes_key_init):
   aes_key = calculate_sha256(aes_key_init)
   dec_str = aes_decrypt(enc_str[17:],aes_key,enc_str[1:17])
   return dec_str
def parse_camp(input_str):
   lines = input_str.strip().split(b'\r\n')
   parsed_data = {}
   for line in lines:
       key, value = line.split(b'=')
       parsed_data[key] = value
   timestamp = int(parsed_data[b'3'])
   dt_obj = pytz.utc.localize(datetime.utcfromtimestamp(timestamp))
   print(f"Botnet ID : {parsed_data[b'10']}'")
   print(f"b'40' : {parsed_data[b'40']}'")
   print(f"Campaign Timestamp : {dt_obj}")
def parse_c2(dec_ips):
   i = 0
   splitted_data = [dec_ips[i:i+7] for i in range(1, len(dec_ips), 8)]
   for data in splitted_data:
       ip = get_ip(data[:4])
       port = int(tohex(data[4:6]),16)
       print('IP[{0}] = {1}:{2}'.format(i,ip,port))
       i = i + 1
def main():
   file_name = input("enter the file path: ")
```

```
# The config data begins at these offsets inside the .data section
   enc_ips_rva = 0x852 ; size_rva = 0x850 ; enc_config_rva = 0x1022
   data_section = extract_data(file_name) #read data section
   size = ord(data_section[size_rva:size_rva+1])
   enc_config_ips = data_section[enc_ips_rva:enc_ips_rva+size]
   enc_config = data_section[enc_config_rva:enc_config_rva+size]
   init_key = b'T2X!wWMVH1UkMHD7SBdbgfgXrNBd(5dmRNbBI9'
   aes_key = calculate_sha256(init_key)
   campaign_info = full_dec(enc_config,init_key)
   dec_c2 = full_dec(enc_config_ips,init_key)
   print('##------ Campaign Info -----##')
   print('sha256 :',tohex(campaign_info[:32]))
   print('#-----#')
   parse_camp(campaign_info[32:])
   print('##------ Qakbot c2 -----##')
   print('sha256 :',tohex(dec_c2[:32]))
   print('#-----#')
   parse_c2(dec_c2[32:])
if ___name___ == '___main___':
```

main()

References