# Dissecting REMCOS RAT: An in- depth analysis of a widespread 2024 malware, Part Two

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In the <u>previous article</u> in this series on the REMCOS implant, we shared information about execution, persistence, and defense evasion mechanisms. Continuing this series we'll cover the second half of its execution flow and you'll learn more about REMCOS recording capabilities and communication with its C2.

## Starting watchdog

If the enable\_watchdog\_flag (index  $0 \times 32$ ) is enabled, the REMCOS will activate its watchdog feature.



0x40F24F Starting watchdog feature if enabled in the configuration

This feature involves the malware launching a new process, injecting itself into it, and monitoring the main process. The goal of the watchdog is to restart the main process in case it gets terminated. The main process can also restart the watchdog if it gets terminated.



Console message indicating activation of watchdog module

The target binary for watchdog injection is selected from a hardcoded list, choosing the first binary for which the process creation and injection are successful:

- svchost.exe
- rmclient.exe
- fsutil.exe



0x4122C5 Watchdog target process selection

In this example, the watchdog process is svchost.exe.



svchost.exe watchdog process

The registry value HKCU/SOFTWARE/{MUTEX}/WD is created before starting the watchdog process and contains the main process PID.

	🛒 regedit.exe	8624	0.01	4.29 MB	DESKTOP-U
l	🗸 👼 Windriver.exe	2968		4.43 MB	DESKTOP-U
	conhost.exe	2408		6.95 MB	DESKTOP-U
l	svchost.exe	1988		544 kB	DESKTOP-U
l	🜉 ProcessHacker.exe	4100	0.61	16.15 MB	DESKTOP-U
1	🗮 x32dbg.exe	8500	0.10	73.44 MB	DESKTOP-U
ł					

FT	FTWARE\WIN-G9ZVSJ					
^	Name	Туре	Data			
	ab (Default)	REG_SZ	(value not set)			
	腿 exepath	REG_BINARY	0e e0 4f 81 d7 b1 06 c3 e4 1a 7c ee d7 45 2f e4 c			
	👪 FR	REG_DWORD	0x00000001 (1)			
	ab licence	REG_SZ	ADADC60D9BCCD50F30722C34A02FBE77			
	👪 time	REG_DWORD	0x65d36fc6 (1708355526)			
	👪 WD	REG_DWORD	0x0000b98 (2968)			

The main process PID is saved in the WD registry key

Once REMCOS is running in the watchdog process, it takes a "special" execution path by verifying if the wD value exists in the malware registry key. If it does, the value is deleted, and the monitoring procedure function is invoked.



0x40EB54 Watchdog execution path when WD registry value exists

It is worth noting that the watchdog process has a special mutex to differentiate it from the main process mutex. This mutex string is derived from the configuration (index  $0 \times E$ ) and appended with -W.

24	<pre>"mutex": "MARE_IS_BEAUTIFUL_EX",</pre>			
25	<pre>"enable_keylogger_flag": true,</pre>			
Mutax field in the configuration				



Comparison between main process and watchdog process mutexes

When the main process is terminated, the watchdog detects it and restarts it using the ShellExecutew API with the path to the malware binary retrieved from the HKCU/SOFTWARE/{mutex}/exepath registry key



Console message indicating process restart by watchdog

## Starting recording threads

## **Keylogging thread**

The offline keylogger has two modes of operation:

- 1. Keylog everything
- 2. Enable keylogging when specific windows are in the foreground

When the keylogger\_mode (index 0xF) field is set to 1 or 2 in the configuration, REMCOS activates its "Offline Keylogger" capability.

15:38:37:043	i	L	Remcos Agent initialized
5:38:37:043	i	Ι	Offline Keylogger Started
15:38:37:541	Т	T	ACCESS LEVEL: AUMINISTRATOL
15.38.37.5/1	i	1	Connecting   TIS Off   es]

Keylogging is accomplished using the SetWindowsHookExA API with the WH\_KEYBOARD\_LL constant.

<pre>1 intthiscall ctf::Keylogger::InitializeKeylogger(ctf::Keylogger *p_this)</pre>				
2 {				
3 HMODULE h_current_module; // eax				
4 HHOOK v3; // eax				
5 DWORD LastError; // eax				
6 ctf::std::String *v5; // eax				
7 ctf::std::String v7; // [esp-30h] [ebp-70h] BYREF				
8 ctf::std::String v8; // [esp-18h] [ebp-58h] BYREF				
9 ctf::std::String v9; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-34h] BYREF				
.0 struct tagMSG Msg; // [esp+24h] [ebp-1Ch] BYREF				
2 g_offline_keylogger1 = p_this;				
3 if ( p_this->h_windows_hook				
<pre>.4    (h_current_module = GetModuleHandleA(0),</pre>				
v3 = SetWindowsHookExA(WH_KEYBOARD_LL, (HOOKPROC)ctf::callback::KeyloggerWindowsHook, h_current_module, 0),				
$(p_this > h_windows_hook = v3) != 0) )$				
0x4042D9 DEMCOC setting up keybeard event back using SetWindowel lookEvA				

0x40A2B8 REMCOS setting up keyboard event hook using SetWindowsHookExA

The file where the keylogging data is stored is built using the following configuration fields:

- keylogger\_root\_directory (index 0x31)
- keylogger\_parent\_directory (index 0x10)
- keylogger\_filename (index 0x11)

#### The keylogger file path is

{keylogger\_root\_directory}/{keylogger\_parent\_directory}/{keylogger\_filename}.
In this case, it will be %APPDATA%/keylogger.dat.

« Lo	cal Disk (C:) > Users > Cyril > App	pData > Roaming 🛛 🗸 🗸	ට 🔎 Sea
	Name	Date modified	Туре
	Adobe	2/9/2023 1:01 PM	File folder
7		5/10/2023 11:44 AM	File folder
Ŕ	Code	3/11/2024 8:42 PM	File folder
*	Hex-Rays	2/28/2023 12:00 PM	File folder
*	Mael Horz	2/23/2023 4:29 PM	File folder
19270	Microsoft	3/7/2024 5:43 PM	File folder
	NuGet	3/9/2023 12:55 PM	File folder
	Process Hacker 2	2/23/2023 4:07 PM	File folder
		3/11/2024 3:38 PM	File folder
,	📊 Visual Studio Setup	2/23/2023 4:16 PM	File folder
	keylogger.dat	3/11/2024 4:14 PM	DAT File



keylogger.dat - Notepad File Edit Format View Help [2024/03/11 15:38:37 Offline Keylogger Started] [IE cookies cleared!] [Firefox Cookies not found] [Firefox StoredLogins not found] [Chrome Cookies not found] [Chrome StoredLogins not found] [Cleared browsers logins and cookies.] [2024/03/11 15:38:37 c:\program files (x86)\internet explorer\iexplore.exe] [Ctrl+ ][Esc][CtrlL] [2024/03/11 16:14:24 Process Hacker [DESKTOP-U3R87K0\Cyril]+] [Esc][CtrlL]remc[BckSp][BckSp][BckSp]iexp[BckSp][BckSp][BckSp][BckSp][BckSp]iexp Keylogging data content

The keylogger file can be encrypted by enabling the

enable\_keylogger\_file\_encryption\_flag (index 0x12) flag in the configuration. It will be encrypted using the RC4 algorithm and the configuration key.



The file can also be made super hidden by enabling the

enable\_keylogger\_file\_hiding\_flag (index 0x13) flag in the configuration.

When using the second keylogging mode, you need to set the keylogger\_specific\_window\_names (index 0x2A) field with strings that will be searched in the current foreground window title every 5 seconds.



0x40A109 Keylogging mode choice

Upon a match, keylogging begins. Subsequently, the current foreground window is checked every second to stop the keylogger if the title no longer contains the specified strings.



Monitoring foreground window for keylogging activation

## Screen recording threads

When the enable\_screenshot\_flag (index 0x14) is enabled in the configuration, REMCOS will activate its screen recording capability.



0x40F0B3 Starting screen recording capability when enabled in configuration

To take a screenshot, REMCOS utilizes the CreateCompatibleBitmap and the BitBlt Windows APIs. If the enable\_screenshot\_mouse\_drawing\_flag (index 0x35) flag is enabled, the mouse is also drawn on the bitmap using the GetCursorInfo, GetIconInfo, and the DrawIcon API.



The path to the folder where the screenshots are stored is constructed using the following configuration:

- screenshot\_parent\_directory (index 0x19)
- screenshot\_folder (index 0x1A)

The final path is {screenshot\_parent\_directory}/{screenshot\_folder}.

REMCOS utilizes the screenshot\_interval\_in\_minutes (index 0x15) field to capture a screenshot every X minutes and save it to disk using the following format string: time\_%04i%02i%02i\_%02i%02i%02i.



Similarly to keylogging data, when the enable\_screenshot\_encryption\_flag (index 0x1B) is enabled, the screenshots are saved encrypted using the RC4 encryption algorithm and the configuration key.

At the top, REMCOS has a similar "specific window" feature for its screen recording as its keylogging capability. When the enable\_screenshot\_specific\_window\_names\_flag (index 0x16) is set, a second screen recording thread is initiated.



0x40F108 Starting specific window screen recording capability when enabled in configuration

This time, it utilizes the screenshot\_specific\_window\_names (index 0x17) list of strings to capture a screenshot when the foreground window title contains one of the specified strings. Screenshots are taken every X seconds, as specified by the screenshot\_specific\_window\_names\_interval\_in\_seconds (index 0x18) field.

In this case, the screenshots are saved on the disk using a different format string: wnd\_%04i%02i%02i\_%02i%02i%02i. Below is an example using ["notepad"] as the list of specific window names and setting the Notepad process window in the foreground.



## Audio recording thread

When the enable\_audio\_recording\_flag (index 0x23) is enabled, REMCOS initiates its audio recording capability.



0x40F159 Starting audio recording capability when enabled in configuration

The recording is conducted using the Windows Wave\* API. The duration of the recording is specified in minutes by the audio\_recording\_duration\_in\_minutes (0x24) configuration field.



0x401BE9 Initialization of audio recording

After recording for X minutes, the recording file is saved, and a new recording begins. REMCOS uses the following configuration fields to construct the recording folder path:

- audio\_record\_parent\_directory (index 0x25)
- audio\_record\_folder (index 0x26)

The final path is {audio\_record\_parent\_directory}/{audio\_record\_folder}. In this case, it will be C:\MicRecords. Recordings are saved to disk using the following format: %Y-%m-%d %H.%M.wav.



## Communication with the C2

After initialization, REMCOS initiates communication with its C2. It attempts to connect to each domain in its  $c2\_list$  (index  $0\times0$ ) until one responds.

According to previous research, communication can be encrypted using TLS if enabled for a specific C2. In such cases, the TLS engine will utilize the tls\_raw\_certificate (index 0x36), tls\_key (index 0x37), and tls\_raw\_peer\_certificate (index 0x38) configuration fields to establish the TLS tunnel.

It's important to note that in this scenario, only one peer certificate can be provided for multiple TLS-enabled C2 domains. As a result, it may be possible to identify other C2s using the same certificate.

Once connected we received our first packet:

(venv) P5 C:\Users\CyrilFrancois\Documents\Work\esl\remcos\server> python .\main.py b'\$\x04\xff\x00@\x03\x00\x00K\x00\x00DEADBEEF[[\x1e\x1e\x1f]D\x00E\x00S\x00K\x00T\x0 )|\x1e\x1e\x1f]|\x1e\x1e\x1f]23943296|\x1e\x1e\x1f]4.9.3 Pro|\x1e\x1e\x1f]C\x00:\x00 Hello packet from REMCOS

As <u>described in depth by Fortinet</u>, the protocol hasn't changed, and all packets follow the same structure:

- (orange)magic\_number: \x24\x04\xff\x00
- (red)data\_size: \x40\x03\x00\x00

return packet

- (green)command\_id (number): \0x4b\x00\x00\x00
- (blue)data fields separated by |\x1e\x1e\1f|

After receiving the first packet from the malware, we can send our own command using the following functions.

```
MAGIC = 0xFF0424
SEPARATOR = b"\x1e\x1e\x1f|"
def build_command_packet(command_id: int, command_data: bytes) -> bytes:
    return build_packet(command_id.to_bytes(4, byteorder="little") +
command_data)
def build_packet(data: bytes) -> bytes:
    packet = MAGIC.to_bytes(4, byteorder="little")
    packet += len(data).to_bytes(4, byteorder="little")
    packet += data
```

Here we are going to change the title of a Notepad window using the command 0x94, passing as parameters its window handle (329064) and the text of our choice.





REMCOS executed the command, changing the Notepad window text

That's the end of the second article. The third part will cover REMCOS' configuration and its C2 commands.