



This is a quite simple 32 bit DLL file that contains 2 exports. the first one was empty, I then decompiled the second one and performed some renaming and cleaning:



This function locates one of the other extracted files `hicclc.io` (that supposes to be dropped to `%TEMP%` by the NSIS installer by now), allocates some memory, copy the file content inside, and doing a simple xor loop with a hardcoded key to decode the next stage. then it simply calls that, which means that this is a shellcode.

I wrote a little python script to decode this stage:

```
\n
i = 0\nkey = \"584058684148\"\ndecoded = b\"\"\n\nwith open(\"hicclc.io\", \"rb\") as f:\n    encoded = f.read()\n\nwhile i < len(encoded):\n    decoded_byte = encoded[i] ^ ord(key[i % len(key)])\n    decoded += bytes([decoded_byte])\n    i += 1\n\nwith open(\"shellcode.bin\", \"wb\") as f:\n    f.write(decoded)
\n
```

Here I used BlobRunner to debug the shellcode:



The shellcode mission is to load the 3'rd extracted file which is the 3'rd unpacking stage:



Following this flow carefully in the debugger:



Capturing `VirtualAlloc` return address to keep tracking of the decoded stage:



Then we can see how `ReadFile` is filling this memory with the file content:



Vwalla!



The following graph snippet contains a loop in the left block for decoding this stage. I located a BP on the completion of the loop in the right block and let it run:



And now we love what we see!

Let's dump this PE to disk:

\n



When keeping debug the shellcode we observe that it spawns another instance of itself:



Then it maps a fresh copy of NTDLL to evade EDR hooks in the original NTDLL:



Then it performs process hollowing by replacing the child process image with the PE we dumped before, some incriminating process hollowing calls are:



Observing the final PE payload, reveals that it's highly obfuscated and difficult to analyze. It's written in pure assembly using MASM:



It contains only .text section, and Cutter really struggled to create the navigation bar above due to obfuscation and non-conventional code:



The final payload is really tough, and contains lots of anti-vm and anti-debugging tricks, that I won't cover today (or any other time 😊)

By using FLOSS, I managed to extract low-hanging fruits such as interesting stack strings, without delving too much into:



```
FLOSS extracted 180
stackstrings\ndest\version.dll\no%Jr..\\$InternetCloseHandle[System]\NT\CurrentVersion\encrypted_key\nc!\B0\AAIA\n:.6$\n!
H88p\POST\n.exe\nwindir\n.exe\nProgram Files\nB>>[Enter]\nimage/jpeg\n\DB1\nInternet
Explorer\IntelliForms\Storage2\nHost:\nURL:\nHttpRequest\ncl.ini\nPassword\nri.ini\nPATH\nClipboard\npass\nhttpRealm\nPATH\n
ProductName\nUser : \n__Vault\nXhHp\FBIMG\n\NetCookies\nwindir\nbrowser\nOpera\nAut:\n[v]C\n" /V\n\explorer.exe\nG=z\n11#?
*0\ncB@\n\Main\nf"\n"D~**T\n[<-Del]\nPass:\nlogin\nP00` \nWA t\nWindows
Explorer\nimage/png\nx86\n7CbI\n7A@@(\nQSeA-\n1$$H\nim.jpeg\nGUID\nId:\nY77n\nur\mon.dll\n,4$8_\nrv.ini\nU33f\nInternetReadFile\n[
Esc]\nInternetConnect\nauth\n_2016\nAA&\nProgramFiles\n2N H\FBNG:\ni' 'N\nhostname\nprofiles.ini\n+Q0$I<(A\n=j&&LZ661A??
~\nwww.\ng0+JC\n)w -Z\nWindows
Explorer\n_jbF-T\nrg.ini\nChrome\nim.jpeg\n2008\nABCDEFGHIJKLMN0PQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789+/\nrc.ini\n.dll\n}+
+v\n!tX)i\n}{})R>\n2012\nProgramFiles\nx((Pz\nx64\nACAA\nUSERNAME\nt,,X.\n` @\ngK99r\nPass:\n='9-6d\n_55j\nAaAA\nMS-WAPI-
\nCurrentVersion\nt\HbW\nAPI-\nLocal State\n2016\nIexplor\n.sqlite\nServer:\nUnknown\nD<<x\nwininet.dll\naAAWindows
Explorer\nName:\nOutlook Recovery\nV22dN: :t\n00.ini\nThunderbird\n\explorer.exe\nAaAAt\n\Cookies\nSniff
from:\nHttpRequest\n.zip\n#F\n44h\nM;va\nS11b?\n\Opera Software\Opera Stable\nLogin
Data\nPHP\naiKw\nlog.ini\nuser\n\Microsoft\Windows\nchrome_child.dll\nopen\n\Low\n200
OK\nAaAA\nFirefox\n\n.exe\nUser:\nInternetOpen\nFirefox\nInstall Directory\nRecovery\n\nCurrent Session\nProgramFiles\nURL:\nUser-
Agent:\nUr1:\nhc 82\nAEFA\n@J7<\n;fD4-\n[Tab]\n\Firefox\nPort:\nHost:\nUnknown\n.dll\nUser-Agent:\nq/^/\nFirefox\n\n"
/V\nUnknown\nNrZ1\n
```

The final payload is waiting for reversers better than me :)

```
\n", "renderedFileInfo": null, "tabSize": 8, "topBannersInfo":  
{ "overridingGlobalFundingFile": false, "globalPreferredFundingPath": null, "repoOwner": "itaymigd", "repoName": "malware-analysis-  
writeups", "showInvalidCitationWarning": false, "citationHelpUrl": "https://docs.github.com/en/github/creating-cloning-and-archiving-  
repositories/creating-a-repository-on-github/about-citation-  
files", "showDependabotConfigurationBanner": false, "actionsOnboardingTip": null, "truncated": false, "viewable": true, "workflowRedirectUrl": null, "symb  
{ "timedOut": false, "notAnalyzed": true, "symbols": [] }, "copilotAccessInfo": null, "csrf_tokens": { "/itaymigd/malware-analysis-writeups/branches":  
{ "post": "laOE8p6wujajW5f1ZE3YW1iNDzmPJClza1b1YPuV75gz1hL1Rp54yww0_IsRF8Z3Rq-8_htunj02R1Rwj7RQ" } } }, "title": "malware-  
analysis-writeups/FormBook/FormBook.md at main · itaymigd/malware-analysis-writeups", "locale": "en" }
```