

Stealing the LIGHTSHOW (Part Two) — LIGHTSHIFT and LIGHTSHOW

 [mandiant.com/resources/blog/lightshift-and-lightshow](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/lightshift-and-lightshow)



In part one on [North Korea's UNC2970](#), we covered [UNC2970](#)'s tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and tooling that they used over the course of multiple intrusions. In this installment, we will focus on how UNC2970 utilized Bring Your Own Vulnerable Device (BYOVD) to further enable their operations.

During our investigation, Mandiant consultants identified most of the original compromised hosts, targeted by UNC2970, contained the files `%temp%\<random>_SB_SMBUS_SDK.dll` and suspicious drivers, created around the same time on disk.

At the time Mandiant initially identified these files, we were unable to determine how they were dropped or the exact use for these files. It wasn't until later in the investigation, during analysis of a forensic image, where the pieces started falling into place. A consultant noticed

multiple keyword references to the file `C:\ProgramData\US0Shared\Share.DAT` (MD5: `def6f91614cb47888f03658b28a1bda6`). Upon initial glance at the Forensic Image, this file was no longer on disk. However, Mandiant was able to recover the original file, and the initial analysis of the sample found that `Share.DAT` was a XORed data blob, which was encoded with the XOR key `0x59`.

The decoded payload (MD5: `9176f177bd88686c6beb29d8bb05f20c`), referred to by Mandiant as LIGHTSHIFT, is an in-memory only dropper. The LIGHTSHIFT dropper distributes a payload (MD5: `ad452d161782290ad5004b2c9497074f`) that Mandiant refers to as LIGHTSHOW. Once loaded into memory, LIGHTSHIFT invokes the exports `Create` then `Close` in that order. The response from `Close` is written as a hex formatted address to the file `C:\Windows\windows.ini`.

```

IDA View-A      Pseudocode-A      Hex View-1
00000490: .text:0000000180001090      test     rax, rax
00000491: .text:0000000180001093      jnz     short loc_1800010A8
00000492: .text:0000000180001095      mov     rcx, rbp ; hMem
00000493: .text:0000000180001098      call    cs:LocalFree
00000494: .text:000000018000109E      mov     eax, 0FFFFFF00h
00000495: .text:00000001800010A3      jmp     loc_180001118C
00000496: .text:00000001800010A8      ; -----
00000497: .text:00000001800010A8      loc_1800010A8:      lea     rdx, aCreate ; CODE XREF: StartAddress+93!j
00000498: .text:00000001800010A8      ; "Create"
00000499: .text:00000001800010AF      mov     rcx, rax
000004A0: .text:00000001800010AF      ; } // starts at 180001000
000004A1: .text:00000001800010B2      loc_1800010B2:      ; DATA XREF: .rdata:000000018000C628!o
000004A2: .text:00000001800010B2      ; .rdata:000000018000C63C!o ...
000004A3: .text:00000001800010B2      ; _unwind { // _GSHandlerCheck
000004A4: .text:00000001800010B2      mov     [rsp+78h+arg_0], rsi
000004A5: .text:00000001800010BA      call    sub_180001AB0
000004A6: .text:00000001800010BF      lea     rdx, aClose ; "Close"
000004A7: .text:00000001800010C6      mov     rcx, rbx
000004A8: .text:00000001800010C9      mov     rdi, rax
000004A9: .text:00000001800010CC      call    sub_180001AB0
000004AA: .text:00000001800010D1      mov     rcx, cs:qword_18008F2F0
000004AB: .text:00000001800010D8      mov     rsi, rax
000004AC: .text:00000001800010DB      call    rdi
000004AD: .text:00000001800010DD      test    eax, eax
000004AE: .text:00000001800010DF      jz     short loc_1800010E8
000004AF: .text:00000001800010E1      mov     esi, 0F0000004h
000004B0: .text:00000001800010E6      jmp     short loc_1800010EC
000004B1: .text:00000001800010E8      ; -----
000004B2: .text:00000001800010E8      loc_1800010E8:      call    rsi ; CODE XREF: StartAddress+DF!j
000004B3: .text:00000001800010EA      mov     esi, eax
000004B4: .text:00000001800010EC      loc_1800010EC:      mov     rcx, rbx ; CODE XREF: StartAddress+E6!j
000004B5: .text:00000001800010EC      ; lpMem
000004B6: .text:00000001800010EF      call    sub_180001BD0
000004B7: .text:00000001800010F4      xor     eax, eax
000004B8: .text:00000001800010F6      mov     rdi, rbp
000004B9: .text:00000001800010F9      mov     ecx, 7FF00h
000004BA: .text:00000001800010FE      xor     ebp, ebp
000004BB: .text:0000000180001100      lea     r8d, [rax+2] ; dwShareMode
000004BC: .text:0000000180001104      rep     stosb
000004BD: .text:0000000180001106      mov     [rsp+78h+hTemplateFile], rbp ; hTemplateFile
000004BE: .text:0000000180001108      lea     rcx, FileName ; "C:\\Windows\\windows.ini"
000004BF: .text:0000000180001112      xor     r9d, r9d ; lpSecurityAttributes
000004C0: .text:0000000180001115      mov     edx, 40000000h ; dwDesiredAccess
000004C1: .text:000000018000111A      mov     [rsp+78h+dwFlagsAndAttributes], 80h ; dwFlagsAndAttributes
000004C2: .text:0000000180001122      mov     [rsp+78h+dwCreationDisposition], 2 ; dwCreationDisposition
000004C3: .text:000000018000112A      call    cs:CreateFileW
000004C4: .text:0000000180001130      mov     rbx, rax
000004C5: .text:0000000180001133      cmp     rax, 0FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFh
000004C6: .text:0000000180001137      jz     short loc_1800011182
000004C7: .text:0000000180001139      lea     rdx, Format ; "%08X"
000004C8: .text:0000000180001140      lea     rcx, [rsp+78h+Buffer] ; Buffer
000004C9: .text:0000000180001145      mov     r8d, esi
000004CA: .text:0000000180001148      call    sprintf
000004CB: .text:000000018000114D      ;
000004CC: .text:000000018000114D      ;
00000490: 00000490 0000000180001090: StartAddress+90 (Synchronized with Hex View-1)

```

Figure 1: LIGHTSHIFT preparing to load LIGHTSHOW

LIGHTSHOW is a utility that makes use of two primary anti-analysis techniques used to hinder both dynamic and static analysis. To deter static analysis, LIGHTSHOW was observed being packed by VM-Protect. In an effort to thwart dynamic analysis, LIGHTSHOW is targeted to a specific host and requires a specific SHA256 hash corresponding to a specific computer name or the sample will not fully execute. Once FLARE completed the analysis of LIGHTSHOW, we were able to understand how the files %temp%\<random>_SB_SMBUS_SDK.dll and drivers were created on disk.

LIGHTSHOW is a utility that was used by UNC2970 to manipulate kernel data-structures and represents an advancement in DPRK's capabilities to evade detection. To accomplish this, LIGHTSHOW drops a legitimate version of a driver with known vulnerabilities, with a SHA256 hash of

175eed7a4c6de9c3156c7ae16ae85c554959ec350f1c8aaa6dfe8c7e99de3347to

C:\Windows\System32\Drivers with one of the following names chosen at random and appended with mgr:

- circlass
- dmvsc
- hidir
- isapnp
- umpass

LIGHTSHOW then creates the registry key

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\`<service name>` where `<service name>` is the same as the chosen filename without appended mgr. It then creates a registry key with the value name `ImagePath`, which points to the path of the driver. The sample then loads the driver using `NtLoadDriver`. LIGHTSHOW drops and loads a dummy DLL `%temp%\<random>_SB_SMBUS_SDK.dll` to register itself to the driver as a legitimate caller.

Using the vulnerable driver, LIGHTSHOW can perform arbitrary read and write operations to kernel memory. LIGHTSHOW uses this read/write primitive to patch different kernel routines, which are related to the type of facilities an Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) software may use, to enable evasion of said EDR software. After the read and write operations to kernel memory, the sample unloads and deletes `%temp%\<random>_SB_SMBUS_SDK.dll`.

Examining the chain of execution, we see further obfuscation techniques being employed in LIGHTSHOW. UNC2970 has a concerted effort towards obfuscation and employs multiple methods to do this throughout the entire chain of delivery and execution.

```

IDA View-A                                     Hex View-1                                     Structures
.text:00007FEF1551010 var_7EC          = byte ptr -7ECh
.text:00007FEF1551010 var_7E0          = word ptr -7E0h
.text:00007FEF1551010 var_10           = qword ptr -10h
.text:00007FEF1551010 var_s0            = byte ptr 0
.text:00007FEF1551010 arg_0             = qword ptr 10h
.text:00007FEF1551010 arg_8             = qword ptr 18h
.text:00007FEF1551010 arg_10            = qword ptr 20h
.text:00007FEF1551010 arg_18            = qword ptr 28h
.text:00007FEF1551010 ; __unwind { // __GSHandlerCheck
.v .text:00007FEF1551010 mov [rsp+arg_10], rbx
.text:00007FEF1551015 loc_7FEF1551015: ; DATA XREF: sub_7FEF157D4F3:loc_7FEF1573383+o
.text:00007FEF1551015 mov [rsp+arg_18], rdi
.text:00007FEF155101A push rbp
.text:00007FEF155101B lea rbp, [rsp-780h]
.text:00007FEF1551023 sub rsp, 880h
.text:00007FEF155102A mov rax, cs:qword_7FEF1562000
.text:00007FEF1551031 xor rax, rsp ; Non-zero XOR
.text:00007FEF1551034 mov [rbp+780h+var_10], rax
.text:00007FEF155103B mov rbx, rcx
.text:00007FEF155103E lea rcx, [rbp+780h+var_7E0+1]
.text:00007FEF1551042 xor edx, edx
.text:00007FEF1551044 mov r8d, 7CFh
.text:00007FEF155104A mov byte ptr [rbp+780h+var_7E0], 0
.text:00007FEF155104E call sub_7FEF155A3E0
.text:00007FEF1551053 mov r11, gs:30h
.text:00007FEF155105C mov rdi, [r11+60h]
.text:00007FEF1551060 mov [rsp+880h+var_808], 6C64746Eh ; ntdll
.text:00007FEF1551068 mov [rsp+880h+var_804], 6Ch ; 'l'
.text:00007FEF155106F mov [rbp+780h+var_800], 7551744Eh ; NtQueryVirtualMemory
.text:00007FEF1551076 mov [rbp+780h+var_7FC], 56797265h
.text:00007FEF155107D loc_7FEF155107D: ; DATA XREF: sub_7FEF157B49C:loc_7FEF15783C0+o
; sub_7FEF157753A+3744+o
.text:00007FEF155107D mov [rbp+780h+var_7F8], 75747269h
.text:00007FEF1551084 mov [rbp+780h+var_7F4], 654D6C61h
.text:00007FEF155108B mov [rbp+780h+var_7F0], 79726F6Dh
.text:00007FEF1551092 mov [rbp+780h+var_7EC], 0
.text:00007FEF1551096 test rbx, rbx
.text:00007FEF1551099 jnz short loc_7FEF15510A2
.text:00007FEF155109B xor eax, eax
.text:00007FEF155109D jmp loc_7FEF1551183
.text:00007FEF15510A2 ; -----
.text:00007FEF15510A2 loc_7FEF15510A2: ; CODE XREF: Create+89+!j
; sub_7FEF157753A+3744+o
.text:00007FEF15510A2 lea rcx, [rsp+880h+var_808] ; ntdll
.text:00007FEF15510A2 ; } // starts at 7FEF1551010
.text:00007FEF15510A7 loc_7FEF15510A7: ; DATA XREF: .rdata:00007FEF15608A4+o
; .rdata:00007FEF1560888+o ...
.text:00007FEF15510A7 ; __unwind { // __GSHandlerCheck
.text:00007FEF15510A7 mov [rsp+880h+arg_8], rsi
.text:00007FEF15510A7 call sub_7FEF1579D0E
.text:00007FEF15510B4 xchg eax, esp
.text:00007FEF15510B5 lea rdx, [rbp+780h+var_800] ; NtQueryVirtualMemory
.text:00007FEF15510B9 mov rcx, rax
.text:00007FEF15510BC push rcx
000004BC 000007FEF15510BC: Create+AC (Synchronized with Hex View-1)

```

Figure 2: LIGHTSHOW Obfuscation

LIGHTSHOW is another example of tooling that looks to capitalize on the technique of BYOVD. BYOVD is a technique that utilizes the abuse of legitimate and trusted, but vulnerable drivers, to bypass kernel level protections. This technique has been utilized by adversaries ranging from financial actors, such as [UNC3944](#), to espionage actors like [UNC2970](#), which shows its usefulness during intrusion operations. AHNLab recently released a [report](#) on activity tracked as Lazarus Group that focused largely on the use of BYOVD. While Mandiant did not observe the hashes included in the AHNLab report, the use of `SB_SMBUS_SDK.dll` as well as other similarities, such as the exported functions `Create` and `Close`, indicate an overlap between the activity detailed in this blog post and those detailed by AHNLab.

Throughout several incidents we responded to in 2022 that involved UNC2970, we observed them utilizing a small set of vulnerable drivers. This includes the [Dell DBUtil 2.3](#) and the ENE Technology device drivers. UNC2970 utilized both of these drivers in an attempt to evade detection. These two drivers, and many more, are found in the [Kernel Driver Utility \(KDU\)](#) toolkit. With this in mind, it is likely that we will continue to see UNC2970 abuse vulnerable drivers from other vendors.

Mandiant has worked to detect and mitigate BYOVD techniques for a [number of years](#) and has worked closely with industry allies to report vulnerabilities when discovered. During research being carried out on UNC2970 we discovered a [vulnerable driver](#) that the actor had access to, but did not know was vulnerable - essentially making it a 0day in the wild but not being actively exploited. This was verified through our Offensive Task Force who subsequently carried out a notification to the affected organization and reported the vulnerability to MITRE, which was assigned [CVE-2022-42455](#).

Outlook and Implications

Mandiant continues to observe multiple threat actors utilizing BYOVD during intrusion operations. Because this TTP provides adversaries an effective means to bypass and mitigate EDR, we assess that it will continue to be utilized and adapted into actor tooling. The continued targeting of security researchers by UNC2970 also provides an interesting way that the group can potentially continue to expand their toolset to gain an upper hand with BYOVD.

Mitigations

Because attestation signing is a legitimate Microsoft program and the resulting drivers are signed with Microsoft certificates, execution-time detection is made much more difficult as most EDR tools and Anti-Viruses will allow binaries signed with Microsoft certificates to load. The recent blog post released by Mandiant on [UNC3944 driver operations](#) details multiple techniques that can be used by organizations to hunt for the abuse of attestation signing. If you haven't already, don't forget to read [part one on North Korea's UNC2970](#). Additionally, Microsoft recently released a report detailing how organizations can [harden their environment against potentially vulnerable third-party developed drivers](#).

Indicators of Compromise

MD5	Signature
def6f91614cb47888f03658b28a1bda6	XOR'd LIGHTSHIFT

9176f177bd88686c6beb29d8bb05f20c	LIGHTSHIFT
ad452d161782290ad5004b2c9497074f	LIGHTSHOW
7e6e2ed880c7ab115fca68136051f9ce	ENE Driver
SB_SMBUS_SDK.dll	LIGHTSHOW Dummy DLL
C:\Windows\windows.ini	LIGHTSHIFT Output

Signatures

LIGHTSHIFT

```
rule M_Code_LIGHTSHIFT
{
    meta:
        author = "Mandiant"
        description = "Hunting rule for LIGHTSHIFT"
        sha256 =
"ce501fd5c96223fb17d3fed0da310ea121ad83c463849059418639d211933aa4"
        strings:
            $p00_0 = {488b7c24??448d40??48037c24??488bcfff15[4]817c24[5]74??
488b4b??33d2}
            $p00_1 = {498d7c01??8b47??85c075??496345??85c07e??8b0f41b9}
        condition:
            uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and
            (
                ($p00_0 in (750..11000) and $p00_1 in (0..8200))
            )
}
```

LIGHTSHOW

rule M_Code_LIGHTSHOW

{

meta:

author = "Mandiant"

description = "Hunting rule For LIGHTSHOW."

md5 =

"ee5057da3e38b934dae15644c6eb24507fb5a187630c75725075b24a70065452"

strings:

\$E01 = { 46 75 64 4d 6f 64 75 6c 65 2e 64 6c 6c }

\$I01 = { 62 63 72 79 70 74 2e 64 6c 6c }

\$I02 = { 4b 45 52 4e 45 4c 33 32 2e 64 6c 6c }

\$I03 = { 75 73 65 72 33 32 2e 64 6c 6c 00 }

\$H1 = { 4D 5A 90 00 }

\$H2 = { 69 73 20 70 72 6F 67 72 61 6D 20 63 61 6E 6E 6F }

\$F01 = { 47 65 74 4d 6f 64 75 6c 65 46 69 6c 65 4e 61 6d 65 57 }

\$F02 = { 47 65 74 4d 6f 64 75 6c 65 48 61 6e 64 6c 65 41 }

\$F03 = { 47 65 74 46 69 6c 65 54 79 70 65 }

\$F04 = { 47 65 74 56 65 72 73 69 6f 6e }

\$F05 = { 51 75 65 72 79 53 65 72 76 69 63 65 53 74 61 74 75 73 }

\$F06 = { 42 43 72 79 70 74 4f 70 65 6e 41 6c 67 6f 72 69 74 68
6d 50 72 6f 76 69 64 65 72 }

\$M01 = { 68 2d 79 6e b1 }

\$M02 = { 68 ea 71 c2 55 }

\$M03 = { 66 b8 ad eb }

\$M04 = { 4c 8d 2c 6d b3 6c 05 39 }

\$M05 = { 48 8d 2c 95 08 9d ec 9a }

\$S01 = { 48 8d 0c f5 a3 cd 0a eb }

\$S02 = { 81 f9 7f 56 e6 0a }

condition:

(\$H1 in (0..2048)) and (\$H2 in (0..2048)) and filesize < 100MB and
filesize > 5KB and all of (\$M0*) and all of (\$E*) and all of (\$I0*) and 6 of
(\$F0*) and all of (\$S0*)

}