


BumbleBee: Round Two

 thefirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/

September 26, 2022

Bumblebee Execution



In this intrusion from May 2022, the threat actors used BumbleBee as the initial access vector. BumbleBee has been identified as an initial access vector utilized by several ransomware affiliates.

In this intrusion, we see the threat actor use BumbleBee to deploy Cobalt Strike and Meterpreter. The threat actor then used RDP and SMB to move around the network looking at backup systems and file shares before being evicted from the network.

Case Summary

The intrusion began with the delivery of an ISO file containing a LNK file and a BumbleBee payload in the form of a hidden DLL file. A user on a workstation mounted the ISO file and executed the LNK file, running the Bumblebee payload.

Around 15 minutes after the execution of BumbleBee, multiple processes were spawned with the goal of injecting Meterpreter into each of them. After the threat actors gained access with Meterpreter, they began conducting reconnaissance on the workstation and network, including querying domain controllers, mapping domain joined computers, enumerating Active Directory trusts, and listing Domain Admin accounts. All of this first wave of discovery relied on built in Windows utilities like nltest, arp, net, ping, nbtstat, and nslookup.

BumbleBee executed under a user with local administrator privileges on all workstations in the environment. At around six hours after initial execution, we observed a new process created that was then used to host a Cobalt Strike beacon, from the same command and control server observed in a prior BumbleBee case. This beacon reprised discovery activity, but also cut a common command short `net user /dom` instead of `/domain`, whether from keyboard laziness or a trick to trip-up detections. The threat actor then used their access to execute procdump via a remote service creation with the intention of dumping credentials from LSASS from an adjacent workstation on the network.

Next, the threat actors moved laterally via RDP to a server. A new local user, `sql_admin`, was created and added to the local administrator's group and AnyDesk remote access software was installed. Through the AnyDesk session, the threat actor was observed connecting to a file share and accessing multiple documents related to cyber insurance and spreadsheets with passwords.

A second round of enumeration was observed on the beachhead using AdFind, which was executed via the Cobalt Strike beacon on the system. Following this second round of enumeration, the threat actor moved latterly to a server hosting backups, via RDP and interacted with the backup console. From the backup system, the threat actors also opened internet explorer and attempted to load the environment's mail server, likely checking for Outlook Web Access.

A third round of enumeration, this time taking place from the first lateral server host, was observed via a script named '1.bat' that would ping all computers in the environment. Following this third round of enumeration the threat actors were evicted from the environment and no further impact was observed.

We assess with medium confidence this intrusion was related to pre-ransomware activity due to the tool set and techniques the actor displayed.


Services

We offer multiple services including a [Threat Feed service](#) which tracks Command and Control frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, BumbleBee, Covenant, Metasploit, Empire, PoshC2, etc. More information on this service and others can be found [here](#).

We also have artifacts and IOCs available from this case such as pcaps, memory captures, files, event logs including Sysmon, Kape packages, and more, under our [Security Researcher and Organization](#) services.

Timeline

Bumblebee: Round Two




Analysis and reporting completed by @MetallicHack, @iiamaleks & @svch0st

Initial Access

The BumbleBee malware has been following the trend of using the effective combination of utilizing an .iso image containing a .lnk and .dll file. We have observed the same behavior with other major malware distributors in previous reports:

- IcedID – [Stolen Images Campaign Ends in Conti Ransomware](#)
- BazarLoader – [Diavol Ransomware](#)

Using the event log, “Microsoft-Windows-VHDMP-Operational.evtx”, we can quickly find when the user mounted the .iso.



Level	Date and Time	Source	Event ID	Task Category
Information		VHDMP	14	Virtual Disk Handle Close
Information		VHDMP	30	Virtual Disk Handle Close
Information		VHDMP	1	Surface Virtual Disk
Information		VHDMP	25	Surface Virtual Disk
Information		VHDMP	12	Virtual Disk Handle Create
Information		VHDMP	23	Filewrapper Handle Create
Information		VHDMP	22	Filewrapper Handle Create
Information		VHDMP	23	Filewrapper Handle Create
Information		VHDMP	22	Filewrapper Handle Create
Information		VHDMP	23	Filewrapper Handle Create
Information		VHDMP	22	Filewrapper Handle Create
Information		VHDMP	15	None
Information		VHDMP	21	Virtual Disk Handle Create

Event 12, VHDMP

General Details

Handle for virtual disk '\\?C:\Users\██████████\Desktop\document.iso' created successfully. VM ID = {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}, Type = ISO, Version = 1, Flags = 0x0, AccessMask = 0xD0000, WriteDepth = 0, GetInfoOnly = false, ReadOnly = false, HandleContext = 0xffffdf8580de7a80, VirtualDisk = 0xffffdf8582382040.

Upon clicking the LNK file the BumbleBee payload was executed.



EventId	MapDescription	PayloadData6	ExecutableInfo
1	Process creation	ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE	"C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe" tamirlan.dll,EdHVntqdwT

```
"C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe" rundll32.exe tamirlan.dll,EdHVntqdwT
```

Execution

Following the user mounting the .iso file, they clicked on a .lnk file `documents.lnk`. As noted in previous [reports](#), the .dll is hidden from the user unless they display hidden items in explorer like so:

› This PC › DVD Drive (H:) 79674b60

Name	Type	Size
documents	Shortcut	2 KB
tamirlan.dll	Application extens...	1,094 KB

The .lnk contains instructions to execute a specific exported function with the BumbleBee DLL file.

```
Relative Path: ..\..\..\..\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe
Arguments: tamirlan.dll,EdHVntqdWt
Icon Location: %systemroot%\system32\imageres.dll
```

When the .lnk was double clicked by the user, the BumbleBee malware `tamirlan.dll` was executed:


```
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe tamirlan.dll,EdHVntqdWt
```

The output of `LECmd.exe`, when used on `documents.lnk`, provided additional context to where and when this .lnk file was created:

```
>> Tracker database block
Machine ID: user-pc
MAC Address: 9a:5b:d6:3e:47:ec
MAC Vendor: (Unknown vendor)
Creation: <REDACTED DATE>
```

Approximately 5 seconds after execution, the `rundll32.exe` process contacted the IP `154.56.0.221`. More information on this traffic is covered in the Command and Control section below.

An interesting tactic of note, was the use of WMI and COM function calls to start the process, used to inject into. The BumbleBee loader uses WMI to start new process by calling COM functions to create a new process. Below you can see the COM instance creation followed by defining the WMI namespace and WMI object being created – “Win32_Process”.



Analysis of the loader found that a function of the malware chooses 1 of 3 target processes before injecting the supplied code:

- C:\Program Files\Windows Mail\wabmig.exe
- C:\Program Files\Windows Mail\wab.exe
- C:\Program Files\Windows Photo Viewer\ImagingDevices.exe


```

:000001C7F428E9A0 off_1C7F428E9A0 dq offset aWindowsPhotoVi
:000001C7F428E9A0 ; DATA XREF: sub_1C7F4219480+1435↑
:000001C7F428E9A0 ; DATA XREF: sub_1C7F4219480+151A↑
:000001C7F428E9A0 ; "\\Windows Photo Viewer\\ImagingDevices"...
:000001C7F428E9A8 dq offset aWindowsMailWab ; "\\Windows Mail\\wab.exe"
:000001C7F428E9B0 dq offset aWindowsMailWab_0 ; "\\Windows Mail\\wabmig.exe"

```


This resulted in new processes not being a child of BumbleBee, but rather WmiPrvSE.exe.

Map Description	Payload Data6	Executable Info
Process creation	ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE	"C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe" tamirlan.dll,EdHVntqdwit
Process creation	ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmioprse.exe -secured -Embedding	"C:\Program Files\Windows Photo Viewer\ImagingDevices.exe"
Process creation	ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmioprse.exe -secured -Embedding	"C:\Program Files\Windows Mail\wabmig.exe"
Process creation	ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmioprse.exe -secured -Embedding	"C:\Program Files\Windows Mail\wabmig.exe"
Process creation	ParentCommandLine: "C:\Program Files\Windows Mail\wabmig.exe"	C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C ipconfig /all

In this intrusion, an instance of `C:\Program Files\Windows Photo Viewer\ImagingDevices.exe` was created and accessed by the BumbleBee `rundll32.exe` process. Shortly after this interaction, the process started communicating to a Meterpreter C2 `3.85.198.66`. This process spawned `cmd.exe` and several typical discovery commands that are covered in more detail below.

The second process, was spawned the WMI technique was an instance of `C:\Program Files\Windows Mail\wabmig.exe`. This process was used to host both a session to another Meterpreter C2 `50.16.62.87` and a Cobalt Strike C2 server `45.153.243.142`, which was then used to conduct the majority of additional activity including credential dumping and discovery exercises highlighted below. The pivot to using Cobalt Strike began around 6 hours after the execution of the BumbleBee loader.

Bumblebee Execution




Persistence

A new local administrator user was created on a server to facilitate persistence on the machine. The user account was observed to be accessed via an AnyDesk session on the same machine.

```
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
→ net user sql_admin [email protected]! /add
→ net localgroup Administrators sql_admin /ADD
```

In addition, AnyDesk was installed as a service:



Defense Evasion

The BumbleBee loader itself uses several defense evasion and anti-analysis techniques. As detailed in the Execution section, the use of WMI to spawn new processes is a known technique to evade any parent/child process heuristics or detections.

Anti-Analysis

Once the malware is unpacked, it becomes quite apparent to what the malware author(s) were looking for—

Known malware analysis process names running:

```

mov     [rbp+30h+var_10], rax
lea     rax, aOlllydbgExe ; "ollydbg.exe"
xor     ebx, ebx
mov     [rsp+130h+var_110], rax
lea     rax, aProcessHackerE ; "ProcessHacker.exe"
mov     [rsp+130h+var_108], rax
lea     rax, aTcpviewExe ; "tcpview.exe"
mov     [rsp+130h+var_100], rax
lea     rax, aAutorunsExe ; "autoruns.exe"
mov     [rsp+130h+var_F8], rax
lea     rax, aAutorunscExe ; "autorunsc.exe"
mov     [rsp+130h+var_F0], rax
lea     rax, aFilemonExe ; "filemon.exe"
mov     [rsp+130h+var_E8], rax
lea     rax, aProcmonExe ; "procmon.exe"
mov     [rsp+130h+var_E0], rax
lea     rax, aRegmonExe ; "regmon.exe"
mov     [rsp+130h+var_D8], rax
lea     rax, aProcexpExe ; "procexp.exe"
mov     [rsp+130h+var_D0], rax
lea     rax, aIdaqExe ; "idaq.exe"
mov     [rsp+130h+var_C8], rax
lea     rax, aIdaq64Exe ; "idaq64.exe"
mov     [rsp+130h+var_C0], rax
lea     rax, aImmunitydebugg ; "ImmunityDebugger.exe"
mov     [rsp+130h+var_B8], rax
lea     rax, aWiresharkExe ; "Wireshark.exe"
mov     [rbp+30h+var_B0], rax
lea     rax, aDumpcapExe ; "dumpcap.exe"
mov     [rbp+30h+var_A8], rax
lea     rax, aHookexplorerEx ; "HookExplorer.exe"
mov     [rbp+30h+var_A0], rax
lea     rax, aImportrecExe ; "ImportREC.exe"
mov     [rbp+30h+var_98], rax
lea     rax, aPetoolsExe ; "PETools.exe"
mov     [rbp+30h+var_90], rax
lea     rax, aLordpeExe ; "LordPE.exe"
mov     [rbp+30h+var_88], rax
lea     rax, aSysinspectorEx ; "SysInspector.exe"
mov     [rbp+30h+var_80], rax
lea     rax, aProcAnalyzerEx ; "proc_analyzer.exe"
mov     [rbp+30h+var_78], rax
lea     rax, aSysanalyzerExe ; "sysAnalyzer.exe"
mov     [rbp+30h+var_70], rax
lea     rax, aSniffHitExe ; "sniff_hit.exe"
mov     [rbp+30h+var_68], rax
lea     rax, aWindbgExe ; "windbg.exe"
mov     [rbp+30h+var_60], rax
lea     rax, aJoeboxcontrolE ; "joeboxcontrol.exe"
mov     [rbp+30h+var_58], rax
lea     rax, aJoeboxserverEx ; "joeboxserver.exe"
mov     [rbp+30h+var_50], rax
mov     [rbp+30h+var_48], rax
lea     rax, aResourcehacker ; "ResourceHacker.exe"
mov     [rbp+30h+var_40], rax
lea     rax, aX32dbgExe ; "x32dbg.exe"
mov     [rbp+30h+var_38], rax
lea     rax, aX64dbgExe ; "x64dbg.exe"
mov     [rbp+30h+var_30], rax
lea     rax, aFiddlerExe ; "Fiddler.exe"
mov     [rbp+30h+var_28], rax
lea     rax, aHttpdebuggerEx ; "httpdebugger.exe"
mov     [rbp+30h+var_20], rax

```

```
mov     [rsp+2D8h+var_20], rax
nop     dword ptr [rax+00h]
```

Known sandbox usernames (Sorry if your name is Peter Wilson, no malware for you 😞):

```
mov     [rsp+2D8h+var_18], rax
lea     rax, aCurrentuser ; "CurrentUser"
mov     [rsp+2D8h+pcbBuffer], 101h
mov     [rsp+2D8h+Str1], rax
mov     ecx, 202h
lea     rax, aSandbox ; "Sandbox"
mov     [rsp+2D8h+var_2A0], rax
lea     rax, aEmily ; "Emily"
mov     [rsp+2D8h+var_298], rax
lea     rax, aHapubws ; "HAPUBWS"
mov     [rsp+2D8h+var_290], rax
lea     rax, aHongLee ; "Hong Lee"
mov     [rsp+2D8h+var_288], rax
lea     rax, aItAdmin ; "IT-ADMIN"
mov     [rsp+2D8h+var_280], rax
lea     rax, aJohnson ; "Johnson"
mov     [rsp+2D8h+var_278], rax
lea     rax, aMiller ; "Miller"
mov     [rsp+2D8h+var_270], rax
lea     rax, aMilozs ; "milozs"
mov     [rsp+2D8h+var_268], rax
lea     rax, aPeterWilson ; "Peter Wilson"
mov     [rsp+2D8h+var_260], rax
lea     rax, aTimmy ; "timmy"
mov     [r11-258h], rax
lea     rax, aSandBox ; "sand box"
mov     [r11-250h], rax
lea     rax, aMalware ; "malware"
mov     [r11-248h], rax
lea     rax, aMaltest ; "maltest"
mov     [r11-240h], rax
lea     rax, aTestUser ; "test user"
mov     [r11-238h], rax
lea     rax, aVirus ; "virus"
mov     [r11-230h], rax
lea     rax, aJohnDoe ; "John Doe"
mov     [r11-228h], rax
call    j__malloc_base
mov     rsi, rax
test    rax, rax
jz      short loc_1C7F425394B
```

```
lea     rdx, [rsp+2D8h+pcbBuffer] ; pcbBuffer
mov     rcx, rax ; lpBuffer
call    cs:GetUserNameW
test    eax, eax
jnz     short loc_1C7F4253969
```

Specific Virtualization Software files on disk and registry keys (Virtual Box, Qemu, Parallels), example:

```
sub     rsp, 6F0h
mov     rax, cs:__security_cookie
xor     rax, rsp
mov     [rbp+5F0h+var_10], rax
lea     rax, aSystem32Driver ; "System32\\drivers\\VBoxMouse.sys"
xor     edx, edx ; Val
mov     [rsp+6F0h+pszFile], rax
lea     rcx, [rbp+5F0h+Buffer] ; Dst
lea     rax, aSystem32Driver_0 ; "System32\\drivers\\VBoxGuest.sys"
mov     r8d, 208h ; Size
mov     [rsp+6F0h+var_688], rax
lea     rax, aSystem32Driver_1 ; "System32\\drivers\\VBoxSF.sys"
mov     [rsp+6F0h+var_680], rax
lea     rax, aSystem32Driver_2 ; "System32\\drivers\\VBoxVideo.sys"
mov     [rsp+6F0h+var_6A8], rax
lea     rax, aSystem32Vboxdi ; "System32\\vboxdisp.dll"
mov     [rsp+6F0h+var_6A0], rax
lea     rax, aSystem32Vboxho ; "System32\\vboxhook.dll"
mov     [rsp+6F0h+var_698], rax

check_vbox_files:
lea     rax, aSystem32Vboxmr ; "System32\\vboxmrxnp.dll"
mov     [rsp+6F0h+var_690], rax
lea     rax, aSystem32Vboxog ; "System32\\vboxogl.dll"
mov     [rsp+6F0h+var_688], rax
lea     rax, aSystem32Vboxog_0 ; "System32\\vboxoglarrayspu.dll"
mov     [rsp+6F0h+var_680], rax
lea     rax, aSystem32Vboxog_1 ; "System32\\vboxoglcrutil.dll"
mov     [rsp+6F0h+var_678], rax
lea     rax, aSystem32Vboxog_2 ; "System32\\vboxoglerrorspu.dll"
mov     [rbp+5F0h+var_670], rax
lea     rax, aSystem32Vboxog_3 ; "System32\\vboxoglfeedbackspu.dll"
mov     [rbp+5F0h+var_668], rax
lea     rax, aSystem32Vboxog_4 ; "System32\\vboxoglpackspu.dll"
mov     [rbp+5F0h+var_660], rax
lea     rax, aSystem32Vboxog_5 ; "System32\\vboxoglpassthroughspu.dll"
mov     [rbp+5F0h+var_658], rax
lea     rax, aSystem32Vboxse ; "System32\\vboxservice.exe"
mov     [rbp+5F0h+var_650], rax
lea     rax, aSystem32Vboxtr ; "System32\\vboxtray.exe"
mov     [rbp+5F0h+var_648], rax
lea     rax, aSystem32Vboxco ; "System32\\VBoxControl.exe"
mov     [rbp+5F0h+var_640], rax
call    memset
xor     edx, edx ; Val
lea     rcx, [rbp+5F0h+pszDest] ; Dst
mov     r8d, 208h ; Size
call    memset
xor     edi, edi
```

Process Injection

Create Remote Thread – The malware used the win32 function CreateRemoteThread in order to execute code in rundll32.exe.

Event 8, Sysmon

General Details

```
CreateRemoteThread detected:  
RuleName: technique_id=T1055,technique_name=Process Injection  
UtcTime: DAY 1 18:28:04.837  
SourceProcessGuid: {23cccd48-dd53-6287-3107-000000000f00}  
SourceProcessId: 7808  
SourceImage: C:\Program Files\Windows Mail\wabmig.exe  
TargetProcessGuid: {23cccd48-ddb4-6287-4207-000000000f00}  
TargetProcessId: 7024  
TargetImage: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe  
NewThreadId: 4420  
StartAddress: 0x000001C3C2030D3E  
StartModule: -  
StartFunction: -
```

Log Name: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

Named Pipes – Two named pipes were created in order to establish inter-process communications (IPC) between rundll32.exe and wabmig.exe.

Event.EventData.Image	Event.System.EventID	Event.EventData.EventType	Event.EventData.PipeName	Event.EventData.RuleName
C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe	17	CreatePipe	\postex_7c7b	-
C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe	17	CreatePipe	\postex_515f	-
C:\Program Files\Windows Mail\wabmig.exe	18	ConnectPipe	\postex_7c7b	technique_id=T1055; Possible Cobalt Strike post-exploitation jobs.
C:\Program Files\Windows Mail\wabmig.exe	18	ConnectPipe	\postex_515f	technique_id=T1055; Possible Cobalt Strike post-exploitation jobs.

\postex_515f
\postex_7c7b

Credential Access

ProcDump

A remote service was created on one of the workstations in order to dump lsass.

```
A service was installed in the system.
```

```
Service Name: 1952820  
Service File Name: C:\programdata\procdump64.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe C:\programdata\lsass.dmp  
Service Type: user mode service  
Service Start Type: demand start  
Service Account: LocalSystem
```

Event 7045 from Service Control Manager

```
1 "zeek.smb_files", "ProgramData\procdump64.exe, \\  
2 "zeek.smb_files", "ProgramData\procdump64.exe, \\  
3 "zeek.smb_files", "ProgramData\procdump64.exe, \\  
4 "zeek.smb_files", "ProgramData\procdump64.exe, \\
```

```
C:\programdata\procdump64.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe C:\programdata\lsass.dmp
```

Discovery

The first discovery stage includes TTPs that we have seen in multiple cases, such as trusts discovery, domain admin group discovery, network discovery and process enumeration.

```
C:\Program Files\Windows Mail\wabmig.exe  
→ C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C ipconfig /all  
→ C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C ping -n 1 <REDACTED_DOMAIN_NAME>  
→ C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C nltest /dclist:  
→ C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C nltest /domain_trusts  
→ C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C net group "domain admins" /domain  
→ C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C tasklist /v /s <REDACTED_IP>
```


AdFind

AdFind.exe was renamed to af.exe and was used by threat actors in order to enumerate AD users, computers, OU, trusts, subnets and groups.

```
C:\Program Files\Windows Mail\wabmig.exe  
→ C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C af.exe -f "(objectcategory=person)" > ad_users.txt  
→ C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C af.exe -f "objectcategory=computer" >  
ad_computers.txt  
→ C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C af.exe -f "(objectcategory=organizationalUnit)" >  
ad_ous.txt  
→ C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C af.exe -sc trustdmp > trustdmp.txt  
→ C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C af.exe -subnets -f (objectCategory=subnet) >  
subnets.txt  
→ C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C af.exe -f "(objectcategory=group)" > ad_group.txt  
→ C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C af.exe -gcb -sc trustdmp > trustdmp.txt
```

Lateral Movement

The threat actor was observed moving via RDP throughout the network with a Domain Admin account.



As mentioned in Credential Access, the threat actor used remote services to execute commands on remote hosts.

```
A service was installed in the system.  
  
Service Name: 1952820  
Service File Name: C:\programdata\procdump64.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe C:\programdata\lsass.dmp  
Service Type: user mode service  
Service Start Type: demand start  
Service Account: LocalSystem
```

SMB was used to transfer the various tools laterally, as needed in the environment, like procdump.exe and AnyDesk executables.

127	171.576038	10	10	TCP	60	52092	-	445	[ACK]	Seq=9138	Ack=34486	Win=262400	Len=0	
128	175.270051	10	10	SMB2	250					Create Request	File: ProgramData			
129	175.270631	10	10	SMB2	298					Create Response	File: ProgramData			
130	175.271815	10	10	SMB2	146					Close Request	File: ProgramData			
131	175.272487	10	10	SMB2	182					Close Response				
132	175.273335	10	10	SMB2	414					Create Request	File: ProgramData\procdump64.exe			
133	175.274729	10	10	SMB2	410					Create Response	File: ProgramData\procdump64.exe			
134	175.279110	10	10	TCP	1514	52092	-	445	[ACK]	Seq=9786	Ack=35214	Win=261632	Len=1460	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
135	175.279110	10	10	TCP	1514	52092	-	445	[ACK]	Seq=11246	Ack=35214	Win=261632	Len=1460	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
136	175.279110	10	10	TCP	1514	52092	-	445	[ACK]	Seq=12796	Ack=35214	Win=261632	Len=1460	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
137	175.279110	10	10	TCP	1514	52092	-	445	[ACK]	Seq=14166	Ack=35214	Win=261632	Len=1460	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
138	175.279110	10	10	TCP	1514	52092	-	445	[ACK]	Seq=15626	Ack=35214	Win=261632	Len=1460	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
139	175.279110	10	10	TCP	1514	52092	-	445	[ACK]	Seq=17086	Ack=35214	Win=261632	Len=1460	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
140	175.279110	10	10	TCP	1514	52092	-	445	[ACK]	Seq=18546	Ack=35214	Win=261632	Len=1460	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
141	175.279110	10	10	TCP	1514	52092	-	445	[ACK]	Seq=20006	Ack=35214	Win=261632	Len=1460	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
142	175.279167	10	10	TCP	1514	52092	-	445	[ACK]	Seq=21466	Ack=35214	Win=261632	Len=1460	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
143	175.279167	10	10	TCP	1514	52092	-	445	[ACK]	Seq=22926	Ack=35214	Win=261632	Len=1460	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
144	175.279167	10	10	TCP	1514	52092	-	445	[ACK]	Seq=24386	Ack=35214	Win=261632	Len=1460	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
145	175.279167	10	10	TCP	1514	52092	-	445	[ACK]	Seq=25846	Ack=35214	Win=261632	Len=1460	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
146	175.279167	10	10	TCP	1514	52092	-	445	[ACK]	Seq=27306	Ack=35214	Win=261632	Len=1460	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
147	175.279167	10	10	TCP	1514	52092	-	445	[ACK]	Seq=28766	Ack=35214	Win=261632	Len=1460	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
148	175.279167	10	10	TCP	1514	52092	-	445	[ACK]	Seq=30226	Ack=35214	Win=261632	Len=1460	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
149	175.279167	10	10	TCP	1514	52092	-	445	[ACK]	Seq=31686	Ack=35214	Win=261632	Len=1460	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]

```

Frame 133: 410 bytes on wire (3280 bits), 410 bytes captured (3280 bits)
  Ethernet II, Src: ..., Dst: ...
  Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.10.10.1, Dst: 10.10.10.1
  Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 445, Dst Port: 52092, Seq: 34858, Ack: 9786, Len: 356
  NetBIOS Session Service
  SMB2 (Server Message Block Protocol version 2)
    SMB2 Header
    Create Response (0x05)
      StructureSize: 0x0059
      Oplock: Lease (0xff)
      Response Flags: 0x00
      Create Action: The file did not exist but was created (2)
      Create:
        Last Access:
        Last Write:
        Last Change:
        Allocation Size: 0
        End Of File: 0
      File Attributes: 0x00002020
      Reserved: 00000000
      GUID handle File: ProgramData\procdump64.exe
      Blob Offset: 0x00000098
      Blob Length: 200
      ExtraInfo SMB2_CREATE_QUERY_MAXIMAL_ACCESS_REQUEST SMB2_CREATE_REQUEST_LEASE SMB2_CREATE_DURABLE_HANDLE_REQUEST_V2 SMB2_CREATE_QUERY_ON_DISK_ID

```

event_dataset	source_address	destination_address	zeek_smb_files_path	file_name	zeek_smb_files_action
zeek_smb_files	10.10.10.1	10.10.10.1	\\10.10.10.1\c\$	<share_root>	SMB::FILE_OPEN
zeek_smb_files	10.10.10.1	10.10.10.1	\\10.10.10.1\c\$	ProgramData\AnyDesk (1).exe	SMB::FILE_OPEN
zeek_smb_files	10.10.10.1	10.10.10.1	\\10.10.10.1\c\$	ProgramData\AnyDesk (1).exe	SMB::FILE_OPEN
zeek_smb_files	10.10.10.1	10.10.10.1	\\10.10.10.1\c\$	ProgramData	SMB::FILE_OPEN
zeek_smb_files	10.10.10.1	10.10.10.1	\\10.10.10.1\c\$	ProgramData\AnyDesk (1).exe	SMB::FILE_OPEN
zeek_smb_files	10.10.10.1	10.10.10.1	\\10.10.10.1\c\$	ProgramData\AnyDesk (1).exe	SMB::FILE_OPEN
zeek_smb_files	10.10.10.1	10.10.10.1	\\10.10.10.1\c\$	ProgramData\AnyDesk (1).exe	SMB::FILE_OPEN
zeek_smb_files	10.10.10.1	10.10.10.1	\\10.10.10.1\c\$	ProgramData\AnyDesk (1).exe	SMB::FILE_OPEN
zeek_smb_files	10.10.10.1	10.10.10.1	\\10.10.10.1\c\$	ProgramData\AnyDesk (1).exe	SMB::FILE_OPEN
zeek_smb_files	10.10.10.1	10.10.10.1	\\10.10.10.1\c\$	ProgramData\AnyDesk (1).exe	SMB::FILE_OPEN
zeek_smb_files	10.10.10.1	10.10.10.1	\\10.10.10.1\c\$	ProgramData\AnyDesk (1).exe	SMB::FILE_OPEN
zeek_smb_files	10.10.10.1	10.10.10.1	\\10.10.10.1\c\$	ProgramData\AnyDesk (1).exe	SMB::FILE_OPEN
zeek_smb_files	10.10.10.1	10.10.10.1	\\10.10.10.1\c\$	ProgramData\AnyDesk (1).exe	SMB::FILE_OPEN
zeek_smb_files	10.10.10.1	10.10.10.1	\\10.10.10.1\c\$	Program Files (x86)	SMB::FILE_OPEN
zeek_smb_files	10.10.10.1	10.10.10.1	\\10.10.10.1\c\$	ProgramData\AnyDesk (1).exe	SMB::FILE_OPEN
zeek_smb_files	10.10.10.1	10.10.10.1	\\10.10.10.1\c\$	ProgramData\AnyDesk (1).exe	SMB::FILE_DELETE

Collection

The threat actor accessed multiple documents and folders from a remote file server. The SMB share was accessed through a compromised server via an AnyDesk session.

Eventid	MapDescription	PayloadData6	ExecutableInfo
1	Process creation	ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE	"C:\Program Files\Windows NT\Accessories\WORDPAD.EXE" "C:\Users\... (Shares)\Contracts\... docx"
1	Process creation	ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE	"C:\Program Files\Windows NT\Accessories\WORDPAD.EXE" "C:\Users\... (Shares)\Contracts\... docx"

The Isass dump file ran remotely, was copied to the beachhead through the admin share C\$. After being copied, the file was zipped using 7za.exe (7-zip), in preparation for exfiltration.

```
C:\Program Files\Windows Mail\wabmig.exe
  → C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C copy \\
<REMOTE_WORKSTATION>\C$\ProgramData\lsass.dmp c:\programdata\lsass.dmp
  → C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C 7za.exe a -tzip -mx5 c:\programdata\lsass.zip
c:\programdata\lsass.dmp
```

Command and Control

BumbleBee

154.56.0.221:443
64.44.101.250:443

JA3: c12f54a3f91dc7bafd92cb59fe009a35
JA3s: 76c691f46143bf86e2d1bb73c6187767

Certificate: [ac:18:a0:22:b2:ef:65:c8:85:5e:1f:eb:f5:35:23:28:89:3a:5d:f9]
Not Before: 2022/05/19 07:40:24 UTC
Not After: 2023/05/19 07:40:24 UTC
Issuer Org: Internet Widgits Pty Ltd
Subject Org: Internet Widgits Pty Ltd
Public Algorithm: rsaEncryption

Certificate: [0f:a6:76:b0:de:4c:f6:5e:a8:35:60:94:60:69:2c:2c:9c:cb:11:5c]
Not Before: 2022/05/19 07:48:30 UTC
Not After: 2023/05/19 07:48:30 UTC
Issuer Org: Internet Widgits Pty Ltd
Subject Org: Internet Widgits Pty Ltd
Public Algorithm: rsaEncryption

Meterpreter

ec2-3-85-198-66.compute-1.amazonaws.com
3.85.198.66:443

JA3: ce5f3254611a8c095a3d821d44539877
JA3s: ec74a5c51106f0419184d0dd08fb05bc

Certificate: [e5:a3:1d:28:ee:34:4f:9d:99:b8:a9:6e:b4:a9:d0:1f:63:43:3c:ac]
Not Before: 2021/05/03 23:37:39 UTC
Not After: 2027/05/02 23:37:39 UTC
Issuer Org: Stracke, Lakin and Windler
Subject Common: stracke.lakin.windler.net
Subject Org: Stracke, Lakin and Windler
Public Algorithm: rsaEncryption

Certificate: [84:38:01:51:ba:46:74:89:b3:2a:67:57:b7:a1:4a:5b:49:4a:b9:03]
Not Before: 2020/03/19 06:49:58 UTC
Not After: 2026/03/18 06:49:58 UTC
Issuer Org: Reilly-Carroll
Subject Common: reilly.carroll.com
Subject Org: Reilly-Carroll
Public Algorithm: rsaEncryption

ec2-50-16-62-87.compute-1.amazonaws.com
50.16.62.87:443

JA3: ce5f3254611a8c095a3d821d44539877
JA3s: ec74a5c51106f0419184d0dd08fb05bc

Certificate: [6c:0e:6d:6e:d8:06:92:c6:9a:13:2a:ee:d7:8c:9d:15:63:5e:e9:f2]
Not Before: 2020/09/03 16:14:07 UTC
Not After: 2024/09/02 16:14:07 UTC
Issuer Org: Jerde-Kreiger
Subject Common: jerde.kreiger.info
Subject Org: Jerde-Kreiger
Public Algorithm: rsaEncryption

Cobalt Strike

This C2 server was observed in a previous [BumbleBee case](#).

https://fuvataren.com
45.153.243.142:443

JA3: a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1
JA3s: ae4edc6faf64d08308082ad26be60767

Certificate: [6c:54:cc:ce:ca:da:8b:d3:12:98:13:d5:85:52:81:8a:9d:74:4f:fb]
Not Before: 2022/04/15 00:00:00 UTC
Not After: 2023/04/15 23:59:59 UTC
Issuer Org: Sectigo Limited
Subject Common: fuvataren.com [fuvataren.com ,www.fuvataren.com]
Public Algorithm: rsaEncryption

Configuration

```

{
  "beacontype": [
    "HTTPS"
  ],
  "sleeptime": 5000,
  "jitter": 24,
  "maxgetsize": 1398708,
  "spawnto": "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==",
  "license_id": 1580103814,
  "cfg_caution": false,
  "kill_date": null,
  "server": {
    "hostname": "fuvataren.com",
    "port": 443,
    "publickey":
"MIGfMA0GCsGqSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC5eYxmuxksHBu5HqtK11PJye1th52fYvmUXmFrL1vEIQs9+
  },
  "host_header": "",
  "useragent_header": null,
  "http-get": {
    "uri": "/rs.js",
    "verb": "GET",
    "client": {
      "headers": null,
      "metadata": null
    },
    "server": {
      "output": [
        "print",
        "prepend 600 characters",
        "base64",
        "mask"
      ]
    }
  },
  "http-post": {
    "uri": "/en",
    "verb": "POST",
    "client": {
      "headers": null,
      "id": null,
      "output": null
    }
  },
  "tcp_frame_header":
"AAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

  "crypto_scheme": 0,
  "proxy": {
    "type": null,
    "username": null,

```

```
"password": null,
"behavior": "Use IE settings"
},
"http_post_chunk": 0,
"uses_cookies": true,
"post-ex": {
  "spawnto_x86": "%windir%\syswow64\rundll32.exe",
  "spawnto_x64": "%windir%\sysnative\rundll32.exe"
},
"process-inject": {
  "allocator": "VirtualAllocEx",
  "execute": [
    "CreateThread",
    "CreateRemoteThread",
    "RtlCreateUserThread"
  ],
  "min_alloc": 11977,
  "startrwx": false,
  "stub": "tUr+Aexqde3zXhpE+L05KQ==",
  "transform-x86": [
    "prepend '\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90'"
  ],
  "transform-x64": [
    "prepend '\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90'"
  ],
  "userwx": false
},
"dns-beacon": {
  "dns_idle": null,
  "dns_sleep": null,
  "maxdns": null,
  "beacon": null,
  "get_A": null,
  "get_AAAA": null,
  "get_TXT": null,
  "put_metadata": null,
  "put_output": null
},
"pipename": null,
"smb_frame_header":
"AAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

"stage": {
  "cleanup": true
},
"ssh": {
  "hostname": null,
  "port": null,
  "username": null,
  "password": null,
  "privatekey": null
```

```
}  
}
```

AnyDesk

AnyDesk was installed to facilitate interactive desktop command and control access to a server in the environment.

Reviewing the ad_svc.trace logs from Anydesk located in %programdata%\AnyDesk reveal the logins originating from 108.177.235.25. This was again the same IP observed in the prior Bumblebee case.

```
info REDACTED 19:07:21.173 gsvc 1160 408 24 anynet.any_socket - Logged in from  
108.177.235.25:49672 on relay dafa4c5b.  
info REDACTED 19:27:45.255 gsvc 1160 408 41 anynet.any_socket - Logged in from  
108.177.235.25:49672 on relay dafa4c5b.
```

The Client-ID observed in the logs was 892647610

```
info REDACTED 18:56:00.723 lsvc 5924 5928 2 anynet.connection_mgr - New user data.  
Client-ID: 892647610
```

Exfiltration

No exfiltration methods were observed beyond the established command and control channels, which can be assessed as likely used to take data like the lsass dump out of the network.

Impact

The threat actors were evicted from the network before any further impact.

Indicators

Atomic

BumbleBee
154.56.0.221:443
64.44.101.250:443
103.175.16.117:443

Cobalt Strike
<https://fuvataren.com>
45.153.243.142:443

Meterpreter
50.16.62.87:443
3.85.198.66:443

Computed

document.iso

f4235fde77119ac772a2730d55c49c54

a250adaf3d5a5c2cd4d5ad4390e4cecbe00b3dd7

11bce4f2dcdc2c1992fddefb109e3ddad384b5171786a1daaddadc83be25f355

documents.lnk

fe0a99334486dcd2fcb6ec7a79163524

7aca51b571005c5d1be54fb8a056c33160abbf8d

cadd3f05b496ef137566c90c8fee3905fff13e8bda086b2f0d3cf7512092b541c

tamirlan.dll

69f1eeb7d5d466a2d53c8b7e3a929e9c

a27f6f5cc0051f4c4deed6ee14d5110c7807545f

123f96ff0a583d507439f79033ba4f5aa28cf43c5f2c093ac2445aaebdcfd31b

Behavioral

The threat actor delivers the BumbleBee loader in the form of a DLL (tamirlan.dll) via an ISO file named document.iso and tricks a user into executing it via an LNK (document.lnk).

The threat actor dumps lsass using procdump and copies it over an admin share before using 7zip to zip it.

BumbleBee is used to load both Meterpreter and Cobalt Strike into memory and communicate with the C2 server.

Detections

Network

ET USER_AGENTS AnyDesk Remote Desktop Software User-Agent

ET POLICY SSL/TLS Certificate Observed (AnyDesk Remote Desktop Software)

ET RPC DCERPC SVCCTL - Remote Service Control Manager Access

ET POLICY SMB2 NT Create AndX Request For an Executable File

ET POLICY SMB Executable File Transfer

Sigma

https://github.com/The-DFIR-Report/Sigma-Rules/blob/main/14373/bumblebee_wmiprvse_execution_pattern.yaml

title: BumbleBee WmiPrvSE execution pattern
id: 1620db43-fde5-45f3-b4d9-45ca6e79e047
status: Experimental
description: Detects BumbleBee WmiPrvSE parent process manipulation
author: TheDFIRReport
references:
- <https://thedfirreport.com/>
date: 2022/09/26
logsource:
 category: process_creation
 product: windows
detection:
 selection_image:
 Image|endswith:
 - 'ImagingDevices.exe'
 - 'wabmig.exe'
 selection_parent:
 ParentImage:endswith:
 - 'WmiPrvSE.exe'
 condition: selection_image and selection_parent
falsepositives:
 - Unknown
level: high
tags:
 - attack.defense_evasion
 - attack.t1036

https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/071bcc292362fd3754a2da00878bba4bae1a335f/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_ad_find_discovery.yml

https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/becf3baeb4f6313bf267f7e8d6e9808fc0fc059c/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_recon_activity.yml

https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_procdump_lsass.yml

https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/8bb3379b6807610d61d29db1d76f5af4840b8208/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_trust_discovery.yml

YARA

```

/*
YARA Rule Set
Author: The DFIR Report
Date: 2022-09-26
Identifier: Case 14373 BumbleBee
Reference: https://thedfirreport.com/
*/

/* Rule Set ----- */

rule case_14373_bumblebee_document_iso {
  meta:
    description = "Files - file document.iso"
    author = "The DFIR Report"
    reference = "https://thedfirreport.com/"
    date = "2022-09-26"
    hash1 = "11bce4f2dc2c1992fddefb109e3ddad384b5171786a1daaddadc83be25f355"
  strings:
    $x1 = "tamirlan.dll,EdHVntqdWt\"%systemroot%\system32\imageres.dll" fullword
wide
    $s2 = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe" fullword ascii
    $s3 = "xotgug064ka8.dll" fullword ascii
    $s4 = "tamirlan.dll" fullword wide
    $s5 = ")..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe" fullword wide
    $s6 = "          <requestedExecutionLevel level='asInvoker' uiAccess='false' />"
fullword ascii
    $s7 = "claims indebted fires plastic naturalist deduction meaningless yielded
automatic wrote damage far use fairly allocation lever ne" ascii
    $s8 = "documents.lnk" fullword wide
    $s9 = "4System32" fullword wide
    $s10 =
"\_P^YVPX[SY]WT^RQ_V[YQV\Y]USUZV[XWT_SWT[UYURVVRVVR^[_XRQPPUXZWYYVU]V\
[TS[SSWVY_R_Y[XZ_W[VVS\]ZYSPYURUSP\U^P^S\QVRQXPTV" ascii
    $s11 =
"\_P^YVPX[SY]WT^RQ_V[YQV\Y]USUZV[XWT_SWT[UYURVVRVVR^[_XRQPPUXZWYYVU]V\
[TS[SSWVY_R_Y[XZ_W[VVS\]ZYSPYURUSP\U^P^S\QVRQXPTV" ascii
    $s12 = " Type Descriptor" fullword ascii
    $s13 =
"Y^WTS]V[WPTWR\_P[WX_SPYQ[SQ]]UWTU]QR\UQR]]\^]UZUX\X^U]P^S[ZY^R^]UXWZURR\X[
ascii
    $s14 = "494[/D59:" fullword ascii /* hex encoded string 'IMY' */
    $s15 =
"_ZQ\V\TW]P\YW^_PZT_TR[T_WVQUSQPVSPYRSWPS^WVQR_[T_PS[TT]RSSQV[_Q]UY\QPVQRXXPPF
ascii
    $s16 = "?+7,*[email protected]." fullword ascii /* hex encoded string 'v$' */
    $s17 = "[email protected]= " fullword ascii /* hex encoded string 'ghc' */
    $s18 = "*/;+273++C" fullword ascii /* hex encoded string '<' */
    $s19 = "*/:>?2-:[email protected]>5D+" fullword ascii /* hex encoded string '.' */
*/
    $s20 =

```

```
"UPVX]VWVQU[_^ZU[_W^[R^]SPQ[[VPRR]]Z[\XVU^_TR[YPR\PY]RXT[_RXSPYSWTU]PV_SWWUVU\R_X_U
fullword ascii
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x0000 and filesize < 8000KB and
1 of ($x*) and 4 of them
}
```

```
rule case_14373_bumblebee_tamirlan_dll {
```

```
meta:
```

```
description = "Files - file tamirlan.dll"
```

```
author = "The DFIR Report"
```

```
reference = "https://thedfirreport.com/"
```

```
date = "2022-09-26"
```

```
hash1 = "123f96ff0a583d507439f79033ba4f5aa28cf43c5f2c093ac2445aaebdcfd31b"
```

```
strings:
```

```
$s1 = "xotgug064ka8.dll" fullword ascii
```

```
$s2 = " <requestedExecutionLevel level='asInvoker' uiAccess='false' />"
```

```
fullword ascii
```

```
$s3 = "claims indebted fires plastic naturalist deduction meaningless yielded
automatic wrote damage far use fairly allocation lever ne" ascii
```

```
$s4 =
```

```
"\P^YVPX[SY]WT^RQ_V[YQV\Y]USUZV[XWT_SWT[UYURVVRV^[_XRQPPUXZWYYVU]V\
[TS[SSWVY_R_Y[XZ_W[VVS\]ZYSYURUSP\U^P^S\QVRQXPTV" ascii
```

```
$s5 =
```

```
"\P^YVPX[SY]WT^RQ_V[YQV\Y]USUZV[XWT_SWT[UYURVVRV^[_XRQPPUXZWYYVU]V\
[TS[SSWVY_R_Y[XZ_W[VVS\]ZYSYURUSP\U^P^S\QVRQXPTV" ascii
```

```
$s6 = " Type Descriptor'" fullword ascii
```

```
$s7 =
```

```
"Y^WTS]V[WPTWR_\P[WX_SPYQ[SQ]]UWTU]QR\UQR]]\^]UZUX\X^U]P_^S[ZY^R^]UXWZURR\X[
ascii
```

```
$s8 = "494[/D59:" fullword ascii /* hex encoded string 'IMY' */
```

```
$s9 =
```

```
"_ZQ\W\TW]P\Y^_PZT_TR[T_WVQUSQPVSPYRSWPS^WVQR_[T_PS[TT]RSSQV[_Q]UY\QPVQRXXPPF
ascii
```

```
$s10 = "?+7,*[email_protected]" fullword ascii /* hex encoded string 'v$' */
```

```
$s11 = "[email_protected]=]" fullword ascii /* hex encoded string 'ghc' */
```

```
$s12 = "*/+273++C" fullword ascii /* hex encoded string '<' */
```

```
$s13 = "*/:>?2-:[email_protected]>5D+" fullword ascii /* hex encoded string '.' */
```

```
*/
```

```
$s14 =
```

```
"UPVX]VWVQU[_^ZU[_W^[R^]SPQ[[VPRR]]Z[\XVU^_TR[YPR\PY]RXT[_RXSPYSWTU]PV_SWWUVU\R_X_U
fullword ascii
```

```
$s15 =
```

```
"YX\^SPP^XW^_Y]ZY[T_UQU_QXP[SV^RT_ZRPV\YVVYPVR^UP^QYQXV^]]T_SQQR_ZSQZT_Y^_]Z]QY
[ ]WVSRR\Q]Q" ascii
```

```
$s16 = "Z_VV\PSYWUT_Z\WQSPY\ZZ\PY]W]
```

```
[RW\^ZPUZV[WZ\QU_V[YU\X[Q_\YQQPZ[VR\QUZUQVQ^PUPUXWQ_ZTRTZU[T^QUZ[UZRUVY\^WRY_S
ascii
```

```
$s17 = "R_XUSP^T[RXUR_\VU\Y[YWV\WYXV\SQ_RU]
```

```
[R\ZTU\PWYQ[ZSRTQUZ]\WSPY\[_]TX]YZPTSSZ[VXW[YT\W\Z[SXRYZYQ^PR^VZVU^VRV]
```

```
[RR]S\V_" ascii
```

```

    $s18 = "Z_VV\PSYWUT_Z\WQSPY\ZZ\PY]W]
[RW^\^ZPUZV[WZ\QU_V[YU\X[Q_\YQQPZ[VR\QUZUQVQ^PUPUXWQ_ZTRTZU[T^QUZ[UZRUVV\^WRY_S
  ascii
    $s19 =
"PQP]^_\ZZUSZYT_^S_SPPV]\XPT_TPQU\WVZQYZPZ^]]SW]R^[WYP]^[[R_RTSPYW^WU^QVPZ"
fullword ascii
    $s20 =
"Y]_QU\ZQQSXR[X[SPYVRWXU^P[VSSWUR]]PSW\X]Y[PX_UZ_PPP[WQVXY^^]^ARRSPZ]^XWV^]"
fullword ascii
  condition:
    uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 3000KB and
    8 of them
}

```

```

rule case_14373_bumblebee_documents_lnk {
  meta:
    description = "Files - file documents.lnk"
    author = "The DFIR Report"
    reference = "https://thedfirreport.com/"
    date = "2022-09-26"
    hash1 = "cadd3f05b496ef137566c90c8fee3905ff13e8bda086b2f0d3cf7512092b541c"
  strings:
    $x1 = "tamirlan.dll,EdHVntqdWt\"%systemroot%\system32\imageres.dll" fullword
wide
    $s2 = "C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe" fullword ascii
    $s3 = ").\..\..\..\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe" fullword wide
    $s4 = "4System32" fullword wide
    $s5 = "user-pc" fullword ascii
    $s6 = "}Windows" fullword wide
  condition:
    uint16(0) == 0x004c and filesize < 4KB and
    1 of ($x*) and all of them
}

```

MITRE

Mark-of-the-Web Bypass - T1553.005
User Execution - T1204
Rundll32 - T1218.011
Masquerading - T1036
Local Account - T1136.001
LSASS Memory - T1003.001
Archive via Utility - T1560.001
Archive Collected Data - T1560
Service Execution - T1569.002
Process Discovery - T1057
System Network Configuration Discovery - T1016
Domain Trust Discovery - T1482
Domain Groups - T1069.002
SMB/Windows Admin Shares - T1021.002
Lateral Tool Transfer - T1570
Remote Desktop Protocol - T1021.001
Web Protocols - T1071.001
Remote Access Software - T1219
Process Injection - T1055

Internal case #14373