Threat Thursday: Unique Delivery Method for Snake Keylogger

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The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team



A recently found downloader for Snake Keylogger brings several slippery evasion tactics together. It socially engineers its victims, targets organizations/users that failed to patch a known exploit, and uses a variety of twists and turns in an effort to evade traditional antivirus (AV) products. In this blog, our team digs into this threat to find out exactly how it works and what takeaways we can share with people to help protect them from this extremely stealthy threat.

In a recent threat campaign, the Snake Keylogger was delivered by a downloader that uses an unconventional file type as a lure, in addition to using embedded files within that lure, encrypted shellcode, and remote code execution exploits. The Snake Downloader uses these techniques like tall grass to hide its path toward an intended target.

Because of the public's familiarity with Microsoft® Office formats, DOC and XLS files tend to be the lure documents of choice for threat actors. Because of this, it is far less common to see a PDF file like the one used by this threat as the initial vector in an attack. We'll

examine why the author of Snake Downloader chose this uncommon threat vector and what it reveals about the threat actor's intentions and ultimate goals.

Operating System

Windows	MacOS	Android			
Yes	No	No	No		

Risk & Impact

Impact	Medium
Risk	Medium

Technical Analysis

For an initial understanding of how this attack is structured, let's look at the different files involved in our analysis of the downloader and how they relate to each other.

Here are the files used:

- "**REMMITANCE INVOICE.pdf**" The original PDF attachment/lure document
- "has been verified. However pdf, jpeg, xlsx, .docx" The DOCX file used to download the rich text format (RTF) file via macros. It is opened by the PDF lure after prompting the user.
- "f_document_shp.doc" The RTF document downloaded by the DOCX file; it holds the malformed objects.
- "0000000.ole" The object linking and embedding (OLE) object extracted and reconstructed from "f_document_shp.doc"
- "0000000.bin" The encrypted shellcode extracted from "0000000.ole"
- "fresh.exe" Snake Keylogger

<u>HP Wolf Security recently</u> discovered this threat when they came across a PDF attachment named "REMMITANCE INVOICE.pdf." Running this file prompts the user to open a DOCX file, which is deceptively named "**has been verified. However PDF, Jpeg, xlsx, .docx.**" This strange choice of filename was chosen for a specific reason; at a casual glance, the filename cleverly makes it appear as if the file has been automatically vetted and verified by the victim's machine, as shown in Figure 1. This is a type of social engineering that relies heavily on the victim only giving the popup a cursory glance. The threat's author hopes that the victim will be too busy or distracted to properly read the "Open File" dialog, which means that many people working in a fast-paced office environment may fall victim to this threat.

Open File	\times
The file 'has been verified. However PDF, Jpeg, xlsx, .docx' may contain programs, macros, or viruses that could potentially harm your computer. Open the file only if you are sure it is safe. Would you like to:	
• Open this file	
○ Always allow opening files of this type	
O Never allow opening files of this type	
OK Cancel	

Figure 1 – Prompt displayed after opening "REMMITANCE INVOICE.pdf"

If this DOCX file is opened and macros are enabled by the victim, this triggers the download of an RTF file while displaying the strangely named document in Microsoft® Word. Users who look closely will also see that Word reaches out to a certain URL while loading, as shown in Figure 2, coinciding with DNS requests to the same URL.




Figure 2 – URL displayed when loading Word

For a closer look at the file, our team viewed the Office Open XML (OOXML) file contents and found the URL (vtaurl[.]com/IHytw) in the document's relationships file. We can also see that an OLE object is being loaded from this URL. Once the RTF document

(**f_document_shp.doc**) is downloaded, we can check it for any OLE objects, such as the two malformed objects shown in Figure 3.

Command Prompt Х (analysis) C:\Users\foobar\Desktop\venv\analysis\samples>rtfobj f_document_shp.doc ^ rtfobj 0.60.1 on Python 3.7.0 - http://decalage.info/python/oletools THIS IS WORK IN PROGRESS - Check updates regularly! Please report any issue at https://github.com/decalage2/oletools/issues File: 'f document shp.doc' - size: 23348 bytes +----OLE Object id |index 0000175Bh Not a well-formed OLE object -----+---+ 00001707h Not a well-formed OLE object (analysis) C:\Users\foobar\Desktop\venv\analysis\samples>

Figure 3 – Malformed OLE objects found in f_document_shp.doc

To take a closer look at these OLE objects, we reconstructed them first, as seen in Figure 4. Then, using <u>oletools</u> to view information about the objects, we find that one of them (**00000000.ole**) mentions the Microsoft Equation Editor in its description. This feature is often used by attackers to exploit known Word vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code.

Command Prompt			- 0	\times
oleid 0.60.1 - htt THIS IS WORK IN PR	p://decalage.info/olet OGRESS - Check updates issue at https://githu	ools regularl	samples>oleid 00000000.ole y! alage2/oletools/issues	^
Indicator	Value	Risk	Description	
File format	Generic OLE file / Compound File (unknown format)	linfo	Unrecognized OLE file. Root CLSID: 0002CE02-0000- 0000-C000-000000000046 - Microsoft Equation 3.0 (Known Related to CVE-2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802)	
Container format	OLE	info	Container type	
Encrypted	False	none	The file is not encrypted	
VBA Macros	No	none	This file does not contain VBA macros.	
XLM Macros	No	none	This file does not contain Excel 4/XLM macros.	
External Relationships	0	none	External relationships such as remote templates, remote OLE objects, etc	
				~

Figure 4 – Information about one of the reconstructed OLE objects

Following this information, we find shellcode in the OLE that exploits the Equation Editor's remote code execution vulnerability (<u>CVE-2017-11882</u>). This vulnerability was patched over four years ago, but there are still many unpatched machines in the wild that remain vulnerable. The shellcode is shown being extracted from the OLENativeStream structure of the object in Figure 5.




Figure 5 – Extracting encrypted shellcode from 00000000.ole

Since the shellcode is encrypted at first, we must look for the moment during execution where it decrypts itself. To do so, we can use a tool like <u>runsc</u> to convert the extracted shellcode into executable code (see Figure 6), then walk through the code with a debugger.



Figure 6 – Converting shellcode to attach to debugger

As we step through the shellcode, after defining the correct offset, the file begins decrypting itself. In particular, the highlighted instruction shown in Figure 7 is quite revealing. For each iteration of this decryption loop, it shows a specific register (ECX) getting multiplied by a static value and added. Mathematic operations like this can be typical for decryption routines.

 001B01CB 001B01D0 001B01D5 001B01D7 001B01D9 001B01DB 001B01E0 001B01E5 001B01E7 	 E9 36FFFFF E9 F2FEFFFF E8 F4 E8 33 E8 DB E9 E0FEFFFF E9 1CFFFFF E8 25 E8 31 	<pre>jmp 1B0106 jmp 1B00c7 jmp 1B01CB jmp 1B020c jmp 1B01B6 jmp 1B00C0 jmp 1B0101 jmp 1B020c jmp 1B021A</pre>
001801E7 001801E7 001801E7 001801F5 001801FA 00180205 00180207 00180207 00180200 00180217 00180217 00180217 00180214 0018021C 00180210	<pre></pre>	<pre>imp 18021A imul ecx,ecx,5A1AA769 add ecx,37E38471 jmp 18007A jmp 180106 lea edi,dword ptr ds:[edx+2A jmp 1801CB jmp 180106 pop edx jmp 180184 jmp 1800F5 jmp 1801FF pushfd jmp 180229</pre>

Figure 7 – Mathematic operations used in shellcode decryption

If we follow the dump from register ECX, it reveals more and more with each iteration as the shellcode is decrypted. When finished, a reference for downloading **fresh.exe** can be seen, which is the Snake Keylogger itself. This keylogger is a prevalent information stealer, also known as the 404 Keylogger, which has been in circulation since late 2020. This decrypted shellcode can be seen in Figure 8.

Address	Hex	<															ASCII
001B02A0	00	89	С3	E8	0D	00	00	00		6F						72	ÃèLoadLibr
00180280	61	72	79	57			Е8		01	00	00	89	C7	Е8	0F	00	aryw.SèþÇè
001B02C0	00	00	47	65	74	50	72	6F	63	41	64	64	72	65	73	73	GetProcAddress
001B02D0		53	Е8	E2	01	00	00	89	C6		1Α		00	00	45	78	.SèâÆèE×
001B02E0	70	61	бE	64		6E										53	pandEnvironmentS
001B02F0	74	72	69	6E					53	FF					00	00	tringsW.SÿÖh
001B0300	8D	54	24	80		E8			00			00			55	00	.T\$.Rè"%.P.U.
001B0310	42	00	4C	00			43			00			76		62		B.L.I.C.%.∖.v.b.
001B0320	63	00	2E	00			78				00			DÛ	E8	0e	се.х.еÿĐè.
001B0330	00	00	00	55	00	72	00	6C	00			6F		6E	00	00	U.r.l.M.o.n
001в0340	00	FF	D7					00	55	52	4C	44	6F	77	6E	6C	.ÿxèURLDownl
001B0350	6F	61	64		6F			6C									oadToFileW.PÿÖj.
001B0360			8D					Е8				00	68	00	74	00	jT\$.RèNĥ.t.
001B0370			70	00	3A					00			39	00			t.p.:././.1.9.2.
001B0380			32	00	32	00	37		2E		31		39	00	36		2.2.71.9.6.
001B0390	2E	00		00	31				2F	00			52	00	45	00	2.1.1./.F.R.E.
001B03A0	53	00	48	00	2F	00	66				65	00	73	00	68	00	S.H./.f.r.e.s.h.
00180380		00	65	00	78	00	65	00			7в		47		75	01	e.x.e. {.G.u.
001B03C0								DB		1в							
001B03D0				4E	D1		FD			F5		F8			00		.4ÇNÑVýo?õpøñ!.)
001e03e0	8R	<u>8</u>	2n	47	57	<u> 46</u>	<u>n4</u>	83	15C	RD	03	20	FR	35	RR	7n	01-RW('Ô \¼ ë5»)

Figure 8 – Decrypted shellcode used to download Snake Keylogger

Once the shellcode in the RTF file downloads the keylogger, the Snake Downloader has done its job, and now it's up to Snake Keylogger to continue from here. Keyloggers such as Snake lurk in the background on an infected machine and wait for the user to input any juicy information via the keyboard, particularly website logins, such as those used for banking or a cryptocurrency wallet. That information then gets exfiltrated back to the threat actors and used for their own financial gain.

Conclusion

Although it may be less common to see PDFs used as malicious file attachments, they should still be taken just as seriously and handled with the same precautions as any other potentially infected attachments. In the case of Snake Downloader, the lure document is only the first step in an array of tactics used to obfuscate the installation of the Snake Keylogger payload.

From its use of embedded files, encrypted shellcode, and even remote code execution exploits, it's clear that this downloader goes further than most to hide its initial execution on the system. While the CVE-2017-11882 exploit had a patch created for it in 2017, it has been a slow process to get all affected machines patched, which means it's still one of the most common vulnerabilities that threat actors continue to exploit. This latest example speaks to the prevalence of such attacks, and emphasizes the ongoing need for diligence when it comes to patching your organization's endpoints, and distrusting attachments and files shared over the internet.

Who is Affected?

Those with machines still vulnerable to CVE-2017-11882 could be infected by Snake Downloader/ Keylogger malware. The Snake Downloader threat is not confined to a particular industry or sector, but rather takes advantage of busy or distracted individuals to perpetrate its malicious activity.

Mitigation Tips

You can take the following steps to reduce your exposure to this threat:

- Always remain cautious when opening email attachments, regardless of file type.
- Be sure to carefully read all security popups when you're being asked to manually enable something on your machine, particularly macros.
- Ensure you stay up to date with all Security Updates from Microsoft to stay protected from exploits like <u>CVE-2017-11882</u>.
- Monitor accounts for unusual and unauthorized access that falls outside of the baseline (MITRE D3FEND techniques <u>D3-AZET</u>, <u>D3-LAM</u>).

YARA Rule

The following YARA rule was authored by the BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team to catch the threat described in this document:

rule Snake{

```
meta:
    description = "Detects Snake"
    author = "BlackBerry Threat Research Team"
    date = "2022-06-03-"
    license = "This Yara rule is provided under the Apache License 2.0
(https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0) and open to any user or
organization, as long as you use it under this license and ensure originator credit
in any derivative to The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team"
    strings:
        $s1 = "Game1Screen Form Load"
```

```
$s1 = "Game1Screen_Form_Load
$s2 = "get_KeyCode"
$s3 = "Good luck mate"
```

```
condition:
filesize < 1000KB and all of them
```

}

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

05dc0792a89e18f5485d9127d2063b343cfd2a5d497c9b5df91dc687f9a1341d

250d2cd13474133227c3199467a30f4e1e17de7c7c4190c4784e46ecf77e51fe

165305d6744591b745661e93dc9feaea73ee0a8ce4dbe93fde8f76d0fc2f8c3f

f1794bfabeae40abc925a14f4e9158b92616269ed9bcf9aff95d1c19fa79352e

20a3e59a047b8a05c7fd31b62ee57ed3510787a979a23ce1fde4996514fae803

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https://threatresearch.ext.hp.com/pdf-malware-is-not-yet-dead/#

<u>https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/pdf-smuggles-microsoft-word-doc-to-</u> <u>drop-snake-keylogger-malware/</u>

https://www.socinvestigation.com/pdf-campaign-delivering-snake-keylogger/

https://www.zdnet.com/article/this-malware-spreading-pdf-uses-a-sneaky-file-name-to-trickthe-unwary/


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