Nigerian Tesla: 419 scammer gone malware distributor unmasked

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Agent Tesla is a well-known data stealer written in .NET that has been active since 2014 and is perhaps one of the most popular payloads observed in malspam campaigns.

While looking for threats targeting Ukraine, we identified a group we call "Nigerian Tesla" that has been dabbling into phishing and other data theft activities for a number of years. Ironically, one of the main threat actors seemingly compromised his own computer with an Agent Tesla binary.

In this blog, we expose some of the activities from a scammer who started off with classic advance-fee schemes and is now successfully running Agent Tesla campaigns. In the past two years, this threat actor was able to collect close to a million credentials from his victims.

Spam campaign

Our investigation started with an email targeting titled *Ocmamoчнuй платіж.msg* (Ukrainian for *Final payment.msg*). It contained a link to a file sharing site that downloads an archive containing an executable file.

Доброго ранку,

Перевірте доданий документ, щоб підтвердити остаточну оплату рахунку-фактури. Ваша швидка відповідь буде оцінена, оскільки ми маємо намір платити наступного тижня.



Figure 1: Spam email with Agent Tesla

This executable is actually an Agent Tesla stealer, capable of exfiltrating data in multiple ways, though most commonly using SMTP. The technique is really simple as it only requires an email account that sends messages to itself containing stolen credentials for each victim that executed the malware on their computer.

Test successful!

The attacker sent a number of messages containing the body "Test successful!" from the same machine. Those emails should have been deleted for obvious reasons but this threat actor did not and leaked his own IP address allowing us to locate them in Lagos, Nigeria.



These messages are checks done by the threat actor to make sure communication with Agent Tesla is configured properly. This is typical and is often described in hacking forums where users ask for help with the 'software'.

[Agent Tesla] SMTP logs not	recieving	\$			
	11-22-2015, 09:30 PM	♡ 🔓 🐇			
Phurkus • [bin@HF:]	Testing out keylogger Agent Tesla on virtual machine Win 7, after i create it and run the .exe, the emails are never recived by my email. I click on test when putting my email, and it says test successful, and i DO recive the email from the test, but i never recieve the email of the logs.				
`★★★` ₩	I am using Miscrosoft @outlook.com as my email provider				
Desta: 759	My host OS is kali linux if it makes a diffrence.				
Posts: 758 Threads: 143 B Rating: 0 Popularity: 0 βytes: 🕹 β 0 Game XP: 0	-agent tesla latest verison. - Log sent intervals are set to 2 - 5 minutes for testing				

Figure 3: Forum post complaining about issue not receiving logs

There were an additional 26 emails sent from the same IP address that weren't test emails but came from a real Agent Tesla execution. We don't know exactly how, but the attacker managed to infect his own machine.



Figure 4: Information exfiltrated from the attacker's machine

Here is a list containing some of the services that the Nigerian Tesla threat actor used:

• PerfectMoney

- Glassdoor signupanywhere (could be a source to get victims emails)
- omail.io (service for extracting emails)
- warzone.ws (Warzone RAT)
- worldwiredlabs (NetWire RAT)
- le-vpn.com and bettervpn.com zenmate.com tigervpn hotvpn (VPN provider)
- securitycode.eu cassandra.pw (Code Protector)
- esco.pw (office document protection)
- monovm hostwinds.com firevps dynu 4server.su (VPS and dedicated servers)
- dnsomatic.com cloudns.net (DNS services)
- spam-lab.su
- filesend.io 4shared (hosting files)
- avcheck.net (offline av test)
- bitshacking.com
- archive.org (used like cloud storage)
- xss.is hackforums.net exploit.in
- titan.email (.pw accounts, various scams)

Rita Bent, Lee Chen and John Cooper are some of the names that have been used in the past along with dozens of different email accounts with passwords containing the string '1985'. The following image shows the activity from user rita398 in hackforums asking about Esco Crypter:



Figure 5: Rita398 interested in Esco Crypter

In that case, we see Rita complaining about some RDP suspension that happened eventually to one of his registered domains.



- info@borrellacerrajeros.com
- info@crmarismas.org
- info@cristaleriagandia.com
- infogestinsur@grupogestinsur.com
- instalaciones@gopamar.com
- isabel@grupoatu.com
- m.lopez@forestadent.es
- nacho@alasvigilnevot.com
- restaurante@elsecretodechimiche.com
- soceanwave244@gmail.com
- tienda@di-tempo.com
- torremolinos3@copiplus.es
- v.reino@gooddental.es
- victor@sugesol.com
- vives@viveselectricitat.com

Based on these profiles, we can see this threat actor has an extensive criminal record starting at least from 2014. Back then, they performed classic scams under the Rita Bent moniker.



My name is Rita Bent I have something very important to tell you that might change your life for good. You might not know me in person but I know you very well and in my opinion you are a good man that have given much to the human race. Like I mentioned I have something very important to tell you please reply my message. Check attachment you will see my photo.

Rita Bent



Figure 7: Scam conducted by the same attacker in the past

One of their preferred scams was phishing for Adobe login pages. We have records indicating that several Adobe fake pages were deployed from 2015 until recently. Landing pages looked like the following:



Figure 8: Fake Adobe login page

Fast forward to 2020, and the threat actor has graduated to malware distributor. He protects his binaries with the Cassandra Protector obfuscator and then checks them against AVcheck[.]net.

\leftrightarrow \rightarrow C (ı/scan-list.php			œ ¢
Cassandra Protector				
	File ID	File name	Scan Date	Action
🖀 Home	ht9JpcfnzGJn	wvS6QCfV9ddcAoJ.exe	04/28/2022 12:30 AM	View
Protect	yFcRvr4Dx2Ne	QBokvfwrROn6w5k.exe	04/28/2022 12:16 AM	View
	E2zTnT52zell	JGuVD3uNyD6KxgK.exe	04/27/2022 10:32 AM	View
Files	btNZ4pk1Y91b	cGF0f8NE7tucSuX.exe	04/26/2022 12:15 PM	View
🙀 Scanner 🗸	JXEJRQwOHqvl	MJd44ZjQSMnqAQX.exe	04/25/2022 12:20 AM	View
Purchase	59T0ctdKy83E	NBGTf5nkPBRwSTn.exe	04/25/2022 12:10 AM	View
	FyAihvFkdl4l	NBGTf5nkPBRwSTn.exe	04/25/2022 12:10 AM	View
🖬 Tickets 🗸 🗸	OgYYvYABG7ms	NBGTf5nkPBRwSTn.exe	04/25/2022 12:10 AM	View
🛛 User 🗸	r6f4wuk3AnL2	m2zSaLX20R7Z9cu.exe	04/22/2022 09:35 AM	View
	xE5BqnPjkXeA	6cdlOkpXITTqrn2.exe	04/20/2022 08:47 AM	View
🗮 More 🗸				

Figure 9: Cassandra Protector

File Name	Detection Rate	Result	Scan Date	
wvS6QCfV9ddcAoJ.exe	0/26	Clean	04/28/2022 00:30:42	
Ambinimum		Decult		
Antivirus		Result		
adaware		Clean		
ahnlab		Clean		
alyac		Clean		
avast		Clean		Figure
avg		Clean		
avira		Clean		
bitdef		Clean		
bullguard		Clean		
clam		Clean		
comodo		Clean		
drweb		Clean		
emsisoft		Clean		

Who is behind these attacks?

The threat actor shared photos of himself back in 2016 and for some reason forgot about them.



Figure 11: Photos of the threat actor

E.K. was born in 1985 according to his driver license. Remember that 1985 was used in a lot of passwords collected from accounts that conducted these illegal activities.



Figure 12: Threat actor's drivers license

At the moment, we do not have much information about other members in the team. But E. K. seems to be the most relevant figure, at least the one who started the scheme.

From 419 scams to Agent Tesla

Nigerian Tesla stole more than 800,000 different credentials from about 28,000 victims. This shows how simple and yet effective running one of these campaigns can be. In this case we see an interesting evolution from a threat actor that was performing the classic <u>advance-fee</u> <u>scam</u> (419 scam) before moving into the malware distribution world, more or less for the same end goal.

Malwarebytes users are protected against Agent Tesla. We detect this sample as Spyware.Password.Stealer.