Point-of-Sale malware - RTPOS

reversing.fun/posts/2022/01/30/rtpos.html

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RTPOS is a ram scraper used to find credit card data within a process memory address space. Credit card data is saved into a log file that needs to be manually grabbed by the malware operators.

Sample:

```
Filename: alohae.exe
SHA256: fb749c32b58fd1238f21d48ba1deb60e6fb4546f3a74e211f80a3ed005f9e046
```

It supports two command-line options to either install itself as a service or remove the existing installation:

```
if ( argc > 1 && (*argv[1] == '-' || *argv[1] == '/') )
{
   if ( _wcsicmp(L"install", argv[1] + 1) )
   {
     if ( !_wcsicmp(L"remove", argv[1] + 1) )
        RemoveService(L"WinLogOn");
}
```

When executed with the install argument, RTPOS installs itself as a service named **WinLogon** with the start type set to auto start:

```
CreateService(
  L"WinLogOn",
  L"Windows Logging On Service",
  SERVICE_AUTO_START,
  &Dependencies,
  L"NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM",
  0);
```

Service details:

```
C:\Documents and Settings\sysadmin\Desktop>sc query WinLogOn
SERVICE_NAME: WinLogOn
                                       : 10 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
: 4 RUNNING
(STOPPABLE,NOT_PAUSABLE,ACCEPTS_SHUTDOWN)
           TYPE
STATE
           WIN32_EXIT_CODE
SERVICE_EXIT_CODE
CHECKPOINT
                                          0
                                               (0x0)
(0x0)
                                          Ōx0
           WAIT_HINT
                                          0x0
C:\Documents and Settings\sysadmin\Desktop>sc qc WinLogOn
ISCl GetServiceConfig SUCCESS
SERVICE_NAME: WinLogOn
                                          10 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
2 AUTO_START
1 NORMAL
C:\Documents and Settings\sysadmin\Desktop\rtpos.exe
           TYPE
START_TYPE
ERROR_CONTROL
BINARY_PATH_NAME
LOAD_ORDER_GROUP
                                          0
Windows Logging On Service
           DISPLAY_NAME
           DEPENDENCIES : SERVICE_START_NAME :
                                          NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
C:\Documents and Settings\sysadmin\Desktop>
```

RTPOS creates a file mapping to store the credit card data before saving it to disk:

```
9 39
      if ( CTrackGrabber ->file mapping )
 40
        CTrackGrabber_->view_of_file_mapping = MapViewOfFile(CTrackGrabber_->file_mapping, 6u, 0, 0, 0);
41
 42
      }
 43
      else
 44
45
        FileMappingAttributes.nLength = 12;
46
        FileMappingAttributes.lpSecurityDescriptor = 0;
47
        FileMappingAttributes.bInheritHandle = 1;
48
        v3 = CreateFileMappingW(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE, &FileMappingAttributes, PAGE_READWRITE, 0, 80000u, 0);
        CTrackGrabber_->file_mapping = v3;
49
9 50
        v4 = MapViewOfFile(CTrackGrabber_->file_mapping, 6u, 0, 0, 0);
51
        CTrackGrabber_->view_of_file_mapping = v4;
        memset(CTrackGrabber_->view_of_file_mapping, 0, 80000u);
```

RTPOS saves the logs with credit card data in a file named **sql8514.dat** inside the folder C:\Windows\System32 or C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ if the malware runs in a 64-bit machine:

```
if ( SHGetFolderPathW(0, 0x8025, 0, 0, pszPath) >= 0 )
57
  58
59
         PathAppendW(pszPath, L"sq18514.dat");
60
         FileW = CreateFileW(pszPath, 4u, 1u, 0, CREATE_NEW, 0x80u, 0);
         if ( FileW == -1 )
61
  62
63
           v6 = CreateFileW(pszPath, 4u, 1u, 0, OPEN_EXISTING, 0x80u, 0);
           CTrackGrabber ->sql8514_dat_hdl = v6;
64
  65
         }
         else
  66
  67
68
           CTrackGrabber ->sql8514 dat hdl = FileW;
  69
  70
       }
```

The malware enters in a loop where it will keep scanning the running processes for credit card data:

```
1 // : RtPOS/CtrackGrabber
2 void __thiscall __noreturn GrabberLoop(CTrackGrabber *grabber)
3 {
4  while ( 1 )
5  {
6    SearchTracks(grabber);
7    Sleep(grabber->sleep_time);
8  }
9 }
```

To read the memory of the targeted processes, RTPOS uses the classic combinations of Windows APIS:

- CreateToolhelp32Snapshot
- Process32FirstW/Process32NextW
- OpenProcess
- VirtualQueryEx
- ReadProcessMemory

It will avoid scanning vmtoolsd.exe, System, windbg.exe, and ntsd.exe processes:

The credit card tracks are validated with the Luhn algorithm:

```
1 // 🗀: RtPOS/CtrackGrabber
   2 BOOL __stdcall LuhnCheck(int a1, int a2)
   3 {
   4
      int v4; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-44h]
   5
      int v5; // [esp+18h] [ebp-38h]
      BOOL v6; // [esp+1Ch] [ebp-34h]
   7
      int v8[10]; // [esp+24h] [ebp-2Ch]
  9
      v8[0] = 0;
10
      v8[1] = 2;
11
      v8[2] = 4;
12
      v8[3] = 6;
13
      v8[4] = 8;
14
      v8[5] = 1;
15
      v8[6] = 3;
16
      v8[7] = 5;
17
      v8[8] = 7;
      v8[9] = 9;
18
19
      v6 = 1;
20
      v5 = 0;
21
      while ( a2-- )
  22
23
        if ( v6 )
24
          v4 = *(a2 + a1) - 48;
  25
26
          v4 = v8[*(a2 + a1) - 48];
27
        v5 += v4;
28
        v6 = !v6;
  29
     return v5 % 10 == 0;
30
```

Example of the content of **sql8514.dat**:

```
sql8514.dat ×

|25.02.2021 - 00:22:04| ph.exe: ;4716042088430250=21082010000002220000?
|25.02.2021 - 00:22:04| ph.exe: ;4716042088430250D21082010000013870000?
```