A Look Into Purple Fox's Server Infrastructure

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December 13, 2021

Introduction

In one of our previous <u>blog</u> entries, we analyzed the Purple Fox botnet by providing an overview of how it worked. In addition, we also examined its initial access techniques and some of its associated backdoors.

In this research, we shed greater light on the later stages of its infection chain that we have observed via <u>Trend Micro Managed XDR</u> — specifically how it infects SQL databases by inserting a malicious SQL CLR assembly to achieve a persistent and stealthier execution. It should be noted that most files used in this attack are not stored on the disk and are either executed from memory after either being pulled from the command-and-control (C&C) server or encrypted, after which these are loaded by another process.

We also discuss the botnet's underlying C&C infrastructure and the motivation behind Purple Fox operators' choice to target SQL servers in their recent activities.

By examining Purple Fox's routines and activities, both with our initial research and the subject matter we cover in this blog post, we hope to help incident responders, security operation centers (SOCs), and security researchers find and weed out Purple Fox infections in their network.

Process injection

Let's begin by analyzing Purple Fox's process injection routine. The malware first loads its various components by spawning a suspended svchost.exe (changed to fontdrvhost.exe by the accompanied rootkit) process. It then loads the DLL component in the process address space, then redirects execution to the loaded DLL.



Figure 1. Process tree overview

The C&C server

The malware has three different ways to communicate with its C&C servers. Each method is used at a particular stage of execution for various purposes.

DNS

The DNS is used to get a list of C&C IP addresses at the start of each process execution. It is also used to renew this list if all servers fail to respond during this stage, or in a later stage as we see next. One thing to note is that the IP addresses received by the DNS requests are not the real IP addresses used for the C&C server. Although those received by the DNS requests are encoded, they can be decoded by subtracting a fixed number from the IP address. The following table shows examples of this.

IP address from DNS request Decoded IP address

178[.]195.162.94

216[.]189.159.94:12113

79[.]222.214.20	117[.]216.211.20:10669
145[.]68.65.106	183[.]62.62.106:13600
73[.]127.195.228	111[.]121.192.228:14640
53[.]238.137.143	91[.]232.134.143:18372

Table 1. Examples of IP addresses received via DNS requests and the actual decoded IP addresses The following are the domains used for the DNS requests:

- Kew[.]8df[.]us which points to m[.]tet[.]kozow[.]com
- ret[.]6bc[.]Us which points to a[.]keb[.]kozow[.]com

The list of returned IP addresses changes every few minutes or so, in order to cycle through the botnet C&C infrastructure.

UDP

The second communication method, User Datagram Protocol (UDP), is used for various types of messages and includes the building of a cache IP address list that will be used for further communication. In addition, it is used for pulling configuration for running tools and for retrieving the IP:PORT list for the HTTP traffic discussed in the next section.

After selecting an IP address from the DNS, it is decoded to the real IP address and a port number, after which a request is made to pull the cache IP address list. If at any point this cache list fails, the malware will return to the DNS to pull a new IP address to build another cache IP address list.

HTTP

To start performing its routine on the system, the malware pulls encrypted DLLs by issuing a GET request in the format http://IP:PORT/xxxx[.]moe, where IP:PORT is selected by a UDP message and xxxx[.]moe is one of the worker DLLs. These DLLs are saved in a file and are loaded by the worker process that decrypts, decompresses, and executes them.

The Worker DLLs

The SQL Server Scanner [32A7E157.moe]

The first of the worker DLLs is a SQL Server scanner that pulls its core module from /3FE8E22C.moe using the HTTP communication described previously. This core module is injected to a new process and the scanner configuration is pulled using UDP communication, which has the starting public address for scanning.

It scans local and public IP addresses for SQL Server over port 1433. If it finds an open port, it begins a brute-force attack for the SQL Server authentication using the 10 million-strong word list.

When the malware is authenticated, it executes an SQL script that installs a backdoor assembly (evilclr.dll) on the SQL Server database that is used to facilitate executing commands using SQL statements. Using this assembly, PowerShell commands are executed on the SQL Server to start Purple Fox's infection chain as discussed in our previous blog entry.

🖉 Wireshark · Packet 2620 · sql_traffic.pcapng — 🛛 🗧	×
<pre>> Frame 2620: 240 bytes on wire (1920 bits), 240 bytes captured (1920 bits) on interface \Device\NPF_{A92D8570-5828-4574-9CE1-9CEBCE23ED98}, id > Ethernet II, Src: VMware_03:a5:9a (00:0c:29:03:a5:9a), Dst: VMware_e0:c2:ff (00:0c:29:e0:c2:ff) > Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.8.121, Dst: 192.168.8.202 > Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 51159, Dst Port: 1433, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 186 Tabular Data Stream Type: TD57 login (16) > Status: 0x01, End of message Length: 186 Channel: 0 Packet Number: 1 Window: 0 * TD57 Login Packet > Login Packet Lengths and offsets Client name: u191qdshto Username: sa Password: 654321 App name: vn2c2hqxp Server name: 192.168.8.202 Library name: 01ED8 > (ESSAPU Generic Serveity Service Application Program Interface</pre>	θ
> GSS-API Generic Security Service Application Program Interface	
0000 000 c2 29 c2 1f 000 c2 29 c3 a5 9a 08 00 45 00)) 0020 08 c2 a c7 d7 05 99 00 01 c1 49 b8 93 de 61 50 18	
No.: 2620 · Time: 56.423877 · Source: 192.168.8.121 · Destination: 192.168.8.202 · Protocol: TD5 · Length: 240 · Info: TD57 login Close	Help

Figure 2. An SQL brute-force request

Wireshark · Packet 2628 · sql_traffic.pcapng	- 0	×
<pre>> Frame 2628: 172 bytes on wire (1376 bits), 172 bytes captured (1376 bits) on interface \Device\NPF_{A92D8570-5B28-4574-9CE1-9C > Ethernet II, Src: VNware_e0:c2:ff (00:0c:29:e0:c2:ff), Dst: VNware_03:a5:9a (00:0c:29:03:a5:9a) > Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.8.202, Dst: 192.168.8.121 > Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1433, Dst Port: 51160, Seq: 1, Ack: 185, Len: 118 </pre> Tabular Data Stream Type: Response (4)	EBCE23ED98}, id 0	
<pre>> Status: 0x01, End of message Length: 118 Channel: 53 Packet Number: 1 Window: 0 > Token - Error</pre>		
> Token - Done		
0010 00 920 03 b3 00 00 02 04 00 00 04 00 04 00 04 00 04 00 04 00 04 00 04 00 04 00 04 00 04 00 04 00 04 04 04 04 04 04 04		
0070 00 100 17 00 100 17 00 100 17 100 100 17 100 100 17 100 100 17 100 100 17 100 100 17 100 100 17 100 100 17 100 100 17 100 100 17 100 100 17 100 100 17 100 100 17 100 100 17 100 <td< td=""><td></td><td></td></td<>		
No.: 2628 · Time: 56.429398 · Source: 192.168.8.202 · Destination: 192.168.8.121 · Protocol: TD5 · Length: 172 · Info: Response	Close He	elp

Figure 3. A failed response to the SQL brute-force request

Wireshark · Packet 2635 · sql_traffic.pcapng	- 0	×
> Frame 2635: 463 bytes on wire (3704 bits), 463 bytes captured (3704 bits) on interface \Device\NPF_{A92D8570-5B28-4574-9CE1-9CEBCE23ED9 > Ethernet II, Src: VNware_e0:c2:ff (00:0c:29:e0:c2:ff), Dst: VNware_03:a5:9a (00:0c:29:03:a5:9a) > Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.8.202, Dst: 192.168.8.121 > Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1433, Dst Port: 51161, Seq: 1, Ack: 191, Len: 409 Y Tabular Data Stream	8}, id 0	
Type: Response (4) > Status: 0x01, End of message Length: 409 Channel: 53		
Packet Number: 1 Window: 0		
> Token - EnvChange > Token - EnvChange		
Token - EnvChange Token - Info Token - LoginAck		
> Token - EnvChange > Token - Done		
0000 00 0c 29 03 a5 9a 00 0c 29 e0 c2 ff 08 00		
0030 08 05 66 fe 00 00 04 01 01 99 00 35 01 00 e3 1b		
0060 16 00 00 02 00 25 00 43 00 68 00 61 00 6e 00 67 ·····%·C ·h·a·n·g 0070 00 65 00 64 00 20 00 64 00 61 00 74 00 61 00 62 ··e·d··d·a·t·a·b 0080 00 61 00 73 00 65 00 20 00 63 00 6f 00 6e 00 74 ·····%·C ·h·a·t·a·b		
0090 00 65 00 74 00 20 00 27 ·e·x·t······ ·e·x·t······ 0000 00 6d 00 74 00 65 00 70 2e ·m·a·s·t··e·r·· · 0000 00 10 40 45 00 46 00 50 30 70 2e ····································		
00c0 51 00 4c 00 45 00 58 00 52 00 45 00 53 00 Q_L-E-X- P-R-E-S- 00d0 53 00 00 10 0e 31 00 e3 08 00 07 05 09 04 40 00 34 00 S4- 00e0 e3 17 00 02 0a 75 00 73 00 5f 00 65 00 66 00 67		
00f0 00 6c 00 69 00 73 00 68 00 00 ab 7a 00 47 16 00 ·l·i·s·h ···z·G·· 0100 00 01 00 27 00 43 00 68 00 61 00 6e 00 67 00 65 ····'C·h ·a·n·g·e 0110 00 64 00 20 00 6c 00 61 00 6e 00 67 00 75 00 61 ····'C·h ·a·n·g·e		
0120 00 67 00 65 00 74 00 69 ·g·e···s··e·t·t·i 0130 00 66 00 70 00 67 00 74 00 69 ·g·e··s··s··e·t·t·i 0130 00 66 00 74 00 67 00 73 00 67 00 73 00 67 00 73 00 67 00 73 00 67 00 73 00 67 00 73 00 67 00 73 00 67 00 73 00 67 00 73 00 67 00 73 00 67 00 73 00 67 00 67 00 67 00 67 00 67 00 67 00 67 00 67 00 67 00 67 00 67 00 67 00 67 00 67 00 67 00 67 00 67 00 67 00		
0150 00 2e 00 14 00 4e 00 5c 00 NE- L·O·N·\· 0160 53 00 51 00 4c 00 52 00<		
0_{100} 4_{10} 0_{20}		
01c0 30 00 36 00 60 50 60 50 60 50 60 50 60 50 60 50 60 50 60 50 60 50 60 50 60 60 50 60 60 50 60 60 50 60 60 50 60 60 50 60 60 50 60 60 50 6		
Close	Н	lelp

Figure 4. A successful response to the SQL brute-force request

Wireshark · Packet 41675 · sql_traffic.pcapng	- 🗆 X
 Frame 41675: 4030 bytes on wire (32240 bits), 4030 bytes Ethernet II, Src: VMware_03:a5:9a (00:0c:29:03:a5:9a) Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.8.121, Dst: Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 53327, Dst Port Tabular Data Stream 	tes captured (32240 bits) on interface \Device\NPF_{A92D8570-5B28-4574-9CE1-9CEBCE23ED98}, id 0 , Dst: VMware_e0:c2:ff (00:0c:29:e0:c2:ff) 192.168.8.202 ort: 1433, Seq: 20703, Ack: 589, Len: 3976
Type: SQL batch (1) > Status: 0x01, End of message Length: 3976 Channel: 0 Packet Number: 5 Window: 0	
 > [6 TDS Fragments (24408 bytes): #41665(4088), #4166 Y TDS Query Packet Query [truncated]: IF exists(SELECT @@version where the second se	67(4088), #41669(4088), #41671(4088), #41673(4088), #41675(3968)] here @@version like '%2005%' or @@version like '%2008%' or @@version like '%2012%' or @@version l
٢	>
0000 49 00 46 00 20 00 65 00 78 00 69 00 73 00 74 00	I-Fe- x-i-s-t-
0010 73 00 28 00 53 00 45 00 46 00 45 00 43 00 54 00 0020 20 00 40 00 76 00 65 00 72 00 73 00 69 00	s-(-S-E- L-E-C-T- -@-@-v- e-r-s-i-
0030 6f 00 6e 00 20 00 77 00 68 00 65 00 72 00 65 00 0040 20 00 40 00 40 00 76 00 65 00 72 00 73 00 69 00	orn w herrer -@@@vv errsi
0050 6f 00 6e 00 20 00 6c 00 69 00 6b 00 65 00 20 00	on. 1. i.k.e 1.8.2.0. 0.5.8.1.
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0080 72 00 73 00 69 00 6f 00 6e 00 20 00 6c 00 69 00 0090 6b 00 65 00 20 00 27 00 25 00 32 00 30 00 30 00	r-s-i-o- nl-i- k-e'- %-2-0-0-
00a0 38 00 25 00 27 00 20 00 6f 00 72 00 20 00 40 00	
00c0 20 00 6c 00 69 00 6b 00 65 00 20 00 27 00 25 00	0.0.6.1.5.1.0.0. -1.i.k. e'.%
00d0 32 00 30 00 31 00 32 00 25 00 27 00 20 00 6f 00	2.0.1.2. %.'
00f0 69 00 6f 00 6e 00 20 00 6c 00 69 00 6b 00 65 00	i-o-n- · l-i-k-e-
0100 20 00 27 00 25 00 32 00 30 00 31 00 34 00 25 00 0110 27 00 20 00 55 00 72 00 20 00 40 00 40 00 75 00	······································
0120 65 00 72 00 73 00 69 00 6f 00 6e 00 20 00 6c 00	errsi on i
0130 69 00 6b 00 65 00 20 00 27 00 25 00 32 00 30 00 0140 31 00 36 00 25 00 27 00 20 00 6f 00 72 00 20 00	i·k·e· · '·%·2·0· 1-6·%·'· · · ····
0150 40 00 40 00 76 00 65 00 72 00 73 00 69 00 6f 00	0.0.vve. r.s.i.o.
0160 6e 00 20 00 6c 00 69 00 6b 00 65 00 20 00 27 00 0170 25 00 32 00 30 00 31 00 37 00 25 00 27 00 20 00	n· ·l·i· k·e· ·'· %.2.0.1. 7.%.'
0180 6f 00 72 00 20 00 40 00 40 00 76 00 65 00 72 00	orr ·@· @·v·e·r·
0190 73 00 69 00 6f 00 6e 00 20 00 6c 00 69 00 6b 00 01a0 65 00 20 00 27 00 25 00 32 00 30 00 31 00 39 00	s-i-o-nl-i-k- e'-%- 2-0-1-9-
Frame (4020 hyter) Deserve hist TDS (24400 hyter)	~
Pranic (1000 09(85) Reassembled IDS (24408 09(85)	· TDS · Lenath: 4030 · Info: SOI hard
1011 - 2017 - 1112 - 2017 - 3237 - 3247 - 2224 - 22	Close Help

Figure 5. Executing SQL statements





XMR Coinminer [F30DC9EB.moe]

The second worker DLL is an XMR Coinminer that starts its routine by retrieving the configuration over UDP. It then begins executing an embedded XMRig binary with the configuration pulled, making the bot join the mining pool on 108[.]177[.]235[.]90:443.

ዾ Administrator: Windows PowerS	× + ~	–
PS C:\Users\	ktop> .\xmr	rig_mal.exe
[2021-10-28 02:57:53.067] Huge page	s support was successfully enabled, but reboot required to use it
* ABOUT XMRig/6.12.2 MSVC/2019		
* LIBS libuv/1.	libuv/1.41.0 OpenSSL/1.1.1k hwloc/2.4.1	
* HUGE PAGES unavailable		
* 1GB PAGES unavailable		
* CPU Intel(R) Core(TM) i9-10900 CPU @ 2.80GHz (1) 64-bit AES VM		
L2:1.0 MB L3:20.0 MB 4C/4T NUMA:1		
* MEMORY 1.5/8.0	* MEMORY 1.5/8.0 GB (19%)	
RAM slot #0: 8 GB DRAM @ 0 MHz VMW-8192MB		
 MOTHERBOARD VMware, 	Inc. – VMwa	ure7,1
* ASSEMBLY auto:int	el	
* POOL #1 108.177.	235.90:443	algo rx/0
* COMMANDS hashrate	, pause, re	sume, results, connection
[2021-10-28 02:57:53.742] net	use pool 108.177.235.90:443 TLSv1.3 108.177.235.90
[2021-10-28 02:57:53.743] net	fingerprint (SHA-256): "c3e408e1268f8dc12b758e4069d2b1be742fe775252219f5a54d33fe5ad4af7a"
[2021-10-28 02:57:53.744] net	new job from 108.177.235.90:443 diff 10000 algo rx/0 height 2480787
	_ cpu	use argon2 implementation AVX2
	randomx	init dataset algo rx/0 (2 threads) seed 54ba57cb0b97328b
	randomx	allocated 2336 MB (2080+256) huge pages 0% 0/1168 +JIT (0 ms)
	randomx	dataset ready (13969 ms)
	j cpu	use profile rx (2 threads) scratchpad 20048 kB
	J CPU	READY THREADS 2/2 (2) Huge pages 0% 0/2 memory 4096 KB (6 ms)
	J CPU	accepted (1/0) diff 10000 (212 ms)
	j cpu	
	j miner	speed 105/005/15m n/a n/a h/s max n/a h/s
	j miner	Speed 105/05/15m 843.7 n/a n/a H/S max 800.8 H/S
		Speed 105/005/15m /55.9 M/d M/d M/S max 800.8 M/S
	j cpu	accepted (J/6) diff 10000 (210 ms)
	j cpu	accepted (4/6) diff 10000 (220 ms) r_{2} (200 ms) r_{2} (200 ms)
		Speed 105/005/100 005/1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 $(-1)^{-1}$
[2021 10 20 02:00:00:010	miner	sneed 10c/60c/15m 868 1 n/c n/a H/s may 87/1 5 H/c
[2021-10-28 02:59:06 837		accented (6/A) diff 10000 (214 ms)
[2021-10-28 02:59:08.898		speed 10s/66/15m 776 7 877 9 n/a H/s max 874 5 H/s
[2021-10-28 02:59:12.711	l net	new job from 108,177,235,90:443 diff 10000 algo rx/0 height 2480787
[2021-10-28 02:59:19.178	miner	speed 105/605/15m 802.4 817.5 n/a H/s max 874.5 H/s
[2021-10-28 02:59:29.443	miner	speed 10s/60s/15m 850.2 821.5 n/a H/s max 874.5 H/s
[2021-10-28 02:59:39.678	miner	speed 105/605/15m 828.6 830.2 n/a H/s max 874.5 H/s

Figure 8. Custom XMRig running in the foreground

Operating system execution via SQL Server

Purple Fox focuses on SQL servers as its target as opposed to normal computers for the former's cryptocurrency-mining activities. This is mainly because of the more powerful hardware configuration — for both CPU and memory — that the servers would usually have. More specifically for SQL servers, the combination of CPU, memory, and disk factors should scale with the database-related operations to avoid bottlenecks in performance.

These machines normally possess much greater computing power compared to normal desktops, as such servers are usually fitted with hardware such as the Intel Xeon line of CPUs that produces a <u>significantly higher amount of hash-based calculations</u> (hash rates), making a server more advantageous to coinmining compared to a typical desktop computer.

Since SQL databases support different vectors for executing operating system commands directly, Purple Fox has leveraged the stealthiest method of having a binary inserted in the SQL server database that can be executed via TSQL commands. The following interfaces are available from the SQL components for the malicious actors to use when targeting an SQL server:

Method Details

NET	 New Process() + UseShellExecute System.management.automation.powershell <u>Common Language Runtime (CLR) Assemblies</u>
C++	ShellExecute/ShellExecuteExxp_cmdshell
COM objects	wscript.shellshell.application

Table 2. The available interfaces from the SQL components

Purple Fox opted to go with the .NET method using <u>CLR Assemblies</u>, a group of DLLs that can be imported into a SQL Server, in its infection chain instead of the more popular xp_cmdshell, which is heavily monitored by security analysts. Once the DLLs have been imported, they can be linked to stored procedures that can be executed via a TSQL script. The affected versions for this vector start from SQL Server 2008.

This method, which requires a system administrator role by default, executes as an SQL Server service account. By leveraging this interface, an attacker is able to compile a .NET assembly DLL and then have it imported into the SQL server. It is also able to have an assembly stored in the SQL Server Table, create a procedure that maps to the CLR method, and finally, run the procedure.

The CLR Assemblies method is reported to have been <u>used before</u> by <u>groups other than</u> <u>Purple Fox</u>, such as MrbMiner and Lemon Duck.

Infrastructure

The C&C servers used in the communication schemes that have been described here are infected servers that are part of the botnet used to host the various payloads for Purple Fox. We deduced this via the following facts:

- The C&C servers are SQL Servers themselves.
- The HTTP server header is <u>mORMot</u>, which is written in Delphi, the same language used for the various components.
- There is a large number of servers (1,000+ in just over a week).

Both initial DNS requests are CNAMEs to subdomains under kozow[.]com, which is a free dynamic domain service provided by dynu[.]com. This service can be updated with an API to make it point to different IP addresses — a technique the attacker uses to change the IP address at a regular interval.

Other notable characteristics

Using our telemetry, we found non-server systems infected with Purple Fox, indicating that there are other possible initial access methods other than the SQL Server brute-force attack to spread the malware.

This activity is similar to the ones seen in <u>Lemon Duck</u> attacks and even shares some techniques, like the use of PowerSploit for reflective PE loading and implementing the same backdoor, evilclr.dll, for the SQL Server assembly. Both attacks also share the same goal of mining Monero.

Security recommendations

Upon observing any suspicious activities related to the Purple Fox botnet on a SQL server, we recommend the following steps to completely remove all the malicious remnants from the infection.

- Review all the SQL Server's Stored Procedures and Assemblies for any suspicious assemblies not recognized by the DBAs. Remove any of these assemblies if detected.
- Execute the following TSQL script to remove the following remnants of malicious CLR assemblies that are inserted into the database:
- USE [master]
- GO
- DROP ASSEMBLY [fscbd]
- GO
- Disable all the unknown accounts on the database server and change all the passwords.
- As a defensive posture, do not publish externally exposed port TCP 1433 to an untrusted zone. In addition, secure the SQL server hosts via a perimeter firewall in a DMZ zone with well-protected access policies.
- Implement proper network microsegmentation and network zoning while also applying a zero trust policy via your network security controls.
- Restrict the traffic to and from SQL servers. These servers have a very specific function; therefore, they should only be allowed to communicate with other trusted hosts. Inbound and outbound internet accessibility should also be controlled.

Detections and Mitigations

Trend Micro <u>Vision One™ with Managed XDR</u> focuses on both the early stages of the attack kill chain (covered in the previous research) and the final payloads intended to do the actual damage, thereby protecting users of this service against the damage caused by the latest evolution of this botnet.

Both the Vision One platform and Managed XDR threat experts can correlate the suspicious activities observed from the protected SQL servers. An environment that has any of the behavioral detections found in our Vision One heuristics rules might mean that the SQL servers within the environment have already been affected by an attack. This extends even to stealthy malware, such as Purple Fox, that does not store majority of its files on the disk.

- Since servers have a predictable network footprint and behavior, unusual or unexpected network patterns could be a sign of botnet propagation.
- The same goes for unusual and unexpected SQL server application login failures that seem like brute-force attacks . The main propagation method for Purple Fox when infecting SQL servers uses brute-force attacks rather than acting as a worm that exploits only the vulnerable services.
- When a SQL server starts having unusual traffic related to UDP and TCP, there should be a massive surge in traffic since it scans public IP addresses and the local network. This will create a domino effect within an environment due to most organizations having more than one SQL server, such as standby or backup servers.
- Unusual network traffic patterns and login failures on the SQL server are also a good indicator for this threat.
- A sudden and unexpected spike in CPU utilization on the SQL server could also be a sign of SQL bottlenecks or an infection with the XMR Coinminer. Furthermore, there could also be unusual amounts of network traffic on the server as it joins the mining pool.

Malware

By examining Purple Fox's routines and activities, both with our initial research and the subject matter we cover in this blog post, we hope to help incident responders, security operation centers (SOCs), and security researchers find and weed out Purple Fox infections in their network.

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