# QakBot technical analysis

SL securelist.com/qakbot-technical-analysis/103931/



#### Authors

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## Main description

QakBot, also known as QBot, QuackBot and Pinkslipbot, is a banking Trojan that has existed for over a decade. It was found in the wild in 2007 and since then it has been continually maintained and developed.

In recent years, QakBot has become one of the leading banking Trojans around the globe. Its main purpose is to steal banking credentials (e.g., logins, passwords, etc.), though it has also acquired functionality allowing it to spy on financial operations, spread itself, and install ransomware in order to maximize revenue from compromised organizations.

To this day, QakBot continues to grow in terms of functionality, with even more capabilities and new techniques such as logging keystrokes, a backdoor functionality, and techniques to evade detection. It's worth mentioning that the latter includes virtual environment detection, regular self-updates and cryptor/packer changes. In addition, QakBot tries to protect itself from being analyzed and debugged by experts and automated tools.


Another interesting piece of functionality is the ability to steal emails. These are later used by the attackers to send targeted emails to the victims, with the obtained information being used to lure victims into opening those emails.

# QakBot infection chain

QakBot is known to infect its victims mainly via spam campaigns. In some cases, the emails were delivered with Microsoft Office documents (Word, Excel) or password-protected archives with the documents attached. The documents contained macros and victims were prompted to open the attachments with claims that they contained important information (e.g., an invoice). In some cases, the emails contained links to web pages distributing malicious documents.

However, there is another infection vector that involves a malicious QakBot payload being transferred to the victim's machine via other malware on the compromised machine.

The initial infection vectors may vary depending on what the threat actors believe has the best chance of success for the targeted organization(s). It's known that various threat actors perform reconnaissance (<u>OSINT</u>) of target organizations beforehand to decide which infection vector is most suitable.



## QakBot infection chain

The infection chain of recent QakBot releases (2020-2021 variants) is as follows:

- The user receives a phishing email with a ZIP attachment containing an Office document with embedded macros, the document itself or a link to download malicious document.
- The user opens the malicious attachment/link and is tricked into clicking "Enable content".
- A malicious macro is executed. Some variants perform a 'GET' request to a URL requesting a 'PNG' However, the file is in fact a binary.
- The loaded payload (stager) includes another binary containing encrypted resource modules. One of the encrypted resources has the DLL binary (loader) which is decrypted later during runtime.
- The 'Stager' loads the 'Loader' into the memory, which decrypts and runs the payload during runtime. The configuration settings are retrieved from another resource.
- The payload communicates with the C2 server.
- Additional threats such as ProLock ransomware can now be pushed to the infected machine.

# **Typical QakBot functions**

Typical QakBot malicious activity observed in the wild includes:

- Collecting information about the compromised host;
- Creating scheduled tasks (privilege escalation and persistency);
- Credentials harvesting:
  - Credential dumping (Mimikatz, exe access)\*;
  - Password stealing (from browser data and cookies);
  - Targeting web banking links (web injects)\*.
- Password brute forcing;
- Registry manipulation (persistence);
- Creating a copy of itself;
- Process injection to conceal the malicious process.

# **Communication with C2**

The QakBot malware contains a list of 150 IP addresses hardcoded into the loader binary resource. Most of these addresses belong to other infected systems that are used as a proxy to forward traffic to other proxies or the real C2.

Communication with the C2 is a HTTPS POST request with Base64-encoded data. The data is encrypted with the RC4 algorithm. The static string "jHxastDcds)oMc=jvh7wdUhxcsdt2" and a random 16-byte sequence are used for encryption. The data itself is in JSON format.

```
{
  "2":"wudvxt371400", // Unique infected system ID(aka bot ID)
  "8":9, // Request ID 9 - Ping request
  "1":18 // Protocol version
}
```

Original message in JSON format



## HTTPS POST request with encrypted JSON

Usually, after infection the bot sends a 'PING' message, 'SYSTEM INFO' message and 'ASK for COMMAND' message, and the C2 replies with 'ACK' and 'COMMAND' messages. If additional modules were pushed by the C2, the bot sends a 'STOLEN INFO' message containing data stolen by the modules.

**'PING' message** – bot request message to C2 with 'BOT ID' in order to check if C2 is active:

```
{
   "2":"wudvxt371400", // Unique infected system ID(aka bot ID)
   "8":9, // Request ID 9 - Ping request
   "1":18 // Protocol version
}
```

## 'PING' message

**'ACK' message** – C2 response message with field "16" containing the external IP address of the infected system, the only valuable information:

```
{
    "8":5, // Message type 'ACK'
    "16":3211131999, // External IP address of infected system
    "39":"6E2vNJxjP3m....dNR7d4UUMFQhGe8L4IQgJ", // Random string
    "38":1
}
```

**'SYSTEM INFO' message** – bot request message to C2 with information collected about the infected system. In addition to general system information such as OS version and bitness, user name, computer name, domain, screen resolution, system time, system uptime and bot uptime, it also contains the results of the following utilities and WMI queries:

- whoami /all
- ∘ arp -a
- ipconfig /all
- net view /all
- cmd /c set
- nslookup -querytype=ALL -timeout=10 \_ldap.\_tcp.dc.\_msdcs.{DOMAIN}
- nltest /domain\_trusts /all\_trusts
- net share
- route print
- netstat -nao
- net localgroup
- qwinsta
- WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32\_BIOS
- WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32\_DiskDrive
- WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32\_PhysicalMemory
- WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32\_Product
- WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32\_PnPEntity

```
{
 "8":4,
                          Message type 4 - SYSTEM INFO
                          Protocol Version
 "1":18.
                        Unique infected system ID (aka bot ID)
Campaign ID
 "2":"wvxtud759874",
 "3":"notset",
                            Bot Version HI
 "4":1025,
                           Bot Version LOW
 "5":78,
 "10":1607678329,
                           System timestamp
                           Bot uptime
 "6":574.
 "7":1960,
                           System uptime
  "59":0.
                           System bitness 2 - x64
  "22":2,
  "23":"10.0.1.15689.0.0.0200",
  "24": "Microsoft Windows",
  "28":10.
  "102":3,
  "47":"Intel(R) Core(TM) i3-2000K CPU @ 2.20GHz",
                                                                 whoami /all
  "25":"PC-NAME",
                                                                 cmd /c set
 "26": "TESTDOMAIN.NET",
                                                                 arp -a
 "101":1,
                                                                 ipconfig /all
 "73":0,
                                                                  net view /all
 "50":"UserName",
                                                                 nslookup -querytype=ALL -timeout=10 _ldap._tcp.dc
 "45":2,
                                                                 nltest /domain trusts /all trusts
 "30":O,
                                                                 net share
 "31":"Windows Defender",
                                                                 route print
 "51":1920,
                                                                 netstat -nao
                     Screen resolution
 "52":1080.
                                                                 net localgroup
 "57":"C:\\Users\\....", Current bot path
                                                                 gwinsta
  "58":"C:\\WINDOWS\\SysWOW64\\explorer.exe", Current process path
 "74":"\r\nUSER INFORMATION\r\n-----\r\n\r\nUser Name
                                                                            SID
  "75":"ALLUSERSPROFILE=C:\\ProgramData\r\nAPPDATA=C:\\Users\\UserName\\AppData\\Roaming\r\nCommonProgramFil
 "76":"\r\nInterface: 10.10.10.10 --- 0x4\r\n Internet Address Physical Address Type\r\n 10.10.
 "77":"\r\nWindows IP Configuration\r\n\r\n Host Name . . . . . . . . . . . . PC-NAME\r\n Primary Dns
 "78":"Server Name Remark\r\n\r\n-----
 "79":"*** UnKnown can't find ldap. tcp.dc. msdcs.TESTDOMAIN.NET: Non-existent domain/r/r/nServer: UnKnow
 "80":"List of domain trusts:\r\n 0: testdomain testdomain.net (NT 5) (Forest Tree Root) (Primary Domain
 "81":"\r\nShare name Resource
                                             Remark\r\n\r\n-----
                                  -----\r\nInterface List\r\n 4
 "82":"==============
 "83":"\r\nActive Connections\r\n\r\n Proto Local Address Foreign Address State
 "84":"\r\nAliases for \\\\PC-NAME\r\n\r\n-----
  "85":"SESSIONNAME USERNAME ID STATE TYPE DEVICE\r\nconsole Administrator 0 acti
  "33": Process List
   {"54":"[System Process]","53":"[System Process]"},{"54":"System","53":"System"},{"54":"Registry","53":"R
   1,
  "60": [ WMI Ouerv information
   {"61":"ROOT\\CIMV2","62":"Win32 ComputerSystem","63":[{"AdminPasswordStatus":"3","AutomaticManagedPagefi
   {"61":"ROOT\\CIMV2","62":"Win32 Bios","63":[{"BiosCharacteristics":"6;77","BIOSVersion":"TEST BIOS 0/1",
   {"61":"ROOT\\CIMV2","62":"Win32 DiskDrive","63":[{"BytesPerSector":"1024","Capabilities":"5;6;9","Capabi
   {"61":"ROOT\\CIMV2","62":"Win32_PhysicalMemory","63":[{"BankLabel":"","Capacity":"287456982","Caption":"
   {"61":"ROOT\\CIMV2","62":"Win32_Product","63":[{"Caption":"Office 18 Click-to-Run Extensibility Componen
   {"61":"ROOT\\CIMV2","62":"Win32_PnPEntity","63":[{{"Caption":"Volume Manager","Description":"Volume Mana
 1
```

#### 'SYSTEM INFO' message

**'ASK for COMMAND' message** – bot command request message to C2. After the 'SYSTEM INFO' message is sent, the bot starts asking the C2 for a command to execute. One of the main fields is "14" – the SALT. This field is unique and changes in every request. It is used to protect against hijacking or takeover of a bot. After receiving this request, the C2 uses the SALT in the signing procedure and places the signature in the response, so the bot can check the signed data. Only a valid and signed command will be executed.

```
{
 "8":1,
                        // Message type 1 - 'ASK for COMMAND'
 "5":78,
 "1":18,
 "59":0,
 "3":"notset",
 "4":1025,
 "10":1607678329,
 "2": "wvxtud759874",
 "6":578,
 "14":"cGI60wPmRoUEkOSWCjMCOfqCf3XKFh8pdt61xaV6", // SALT
 "7":1964,
 "101":1,
 "26": "TESTDOMAIN.NET",
 "73":0
}
```

#### 'ASK for COMMAND' message

**'COMMAND' message** – C2 response message with command to execute. The current version of the bot supports 24 commands, most of them related to download, execution, drop of additional modules and module configuration files with different options, or setup/update configuration values.

This type of message contains the signed value of the SALT (obtained from the bot's request field "14"), COMMAND ID and MODULE ID. The other values of the message are not signed. In previous versions, the bot received modules and commands immediately after infection and sending a 'SYSTEM INFO' message. Now, the C2 responds with an empty command for about an hour. Only after that will the C2 send commands and modules in the response. We believe that this time delay is used to make it difficult to receive and analyze new commands and modules in an isolated controlled environment.

```
{
    "8":6, // Message type 6 - COMMAND
    "15":"z27kXAAcX....ZWQrVH6hlwhRJL2UIPJYB5CgtOC==", // Signed ('SALT' + 'COMMAND ID' + 'MODULE ID')
    "16":3211131999,
    "16":0, // MODULE ID
    "19":0, // MODULE ID
    "19":0, // COMMAND ID - 0 = <empty command>
    "20":null,
    "39":"MHNzEstKqPVEN...115904PsvvRvIGloLSMoJIcygb"
}
```

#### 'COMMAND' C2 response with empty command

If the C2 pushes some modules, the Base64-encoded binary is placed into field "20" of the message.

'COMMAND' C2 response with additional module to load

**'STOLEN INFO' message** – bot message to C2 with stolen information like passwords, accounts, emails, etc. Stolen information is RC4 encrypted and Base64 encoded. The key for the RC4 encryption is generated in a different way and based on the infected system ID (aka Bot ID) values, and not based on a static string as in the case of traffic encryption.

## 'STOLEN INFO' message

Once communication with the C2 server has been established, QakBot is known to download and use additional modules in order to perform its malicious operations.

The additional modules differ from sample to sample and may include: 'Cookie grabber', 'Email Collector', 'Credentials grabber', and 'Proxy module' among others.

These modules may be written by the threat actors themselves or may be borrowed from third-party repositories and adapted. It can vary from sample to sample. For example, there are older samples that may use Mimikatz for credentials dumping.

Below are some of the modules that we found during our research.

# Additional modules

**Cookie Grabber** – collects cookies from popular browsers (Edge, Firefox, Chrome, Internet Explorer).

.text:10001A80	push	0A8h ; '¨' ; dwBytes
.text:10001A85	mov	<pre>[ebp+szColumnName], offset aFlags_0 ; "Flags"</pre>
.text:10001A8C	mov	<pre>[ebp+var_44], offset aExpires ; "Expires"</pre>
.text:10001A93	mov	[ebp+var_40], offset aRdomain_0 ; "RDomain"
.text:10001A9A	mov	[ebp+var_3C], offset aPath_1 ; "Path"
.text:10001AA1	mov	[ebp+var_38], offset aName_1 ; "Name"
.text:10001AA8	mov	[ebp+var_34], offset aValue_1 ; "Value"
.text:10001AAF	mov	[ebp+lpString], edi

**Hidden VNC** – allows threat actors to connect to the infected machine and interact with it without the real user knowing.

```
07 103 00 00 00
                                           att80
#871B8 52 75 6E 20 43 68 72+aRunChromiumFro_1 db 'Run Chromium from user profile',0
B71D7 00
                                           align 4
:B71D8 52 75 6E 20 43 68 72+aRunChromiumFro_2 db 'Run Chromium from CUSTOM profile',0
                                           align 10h
B71F9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
#87200 44 69 61 67 6E 6F 73+aDiagnoseChrome_0 db 'Diagnose Chrome',0
#B7210 46 69 72 65 66 6F 78+aFirefoxWebgl_0 db 'Firefox WebGL',0
B721E 00 00
                                           align 10h
B7220 52 75 6E 20 46 69 72+aRunFirefoxFrom_1 db 'Run Firefox from user profile',0
B723E 00 00
                                           align 10h
:B7240 52 75 6E 20 46 69 72+aRunFirefoxFrom 2 db 'Run Firefox from CUSTOM profile',0
187260 44 6F 6E 27 74 20 66+aDonTFreezeBrow_0 db 'Don',27h,'t freeze browser process',0
B727D 00 00 00
                                           align 10h
:B7280 53 61 76 65 20 75 73+aSaveUserProfil_0 db 'Save user profile folder \ Run from it',0
B72A7 00
                                           align 4
#B72A8 4B 65 65 70 20 56 4E+aKeepVncSession_0 db 'Keep VNC session',0
B72B9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                           align 10h
:B72C0 44 6F 20 75 20 77 61+aDoUWantToDelet_0 db 'Do u want to delete saved folder and run browser as usual ?',OAh
B72C0 6E 74 20 74 6F 20 64+
                                           db 'Make sure u',27h,'ve closed all browsers and wait 2 sec before sa'
B72C0 65 6C 65 74 65 20 73+
                                           db 'y YES !',0
B733F 00
                                           align 10h
B7340 44 65 6C 65 74 65 20+aDeleteFiles 0 db 'Delete files',0
```

**Email Collector** – tries to find Microsoft Outlook on the infected machine, then iterates over the software folders and recursively collects emails. Finally, the module exfiltrates the collected emails to the remote server.

```
272 log_info("Emails in folder: %u / %u", v42, v46);
273 (*(void ( stdcall **)(int))(*( DWORD *)v47 + 8))(v47);
274 v4 = a2;
275 LABEL 53:
276 if ( (*(int ( stdcall **)(int, DWORD, int *))(*(DWORD *)v4 + 60))(v4, 0, &v44) )
277
     {
278
       log error_0(0, (int)"EnumerateEmailFoldersRecur(): GetHierarchyTable() failed");
279
      return -3;
280
    - }
281 if ( 1v44 )
282 {
283
       log_error @(0, (int)"EnumerateEmailFoldersRecur(): pHierarchy=NULL");
284
       return 0;
285
286 log_info("EnumerateEmailFoldersRecur(): pFolder->GetHierarchyTable() ok");
287 sub 100061FD(( int64 *)&dword 1001B538);
288 v34 = 2;
289 v35 = 805371935;
290 v36 = 268370178;
291 if ( (*(int (_stdcall **)(int, int *, _DWORD))(*(_DWORD *)v44 + 28))(v44, &v34, 0) )
292
    {
293
       log error 0(0, (int)"EnumerateEmailFoldersRecur(): SetColumns() failed");
```

# The threat actors distributed a debug version of the email collector module at some point

**Hooking module** – hooks a hardcoded set of WinAPI and (if they exist) Mozilla DLL Hooking is used to perform web injects, sniff traffic and keyboard data and even prevent DNS resolution of certain domains. Hooking works in the following way: QakBot injects a hooking module into the appropriate process, the module finds functions from the hardcoded set and modifies the functions so they jump to custom code.

```
db
E4
                         0
E5
                         0
                   db
                   db
                         0
E6
                   db
                         0
E7
E8 ; hook_obj wininet_hooks
E8 wininet_hooks
                  hook_obj <180h, 1EEh, 1000DFAEh, 100271BCh, 0, 0>; 0
                                           ; DATA XREF: sub_10002720+134^o
F8
                                           ; sub 10002A44+31o ...
E8
E8
                   hook obj <180h, 1DDh, 1000E008h, 100271CCh, 0, 0>; 1 ; HttpSendRequestW
                   hook_obj <180h, 542h, 1000E3B6h, 100271C0h, 0, 0>; 2
E8
E8
                   hook_obj <180h, 3Ch, 1000E4A5h, 100271C4h, 0, 0>; 3
E8
                   hook_obj <180h, 0F0h, 1000D96Ah, 100271B0h, 0, 0>; 4
                  hook_obj <180h, 152h, 1000D8CCh, 100271ACh, 0, 0>; 5
E8
E8
                   hook_obj <180h, 330h, 1000E748h, 100271C8h, 0, 0>; 6
E8
                   hook_obj <180h, 249h, 1000E7ADh, 100271B8h, 0, 0>; 7
                   hook_obj <180h, 16Dh, 1000E975h, 100271A4h, 0, 0>; 8
E8
                   hook_obj <180h, 0BA1h, 1000E9BEh, 100271B4h, 0, 0>; 9
E8
BA
                  db
                        0
BB
                  db
                       00000000 :
                       00000000
BC
                   db
                       00000000 hook obj
                                               struc ; (sizeof=0x15, mappedto_30)
                  db
BD
BE
                  db
                       00000000
                                                                         ; XREF: .data:wininet hooks/r
BF
                   db 00000000 dll_name_ciphered dd ?
                 db 0C00000004 func name ciphered dd ?
C0 unk 100222C0
                        00000008 hook_func_offset dd ?
CØ
                        0000000C flag_dword
                                                 dd ?
0020DE8 100221E8: .data:00000010 field 10
                                                 dd ?
```

## The module contains a ciphered list of DLLs and functions that the bot will hook

**Passgrabber module** – collects logins and passwords from various sources: Firefox and Chrome files, Microsoft Vault storage, etc. Instead of using Mimikatz as in previous versions, the module collects passwords using its own algorithms.

```
1int cdecl sub 10053CD0(int al)
 2 {
3 dword 1006F758 = 0;
4 if (!a1)
    return -1;
5
 6 sub 100020E7((int)&off 1006E000);
7 if (CoInitialize(0))
8
    return -3;
9 sub 1005A090(sub 10053C90, sub 10053CB0);
10 write app log = (int ( cdecl *)( DWORD, DWORD))a1;
11 process outlook();
12 process credman();
13 process chrome();
14 process firefox();
15 process_internet_explorer();
16 process vault();
17 process pstore();
18 process cuteftp();
19 collect_certs_info();
20 return 0;
21 }
```

#### Procedure that collects passwords from different sources

**Proxy module** – tries to determine which ports are available to listen to using the UPnP port forwarding and tier 2 C2 query. Comparing current and old proxy loader versions revealed some interesting things: the threat actors decided to remove the cURL dependency from the binary and perform all HTTP communications using their own code. Besides removing cURL, they also removed OpenSSL dependencies and embedded all functions into a single executable – there are no more proxy loaders or proxy modules, it's a single file now.

```
v8 = (CHAR *)alloc(0x48u);
*( DWORD *)v8 = "NewRemoteHost";
*(( DWORD *)v8 + 1) = 0;
*(( DWORD *)v8 + 2) = "NewExternalPort";
*((_DWORD *)v8 + 3) = a3;
*((_DWORD *)v8 + 4) = "NewProtocol";
*((_DWORD *)v8 + 5) = "TCP";
*(( DWORD *)v8 + 6) = "NewInternalPort";
*((_DWORD *)v8 + 7) = a2;
*(( DWORD *)v8 + 8) = "NewInternalClient";
*(( DWORD *)v8 + 9) = a1;
v9 = a6;
*(( DWORD *)v8 + 10) = "NewEnabled";
*(( DWORD *)v8 + 11) = "1";
v17[0] = v8;
*(( DWORD *)v8 + 12) = "NewPortMappingDescription";
if ( !a6 )
 v9 = "libminiupnpc";
*(( DWORD *)v8 + 13) = v9;
*(( DWORD *)v8 + 14) = "NewLeaseDuration";
*((_DWORD *)v8 + 15) = "0";
v10 = (CHAR *)sub_10004BFA((int)v8, a4, a5, "AddPortMapping", &v16);
v15 = v10;
if ( !v10 )
```

## UPnP port forwarding query construction

After trying to determine whether ports are open and the machine could act as a C2 tier 2 proxy, the proxy module also starts a multithreaded SOCKS5 proxy server. The SOCKS5 protocol is encapsulated into the QakBot proxy protocol composed of: QakBot proxy command (1 byte), version (1 byte), session id (4 bytes), total packet length (dword), data (total packet length-10). Incoming and outgoing packets are stored in the buffers and may be received/transmitted one by one or in multiple packets in a single TCP data segment (streamed).

The usual proxy module execution flow is as follows:

- 1. Communicate with the C2, try to forward ports with UPnP and determine available ports and report them to the C2. The usual C2 communication protocol used here is HTTP POST RC4-ciphered JSON data.
- 2. Download the OpenSSL library. Instead of saving the downloaded file, QakBot measures the download speed and deletes the received file.
- 3. Set up external PROXY-C2 connection that was received with command 37 (update config)/module 274 (proxy) by the stager.

Communicating with the external PROXY-C2:


- 1. Send initial proxy module request. The initial request contains the bot ID, external IP address of the infected machine, reverse DNS lookup of the external IP address, internet speed (measured earlier) and seconds since the proxy module started.
- 2. Establish a connection (proxy commands sequence 1->10->11) with the PROXY-C2.
- 3. Initialize sessions, perform socks5 authorization with login/password (received from PROXY-C2 with command 10).
- 4. Begin SOCKS5-like communication wrapped into the QakBot proxy module protocol.

QakBot proxy commands are as follows:

Command	Description
1	Hello (bot->C2)
10	Set up auth credentials (C2->bot)
11	Confirm credentials setup (bot->C2)
2	Create new proxy session (C2->bot)
3	SOCKS5 AUTH (bot->C2)
4	SOCKS5 requests processing (works for both sides)
5	Close session (works for both sides)

## Command Description

6	Update session state/session state updated notification (works for both sides)
7	Update session state/session state updated notification (works for both sides)
8	PING (C2->bot)
9	PONG (bot->C2)
19	Save current time in registry (C2->bot)




Parsed packets from C2

	Wireshark ·
00000465 00	
ooo Comman	nd Protocol version Session ID Message size Data
0000048F 00	
00000278	
	04 07 01 00 b0 bd 0e 00 00 00 05 02 00 02 02 07 SOCKS5 AUTH Methods request
	02 00 0d b1 0c 00 00 00 5d bd 04 07 02 00 0d b1]
000002A4	
	00 00 5d bd 04 07 03 00 20 e3 0e 00 00 05 02]
	00 02 02 07 04 00 52 52 0c 00 00 00 5d bd 04 07RR]
	04 00 52 52 0e 00 00 00 05 02 00 02 07 01 00 b0 bd 0c 00 00 00 05 02 03 07 02 00 SOCKS5 AUTH Method login/password respon
	b1 0c 00 00 05 02 03 07 03 00 20 e3 0c 00
	00 05 02 03 07 04 00 52 52 00 00 00 05 02 RR
	[04][07] 01 00 b0 bd 1d 00 00 00 01 04 32 35 6d 63 SOCKS5 login/password
	0c 62 54 67 53 6c 7a 21 38 71 31 46 39 04 07 02 .bTgSlz! 8q1F9
	00 0d b1 1d 00 00 01 04 32 35 6d 63 0c 62 54
00000310	67 53 6c 7a 21 38 71 31 46 39 04 07 03 00 20 e3 gSlz!8q1 F9
00000320	1d 00 00 00 01 04 32 35 6d 63 0c 62 54 67 53 6c25 mc.bTgSl
00000330	7a 21 38 71 31 46 39 04 07 04 00 52 52 1d 00 00 z!8q1F9RR
00000340	00 01 04 32 35 6d 63 0c 62 54 67 53 6c 7a 21 3825mc. bTgSlz!8
00000350	71 31 46 39 q1F9
	07 01 00 b0 bd 0c 00 00 00 01 00 03 07 02 00 Login/password OK response
	b1 0c 00 00 01 00 03 07 03 00 20 e3 0c 00
	00 01 00 03 07 04 00 52 52 0c 00 00 00 01 00 RR
	04 07 01 00 b0 bd 1e 00 00 00 05 01 00 03 0d 61 SOCKS5.method CONNECT request
	70 69 2e 69 70 69 66 79 2e 6f 72 67 01 bb 04 07 pi.ipify .org
	02 00 0d b1 1e 00 00 00 05 01 00 03 0d 61 70 69api
	2e 69 70 69 66 79 2e 6f 72 67 01 bb 04 07 03 00 .ipify.o rg 20 e3 1e 00 00 00 05 01 00 03 0d 61 70 69 2e 69
	70 69 66 79 2e 6f 72 67 01 bb 04 07 04 00 52 52 pify.orgRR
	1e 00 00 00 05 01 00 03 0d 61 70 69 2e 69 70 69
	66 79 2e 6f 72 67 01 bb fy.org.
	01 e5 bd 04 07 02 00 0d b1 14 00 00 00 05 00 SOCKS5 method CONNECT response
00000510 00	01 7f 00 00 01 e5 c0 04 07 03 00 20 e3 14 00
00000520 00	00 05 00 00 01 7f 00 00 01 e5 c3 04 07 04 00
00000530 52	52 14 00 00 05 00 00 01 7f 00 00 01 e5 c6 RR
	84 87 81 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
	00 01 00 03 03 1e 49 82 4e bb c2 20 09 f6 0b f7I. N
	38 b2 fc c6 f5 0a 7c 97 c9 cf 51 f4 61 d4 f1 f3 8
	44 cb b1 54 a9 20 84 2e 7b 3c bf 62 81 76 99 d7 D.T {<.b.v.
	b8 16 27 2c ce bb ae 52 69 02 8c 0d a5 f6 d0 75',R iu
	ef 67 84 e4 7c c2 00 26 c0 2f c0 30 c0 2b c0 2c .g  & ./.0.+.,
	cc a8 cc a9 c0 13 c0 09 c0 14 c0 0a 00 9c 00 9d
	00 2f 00 35 c0 12 00 0a 13 01 13 03 13 02 01 00 ./.5
	00 91 00 00 00 12 00 10 00 00 0d 61 70 69 2e 69api.i 70 69 66 79 2e 6f 72 67 00 05 00 05 01 00 00 00 pify.org
	70 69 66 79 2e 6f 72 67  00 05 00 05 01 00 00 00   pify.org 00 00 0a 00 0a 00 08 00  1d 00 17 00 18 00 19 00
	0b 00 02 01 00 00 0d 00 1a 00 18 08 04 04 03 08

## Tracking single proxy

Web inject – the configuration file for the hooking module

Once communication with the C2 is established, one of the additional modules that is downloaded is the web-inject module. It intercepts the victim's traffic by injecting the module into the browser's process and hooking the network API. The hooking module gets the execution flow from intercepted APIs, and as soon as the victim accesses certain web pages related to banking and finance, additional JavaScript is injected into the source page.



Fragment of JavaScript injected into the source page of the Wells Fargo login page

# **QakBot statistics**

We analyzed statistics on QakBot attacks collected from our Kaspersky Security Network (KSN), where anonymized data voluntarily provided by Kaspersky users is accumulated and processed. In the first seven months of 2021 our products detected 181,869 attempts to download or run QakBot. This number is lower than the detection number from January to July 2020, though the number of users affected grew by 65% compared to the previous year and reached 17,316.

Number of users affected by QakBot attacks from January to July in 2020 and 2021 (download)

We observed the largest campaigns in Q1 2021 when 12,704 users encountered QakBot, with 8,068 Kaspersky users being targeted in January and 4,007 in February.

# Conclusions

QakBot is a known Trojan-Banker whose techniques may vary from binary to binary (older and newer versions). It has been active for over a decade and doesn't look like going away anytime soon. The malware is continuously receiving updates and the threat actors keep adding new capabilities and updating its modules in order to steal information and maximize revenue. We know that threat actors change how they perform their malicious activities based on security vendor activities, using sophisticated techniques to stay under the radar. Although QakBot uses different techniques to avoid detection, for example, process enumeration in order to find running anti-malware solutions, our products are able to detect the threat using behavior analysis. The verdicts usually assigned to this malware:

Backdoor.Win32.QBot Backdoor.Win64.QBot Trojan.JS.QBot Trojan.MSOffice.QBot Trojan.MSOffice.QbotLoader Trojan.Win32.QBot Trojan-Banker.Win32.QBot Trojan-Banker.Win64.QBot Trojan-Downloader.JS.QBot Trojan-PSW.Win32.QBot

## Indicators of compromise (C2 server addresses)

75.67.192[.]125:443	24.179.77[.]236:443	70.163.161[.]79:443
72.240.200[.]181:2222	<u>184.185.103[.]157:443</u>	78.63.226[.]32:443
83.196.56[.]65:2222	95.77.223[.]148:443	76.168.147[.]166:993
105.198.236[.]99:443	73.151.236[.]31:443	<u>64.121.114[.]87:443</u>
213.122.113[.]120:443	97.69.160[.]4:2222	77.27.207[.]217:995
105.198.236[.]101:443	75.188.35[.]168:443	<u>31.4.242[.]233:995</u>
144.139.47[.]206:443	<u>173.21.10[.]71:2222</u>	125.62.192[.]220:443
83.110.109[.]155:2222	76.25.142[.]196:443	<u>195.12.154[.]8:443</u>
186.144.33[.]73:443	<u>67.165.206[.]193:993</u>	96.21.251[.]127:2222
149.28.98[.]196:2222	222.153.122[.]173:995	71.199.192[.]62:443
45.77.117[.]108:2222	45.46.53[.]140:2222	70.168.130[.]172:995
45.32.211[.]207:995	71.74.12[.]34:443	82.12.157[.]95:995
149.28.98[.]196:995	50.29.166[.]232:995	209.210.187[.]52:995

149.28.99[.]97:443	<u>109.12.111[.]14:443</u>	209.210.187[.]52:443
207.246.77[.]75:8443	<u>68.186.192[.]69:443</u>	<u>67.6.12[.]4:443</u>
149.28.99[.]97:2222	188.27.179[.]172:443	189.222.59[.]177:443
149.28.101[.]90:443	98.192.185[.]86:443	174.104.22[.]30:443
149.28.99[.]97:995	<u>189.210.115[.]207:443</u>	142.117.191[.]18:2222
149.28.101[.]90:8443	<u>68.204.7[.]158:443</u>	189.146.183[.]105:443
92.59.35[.]196:2222	75.137.47[.]174:443	213.60.147[.]140:443
45.63.107[.]192:995	24.229.150[.]54:995	196.221.207[.]137:995
45.63.107[.]192:443	86.220.60[.]247:2222	108.46.145[.]30:443
45.32.211[.]207:8443	193.248.221[.]184:2222	187.250.238[.]164:995
197.45.110[.]165:995	<u>151.205.102[.]42:443</u>	2.7.116[.]188:2222
45.32.211[.]207:2222	71.41.184[.]10:3389	<u>195.43.173[.]70:443</u>
<u>96.253.46[.]210:443</u>	24.55.112[.]61:443	106.250.150[.]98:443
172.78.59[.]180:443	<u>24.139.72[.]117:443</u>	45.67.231[.]247:443
90.65.234[.]26:2222	72.252.201[.]69:443	83.110.103[.]152:443
47.22.148[.]6:443	<u>175.143.92[.]16:443</u>	<u>83.110.9[.]71:2222</u>
<u>149.28.101[.]90:995</u>	<u>100.2.20[.]137:443</u>	<u>78.97.207[.]104:443</u>
207.246.77[.]75:2222	<u>46.149.81[.]250:443</u>	<u>59.90.246[.]200:443</u>
144.202.38[.]185:995	207.246.116[.]237:8443	80.227.5[.]69:443
45.77.115[.]208:995	<u>207.246.116[.]237:995</u>	<u>125.63.101[.]62:443</u>
149.28.101[.]90:2222	<u>207.246.116[.]237:443</u>	86.236.77[.]68:2222
45.32.211[.]207:443	207.246.116[.]237:2222	109.106.69[.]138:2222
<u>149.28.98[.]196:443</u>	45.63.107[.]192:2222	<u>84.72.35[.]226:443</u>
<u>45.77.117[.]108:443</u>	71.163.222[.]223:443	217.133.54[.]140:32100
144.202.38[.]185:2222	<u>98.252.118[.]134:443</u>	<u>197.161.154[.]132:443</u>
45.77.115[.]208:8443	<u>96.37.113[.]36:993</u>	<u>89.137.211[.]239:995</u>

<u>45.77.115[.]208:443</u>	27.223.92[.]142:995	74.222.204[.]82:995
207.246.77[.]75:995	<u>24.152.219[.]253:995</u>	<u>122.148.156[.]131:995</u>
<u>45.77.117[.]108:8443</u>	<u>24.95.61[.]62:443</u>	<u>156.223.110[.]23:443</u>
<u>45.77.117[.]108:995</u>	<u>96.61.23[.]88:995</u>	<u>144.139.166[.]18:443</u>
<u>45.77.115[.]208:2222</u>	<u>92.96.3[.]180:2078</u>	202.185.166[.]181:443
<u>144.202.38[.]185:443</u>	<u>71.187.170[.]235:443</u>	<u>76.94.200[.]148:995</u>
207.246.77[.]75:443	50.244.112[.]106:443	<u>71.63.120[.]101:443</u>
<u>140.82.49[.]12:443</u>	<u>24.122.166[.]173:443</u>	<u>196.151.252[.]84:443</u>
81.214.126[.]173:2222	73.25.124[.]140:2222	202.188.138[.]162:443
216.201.162[.]158:443	47.196.213[.]73:443	74.68.144[.]202:443
136.232.34[.]70:443	<u>186.154.175[.]13:443</u>	69.58.147[.]82:2078

<u>\*</u> Can be performed as an external command (extended module).

- Malicious spam
- <u>Malware</u>
- <u>Malware Descriptions</u>
- Malware Technologies
- <u>QakBot</u>
- <u>Trojan</u>
- Trojan Banker

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QakBot technical analysis

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