Fast Insights for a Microsoft-Signed Netfilter Rootkit

intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/fast-insights-for-a-microsoft-signed-netfilter-rootkit/

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Written by Giancarlo Lezama - 10 August 2021

Malicious Main Family: NetFilter Rootkit		01 SHA256 10 d64f906376f ∑ visustotaL Report pe embedded	21677d0585e93dae8b36248f94be7091b01fd1d4381916a326afe 54 (6) Detections) pe 086 probably, parked	Mailclous 0 This file contains code from malicious software, therefor likely that it's malicious.	re It's very
Genetic Analysis TTPs	BETA	• IOCs BETA	Behavior #858		
Original File		Genetic Summ	ary Related Samples Code (41) Strings (44) ^① C:		
		₩ d64190	5376f21677d0585e93dae8b36248f94be7091b01fd1d438 NetFilter Rc		C & L
Dynamic Execution Powered by Cape		→ Ne	Filter Rootkit		Show common 2
Memory V d641906376121677d0585e93.exe					
		Comm Neutra 0 Code	1000		
Dropped Files					
		File Metadata			
Static Extraction					
		File Type			

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Automate malware analysis of Netfilter rootkit and other advanced threats. Obtain deep insights without long, manual effort.

News broke in June about a malicious <u>Netfilter rootkit</u> signed by Microsoft. This was significant in that Windows machines only run drivers with valid signatures. Since drivers can obtain the maximum level of permissions on a machine, they are gold for any threat actor who can obtain such access.

Thanks to malware analysts like Karsten Hahn, additional samples of this malware dating back to March were uncovered, along with details on how they operate. Let's look at the genetic analysis of these <u>samples</u> to see how you can quickly identify them as Netfilter rootkit, as well as understand their capabilities and obtain similar artifacts despite the valid signature.

The Netfilter rootkit was found in a driver signed by Microsoft. This rare technique bypasses defenses, such as Antivirus tools, by making the file appear legitimate, despite the fact that it is tampered with malicious code. Obfuscated strings were also found in this file, which is very uncommon for a legitimate file. When the file is executed, other URLs can be identified, each with a specific purpose, including redirecting infected endpoints to other IP addresses; for self-updating the malware and receiving the valid root certificate.

Detection of malware with valid signatures is challenging. Since these samples are signed legitimately by Microsoft, even Antivirus software can be fooled into trusting them. An analyst could try investigating the abnormal network connections made to the URLs during execution. The URLs might be useful for this variant but there is no way of telling what changes could be made to URLs in future malware variants, or whether the external server the rootkit connects to is hidden from network detection tools through methods such as DynDNS or proxies. Not to mention, how do you know the full extent of the capabilities in the driver? Once a rootkit is executed, it will totally own a machine with maximum permissions, hiding its activities from even endpoint detection solutions.

Let's take a look at the <u>analysis</u> of the Netfilter Dropper sample referenced in the aforementioned article.

Main Family: Net Filter Rootkit	0 5HA256 10 d64f906576f21677d0585693dae8b36248f94be7091b01fd1d4381916a326afe 2) www.max. Report (54 / 69 Detections) pe embedded_pe 186 probably_packed	very (Analyzed on Jun 29th 2021
Genetic Analysis TTPs BETA	IOCs BEX Behavior BEA Think we missed something? Try using our previous analysis engine.	See Extended Dynamic Execution
Original File	Genetic Summary Related Samples Code (41) Strings (44) $^{\textcircled{0}}$ Capabilities (5) $^{\textcircled{0}}$	
113 KB d64f906376f21677d0585e93dae8b3624 Malicious NetFilter Rootkit (41 Genes)	d64f906376f21677d0585e93dae8b36248f94be7091b01fd1d43 NetFilter Rc. pe embedded_pe 1386 probably_packed	C () (* 4
Dynamic Execution ▲ Powered by Cape Show all Memory ▲ ∨ d64/906376/21677/d0585e93.exe 1444	→ NetFilter Rootkit Edit Malware Related Samples 41 Code genes 4 Strings 4 Capabilities	Show common 🛿
d64f906376f21677d0585e93.exe 113.5 KB Malicious NetFilter Rootkit (48 Genes) ✓ regini.exe 2516	Common Edit Neutral 0 Code gures 39 Strings	
Dropped Files		
	File Metadata	
Static Extraction		
e0afb8b937a5907fbe55a1d1cc7574e Malicious NetFilter Rootkit (224 Genes)	File Type Win32 EXE SHA1 aee092fd31772d33932a7a02dd2d73ede677/db0 Ssdeep 1536:HLSRW/XXQ/Wie/KBXmT5p3EpoNyq+4IRXGIHOSyOW77:rLKOQwNOT+eFq+4IAvOI7	
63d61549030fcf46ff1dc138122580b4 Malicious Generic Malware (0 Genes)	ViriusToTAL Report (54 / 69 Detections) Target Machine Intel 386 or later, and compatibles Compiliation Invalid date Timestamp	

With Intezer Analyze you can analyze malware threats in seconds, with every tool you need to do so in one place: *genetic code analysis*, *sandboxing*, *memory analysis* and *static analysis*.

The original file is classified as Netfilter rootkit, where an analysis of the code finds that the file shares 41 code genes, or about 81% of its code (click Show common code), with previously identified Netfilter rootkit samples. It is clear that although the uploaded dropper has a valid signature, the code itself is identified as malicious and belongs to the Netfilter rootkit.

Sometimes, an analysis isn't always this easy. Files can be obfuscated by being packed, encoded, or delivered in the form of installers. For this reason, Intezer also has the ability to statically extract relevant files packed in the original file, as well as dynamically execute the original file in order to see how it executes. In this particular analysis, the driver is embedded in the dropper, which gets dropped onto the disk during execution in the sandbox.



With Intezer Analyze you don't get a blackbox. Instead, you can see exactly in which malware samples the malicious Netfilter rootkit code of the dropper (as well as the dropped files) have been seen before.

Genetic Summary	Related Sampl	es Code (114)	Strings (249)	D Caj	pabilities (3) ⁽¹⁾		
Family Related Samp	bles						
Related Families	(117 genes)	💥 Malware NetFilter	Rootkit				
NetFilter Rootkit		Name	First seen	Label	SHA256 🗗	Reused Genes	
			June 18th 2021		bff9b75ae2	41 Genes	
			June 18th 2021		d64f90637	41 Genes	
			June 18th 2021		a5c873085f	40 Genes	
			June 18th 2021		659e0d1b2	33 Genes	
			June 18th 2021		e0afb8b937	7 Genes	

Intezer's sandboxing capabilities capture what the file did during execution within the context of the MITRE ATT&CK® framework. This provides an immediate sense of what suspicious or malicious activity the file is capable of in order to help you assess the risk. The highest risk behavior found in this file is the ability to persist on an endpoint by making adjustments to the Windows Registry.

MITRE ATTECK	Technique Detect	ion											
Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command And Control	Exfiltration	Impact
				Boot or Logon Autostart Execution :: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder									
MITRE ATT&G	ск			Inc	licator				Severity	Deta	ails		
	oot or Logon Auto		gistry Run Keys / S				artup				KEY_LOCAL_MACHI		
key:HKEY_LOC data:\??\C:\Us	AL_MACHINE\SY ers\mike\AppDat	STEM\ControlSet0 ca\Roaming\netfilt	001\services\netf ter.sys										
											driver service name:\Registry\Machine\System\CurrentContr		
	name:\Registry\I												
										Process:d64f906376f21677d0585e93.exe -> regini			
Process:d64f9		85e93.exe -> regi											
						suspicious feature	s which may be indi			get_n	o_useragent:HTTP		ET request with n
get_no_userag ip_hostname:l suspicious_ree suspicious_ree suspicious_ree suspicious_ree suspicious_ree	gent:HTTP traffic HTTP connection quest:http://110. quest:http://110. quest:http://110. quest:http://110. quest:http://110.	contains a GET re was made to an l 42.4.180:2081/u 42.4.180:2081/s 42.4.180:2081/c 42.4.180:2081/v?v 42.4.180:2081/h?c 42.4.180:2081/p	quest with no us P address rather r=6&m=0bd3b9f5 :=1F8BFBFF00050	er-agent header than domain nam 5a2d3a13f506d9d 1656									
													0.42.4.180:2081/
url:http://110. url:http://110. url:http://110. url:http://110. url:http://110. url:http://110.	42.4.180:2081/u 42.4.180:2081/s 42.4.180:2081/c 42.4.180:2081/v 42.4.180:2081/v 42.4.180:2081/h	∿=6&m=0bd3b9f5 ?c=1F8BFBFF0005i	55a2d3a13f506d9 0656	d8b970e0de									

Another interesting behavior is the resulting network activity from the file's execution, providing us with network IoCs for this file. These network IoCs, along with the file's IoCs uncovered when the file was executed or via static extraction, make up the full list of IoCs shown in a separate tab for ease of access.

Genetic Analysis TTPS BETA IOCS BETA	Behavior BETA	evious analysis engine. (순+ Extended Dynamic Execution
Network IOCs (7)		Download CSV
Туре		
IP		
URL		
Files IOCs (3)		Download CSV
SHA256	Path	Classification
d64f906376f21677d0585e93dae8b36248f94be7091b01fd1d4381916a32		
63d61549030fcf46ff1dc138122580b4364f0fe99e6b068bc6a3d6903656a		
e0afb8b937a5907fbe55a1d1cc7574e9304007ef33fa80ff3896e997a1bea		

The network IoCs are identical to the ones provided in the GData article, each with a distinct purpose as mentioned.

To summarize, there is a lot of information related to the investigation of this malware that can be easily extracted through genetic code analysis and other fundamental techniques with Intezer 's malware analysis tool.

Consider that most malware must evolve into new variants in order to evade detection but their code mostly remains the same. Behavioral analysis and signatures can be evaded by advanced malware like this Netfilter rootkit, but the code doesn't lie.

Intezer Analyze covers every malware-related incident. Scan files, live machines, memory dumps and URLs (coming soon) to get fast verdicts, TTPs, IoCs and more. <u>Sign up</u> for free and start with 50 file uploads per month.



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Giancarlo is an experienced cybersecurity solutions architect. He has helped demonstrate, architect, and deploy security solutions for organizations across various industries.