Watering hole" threat analysis in the government sector of Kazakhstan

tntsecure.kz/en/article_7.html

While studying the threat landscape of Kazakhstan as a part of the Threat Intelligence phase, T&T Security experts discovered the so-called Razy malware family. The investigated samples of the Razy family apparently were used to infect users in the form of a Trojan downloader masquerading as a regular office document (Word, Excel and Adobe PDF). Attackers usually spread Razy using a "Watering hole" attack.

The "Watering hole" is an attack where attackers locate malware on a legitimate, possibly previously hacked, site visited by a potential victim.

Thus the attacker achieves the trustworthiness effect since the link to the malicious file will likely be on a victim's list of trusted sites.

Two of the analysed cases caught our sharp attention, in which the attackers spread the malware using the watering hole attack on the e-government portal (egov.kz). Malicious links:

- hxxps://legalacts.egov.kz/application/downloadnpa?id=5322314
- hxxps://budget.egov.kz/budgetfile/file?fileId=1520392

At the same time, the second malicious Razy sample (at budget.egov.kz) was still available for download on the site at the time of detection.

The files are the same malicious Razy Trojan downloader. We assume that cybercriminals published the malicious software under the pretence of office documents by gaining access to uploading files to the legalacts.egov.kz and budget.egov.kz. The first document is a resolution of the district administration. The second, created in 2021, is a financial summary of the administration's budget. That implies the attacker posted the Razy malware in 2021, accordingly.

We assume that these attacks targeted specific companies that may be using these documents. And most likely, the attackers did not aim for the mass attack on the citizens of Kazakhstan, and the public exposure of the samples themselves is most likely a side effect. The rest of the Razy samples are also documents of different kinds, e.g. the resolution of the district administration. That means cybercriminals look for the documents suitable for the victim and embed them into the final malicious file.

One should note, by the time of publication, the malware control server (C&C server) has already been disabled, and that is currently, these samples cannot load any additional malicious functionality.

Together with the accountable employees of Zerde National Information & Communication Holding JSC, the T&T Security team worked to detect the Razy related incidents and block the caused spreading of malicious content.


tLab successfully detects and blocks this threat, which can be seen in the video below. tLab works on the principle of zero trust based on deep behavioral analysis, and high throughput allows you to analyze tens of thousands of files per day without filters and whitelisting, then our solution effectively blocks such threats even using an attack at the watering hole. Since tLab is used as part of the Cyber Shield of the Republic of Kazakhstan, we can say that the state is ready to repel such threats.

Samples technical analysis

Razy, first spotted in 2015, has been used for attacks to these days. Below is a diagram of how Razy works. One can see that when a user launches a sample, a malicious payload gets activated, and an actual legitimate document embedded in malware pops up.



T&T Security monitored the monthly amounts of Razy malware samples found on Virustotal and discovered a sharp increase in May 2021. Most of the detected malware samples to target Kazakhstan belong to the same period. That is, the embedded documents come from the Kazakh institutions.



Associated Urls

DATE CHECKED	URL	HOSTNAME	SERVER RESPONSE	IP	GOOGLE SAFE BROWSING	ANTIVIRUS RESULTS
Dec 4, 2019	http://wxanalytics.ru	wxanalytics.ru	404	104.239.157.210		
Feb 8, 2019	http://wxanalytics.ru/net%20exe.config	wxanalytics.ru	404	23.253.126.58		
Oct 20, 2017	http://wxanalytics.ru/net.ex	wxanalytics.ru	404	104.239.157.210		
Sep 21, 2017	http://wxanalytics.ru/net.exe.confi	wxanalytics.ru	404	104.239.157.210		
Apr 27, 2017	http://wxanalytics.ru/net.exe,Heuristic	wxanalytics.ru	404	23.253.126.58		
Aug 10, 2016	http://wxanalytics.ru/net.exe.config,Pattern	wxanalytics.ru	404	23.253.126.58	Not Present	
Aug 10, 2016	http://wxanalytics.ru/net.exe,Pattern	wxanalytics.ru	404	23.253.126.58	Not Present	
May 11, 2016	http://wxanalytics.ru/net.exe.config/	wxanalytics.ru	Connection Er.		Not Present	
Jun 3, 2015	http://wxanalytics.ru/	wxanalytics.ru	403	41.223.55.21		
Apr 16, 2015	http://wxanalytics.ru/net.exe	wxanalytics.ru	Connection Er.			

Razy stats from alienvault.com (2015 - 2019)

Associated Files

DATE	HASH	AVAST	AVG	CLAMAV	MSDEFENDER
Nov 4, 2020	6bc43973ab449f5220a8c36585dbff0f2ba139601545761ef2cef5962c378d03	Win32:Malware-gen		Win.Malware.Razy-6723913-0	Worm:Win32/Fadok!rfn
Oct 29, 2020	56bb98c3f683e5aa6496d846a50eaf33eee72a002a6cc37504ff17d3097f99a0	Win32:WormX-gen\ [Wrm]		Win.Malware.Razy-6723913-0	Worm:Win32/Fadok!rfn
Oct 29, 2020	e8a6a54ab6ebec253b37e69569675cc6c8d37d0d6aa1842251cc350c03ad29b5	Win32:WormX-gen\ [Wrm]		Win.Malware.Razy-6723913-0	Worm:Win32/Fadok!rfn
Oct 26, 2020	38d38ab3c4213ca9130effa566dd8ffe0b56b0c8c1bf7b8ce1ec425b4e649821	Win32:WormX-gen\ [Wrm]		Win.Malware.Razy-6723913-0	Worm:Win32/Fadok!rfn
Oct 26, 2020	b869a2030612224bea5851ab63b6b747f68e6681e6e87a536158ee9ec01598cd	Win32:WormX-gen\ [Wrm]		Win.Malware.Razy-6723913-0	Worm:Win32/Fadok!rfn
Oct 25, 2020	e70e97b9e064e7eae270c1199a086ac33c8a688405ac8c6e13800c2c8b788d3a	Win32:WormX-gen\ [Wrm]		Win.Malware.Razy-6723913-0	Worm:Win32/Fadok.A
Oct 23, 2020	fda1ddd786fbfdf2ce7791adc9e3df26029157ad39e749059a0c217cad5bc532	Win32:WormX-gen\ [Wrm]		Win.Malware.Razy-6723913-0	Worm:Win32/Fadok!rfn
Oct 23, 2020	da99ddd1f95be0a12ee3470163563587e385ff78a9c83cc1faba518343118521	Win32:WormX-gen\ [Wrm]		Win.Malware.Razy-6723913-0	Worm:Win32/Fadok!rfn
Oct 23, 2020	c2164f91ddc0b5cbdbe47ade6d09b2b02d5997da48cc96129788fb6ecd3af92f	Win32:WormX-gen\ [Wrm]		Win.Malware.Razy-6723913-0	Worm:Win32/Fadok!rfn
Oct 23, 2020	8d332c9b474396ce7b6a142ddd56b5a31ea8709f7b34b906023dc050a39caa14	Win32:WormX-gen\ [Wrm]		Win.Malware.Razy-6723913-0	Worm:Win32/Fadok!rfn

Razy stats from alienvault.com (2020)

OWNSITREP 241700AJUL16 G3.exe

SHA256: 7615E69D6FA11FC851C4CD10DDEE3820ACFC6170578C61AE74B6D4FD8EA71E10

• eastmere vil.exe

SHA256: 2F6C1C2C4043CA6D19ADDD60FA85A5AD6D347075E73AE1E1DCB76D5CC5224573

• 24160712 ExSteppeEagle INTSUM S2 160X E O.exe

SHA256: 219c44420a95370a22ef806244033c2a21e94b7500fc780fc8e4f25183f745bc

• Отчёт по практике.exe

b06e65a0009ae771566db075c0f5850799977b4a982d7d6a63565a184be60796

• эльвира отчет.ехе

SHA256:


SHA256: 20f7a8258f83862ae6638a6bd1ad0bc83d40928a89eb40c720934db9b65f4bec

• 2 6>10 @CA.exe

DATE

HASH

Razy stats from alienvault.com (2021)



DATE	nasn	AVASI	AVG	CLAMAV	MSDEFENDER
Jun 20, 2021	e37c84ddac59de11fa4e5af4dfd0dace0c88527fa1b2c3f797a2980846e0f 46e	Win32:WormX-gen\ [Wrm]		Win.Malware.Razy-6723913-0	Worm:Win32/Fadok!rfn
Jun 10, 2021	f9b57d287115487db766202cfdd2c2cdbe42231de4d4ff531027f6d030ad8 043	Win32:WormX-gen\ [Wrm]		Win.Malware.Razy-6723913-0	Worm:Win32/Fadok!rfn
Jun 7, 2021	22712fba8c26a1dd3c74297c596e06b4870ba3011ace75c5e8054cfe08923 658	Win32:WormX-gen\ [Wrm]		Win.Malware.Razy-6723913-0	Worm:Win32/Fadok!rfn
May 22, 2021	c3e5cb986820a59835a06ee569a4fbb4d8b5eacc0655669c91549a15b152 53876	Win32:WormX-gen\ [Wrm]		Win.Malware.Razy-6723913-0	Worm:Win32/Fadok!rfn
May 19, 2021	42af97d46069892a93e7a3d1d1ff51f14ca5ce0062ec2094633fc5dc1c416a 3a	Win32:WormX-gen\ [Wrm]		Win.Malware.Razy-6723913-0	Worm:Win32/Fadok!rfn
May 19, 2021	081eecf64fb96cf92c4d3c1ae27de1a124778c309102a6433b9e91d1983a4 0c9	Win32:WormX-gen\ [Wrm]		Win.Malware.Razy-6723913-0	Worm:Win32/Fadok!rfn
May 19, 2021	64abed429d85e6cdf51d525bfef2ee78ef25817358d732efc4c16d9346a3b 442	Win32:WormX-gen\ [Wrm]		Win.Malware.Razy-6723913-0	Worm:Win32/Fadok!rfn
May 17, 2021	295d53b94f118c24885157edc3cc5e1b6a8a34c331dd061dc7b136284b303 c2d	Win32:WormX-gen\ [Wrm]		Win.Malware.Razy-6723913-0	Worm:Win32/Fadok!rfn
May 16, 2021	528b5e29adff1a3f4d74eec7c113af3429f4c68a4d7f33cadbc07b19a9616e 39	Win32:WormX-gen\ [Wrm]		Win.Malware.Razy-6723913-0	Worm:Win32/Fadok!rfn
Apr 21, 2021	a29cc8f06a64d2ee70c2c1ac2cad55242b5f79144fe91ff7ea59f1085b9ba1 e4	Win32:WormX-gen\ [Wrm]		Win.Malware.Razy-6723913-0	Worm:Win32/Fadok!rfn

AVG

CLAMAV

MSDEFENDER

AVAST

• 61c98d12-06b1-4f5d-9c12-ace5630dcc07

SHA256: 3ED1B88C9AE34BA4FFBF8AED737F2DC9A0AEDEEDF8D2A4A69555518845E16264

The identical PDB file paths and the timestamps found in all six samples indicate they were all created by a single "MultiLauncher" tool.

PDB Path		P:\MultiLauncher\Release\MultiLauncher.pdb		
Characteristics	0000000			
TimeDateStamp	54DCF5EC	Thu, 12 Feb 2015 18:50:20 UTC (2090 days, 20.55 hours ago)		
PE file characteristics:				

Most of the samples contain a document displayed to the user in resource number 200.

🚺 DATA	000B1984 50 4B 03 04 14 00 06 00 08 00 00 00 21 00 2B B5 🔺 PK ! +
- 😭 105 : 1049	000B1994 A2 0D B0 01 00 00 17 08 00 00 13 00 08 02 5B 43
200:0	000B19A4 6F 6E 74 65 6E 74 5F 54 79 70 65 73 5D 2E 78 6D ontent_Types].xm
	000B19B4 6C 20 A2 04 02 28 A0 00 22 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 1 (
└─ ☆ 300 : 0	000B19C4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
J Icon	
] Icon Group	
Manifest	
_	00081A14 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	000B1A24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	000B1A34 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	000B1A44 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
	000B1A54 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	000B1A64 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	000B1A74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	000B1A84 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	000B1A94 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	000B1AA4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	000B1AE4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	000B1AF4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	000B1B04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
	000B1B14 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	000B1B24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	000B1B34 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	000B1B44 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
	000B1B54 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	000B1B64 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	000B1B84 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	000B1B94 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	0005154 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	000B1BC4 86 EF 2B F1 1F 22 5F 51 E3 C2 01 A1 55 53 0E 7C + "Q US
	000B1BD4 1C 01 69 41 DA AB 6B 4F 52 83 BF 64 4F 81 FE FB iA kor do
	000B1BE4 1D A7 6D B4 42 29 A9 28 B9 54 4A C6 EF FB 3E 33 m B) (TJ >3
	000B1BF4 56 33 B3 AB 0F 6B 8A 37 88 49 7B 57 B1 B3 72 CA V3 k 7 I{W r
	000B1C04 0A 70 D2 2B ED 9A 8A 3D 3F DD 4D 2E 59 91 50 38 p + =? M.Y P8
	000B1C14 25 8C 77 50 B1 35 24 76 35 3F F9 35 7B 5A 07 48 % wP 5\$v5? 5{Z H
	000B1C24 05 A9 5D AA D8 12 31 FC E6 3C C9 25 58 91 4A 1F] 1 < %X J
	000B1C34 C0 51 A5 F6 D1 0A A4 C7 D8 F0 20 E4 AB 68 80 9F Q h
	000B1C44 4F A7 17 5C 7A 87 E0 70 82 D9 83 CD 67 37 50 8B 0 \z p g7P
	000B1C54 95 C1 E2 F6 83 5E 6F 48 5E 02 34 AC B8 DE 1C CC ^oH^ 4
	000B1C74 68 29 90 EA FC CD A9 4F 64 93 2D 55 49 CA F6 4C h) Od -UI L 000B1C84 5A EA 90 4E E9 CO 9E 84 5C D9 1F B0 5F D7 E8 BA Z N
	000B1C94 B7 99 FC 9E 14 0F 74 01 51 2B 28 1E 45 C4 7B 61 t Q+(E {a
	000B1CA4 A9 CE DF 7D 54 5C 79 B9 B2 A4 29 BF 0E EE E9 CC }T\y)
	000B1CB4 D7 B5 96 D0 E9 B3 5B 88 5E 42 4A 74 B3 D6 94 5D [^BJt]
	000B1CC4 C5 0A ED 76 1D F7 71 C8 55 42 6F F5 AC3 35 82 V q UBo Z 5
	000B1CD4 7D 8C 3E A4 B3 A3 71 3A D3 EC 07 11 35 74 53 DF } > q: 5ts
	000B1CE4 3B 0B B7 B2 0B 88 44 FF F3 C3 E8 AC 07 21 12 AE ; D !
	000B1CF4 0D A4 9F 27 D8 F8 0E C7 03 22 09 C6 00 D8 3A 0F " :
	000B1D04 22 BC C3 E2 CF 68 14 FF 99 0F 82 D4 DE A3 F3 38 The h

The samples contain icon sets for all types of documents. The final file uses one of the types. That leaves us with a conclusion the creators were using one tool and were choosing the required document type in the final build.

▶ DATA ▶ Icon ★ Icon Group ★ 12:1049 ★ 112:1049 ★ 114:1049 ★ 115:1049 ★ 116:1049 ★ 117:1049 ★ 117:1049	32 × 32 (16 colors) - Ordinal name: 28 16 × 16 (16 colors) - Ordinal name: 29 48 × 48 (256 colors) - Ordinal name: 30 32 × 32 (256 colors) - Ordinal name: 31 16 × 16 (255 colors) - Ordinal name: 32 256 × 256 (16.8mil colors) - Ordinal name: 33 48 × 48 (16.8mil colors) - Ordinal name: 34 32 × 32 (16.8mil colors) - Ordinal name: 35 16 × 16 (16.8mil colors) - Ordinal name: 36	
⊢ ☆ 117:1049 image ▲ Manifest └ ☆ 1:1033		R

There are Razy builds that do not contain malicious documents:

- 1f35ce5d620f4eddbfbff5fd1b6142b002bb6a537b864d7745d96ddfd8424bd6
- 3a050db9c571eafd5b1dccb412991434bd0a0fc52c4771274018420a08af4c00

That explains that the attacker always looks for the "right" documents before embedding them into the final file.

The resource can be a PDF file also.

000B1984	25	50	44	46	2D	31	2E	36	0D	25	E2	E3	CF	D3	0D	0A		%PDF-1.6 %
000B1994	33	20	30	20	6F	62	6A	0A	3C	3C	0A	2F	54	79	70	65	E	3 0 obj << /Type
000B19A4	20	2F	58	4F	62	6A	65	63	74	0A	2F	53	75	62	74	79	=	/XObject /Subty
000B19B4	70	65	20	2F	49	6D	61	67	65	0A	2F	4E	61	6D	65	20		pe /Image /Name
000B19C4	2F	49	30	0A	2F	57	69	64	74	68	20	32	31	31	32	A 0		/I0 /Width 2112
000B19D4	2F	48	65	69	67	68	74	20	32	39	36	32	0A	2F	46	69		/Height 2962 /Fi
000B19E4			65										65	63	6F	64		lter /JBIG2Decod
000B19F4			2F											70		6E		e /BitsPerCompon
000B1A04		6E	74			0A								61	73	6B		ent 1 /ImageMask
000B1A14			72								67	74	68	20	34			true /Length 43
000B1A24															00			680 >> stream
000B1A34			30								00		40	00				0 0
000B1A44			00										00		00			
000B1A44																		~
000B1A54															F5			g 7 x- %J+
000B1A04															г 5 1Е			! \$ n G H
															C7			
000B1A84																		g1 I9Sh
000B1A94			60											77		6D		.m`\vd -wm
000B1AA4															57			$K \le W G = W V$
000B1AB4															85			I
000B1AC4															34			у ЗдТ ЗҮ 4
000B1AD4															03			8JP F r
000B1AE4															93			SS< 5 9
000B1AF4															A9			' nJ }kA]
000B1B04															6D			FCbR m}
000B1B14															27			b } 8 '
000B1B24			3E												7E			i>F o N As ~
000B1B34			6A												BD			8jg}:E
000B1B44															35			r H)<5
000B1B54															8A			у4LK # H 5H
000B1B64															00			R (U M
000B1B74															11			1?3 D#
000B1B84															17			U 5
000B1B94															9F 04			w & D P
000B1BA4 000B1BB4															C2			$\begin{array}{c}4 ; \ _+F = \\t \ tb \ ; f\end{array}$
000B1BB4		28				2E									1B			t tb ; f (E#. 6=
000B1BC4															1B 65			
000B1BD4			44													CE		EP q_Ae 1D: 8
000B1BE4															47			I 7 GE
000B1BF4																		d b V C'Vu
000B1C04																		J/E [
000B1C14																		
000B1C24																		
000B1C34																		
000B1C44																		
000B1C54																		Hj }a @]
000B1C04																		uYq[]) TB
000B1C74																		* Z A KC @< \$
000B1C84																		* 5Q)9 BC"%L<
000B1C94																		
000B1CA4																		mPOpE v. i) 2
000B1CB4																		
		52	- 7	20	20	50	75	22	~ TA		20	22	2.0	~~		20		2 m z
Usually, R	azy	is a	an E	EXE	file	e wit	h a	n of	ffice	e do	cun	nen	t ico	on.				

 20f7a8258f83862ae6638a6bd1ad0bc83d40928a89eb40c720934db9b65f4bec.exe

 219c44420a95370a22ef806244033c2a21e94b7500fc780fc8e4f25183f745bc.exe

🐏 b06e65a0009ae771566db075c0f5850799977b4a982d7d6a63565a184be60796.exe

Most of the time, the attackers set up an office document icon for an executable file to mislead the user. When the user launches a file, he sees an opened office document, and a malicious EXE file will perform other operations.

ҚАРАҒАНДЫ ИНДУСТРИЯЛЫҚ УНИВЕРСИТЕТІ КАРАГАНДИНСКИЙ ИНДУСТРИАЛЬНЫЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ

БЕКІТЕМІН/УТВЕРЖДАЮ Кафедра меңгерушісі №/ Зав. Кафедрой: Конакбаева А.Н.

«10» мая 2021жыл/год

Кафедрасы/Кафедра: ФЭТиСУ

ЖЕКЕ ТАПСЫРМА ИНДИВИДУАЛЬНОЕ ЗАДАНИЕ

Студентке/Студенту: Исаеву Никите Игоревичу Өтетінтәжірибесіне/проходящему практику: учебную практику на КГИУ

Тапсырма/задание: Двигатели постоянного тока параллельного возбуждения

Тапсырмаберілгенуақыты/Дата выдачи задания:	10.05.2021	год.	
Тәжірибежетекшісі/Руководитель практики: Конакбаева Асель Ныгметоллаевна			_
Тапсырманыорындауғақабылдапалған/Задание	принял	к	исполнению
студент: Исаев Никита Игоревич			

SHA256:219c44420a95370a22ef806244033c2a21e94b7500fc780fc8e4f25183f745bc

Отчет о проделанной работе на 2020 – 2021 уч.год

Учитель по предмету «Коррекционная ритмика» - Абулхайрова. Э.Е., стаж работы 26 лет, высшая категория.

Прошла курс повышения квалифкации на тему «Инновациялық технологияларды қолдану арқылы педагог- хореографтардың құзреттілігін дамыту»,13.03.2021г.

Коррекционная ритмика в неделю 1 час (1 В, 3Д, 4А, 4В,5В, 6В),

музыкальная коррекционная ритмика в группе детского сада.

В настоящее время работаю над темой «Развития слухового восприятия и произносительной стороны речи на уроках ритмики».

Основные направления работы по коррекционной ритмике:

- Развитие восприятия музыкальных произведений разного характера (веселого, грустного, быстрого, медленного)

- Развитие умения слушать произведение до конца, различать части произведения, определять характер музыки

- Выразительно, правильно выполнять под музыку танцевальные движения, несложные композиции.

Достижения учащихся:

Сентябрь – октябрь: онлайн конкурс – фестиваль народных танцев- «Гран – При».

Ноябрь – декабрь: Международный фестиваль- конкурс театр и студий моды SHA256:b06e65a0009ae771566db075c0f5850799977b4a982d7d6a63565a184be60796

О внесении изменений в постановление акимата Акжаикского района от 28 мая 2018 года № 155 «Об утверждении коэффициента зонирования, учитывающего месторасположение объекта налогообложения в населенном пункте»

В соответствии с Законом Республики Казахстан от 6 апреля 2016 года «О правовых актах» акимат района ПОСТАНОВЛЯЕТ:


1. Внести в постановление акимата Акжаикского района от 28 мая 2018 года № 155 «Об утверждении коэффициента зонирования, учитывающего месторасположение объекта налогообложения в населенном пункте» (зарегистрированное в Реестре государственной регистрации нормативных правовых актов за №5223, опубликованное 8 июня 2018 года в Эталонном контрольном банке нормативных правовых актов Республики Казахстан) следующие изменения:

преамбулу указанного постановления изложить в следующей редакции:

«В соответствии с Кодексом Республики Казахстан от 25 декабря SHA256:20f7a8258f83862ae6638a6bd1ad0bc83d40928a89eb40c720934db9b65f4bec

OFFICIAL SENSITIVE

(EXAMPLE)BATTLEGROUP TITLE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (002) AS AT DATE: 241800AJUL16 INTELLIGENCE CUT OFF DATE:241800AJUL16



VITAL INTELLIGENCE:

1.NSTR

SITUATION IN GENERAL:

- 2 Person visit westmere camp;
- Media visited base;
- Mine field on KazCOY AO;
- Weapon founded in civil car;
- Key persons identified in Eastmere village

SITUATION IN DETAIL / COMPANY SUMMARY

2.NSTR

POPULATION:

1. 2 Person visited Westmere camp;

240830AJUL16 1 male and 1 female came to base and suggest their fruits and vegetables. They said that they had access to inside the camp and militaries, which were before KAZBAT always bought their staff

SHA256:2F6C1C2C4043CA6D19ADDD60FA85A5AD6D347075E73AE1E1DCB76D5CC5224573

OFFICIAL -	EXERCISE	STEPPE	EAGLE
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OWN SITUATION REPORT

<u> Timing –1700.</u>

To:			G3 - <u>watchkeeper</u>	SIC:		0	OWNSITREP
From:			<u>Kazbat</u> S3 Battle CPT	Classification:		Rep	ort Number:
As at/DTG 241100AJUL16 Precedence:							KAZS3150
A	13		BAT/TASKORG - Com				
		Unit/Fo	rmation, i.e. the unit/f ort	ormation submitting	KAZBAT		(20 Chars)
В	17	Comma	nd relationship (2)		02		(2000 Chars)
С	19	Time qu	ualifier and DTG		241500AJUL16		(20Chars)
D1	31	Unit/Fo Comma	inate unit(s)/formatio ormation (3) and relationship inate sub-units/format	KAZBAT 02		(20Chars)	
D2	35	Unit/Fo etc.	ormation	2 nd COY KAZ 02		(5Chars)	
D3	37	Unit/Fo etc.	ormation		UK COY		(20Chars)

SHA256:8FA473C03850B22C2C6AADCFE69268BE4E4C7A33881581FEA83789755AF8F22A

Сырымбет ауылдық округінің аппаратының 2020 жылга арналган бюджетінің азаматтық бюджеті

«Ескелді ауданы Сырымбет ауылдық округі әкімінің аппараты» мемлекеттік мекемесінің бюджеті 2020 жылға барлығы 70418,0 мың теңге көлемінде қарастырылған, оның ішінде:

124001015 «Қаладағы аудан, аудандық маңызы бар қала, кент, ауылдық округ әкімдерінің қызметін қамтамасыз ету» бағдарламасына аппараты ұстап тұруға 18366.0 мың теңге, еңбек ақы аудырамдар есебіне 14288,0 мың теңге, ағымдағы шығындарына 4078,0 мың теңге; игерілгены 18355,0 мың теңге 99,9% ға

124022029 «мемлекеттік органның күрделі шығыстары» бағдарламасына аппаратқа материалдық техникалық базасын нығайтуға 188,0 мың теңге, игерілгені 187,7 мың тенге 99,8%

124041011/028 «Мектепке дейінгі тәрбиелеу және оқыту және мектепке дейінгі тәрбиелеу және оқыту ұйымдарында медициналық қызмет көрсетуді ұйымдастыру» балабақша аппаратын ұстауға арналған шығыстарды жүргізу, байланыс қызметтеріне акы төлеу, негізгі құралдарды, жабдықтарды ағымдағы жөндеу, тауарларды шығыс және жинақтау материалдарын сатып алу, өзге де қөрсетілетін қызметтер мен жұмыстарды сатып алуға 40855,0 мың теңге. Игерілгені 40833,0 мың тенге 99,9% ға

124008029 «Елді мекендердегі көшелерді жарықтандыру» Ескелді ауданы Сырымбет ауылдық округінің елді мекендердегі көшелерді жарықтандыруға 2064,0 мың теңге,игерілгені 2064,0 мың тенге 100 % ға

124009029 «Елді мекендердің санитариясын қамтамасыз ету» Сырымбет ауылық округінің елді мекендерін санитарлық тазалығына 246,0 мың теңге,

SHA256:3ED1B88C9AE34BA4FFBF8AED737F2DC9A0AEDEEDF8D2A4A69555518845E16264

All objects have the same functionality but different office documents. Since all of the samples are just variants of the same family, consider one of them.

20f7a8258f83862ae6638a6bd1ad0bc83d40928a89eb40c720934db9b65f4bec

This object is an EXE file with an icon of a Word document. At a closer look, one can conclude, it is a dropper for office documents.

tLab		👁 ЗАГРУЗКА 🛛 ОЧЕРЕ
С ОТПРАВИТЬ ФАЙЛ ЗАНО	30 🗋 СОХРАНИТЬ PDF 🔲 ВСЕ ОТЧЕТЫ ФАЙ	ЙЛА ① ЗАКЛЮЧЕНИЕ 前 УДАЛИТЬ 🖧 СКАЧАТЬ
20f7a8258f83862	2ae6638a6bd1ad0bc83d40928a8	39eb40c720934db9b65f4bec.bin.sample
Общие сведения		
	Заключение:	ó MALWARE
	Оценка угрозы:	143 (potentially 143)
143	Имя файла:	20f7a8258f83862ae6638a6bd1ad0bc83d40928a89eb40c720934db9b65f4bec.bin.sample
	Тип файла:	EXE
Оценка угрозы	Размер файла:	1.57 MB
	Загрузил:	admin
	Время отчета:	07/07/21 12:27:32
	Хэш SHA-256:	20f7a8258f83862ae6638a6bd1ad0bc83d40928a89eb40c720934db9b65f4bec
	Хэш SHA-1:	4fc3c1c2e55906eec3e14d9ce9ad2611c24e79cf
	Хэш Md5:	eb428bd352de07e6b73b4ac6f140d89a
	Известное легитимное ПО:	Нет

Summary of the object in the tLab system:

Индикаторы угрозы (ІОС)

Тип угрозы	Троян-загрузчик
Функции	Соединение с С&С сервером
	Распаковка и открытие офисного документа
Закрепление в	Копирование себя в папку АРРДАТА
OC	Добавление в автозагрузку

Launching the EXE file will result in a regular office document hiddenly located in the current folder.

20f7a8258f83862ae6638a6bd1ad0bc83d40928a89eb40c720934db9b65f4bec.docx
 20f7a8258f83862ae6638a6bd1ad0bc83d40928a89eb40c720934db9b65f4bec.exe
 Created hidden office document


The malicious file contains office document in its resources (DATA - 200):

· · · · ·																				
A 📗 DATA	000B1984	50	4B	03	04	14	00	06	00	08	00	00	00	21	00	47	E8		PK ! G	
2 105 : 1049	000B1994	9B	69	D9	01	00	00	9F	80	00	00	13	00	08	02	5B	43		i [C	
	000B19A4	6F	6E	74	65	6E	74	5F	54	79	70	65	73	5D	2E	78	6D	=	ontent Types].xm	
🚖 200 : 0	000B19B4	6C	20	A 2	04	02	28	A 0	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		1 (
🚽 😭 300 : 0	000B19C4	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
Icon	000B19D4	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B19E4	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
🛛 📙 Icon Group	000B19F4	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
🖻 🦲 Manifest	000B1A04	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1A14	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1A24	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1A34	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1A44	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1A54	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1A64	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1A74	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1A84	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1A94	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1AA4	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1AB4	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1AC4	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1AD4	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1AE4	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1AF4	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1B04	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1B14	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1B24	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1B34	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1B44	00	00	00				00							00	00	00			
	000B1B54	00	00					00							00	00	00			
	000B1B64	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1B74		00					00						00	00	00	00			
	000B1B84		00					00								00	00			
	000B1B94	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
	000B1BA4							00												
								00											VMo 0	
								51											# "_Q - f{(
	000B1BD4																	-	XW = X g	
	000B1BE4	67	9C	90	80	BA	6D	DC	36	DA	4B	A4	28			9E	DF	Ψ.	g m6K (
	e																			

The first bytes of the file in the resources determine the type of the embedded document. In this case, the "4B 03 04 14 00 06 00 08 00" signature corresponds with the Microsoft Office Open XML Format.

When launched, the Razy malware detects the type of displayed document given the information from the resource number 300 (0x12C):

push	12Ch	;	void *
push	offset aData	;	"DATA"
push	eax	;	int
lea	ecx, [ebp+var_A8	3]	
; } //	/ starts at 407AC	В	
; try	{		
mov	byte ptr [ebp+va		
call	<pre>load_malicious_r</pre>	'es	5



The resource containing real extension of the file

Next, the reading of the original office document from the resource number 200 (0x0C8) begins, using the FindResource, LoadResource, LockResource, SizeOfResource functions:


push	0C8h	<u>ن</u> م	void *
push	offset aData	;	"DATA"
push	eax	;	int
lea	<pre>ecx, [ebp+var_</pre>	F8]	
; }//	′starts at 407	′B5D	
; try	{		
mov	byte ptr [ebp+		
call	load_malicious	s_res	5

```
1DWORD thiscall size of resourced docx(char *this)
  2 {
  3
     char *v1; // esi
  4 DWORD result; // eax
  5
     const WCHAR *v3; // eax
  6 const WCHAR *v4; // ecx
  7
     HRSRC v5; // eax
  8 HGLOBAL v6; // eax
  9
     LPVOID v7; // eax
 10
     HRSRC v8; // ST08 4
 11
• 12
     v1 = this;
     if ( (*(unsigned int8 (**)(void))(*( DWORD *)this + 8))() )
• 13
• 14
       return 0:
     v3 = (const WCHAR *)(v1 + 12);
• 15
• 16
     if (*((DWORD *)v1 + 8) >= 8u)
• 17
      v3 = *(const WCHAR **)v3;
     v4 = (const WCHAR *)(v1 + 36);
• 18
     if (*((DWORD *)v1 + 14) >= 8u)
• 19
20
     v4 = *(const WCHAR **)v4;
21
     v5 = FindResourceW(*((HMODULE *)v1 + 1), v4, v3);
22
     *(( DWORD *)v1 + 2) = v5;
23
     if ( !v5 )
24
       return 0:
25
     v6 = LoadResource(*((HMODULE *)v1 + 1), v5);
26
     *((_DWORD *)v1 + 15) = v6;
27
     if ( !v6 )
28
       return 0;
     v7 = LockResource(v6);
29
0 30
     *(( DWORD *)v1 + 16) = v7;
31
     if ( !v7 )
32
       return 0:
33
     v8 = (HRSRC)*((_DWORD *)v1 + 2);
34
     v1[69] = 1;
     result = SizeofResource(*((HMODULE *)v1 + 1), v8);
35
36 *((_DWORD *)v1 + 18) = result;
37 return result;
38 }
```

Functions for working with resources

```
LOBYTE(v26) = 2;
 42
      sub_CAB1E0((int)&v2, 0, L"DATA", (void *)0x12C);
 43
      v26 = 3;
 44
     v15 = 0;
 45
      v16 = 0;
 46
      v23 = 0;
47
      v24 = 0;
48
      v14 = &ResInStream::`vftable';
49
     v19 = 7;
50
      v18 = 0;
51
52
      v17 = 0;
53
     v22 = 7;
     v21 = 0;
54
55
     v20 = 0;
     LOBYTE(v26) = 6;
56
      sub_CAB1E0((int)&v14, 0, L"DATA", (void *)0xC8);
57
          Code for working with resources under the DATA identifier
```

In the tLab sandbox, when uploading a file, one can see a potential threat indicator:




The result of static analysis on the tLab system

A malicious file opens a created document in Word using the ShellExecuteW function:

The ShellExecute function opens the passed file in a program associated with specific extensions. For example, if the file has the DOCX extension, it will be opened by the program registered to open such files (in our case, Microsoft Word).

The T&T Security sandbox also builds a graph of the dynamic behaviour of an object:



A detailed report on the tLab system

The Word document does not contain any macros and is not malicious, according to the initial analysis. Presumably, the purpose of opening an office document is to conceal malicious activity.

At the same time, the malicious file creates a copy of itself in the APPDATA \ RAC folder under the name mls.exe:

```
if ( argc <= 1 )
152
 153
      {
154
        v66 = 0;
155
        v67 = 7;
        LOWORD(lpValueName) = 0;
156
        str_work(&lpValueName, L"%appdata%\\RAC\\mls.exe", 21);
157
        LOBYTE(v82) = 21;
158
159
        expand env((int)&lpFileName, (const WCHAR *)&lpValueName);
        LOBYTE(v82) = 23;
0160
        if (v67 >= 8)
161
          j free((void *)lpValueName);
162
        v67 = 7;
163
164
        v66 = 0;
        LOWORD(lpValueName) = 0;
165
        sub CAD130(&lpDirectory, (wchar t *)&lpFileName);
166
        LOBYTE(v82) = 24:
167
```

	3 ^
Процесс инициатор перемещения файла	
C:\Users\Администратор\Desktop\MAPKEP.bin	
C:\Users\Администратор\Desktop\MAPKEP.bin	
	C:\Users\Администратор\Desktop\MAPKEPbin

Detection in tLab system

One can also observe this activity through the system call logs

19455	2676 - 15499) NtClose(Handle - 0x354). res: 0
19456	2676 - 15500 - 2680) NtQueryValueKey(KeyHandle - 0x358, ValueName - Cookies), ResultLength - 7c, result - 0x0
19457	KeyName - \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-1558524252-1318029960-2271215133-500\Software\Mindows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders
19458	2676 - 15501) NtClose(Handle - 0x358). res: 0
	2676 - 15502) NtQueryAttributesFile(FileName - C:\Users\Ammunucorpavop\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies, ObjectAttributes.RootDirectory: 0x0).out: res: 0
	2676 - 15503) NtQueryAttributesFile(FileName - C:\Users\Ammenuczparop\AppData\Roaming\RAC\mls.exe, ObjectAttributes.RootDirectory: 0x0).out: res: 0
	2676 - 15504) NtOpenFile(FileName - C: DesiredAccess - 0x100001(FILE READ DATA FILE READ ATTRIBUTES FILE LIST DIRECTORY), CreateOptions: 0x40204020, ObjectAttributes.Attribs - 0x40(OBJ CASE INSENSITIVE), ObjectAttributes.RootDirectory:
	0x0).out: FileHandle - 0x350. res: 0
	2676 - 15505) NtClose(Handle - 0x358), res: 0
	2676 - 15506) NtOpenFile(FileName - C:\Users\Agaansucrparop DesiredAccess - 0x100001(FILE READ DATA FILE READ ATTRIBUTES FILE LIST DIRECTORY), CreateOptions: 0x40204020, ObjectAttributes.Attribs - 0x40(OBJ CASE INSENSITIVE),
	ObjectAttributes.RootDirectory: 0x0).out: FileHandle - 0x358, res: 0
	2676 - 15507) NtClose(Handle - 0x358), res: 0
	2676 - 15508) NtOpenFile (FileName - C:\Users\AguenHucrparop\AgpData DesiredAccess - 0x100001(FILE READ DATA FILE READ ATTRIBUTES FILE LIST DIRECTORY), CreateOptions: 0x40204020, ObjectAttributes.Attribs - 0x40(OBJ CASE INSENSITIVE),
	ObjectAttributes.RootDirectory: 0x0).out: FileHandle - 0x358. res: 0
	2676 - 15509) NtClose(Handle - 0x358), res: 0
19467	2676 - 15510) NtOpenFile(FileName - C:\Users\Anwunucrparop\AppData\Roaming DesiredAccess - 0x100001(FILE_READ_DATA FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY), CreateOptions: 0x40204020, ObjectAttributes.Attribs -
	0x40(OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE), ObjectAttributes.RootDirectory: 0x0).out: FileHandle - 0x358. res: 0
	2676 - 15511) NtClose(Handle - 0x358). res: 0
19469	2676 - 15512) NtOpenFile(FileName - C:\Users\Amountparop\AppData\Roaming\RAC DesiredAccess - 0x100001(FILE_READ_DATA FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY), CreateOptions: 0x40204020, ObjectAttributes.Attribs -
	0x40(OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE), ObjectAttributes.RootDirectory: 0x0).out: FileHandle - 0x358. res: 0
	2676 - 15513) NtClose(Handle - 0x358), res: 0
19471	2676 - 15514) NtCreateFile(Filename - C:\Users\Amsenucceparop\AppData\Roaming\RAC\mls.exe, DiseredAccess - 0x120080(FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES), CreateDisposition: 0x1, CreateOptions: 0x60, ObjectAttributes.Attribs - 0x40(OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE),
	ObjectAttributes.RootDirectory: 0x0).out: File handle - 0x358, IoStatusBlock.Information: 0x1. res: 0

Next, mls.exe sets itself to startup in the registry with the -s parameter:

```
if ( !RegOpenKeyW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, L"Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run", &phkResult) )
{
    v25 = *((_DWORD *)v24 + 4);
    if ( *((_DWORD *)v24 + 5) >= 8u )
        v24 = *(const BYTE **)v24;
    v26 = (const BYTE **)v24;
    v26 = (const WCHAR *)&lpValueName;
    if ( v67 >= 8 )
        v26 = lpValueName;
    RegSetValueExW(phkResult, v26, 0, 1u, v24, 2 * v25 + 2);
    RegCloseKey(phkResult);
}
```

Закрепление в ОС		
Автозагрузка		1 ^
Путь до запускаемой программы "CilliensiAgnewectparopiAppDataiReamingiRACmik.com"-s	Процесс-инициатор автозалуска CAUsers-Харминистратор/Desktop/MAPREPbin	
	2	2 ^
Hasilasine kinova peecitpa Vasilasine kinova peecitpa VeisGGTRP/USERS 1-5-21-1558524252-1318029960-2227121513-500/Software/Microsoft/Windows/Current/Version/Run VeisGGTRP/USER 5-5-21-1558274252-1318029960-2227121513-500/Software/Microsoft/Windows/Current/Version/Run	Прецесс, который открыя ключ С:\User:\Даминстратор:Desktop/MAPKEPbin C:\Windowsystem12.tashbot.exe	
	······································	

Autoload indication on the tLab system

The file is present in the AutoStartup section of the T&T Security forensics tool

💸 ForensicUtility				
Файл Данные				
Програмное обеспечение Аппаратные средства	Польз	овательская активн	ность	
	_	1 - 1 -		
Информация Автозапуск Приложения	Процессы	сеть Сете	евые соединения	
Раздел	Имя		Программа	
1 Registry/LocalMachine/Run	VBoxTray	%SystemRoot%\	system32\VBoxTray.exe	
2 Registry/LocalMachine/WOW6432Node/Run	BCSSync	"C:\Program Files	s (x86)\Microsoft Office\Office	4\BCSSync.exe" /DelayServices
3 Registry/User/Run	mls	"C:\Users\john\A	ppData\Roaming\RAC\mls.ex	'-s
[2020-11-05 10:59:59.919] [ForensicUtility] [info] Getti	ng OS info			
[2020-11-05 10:59:59.919] [ForensicUtility] [info] Getti [2020-11-05 10:59:59.919] [ForensicUtility] [warning]	Error MapR	egistryValues (HARE	DWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Bi)S - BIOSVendor): Could not read registry value
[2020-11-05 10:59:59.919] [ForensicUtility] [warning] [2020-11-05 10:59:59.919] [ForensicUtility] [warning]	Error MapR	egistryValues (HARE	DWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Bi	DS - BIOSVersion): Could not read registry value
		-9,		

Malicious file at autorun in T&T Security forensics tool

After rebooting, mls.exe will run with the -s option

0 314	if (!sub_CA4DD0(&lpFileName, v20, a3, L"-s", 2u))
315	{
0 316	v22 = 0;
317	LABEL_33:
0 318	<pre>sub_CAAC60(v22);</pre>
0 319	v19 = 0;
320	LABEL_34:
0 321	if (v70 >= 8)
9 322	<pre>jfree((void *)lpFileName);</pre>
9 323	goto LABEL_86;
324	}
	The condition for the file restart


After starting with the -s parameter, it calls the addresses hxxp: //wxanalytics.ru/net.exe.config and hxxp: //wxanalytics.ru/net.exe


I

Г	316 68.996102	192.168.5.202	195.22.26.248	TCP	66 49163 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
	317 69.133238	195.22.26.248	192.168.5.202	TCP	58 80 → 49163 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=1460
	318 69.133373	192.168.5.202	195.22.26.248	TCP	54 49163 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0
	319 69.133610	192.168.5.202	195.22.26.248	HTTP	121 GET /net.exe.config HTTP/1.1
	320 69.269963	195.22.26.248	192.168.5.202	TCP	54 80 → 49163 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=68 Win=29200 Len=0
	321 69.269982	195.22.26.248	192.168.5.202	TCP	309 80 \rightarrow 49163 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=68 Win=29200 Len=255 [TCP segment of a reassembled P
	322 69.269988	195.22.26.248	192.168.5.202	HTTP	54 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
	323 69.270074	192.168.5.202	195.22.26.248	TCP	54 49163 → 80 [ACK] Seq=68 Ack=257 Win=63985 Len=0
	324 69.270191	192.168.5.202	195.22.26.248	TCP	54 49163 → 80 [FIN, ACK] Seq=68 Ack=257 Win=63985 Len=0
	325 69.276845	192.168.5.202	195.22.26.248	TCP	66 49164 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
	326 69.421250	195.22.26.248	192.168.5.202	TCP	58 80 → 49164 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=1460
	327 69.421351	192.168.5.202	195.22.26.248	TCP	54 49164 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0
	328 69.433224	192.168.5.202	195.22.26.248	HTTP	114 GET /net.exe HTTP/1.1
	329 69.562689	195.22.26.248	192.168.5.202	TCP	54 80 → 49164 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=61 Win=29200 Len=0
	330 69.562939	195.22.26.248	192.168.5.202	TCP	309 80 → 49164 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=61 Win=29200 Len=255 [TCP segment of a reassembled P…
	331 69.563032	195.22.26.248	192.168.5.202	HTTP	54 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
	332 69.563088	192.168.5.202	195.22.26.248	TCP	54 49164 → 80 [ACK] Seq=61 Ack=257 Win=63985 Len=0
	333 69.563152	192.168.5.202	195.22.26.248	TCP	54 49164 → 80 [FIN, ACK] Seq=61 Ack=257 Win=63985 Len=0

PCAP file content view on the tLab system

The file can run with the -cs and -cc options. In this case, it takes the location path for the original malicious file.





By looking at the list of malicious files that have accessed the same addresses, we will see they have different names.

January 29th 2019 07:52:21 (UTC)	Cnucox nurreparypueze PE32 executable (GUU) Intel 80386, for MS Windows 127722319078ear9ace41349bar7sa88e06a19cdt7es364fe7b9e7d18fd3d9d9d	Sample (1.6MiB)	malicious	Threat Score: 100/100 AV Detection: 91% Dropper:Generic Malware: SFMHX Matched 55 Indicators of == 16 6		Windows 7 32 bit	C
June 1st 2017 09:15:42 (UTC)	mis.exe PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows 92cHo0452d35687f10b203475475f7513dddf2le07ddb8b9al5f2f2caef183e	Sample (1.6MiB)	malicious	Threat Score: 95/100 AV Detectior: 95% Dropper.Generic.Malware.SFMHX Matched 42 Indicators 😅 🖿		Windows 7 32 bit	C
May 5th 2017 22:07:49 (UTC)	xxx, 56 xx8 PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows d4lef5/c214bi964ec03730df499ef8673580c9c6c6776620734bi6ds56ff395d	Sample (3.9MiB)	malicious	Threat Score: 100/100 AV Detection: 77% Gen:Variant.Kazy Matched 54 Indicators o€ ≓ ∎ I Show Smilar Samples		Windows 7 32 bit	C
May 5th 2017 21:34:27 (UTC)	remocra3_trpacc.exe PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows 89d89c69bcb0300bb3035ada568fabb625ffaca6ac178b6760939543f7849319	③ Sample (11MiB)	malicious	Threat Score: 100/100 AV Detection: 68% Trojan.Agent Matched 55 Indicators of ==	-	Windows 7 32 bit	C
May 5th 2017 21:30:35 (UTC)	Мистоплодная беременность анс РЕЗ2 ексладае (б.01) Intel 80386, for HS Windows е.cs35HL8569Hx8E3dadd5623210Be46ke8Bdd94ke08I02eeb2bt734Ib40dta	Sample (3.9MiB)	malicious	Threat Score: 100/100 AV Detection: 83% Gen:Variant Kazy Matched 57 Indicators of: == =		Windows 7 32 bit	C
April 27th 2017 13:11:07 (UTC)	Cnpatra.doc.ete P132.execuable (CUI) Intel 80386.for HS Windows edde:d121656/et:S07b0et8bd8e40e81966357a2H36653129385a13e680ec04		malicious	Threat Score: 100/100 AV Detection: 91% Razy,Generic Matched 57 Indicators of = 🖉 🛷	-	Windows 7 32 bit	C

List of malicious files accessing vwanalytics.ru

Attackers often name malicious files based on the area of interest of potential victims.

Several samples of malicious files on this list were uploaded documents to legalacts.egov.kz and budget.egov.kz. As previously noted, this type of attack is called a watering hole attack.

January 23rd 2020 05:47:	:19 (UTC) Ввод Уровень уг Аннотация		⊕ Sample (1.6MiB
	Страны Среда Действие	AV Detection: 89% Trojan.Agent Matched 59 Indicators ot ≓ ■ Windows 7 64 bit C [*] Re-analyze	
\bigcirc	⊘ No security vendors flagged this URL as	malicious	
 /87 ? Community √ Score 	https://budget.egov.kz/budgetfile/file?fileId= budget.egov.kz downloads-pe	200 application/octet-stream 2021-05-11 13:40: Status Content Type 1 month ago	

Malicious links:

- hxxps://budget.egov.kz/budgetfile/file?fileId=1520392
- hxxps://legalacts.egov.kz/application/downloadnpa?id=532231

The files are the same old malicious Razy downloader Trojan. We assume that cybercriminals published malicious software under the guise of DOCX by gaining access to uploading files to the legalacts.egov.kz site. As of May 11, 2021, only a few well-known anti-viruses identified the object, while none of them could detect the link to the object itself as malicious.

Conclusion

These days even an ordinary user can unravel such techniques as hiding files and faking the icons.

The malicious Trojan downloader itself is not packed in any way to stay undetected by the antivirus signature. The file creation date indicates the use of old-style malware. The hash sums of the studied samples (without resources) coincide with so many other files seen in similar attacks.

All this suggests that the attackers, in this case, used quite an old malware, changing only the office document displayed to the user, which indicates the low qualifications of the attacker. Regardless, the Razy Trojan still poses a live threat and uses actual white papers.