Purple Fox Rootkit Now Propagates as a Worm

c guardicore.com/labs/purple-fox-rootkit-now-propagates-as-a-worm/






Executive Summary

- Purple Fox is an active malware campaign targeting Windows machines.
- Up until recently, Purple Fox's operators infected machines by using exploit kits and phishing emails.
- Guardicore Labs have identified **a new infection vector of this malware** where internet-facing Windows machines are being breached through SMB password brute force.
- Guardicore Labs have also identified Purple Fox's vast network of compromised servers hosting its dropper and payloads. These servers appear to be compromised Microsoft IIS 7.5 servers.
- The Purple Fox malware includes a **rootkit** which allows the threat actors to hide the malware on the machine and make it difficult to detect and remove.

Introduction

During the last few weeks, the Guardicore Labs team have been tracking a new campaign distributing the Purple Fox malware. Purple Fox was discovered in March of 2018 and was covered as an exploit kit targeting Internet Explorer and Windows machines with various privilege escalation exploits.

However, throughout the end of 2020 and the beginning of 2021, Guardicore Global Sensors Network (GGSN) detected Purple Fox's novel spreading technique via indiscriminate port scanning and exploitation of exposed SMB services with weak passwords and hashes.



By leveraging the capabilities of GGSN, we were able to track the spread of Purple Fox. As can be seen in the above graph, May of 2020 brought a significant amount of malicious activity and the number of infections that we have observed has risen by roughly 600% and amounted to a total of 90,000 attacks as of writing this paper.

While it appears that the functionality of Purple Fox hasn't changed much **post exploitation**, its spreading and distribution methods – and its worm-like behavior – are much different than described in previously published articles. Throughout our research, we have observed an infrastructure that appears to be made out of a hodge-podge of vulnerable and exploited servers hosting the initial payload of the malware, infected machines which are serving as


nodes of those constantly worming campaigns, and server infrastructure that appears to be related to other malware campaigns.

In this blog post we will detail our findings about the new worm activity and share IOCs.

Attack Analysis


The attackers are hosting various MSI packages on nearly 2,000 servers (see IOCs section), which to our assessment are compromised machines which were repurposed to host malicious payloads. Our assumption is based on scanning multiple servers, looking at the services that are hosted on them from the perspective of operating system versions, and server versions.

We have established that the vast majority of the servers, which are serving the initial payload, are running on relatively old versions of Windows Server running IIS version 7.5 and Microsoft FTP, which are known to have multiple vulnerabilities with varying severity levels.



According to our findings, there are several ways for this campaign to start spreading:

- 1. The worm payload is being executed after a victim machine is compromised through a vulnerable exposed service (such as SMB).
- The worm payload is being sent via email through a phishing campaign (which could tie the previously published findings about Purple Fox) which exploits a browser vulnerability. We have identified multiple samples that were submitted to VirusTotal through email scanners.



Once code execution is achieved on the victim machine, a new service whose name matches the regex $AC0[0-9]{1} - e.g. AC01, AC02, AC05, etc.$ will be created, the purpose of this service would be to establish persistence and to execute a simple command with a 'for loop', the purpose of this command would be to iterate through a number of URLs which contain the MSI that installs Purple Fox on the machine.



As can be seen in the screenshot from the Guardicore Centra platform, *msiexec* will be executed with the /i flag, in order to download and install the malicious MSI package from one of the hosts in the statement. It will also be executed with the /Q flag for "quiet" execution, meaning, no user interaction will be required.

Once the package is executed, the MSI installer will launch.


For analysis purposes, We have executed the MSI installer without the **/Q** flag (As if it's being executed directly from an email attachment), the installer will present the following window:

AWKYB3	Avkybzwvucewxptgjrqmeomigwhusldexbni \times	1
15	你必须重新启动系统才能使对 AVKYBZWYUCEWXPTGJRQMECMIGWHUSLDEXBNI 做出 的配置更改生效。单击"是"立即重新启动;单 击"否"可在以后以手动方式启动。	INI ,
	是(Y) 否(N)	

The installer pretends to be a Windows Update package along with Chinese text which roughly translates to "Windows Update" and random letters. These letters are randomly generated between each different MSI installer to create a different hash and make it a bit difficult to tie between different versions of the same MSI. This is a "cheap" and simple way of evading various detection methods such as static signatures. Additionally, we have identified MSI packages with the same strings but with random null bytes appended to them in order to create different hashes of the same file.

Offset(h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	OF	Decoded text
0025E240	D0	81	00	00	00	00	80	A0	FD	Α9	17	29	84	14	00	00	Ѐý©.)"
0025E250	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
0025E260	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	40	0D	24	@.\$
0025E270	D9	DF	5C	24	01	38	31	43	4B	ED	92	C1	B1	18	31	08	Ùß∖\$.81CKí′Á±.1.
0025E280	43	EF	99	F9	ЗD	Α4	04	C0	60	AO	FF	C6	BE	11	9B	1E	Cï™ù=¤.À` ÿƾ.>.
0025E290	72	DO	BB	30	36	C2	08	76	В9	02	42	08	21	84	10	42	rл06Â.v¹.B.!".B
0025E2A0	08	21	84	10	42	08	21	84	10	42	08	21	84	10	42	08	.!".B.!".B.!".B.
0025E2B0	21	84	10	42	08	21	FF	01	96	E9	FD	F7	E7	8F	65	C5	!".B.!ÿ.−éý÷ç.eÅ
0025E2C0	79	31	0D	47	ED	8E	7C	31	Β4	36	7B	90	B5	AA	F6	17	yl.GíŽ l′6{.µªö.
0025E2D0	8F	D8	BD	AЗ	6E	49	A 8	DD	75	D2	11	36	67	EΒ	CC	98	.Ø≒£nI″ÝuÒ.6gëÌ~
0025E2E0	7B	Fl	C4	FD	51	Β1	39	DF	90	09	C7	ЗA	F6	71	5F	F5	{ñÄýQ±9βÇ∶öq_õ
0025E2F0	29	3C	ΕA	8E			1B			9E					CC)<êŽ×°.j.ž&G.ÍÌL
0025E300	E6	B5	9B	2A		1A				AD			5A	ЗA	0C	55	æµ>*p. _. őÎ.Î,Z:.U
0025E310	5F	CF	ЗE	36					AB			AC	83	6E	B2	5E	_Ï>6]4Ì.«e'¬fn°^
0025E320	2D	72	4D	5D	8C		29		0F		98	C8	FD	FC	EB	06	-rM]Œ.)~Èýüë.
0025E330	75	C6	C6		9B	18	9D		22		F7			BB	D6	D7	uÆÆ~>V" ÷ó²»Ö×
0025E340		EF	DC	5D	48	43	1D			95		FO	F6	41		F9	.ïÜ]HC.Šà•ãðöAîù
0025E350	40	54	В9	28	75	51	85		C5	40	AF	71	6E	67	1D	99	@T¹(uQ…aÅ@¯qng.™
0025E360	63	0A	B3	EΒ	98				2C			8D	-	EE	-	8B	c.'ë"VNA,-,.‡î‡<
0025E370	CF	C7	F7	21	5B	31			E3		-	D3	ЗD	39	37		ÏÇ÷![1ÇAãü6Ó=97¤
0025E380	Β4	65	4B	5F	25	46		35		СВ	65	6D			ЗA		′eK_%Ft5″Ëemjm:Ï
0025E390	FE	0A			65							00	00	00		00	þ.ø³e fp>ò
0025E3A0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			00	
0025E3B0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
0025E3C0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	••••••
0025E3D0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	••••••
0025E3E0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	••••
0025E3F0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	

We were, however, able to find many different versions of the same MSI and its payloads, as can be seen in the following screenshot from VT graph.



As the installation progresses, the installer will extract the payloads and decrypt them from within the MSI package. The MSI package contains three files:

- 1. A 64bit DLL payload (*winupdate64*).
- 2. A 32bit DLL payload (winupdate32).
- 3. An encrypted file containing a rootkit.

As a part of the installation process, the malware modifies the windows firewall by executing multiple *netsh* commands. The malware adds a new policy named *Qianye* to the windows firewall. Under this policy, it creates a new filter called *Filter1* and under this filter, it prohibits ports 445, 139, 135 on both TCP and UDP from any IP address on the internet (0.0.0.0) to connect to the infected machine, we believe that the attackers are doing it in order to prevent the infected machine from being reinfected, and/or to be exploited by a different threat actor.

Once the aforementioned files are being extracted, they will be executed.

This can be seen as the malware is executing the following commands:

netsh.exe ipsec static add policy name=qianye

netsh.exe ipsec static add filterlist name=Filter1

netsh.exe ipsec static add filter filterlist=Filter1 srcaddr=any dstaddr=Me
dstport=135 protocol=TCP

netsh.exe ipsec static add filter filterlist=Filter1 srcaddr=any dstaddr=Me
dstport=139 protocol=TCP

netsh.exe ipsec static add filter filterlist=Filter1 srcaddr=any dstaddr=Me
dstport=445 protocol=UDP

netsh.exe ipsec static add filter filterlist=Filter1 srcaddr=any dstaddr=Me
dstport=135 protocol=UDP

netsh.exe ipsec static add filter filterlist=Filter1 srcaddr=any dstaddr=Me
dstport=139 protocol=UDP

netsh.exe ipsec static set policy name=qianye assign=y

netsh.exe ipsec static add rule name=Rule1 policy=qianye filterlist=Filter1
filteraction=FilteraAtion1

netsh.exe ipsec static add rule name=Rule1 policy=qianye filterlist=Filter1 netsh.exe
ipsec static add filteraction name=FilteraAtion1 action=block

Additionally, the malware will install an IPv6 interface on the machine by executing the command:

netsh.exe interface ipv6 install

This action is taken in order to allow the malware to port scan ipv6 addresses as well to maximize the efficiency of the spread over (usually unmonitored) ipv6 subnets.

Important note:

These commands can be used as **Indicators of Behavior** (IoBs) in order to check if your environment is compromised.

Additionally, These netsh commands have also appeared in previous campaigns and are not exclusive to this iteration of Purple Fox. These commands, specifically with the Qianye policy name have been documented as a part of <u>Rig EK</u> and NuggetPhantom.

The last step of Purple Fox's deployment before restarting the machine is to load the rootkit that's hidden inside the encrypted payload in the MSI package.

According to our analysis, the rootkit is based on the *hidden* open source rootkit project.

00409a9cHid_Stateu"Hid_State"unicode00409ab0Hid_StealthModeu"Hid_StealthMode"unicode00409ad0Hid_HideFsDirsu"Hid_HideFsDirs*unicode00409aeeHid_HideFsFilesu"Hid_HideFsFiles*unicode00409b0eHid_HideRegKeysu"Hid_HideRegKeys*unicode00409b2eHid_HideRegValuesu"Hid_JideRegValues*unicode00409b52Hid_IgnoredImagesu"Hid_IgnoredImages*unicode00409b76Hid_ProtectedImagesu"Hid_ProtectedImages*unicode3#define CONFIG_ALLOC_TAG 'gfnC'556typedef struct _HidConfigContext { BOOLEAN state;BOOLEAN state;5
00409ad0 Hid_HideFsDirs u"Hid_HideFsDirs" unicode 00409ace Hid_HideFsFiles u"Hid_HideFsFiles" unicode 00409b0e Hid_HideRegKeys u"Hid_HideRegKeys" unicode 00409b2e Hid_HideRegValues u"Hid_HideRegValues" unicode 00409b2e Hid_IgnoredImages u"Hid_IgnoredImages" unicode 00409b76 Hid_ProtectedImages u"Hid_ProtectedImages" unicode 3 4 #define CONFIG_ALLOC_TAG 'gfnC' 5 6 typedef struct _HidConfigContext { 4
00409aee Hid_HideFsFiles u'Hid_HideFsFiles" unicode 00409b0e Hid_HideRegKeys u'Hid_HideRegKeys" unicode 00409b2e Hid_HideRegValues u'Hid_HideRegValues" unicode 00409b2e Hid_IgnoredImages u'Hid_IgnoredImages" unicode 00409b76 Hid_ProtectedImages u'Hid_ProtectedImages" unicode 3 #define CONFIG_ALLOC_TAG 'gfnC' 5 5 6 typedef struct _HidConfigContext { 4
00409b0e Hid_HideRegKeys u"Hid_HideRegKeys" unicode 00409b2e Hid_HideRegValues u"Hid_HideRegValues" unicode 00409b52 Hid_IgnoredImages u"Hid_IgnoredImages" unicode 00409b76 Hid_ProtectedImages u"Hid_ProtectedImages" unicode 3 #define CONFIG_ALLOC_TAG 'gfnC' 5 5 6 typedef struct_HidConfigContext { 6
00409b2e Hid_HideRegValues u"Hid_HideRegValues" unicode 00409b52 Hid_IgnoredImages u"Hid_IgnoredImages" unicode 00409b76 Hid_ProtectedImages u"Hid_ProtectedImages" unicode 3 #define CONFIG_ALLOC_TAG 'gfnC' 5 5 6 typedef struct_HidConfigContext { 6
00409b52 Hid_IgnoredImages u"Hid_IgnoredImages" unicode 00409b76 Hid_ProtectedImages u"Hid_ProtectedImages" unicode 3 #define CONFIG_ALLOC_TAG 'gfnC' 5 5 5 6 typedef struct _HidConfigContext { 4
00409b76 Hid_ProtectedImages u"Hid_ProtectedImages" unicode 3 #define CONFIG_ALLOC_TAG 'gfnC' 5 6 typedef struct _HidConfigContext {
<pre>3 4 #define CONFIG_ALLOC_TAG 'gfnC' 5 6 typedef struct _HidConfigContext {</pre>
<pre>4 #define CONFIG_ALLOC_TAG 'gfnC' 5 6 typedef struct _HidConfigContext {</pre>
5 6 typedef struct _HidConfigContext {
5 6 typedef struct _HidConfigContext {
<pre>6 typedef struct _HidConfigContext {</pre>
7 BOOLEAN state;
8 BOOLEAN stealth;
9 UNICODE_STRING hideFSDirs;
10 UNICODE_STRING hideFSFiles;
11 UNICODE_STRING hideRegKeys;
12 UNICODE_STRING hideRegValues;
13 UNICODE_STRING ignoreImages;
14 UNICODE_STRING protectImages;
<pre>15 } HidConfigContext, *PHidConfigContext;</pre>
1.5 J HIdeon igeoneexe, Thideon igeoneexe,
16 The number of this restlict is to hide verieve registry keys and values, files, etc., or details

The purpose of this rootkit is to hide various registry keys and values, files, etc., as detailed by its author on the git repository. Ironically enough, the *hidden* rootkit was developed by a security researcher in order to conduct various malware analysis tasks and to keep all of these research tasks **hidden** from the malware.

Hidden

This toolset is developed like a solution for my reverse engineering and researching tasks. This is a windows driver with a usermode interface which is used for hidding specific environment on VMs, like installed rce programs (ex. procmon, wireshark), vm infrastracture (ex. vmware tools) and etc.

Features

- hide registry keys and values
- hide files and directories
- protect specific processes using ObRegisterCallbacks
- exclude specific processes from hidding and protection features
- usermode interface (lib and cli) for working with driver

This rootkit and its relationship with Purple Fox was detailed in this article by 360 Security.

Once the rootkit is loaded, the installer will reboot the machine in order to rename the malware DLL into a system DLL file that will be executed on boot. Since we executed the malware in our lab without the **/Q** flag, we were presented with the following window which asks us to restart the machine:

AV	KYB	AVKYBZWVUCEWXPTGJRQMEOMIGWHUSLDEXBNI	×	
Ĕ	ß	你必须重新启动系统才能使对 AVKYBZWYUCEWXPTGTROMECONTGWHUSLDEXBNI 做出 的配置更改生效。单击"是"立即重新启动; 单 击"否"可在以后以手动方式启动。		INI,
0		是(Y) 否(N)		

Once the machine is restarted, the malware will be executed as well. After it's execution, the malware will start its propagation process: the malware will generate IP ranges and start scanning them on port 445.

As the machine responds to the SMB probe that's being sent on port 445, it will try to authenticate to SMB by brute forcing usernames and passwords or by trying to establish a null session.

2892 270.361390	192.168.100.211	180.218.95.239	TCP	66 49920 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2893 270.361440	192.168.100.211	180.218.123.60	TCP	66 49921 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2894 270.361510	192.168.100.211	180.218.116.216	TCP	66 49922 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2895 270.361555	192.168.100.211	180.218.136.176	TCP	66 49923 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2896 270.361623	192.168.100.211	180.218.237.234	TCP	66 49924 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2897 270.361695	192.168.100.211	180.218.58.0	TCP	66 49925 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2898 270.361756	192.168.100.211	180.218.214.177	TCP	66 49915 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2899 270.362028	192.168.100.211	180.218.3.103	TCP	66 49926 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2900 270.362109	192.168.100.211	180.218.46.74	TCP	66 49927 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2901 270.362179	192.168.100.211	180.218.254.171	TCP	66 49928 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2902 270.362249	192.168.100.211	180.218.104.44	TCP	66 49929 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2903 270.362310	192.168.100.211	180.218.156.41	TCP	66 49930 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2904 270.362373	192.168.100.211	180.218.139.153	TCP	66 49931 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2905 270.362426	192.168.100.211	180.218.86.140	TCP	66 49932 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2906 270.362505	192.168.100.211	180.218.201.190	TCP	66 49933 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2907 270.362537	192.168.100.211	180.218.4.172	TCP	66 49934 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2908 270.362610	192.168.100.211	180.218.100.153	TCP	66 49935 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2909 270.362670	192.168.100.211	180.218.248.98	TCP	66 49936 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2910 270.362707	192.168.100.211	180.218.166.132	TCP	66 49938 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK PERM=1
2911 270.362743	192.168.100.211	180.218.87.209	TCP	66 49939 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2912 270.362821	192.168.100.211	180.218.57.85	TCP	66 49940 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2913 270.362851	192.168.100.211	180.218.186.117	TCP	66 49942 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2914 270.362877	192.168.100.211	180.218.143.24	TCP	66 49943 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2015 270 250040	400 400 400 044	100 010 00 05	TCD	

If the authentication is successful, the malware will create a service whose name matches the regex AC0[0-9]{1} — e.g. AC01, AC02, AC05 (as mentioned before) that will download the MSI installation package from one of the many HTTP servers and thus will complete the infection loop.

Indicators of Compromise

IOCs are available in our IOC github repository