## Threat Attribution — Chimera "Under the Radar"

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## Threat Attribution Research Comparison

On 12 January 2021, Fox-IT & NCC Group published their detailed report, <u>"Abusing Cloud Services to Fly Under the Radar"</u>. The threat actor tracked in their report shared many similarities to the <u>China-linked threat actor Chimera</u>, whom CyCraft attributed to a year-long cyberattack targeting the Taiwan semiconductor industry just last year.

Much like Chimera, the threat actor mentioned in the Fox-IT & NCC Group report (referred to in this article as CUTR, Chimera Under the Radar) targeted intellectual property (IP) from the semiconductor industry; however, the report goes into further detail explaining how their


threat actor's targets were more diverse, including targeting sensitive data from the EU aviation industry.

In this article, we analyze and compare their research to ours.

#### Conclusions

- 1. There is a strong probability the threat actor, CUTR, is Chimera as their IoCs, commonly used infra, tools, techniques, and behaviors are all very similar to Chimera; 42 of the 67 adversarial techniques used in both campaigns were identical.
- 2. China-linked threat actors (e.g., Chimera, BlackTech, APT30) are known to share tools and attack methods with each other, making attribution challenging.
- 3. Some differences in attack behavior may be due to differences in the victims' architecture, security maturity, or geographic location (EU, not Taiwan). Different environments may require different TTP. TTP designed for infiltrating Taiwan's semiconductor industry may require adjustment for the EU aviation industry and vice versa.
- 4. Chimera was focused solely on the Taiwan semiconductor industry. CUTR showed "a wide set of interests," including the EU semiconductor industry as well as aviation. While some China-linked threat actors have demonstrated an ability to adapt techniques, tools, and targets, sudden changes in attack behavior are not common keeping true to the ideas behind Bianco's Pyramid of Pain, as mentioned in the Fox-IT & NCC Group report. As TTPs are the hardest to change and tend to stay inflexible for longer periods of time, similar TTP usage between different attack campaigns/operations is a strong indicator of attribution.

# **PYRAMID OF PAIN**



As mentioned in the FOX-IT & NCC Group report, Bianco's Pyramid of Pain illustrates how difficult it is for an attacker to circumvent a particular attack method that has been stripped away from them. For example, while blocking a file or IP address is rather trivial for an attacker to get around, taking away an attacker's tool is challenging; they will have to devise a new way of carrying out their objectives.

According to the Fox-IT & NCC Group report, "the largest overlap [between Chimera and their threat actor] is in the top half of the Pyramid of Pain: domain names, host artifacts, tools, and TTPs."

We will compare Chimera with CUTR using the Pyramid of Pain model from the ground up.

### **Hash Values**

The following table shows the hash of these IoCs. As depicted in the table, 3 of the hashes are identical to our research. Even though the identical WinRAR and get.exe can be easily used by other threat actors, the added inclusion of the Cloud exfil tool increases the probability of Chimera attribution.

Chimera primarily used both the Cobalt Strike Beacon and the Winnti backdoors during their operation against Taiwan's semiconductor industry. CUTR was not observed using the Winnti backdoor but was observed using Cobalt Strike Beacon's remote access functionality; however, we cannot confirm if it is the exact same Cobalt Strike Beacon as Fox-IT & NCC Group did not release the hash in their report.

Comparison	Hash	Note
Identical	4d5440282b69453f4eb6232a 1689dd4a	Cloud exfil tool
Identical	c9b8cab697f23e6ee9b1096e 312e8573	WinRAR
Observed	133a159e86ff48c59e79e67a 3b740c1e	get.exe  We do not list this in our report as we do not have strong enough evidence to link it to the threat actor, but it was observed in the victim's environment.
Not Observed in Chimera	328ba584bd06c3083e3a66cb4 7779eac	
Not Observed in Chimera	65cf35ddcb42c6ff5dc56d6259 cc05f3	
Not Observed in Chimera	90508ff4d2fc7bc968636c716d 84e6b4	
Not Observed in Chimera	dd138a8bc1d4254fed9638989 da38ab1	

4 d5440282 b69453 f4 eb6232 a1689 dd4 ac9 b8 cab697 f23 e6 ee 9 b1096 e312 e8573133 a159 e86 ff48 c59 e79 e666 e1966 e

### IP address & Domain Name

None of the domain names are identical, but the behavior of abusing the cloud platforms such as Appspot or Azure Edge is aligned with our findings. This increases the probability of Chimera attribution.

### **Network & Host Artifacts**

Some file names used are similar to our research. Here we list some similar naming schemes.

RecordedTV.ms OneDrive.exe update.exe jucheck.exe

### Tool

The tools used by their threat actor significantly overlap with our research into Chimera.

Cobalt Strike
OneDrive
Modified RAR
Cloud Service

#### TTP

According to the Pyramid of Pain model, TTP are the most difficult and less frequently changed methods of an attacker, suggesting that campaigns/operations with multiple similarities in TTP are most likely performed by the same threat actor.

Comparing the adversarial techniques used by Chimera and CUTR, 42 of the 67 adversarial techniques used in both campaigns were identical. Below are a few notable similarities and differences.

## Techniques critical to both Chimera & CUTR's attack behavior:

T1003.003 OS Credential Dumping: NTDS

T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

T1078 Valid Accounts

## Observed only in CUTR:

T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading

T1111 Two-Factor Authentication Interception

T1550.002 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash

## Observed only in Chimera:

T1055.001 Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection

T1556.001 Modify Authentication Process: Domain Controller Authentication

Differences in attack behavior may be due to differences in the victims' architecture, security maturity, geographic location (EU, not Taiwan), or differences in visibility.

Both threat actors are China-based and located in the UTC +8 timezone.

The TTP used by both Chimera and CUTR are summarized below — mapped in the MITRE ATT&CK® framework.

Execution
Credential Access
<u>Lateral Movement</u>
Collection
<u>Conection</u>
<u>Exfiltration</u>
<u>EXTRICUTOR</u>
Summary
Threat attribution is difficult.
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Initial Access

China-linked threat actors are known to share tools and attack methods (and possibly even personnel) with each other. Differences in victim security operational culture, geographic location, system architecture, security maturity, industry, and defense technology can all lead to minor and major differences in attack behavior. There are always numerous factors to consider and weigh, making perfect attribution difficult.

However, the evidence presented after comparing research from both CyCraft and Fox-IT & NCC Group illustrates a strong likelihood that CUTR is Chimera.

Chimera and CUTR are both located in the UTC +8 timezone, are China-based, and have a strong overlap in IoCs, commonly used infra, tools, techniques, and behavior. 42 of the 67 adversarial techniques used in both Chimera and CUTR campaigns were identical.

CyCraft confirms with high confidence that CUTR is Chimera.

We would like to thank Fox-IT & NCC Group for their detailed report, added visibility into the Chimera threat, and added threat intelligence against this China-based threat actor so that SOCs can better defend their organizations and keep their data secure.

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