Negasteal Uses Hastebin for Fileless Delivery of Crysis Ransomware

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We recently encountered a Negasteal (also

known as Agent Tesla) variant that used hastebin for the fileless delivery of the Crysis (also known as Dharma) ransomware. This is the first time that we have observed Negasteal with a ransomware payload.

Only a few months ago, Deep Instinct published the <u>first reported case</u> of a Negasteal variant that used hastebin[.]com, a paste site for online content. Negasteal is a spyware trojan that was <u>discovered</u> in 2014. It offers its services in the form of paid subscriptions in cybercriminal underground forums, with its developers constantly making changes to improve its evasion tactics and remain relevant in their market.

The Crysis ransomware, meanwhile, is behind several <u>high-profile attacks</u>, with variants that continuously demonstrate <u>different techniques</u>. Similar to Negasteal, Dharma works on a <u>ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS)</u> model that makes it accessible for other cybercriminals to pay for.

Behavior

This is the first time that we have observed these two malware services being used together. According to the sample that we encountered, the variant arrives through a phishing email, as seen in Figure 1.



Figure 1. An image of the phishing email that was used

As part of its evasion tactics, it tries to exclude itself from debugging by Windows Defender, which it can also try to disable as a possible alternative evasion method. These tactics are shown in Figures 2 and 3.

key: HKLUS-1-5-21-3129151729-2737224167-1243983807-1000. CLASSES\Local Settings\MuiCache\38\52C6487F value: LanguageList data: en-LIS. en

"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath "C:_virus\b524398df66d04ac28e7461e7c7ff97c6d69343d13d7f3fdd11e26729813ae5c.exe" -Force
key: HKU\S-1-5-21-3129151729-2737224167-1243983807-1000_CLASSES\Local Settings\MuiCache\38\52C6487E value: LanguageList data: en-US, en

Figure 2. The malware excludes itself from being debugged.

```
key: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender
key: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender value: DisableAntiSpyware data: 1
key: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time Protection
key: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time Protection value: DisableBehaviorMonitoring data: 1
key: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time Protection value: DisableOnAccessProtection data: 1
key: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time Protection value: DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable data: 1
```

Figure 3. The malware disables Windows Defender.

For persistence, it adds itself to the startup folder and CurrentVersion\Run. Eventually, the loader will connect to "hastebin[.]com" and decode the binary (Crysis) from the command-and-control (C&C) server, thereby allowing fileless delivery of the ransomware.

key: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wicrosoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run value: b524398df66d04ac28e7461e7c7ff97c6d69343d13d7f3fdd11e26729813ae5c.exe data: C:\Windows\System32\b524398df66d0...
C:\Users\Win7x32\ppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\b524398df66d04ac28e7461e7c7ff97c6d69343d13d7f3fdd11e26729813ae5c.exe
C:\Users\Win7x32\ppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\b524398df66d04ac28e7461e7c7ff97c6d69343d13d7f3fdd11e26729813ae5c.exe
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\b524398df66d04ac28e7461e7c7ff97c6d69343d13d7f3fdd11e26729813ae5c.exe
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\b524398df66d04ac28e7461e7c7ff97c6d69343d13d7f3fdd11e26729813ae5c.exe
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\b524398df66d04ac28e7461e7c7ff97c6d69343d13d7f3fdd11e26729813ae5c.exe

Figure 4. A snippet of the malware adding itself to the startup folder

```
Received new connection on port: 80.1

New request on port 80.1

GET /wpad.dat HTTP/1.1

Connection: Keep-Alive
Accept: */*

Host: 127.0.0.1

Sent http response to client.1

Domain name: hastebin.com

Received new connection on port: 443.1

Received new connection on port: 80.1
```

Figure 5. The malware connects to hastebin[.]com




Figure 6. The Crysis ransomware payload

Security Recommendations

This campaign shows the potential of Negasteal to deliver other malware filelessly through its hastebin C&C server. The combination of these two active malware services demonstrates how cybercriminals can cobble together accessible malware in hopes of a successful campaign. Fileless delivery also adds a further challenge in removing this threat, as it leaves no trace after execution.

For organizations, following security best practices will help minimize the success of similar campaigns. As with this campaign, stopping threats from their initial entry can prevent larger problems caused by their payloads. In this case, the campaign has a ransomware payload that can encrypt important files and freeze operations.

Here are some general security practices to implement:

 <u>Secure email gateways</u>. Secured email gateways thwart threats that are delivered via spam and phishing. They also help users to avoid opening suspicious emails and attachments.

- <u>Regularly back up files</u>. This also serves as a good precaution against ransomware attacks.
- Keep systems and applications updated. Use <u>virtual patching</u> for legacy or unpatchable systems and software.
- Enforce the principle of least privilege. Implement <u>network segmentation</u> and <u>data</u> <u>categorization</u> to minimize further exposure of mission-critical data.
- Implement defense in-depth. Additional layers of security like <u>application</u> <u>control</u> and <u>behavior monitoring</u> help prevent the execution of anomalous files.

A <u>multilayered security</u> approach is advised to protect all possible threat entry points. The following solutions can help secure against a variety of threats:

- <u>Trend Micro Apex One™</u> and <u>Apex One Endpoint Sensor</u> Employ behavioral analysis that protects against malicious scripts, injection, ransomware, and memory and browser attacks related to fileless threats.
- <u>Trend Micro XDR</u> Connects email, endpoints, servers, cloud workloads, and networks to detect and respond to threats earlier.
- <u>Trend Micro™ Email Security</u> Uses enhanced machine learning and dynamic sandbox analysis for file and URL to stop email threats.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):

Files

- 2adb3505038e73bc83e5c5d9a60b725645fb65a7b0a781a5aadde50c942d13dc (detected as TrojanSpy.MSIL.NEGASTEAL.DYSHPF)
- b524398df66d04ac28e7461e7c7ff97c6d69343d13d7f3fdd11e26729813ae5c (detected as Trojan.MSIL.NEGASTEAL.BGO)

Payload

f3587884456922ffd42c8189e111c1184d74e12f (detected as Ransom.MSIL.DHARMA.AC)

C&C

- hxxps://hastebin[.]com/raw/avucapadey
- hxxps://hastebin[.]com/raw/molijokewe
- hxxps://hastebin[.]com/raw/sijifewopi
- 199[.]193[.]7.228

HIDE

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