Latest Amadey Uses Screen Capture, Pushes Remcos RAT

Scaler.com/blogs/security-research/latest-version-amadey-introduces-screen-capturing-and-pushes-remcos-rat

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The Zscaler <u>ThreatLabZ</u> team is continually monitoring known threats to see if they reappear in a different form.

One such threat we've kept an eye on is Amadey, a bot of Russian origin, which was first seen in late 2018. Once on a victim's machine, Amadey sends user data to a Command and Control (C&C) server and executes other tasks sent back by the C&C server. Several versions of this bot have been seen, with the last version (v1.09) first being spotted by <u>Cylance</u> earlier this year. In this blog, we will analyze the latest version of this bot, looking at the updates from the previous version.

In addition to the new version of the bot payload, the author also updated the login page "a2020 AMADEY". This latest version has some new functionality, such as screen capturing, is pushing the Remcos RAT on its C&C panel task list, and features some modified modules.




Figure 1: Amadey Live 2020 Login Page

As per the Twitter source handle, <u>@FaLconIntel</u> and further confirmed by our analysis, the new version of Amadey is being delivered via the well-known RIG Exploit Kit (RIG EK).

Time	Server IP	Server Type	Pro	Method	R	Host	URL	User-Agent	Comments
2020/04/16 20:28:55	2606:4700:303	doudflare	HTTPS	GET	302	megamylife.online	/dick.php?key=8ut313lof0jear11ubuq8bid=0.000208aiteid=4534718category=E	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:72.0) Gedko/20100101 Firefox/7	
2020/04/16 20:28:55	54.188.206.97	nginx/1.10	HTTP	GET	200	ec2-54-188-206-97.us-west-2.compute.amazonaws.com	/landing.php?clickid=0cd7fus3vb4qnfe6688.campaign=651	Hozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:72.0) Gecko/20100101 FL.	#loader
2020/04/16 20:44:27	140.82.14.75	nginx	HTTP	GET	200	www.fasterpdfdownioada.top	/6/001.exe	Mozila/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0;	#Trojan ,#Stealer
2020/04/16 20:44:35	45.63.55.236		HTTP	POST	200	fastpdfinstala.top: 10000	//api/anonymous/cookie/post	Mozila/4.0(compatible;MSIE7.0;WindowsNT5.1;3605E)	#Trojan ,#Stealer
2020/04/16 20:44:38	159.69.250.163	nginx	HTTP	GET	200	toupdate 15.com	/SearchNewTab.exe	Mozila/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0;	#Python-unlib Instaler
2020/04/36 20:44:46	52.218.218.81	Amazon53	HTTPS	GET	200	linkury.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com	/safefinder.exe	Mozila/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0;	
2020/04/16 20:44:51	52.174.148.190	Microsoft-IIS	HTTP	GET	302	install.portndfmoon.com	/download/APSPPango	Mozila/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0;	#Unkury
2020/04/16 20:44:53	69.16.175.42		HTTP	GET	200	h8y9u9b2.ssl.hwcdn.net	/APSPPango/cs_1586953574971.exe	Mozila/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0;	#Linkury
2020/04/16 20:46:36	2606:4700:::68	doudflare	HTTP	GET	200	rt.webcompanion.com	/notifications/download/ht/ActiveFeatures.zp		#Adware #WebCompanion
2020/04/36 20:46:38	185.130.215.136	nginx	HTTP	GET	302	www.videossources.com	/vds 1043/videosource.exe	Mozila/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0;	\$Socelars Installer
2020/04/16 20:46:41	185.130.215.136	nginx	HTTP	GET	200	www.videossources.com	/videosource.exe	Mozila/4.0 (compatible; MS2E 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0;	#Socelars Installer
2020/04/16 20:46:46	52.218.56.179	Amazon53	HTTPS	GET	200	s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com	/shdwt/setup.exe	Mozila/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0;	#TROJAN Win32/Agent.ABLU
2020/04/16 20:46:51	54.210.248.7	Apache/2.4	HTTPS	GET	302	pc.publicnewsetup.com	/api/v1/buying/redirect/305ca5ed85636165.57669870/sub_id_1=898aub_id_2=0		
2020/04/16 20:46:52	52.4.75.112	Apache/2.4	HTTPS	GET	200	www.shutdowntime.com	/marketing/creative/windows/offer_screen/default/mode=click&track_id=3.15870		ShutdownTime Installer
2020/04/16 20:46:55	52.216.100.37	Amazon53	HTTPS	GET	200	s3.amazonaws.com	/malapps/shutdowntime.exe		ShutdownTime Installer
2020/04/16 20:46:57	2606:4700:303	doudflare	HTTP	GET	200	mainbook.xyz	/app/app.exe	Mozila/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0;	Glupteba
2020/04/16 20:48:52	52.4.75.112	Apache/2.4	HTTPS	CET	301	thebestoffersintheweb.com	/redrect/57a764d042bf8/	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; nv:11.0) like Gecko	
2020/04/16 20:48:52	52.4.75.112	Apache/2.4	HTTPS	GET	200	thebestoffersintheweb.com	/redrect/57a764d042bf8	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gedio	
2020/04/16 20:48:52	35, 190, 11, 164	opervesty	HTTP	GET	200	www.ondidmax.com	/script/preurl.php?t=15902298aub1=9	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko	
2020/04/16 20:48:52	35.190.11.164	opervesty	HTTP	GET	302	www.onclickmax.com	/script/preurl.php?stamatwm%7C%2Cktj3UjOq83dA30dEd+P3xP.d38%2CwTQUaj	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko	
2020/04/16 20:48:53	104.18.53.183	doudflare	HTTPS	GET	200	affiche.info	/?acsc=203685860	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko	
2020/04/16 20:48:58	15.164.187.250	nginx	HTTPS	GET	200	mthogim.com	/dick?tvvid=10001&extid=(dick_id)&cost=(cost)&campid=(campaign_id)&creaid	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko	
2020/04/16 20:48:58	15.164.187.250	nginx	HTTPS	GET	200	mthogim.com	/double?t=2&d=ey3A4wiOl3od+RwczovL2dgcmxtunFidH3ja2vyLmNvb59jL2BmirjL	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko	
2020/04/16 20:48:59	2600:1/18:420	nginx	HTTPS	GET	302	girlm-abtroker.com	/c/0fb26e40a8d72b3e7?sxid=ga6dov4ji4zy	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko	
2020/04/16 20:49:00	2600:1f18:420	nginx	HTTPS	GET	200	gtrim, track-fref, com	/redrect/index?type=meta&to=aHR0cHM6ky9nan3sb550cmFjazRyZWYuY29t&dat	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko	
2020/04/16 20:49:01	2600:1f18:420	nginx	HTTPS	GET	200	gtrim, track-kref, com	/redrect/index?type=meta8ts=aHR0cHM6ky9nan3sb550cmFjazRyZWYuY29t8dat	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko	
2020/04/16 20:49:03	37.140.192.59	nginx	HTTPS	GET	200	adexhangejuicyads.xyz	/?td=ewfdb5e98462a69af9983438590	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko	
2020/04/16 20:49:03	37.140.192.59	nginx	HTTPS	CET 130	200	adexhangejuicyads.xyz	/api.php	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; nv:11.0) like Gedko	
2020/04/16 20:49:26	188.127.249.18	nginx	HTTPS	GET	404	gteriotcacy/,buzz	h3rC27	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko	Spelevo Redirector
2020/04/16 21:12:51	52.4.75.112	Apache/2.4	HTTPS	GET	301	thebestoffersintheweb.com	/redrect/57a764d042bf8/	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko	
2020/04/16 21:12:51	52.4.75.112	Apache/2.4	HTTPS	GET	200	thebestoffersintheweb.com	/redrect/57a764d042bf8	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko	
2020/04/16 21:12:52	173.192.101.24	nginx	HTTP	CET	301	p187425.ckaite.com	/adServe/banners?tid=187425_340871_08action=r	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; nv:11.0) like Gecko	
2020/04/16 21:12:52	173.192.101.24		HTTP	CONNECT	200	Tunnel to	infepidked.com:443	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gedio	
2020/04/16 21:12:53	173.192.101.24	nginx	HTTPS	GET	302	infopicked.com	/adServe/banners?tid=187425_340871_08action=r	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; nv11.0) like Gecko	
2020/04/16 21:12:53	176.57.214.180	nginx	HTTP	GET	301	cryptomone yinsiders.site	/getnewcrypto?cpm_id=467839188cpm_cost=0.0012	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko	RIG Redirector
2020/04/16 21:12:53	176.57.214.180	nginx	HTTP	GET	302	cryptomone yinsiders.site	/getnewcrypto/?cpm_id=467839188cpm_cost=0.0012	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; nv:11.0) like Gecko	RIG Redirector
2020/04/16 21:12:54	37.46.134.134	nginx/1.10.3	HTTP	GET	200	37.46.134.134	/MTUxMjp=8//acd5b3t4gfgfdf4=dK-8Lb=Tm0111_gHpr/pLNFTN_6Go2EftcR-d	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko	RIG EK [URI] (Landing Page)
2020/04/16 21:12:57	37.46.134.134	nginx/1.10.3	HTTP	GET	200	37.46.134.134	/favicon.ico	Mozila/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; nv:11.0) like Gedko	
2020/04/16 21:13:09	35.228.114.60	ngirx/1.14.0	HTTP	GET	200	35.228.114.60	/gate/sqite3.dl	Mozila/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0;	RaccoorStealer C2 [URI]
2020/04/16 21:13:13	15,228,114,60	nginx/1.14.0	HTTP	GET	200	35.228.114.60	(pate/libs.zip	Mozila/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0;	RaccoonStealer C2 [URJ]

Figure 2: RIG EK [Image Source: <u>Twitter</u>]

Packed file analysis

The parent file is compiled in Visual C++ and is responsible for unpacking the Amadey bot module.

The unpacking is done in two stages. The first stage is shown in Figure 3. To deobfuscate the first layer, it starts in reverse order.

	-
inc	ecx
and	ecx, OFFh
MOV	dl, byte_83C158[ecx]
MOVZX	ebx, dl
add	ebx, eax
and	ebx, OFFh
mov	eax, ebx
mov	b1, byte_83C158[eax]
mov	byte_83C158[eax], d1
mov	byte_83C158[ecx], bl
MOVZX	edx, byte_83C158[eax]
MOVZX	ebx, bl
add	edx, ebx
and	edx, OFFh
MOVZX	edx, byte_83C158[edx]
xor	[edi+esi], dl
sub	esi, 1
jns	short loc_40B7B2
mov	dword_83DD48, eax
mov	dword_83DD50, ecx

Figure 3: The first layer of deobfuscation in reverse order.

The above deobfuscation contains in-memory code that resolves Windows Library and API names in stack and loads them.

...

	8B45 08	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]	
	8B4D CC	MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-34]	
	8948 14	MOU DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+14],ECX	
	8365 C8 00	AND DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-38], <mark>00000000</mark>	
	8365 F4 00	AND DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-0C],00000000	
	8B45 C8	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-38]	
	C74405 D0 6B65	MOU DWORD PTR SS:[EAX+EBP-30], <mark>6E72656B</mark>	
	8B45 C8	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-38]	
	8300 04	ADD EAX,	
	8945 C8	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-38],EAX	
	8B45 C8	MOU EAX, <mark>dword PTR SS:[EBP-38]</mark>	
	C74405 D0 656C	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EAX+EBP-30], <mark>32336C65</mark>	
	8B45 C8	MOV EAX, <mark>dword PTR SS:[EBP-38]</mark>	
	8300 04	ADD EAX, <mark>4</mark>	
	8945 C8	MOU DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-38],EAX	
	8B45 C8	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-38]	
	C74405 D0 2E64(MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EAX+EBP-30], <mark>6C6C642E</mark>	
	8B45 C8	MOV EAX, <mark>dword PTR SS:[EBP-38]</mark>	
- 1	8300 04	ADD EAX, <mark>4</mark>	
	8945 C8	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-38],EAX	
	8B45 C8	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-38]	
	C64405 D0 00	MOV BYTE PTR SS:[EAX+EBP-30],0	
	8365 C8 00	AND DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-38],0000000	
	8D45 D0	LEA EAX, <mark>[EBP-30]</mark>	
	50	PUSH EAX	
	8B45 08	MOV EAX, <mark>dword PTR SS:[EBP+8]</mark>	
	FF50 10	CALL DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+10]	kerne132.LoadLibraryA

Figure 4: The API name resolving in stack.

For instance, the "6E72656B 32336C65 6C6C642E" hex value resolves to "kernel32.dll" in the same way it loads specific library procedures and other modules. After completing the API resolving task, it moves to the next stage of the deobfuscation module to unpack the complete executable code.

C3	RETN
55	PUSH EBP
8BEC	MOV EBP,ESP
8B4D 08	MOV ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
8B41 OC	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+0C]
69C0 FD430300	IMUL EAX,EAX, <mark>343FD</mark>
05 C39E2600	ADD EAX, <mark>269EC3</mark>
8941 OC	MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+0C],EAX
C1E8 10	SHR EAX, <mark>10</mark>
25 FF7F0000	AND EAX, <mark>00007FFF</mark>
5D	POP EBP
	·

Figure 5: The executable code deobfuscation.

Amadey payload analysis

Before executing its main payload, Amadey looks for any antivirus products installed on the infected machine with the command **_Z8aCheckAVv**(). After confirming antivirus is not installed on the victim machine, Amadey copies itself into **C:\ProgramData\e734daf4d7\nvlut.exe**.

Below are the list of antivirus product names that Amadey looks for before starting the execution:

- Avast Software
- Avira
- Kaspersky Lab
- ESET
- Panda Security
- Dr. Web
- AVG
- 360 Total Security
- Bitdefender
- Norton
- Sophos
- Comodo

For persistence, Amadey executes the following command to create a registry entry:

"REG ADD "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders" /f /v Startup /t REG_SZ /d C:\ProgramData\e734daf4d7"

After completing the persistence stage, Amadey attempts to load two DLL files named *"cred.dll"* and *"scr.dll"* by using **LoadPluginPc()** on the victim machine. This was not present in Amadey 1.09 version.

The file **cred.dll** is responsible for stealing credentials from the system. Amadey looks to steal credentials for the following applications:

- FileZilla
- Pidgin
- WinSCP
- TigerVNC
- RealVNC
- TightVNC

The file **scr.dll** is responsible for taking system screenshots and sending them via a POST request to the C&C server.

LoadPluginPc(): This module is responsible for loading the above-mentioned DLL file. First, it decrypts the URL using the **DecryptPc()** module with keys as an argument as shown in Figure 6.




Figure 6: Decrypting the URL.

Keys as argument	Resolved strings
dbd77	http://
39157	sh1091505.a.had.su
cd1ed	1/index.php
4ee6d	cred.dll

After resolving the URL **sh1091505[.]a[.]had[.]su[/]1[/]cred.dll**, Amadey checks whether the DLL file already exists in **%TEMP%** as **cred.dll**. If the file is present, then it won't download. It adds an auto-run registry entry for the same DLL and creates a new process to run the DLL with following command **"rundll32.exe %AppData%\Local\Temp\cred.dll, Main".**

Note: It attempts to download cred.dll from two other locations:

- sh1091505[.]a[.]had[.]su[/]2[/]cred.dll
- sh1091505[.]a[.]had[.]su[/]3[/]cred.dll

The Main() module functionality is to steal stored credentials and other information from a predetermined list of applications. The harvested credentials along with the names of the applications are relayed to the C&C server via POST request over plain-text HTTP as seen below:

Figure 7: The POST request to send collected credentials to the C&C.

Amadey attempts to download the *scr.dll* file from the following URLs:

```
"http://sh1091505.a.had.su/1/scr[.]dll"
"http://sh1091505.a.had.su/2/scr[.]dll"
"http://sh1091505.a.had.su/3/scr[.]dll"
```

Scr.dll is responsible for capturing screenshots of the victim's desktop. The screen captures are stored in the **%TEMP%** directory as **[Uniquely Generated ID].jpg**. Amadey then uploads the screen capture image to the remote C&C server.

Figure 8: The POST request for a captured image.

In addition to uploading the harvested credentials and screen captures, Amadey also relays system information of the victim machine (as shown in Figure 9) to the C&C server.

id=cf502f898f&sd=f9c9ae&vs=1.71&ar=1&bi=1&lv=0&os=1&av=1&pc=216554&un=.....s&dm=L_____K

Figure 9: The POST request for system information of the victim machine.

Key	Value
&id	Identification
&sd	Build identifier for the Amadey executable
&vs	Version 1.71 (version varies from 1.05 to 1.98 until now)
&ar	Infected machine has administrative privilege or not
&bi	64bit or 32bit
&lv	Additional malware installed on infected machine
&os	Operating System
&av	Antivirus present or not
&pc	Host Name
&un	User Name
&dm	Domain Name

Figure 10: The POST parameters of Amadey-C&C communication.

We looked at the C&C panel associated with the payload that we analyzed and discovered that a large percentage (56 percent) of infected systems are based in Canada.

Parametr:		Value:
O Active tasks:		1
O Loads:		57
O Loading/launch errors:		3
O Units:		29169
0 Units online:		36
O Units online (day):		2527
O Units online (week):		16199
O New units on day:		2435
O New units on week:		16089
O Credential:		11
Country:	Units:	Percent:
0 ?	521	1.786%
D Argentina	6	0.020%
D Australia	412	1.412%
D Austria	93	0.318%
D Brazil	386	1.323%
D Canada	16464	56.44%
D China	15	0.051%
D Colombia	103	0.353%
D Czech Republ	234	0.802%
D Ecuador	1	0.003%
D Estonia	1	0.003%
D Finland	278	0.953%
D France	848	2.907%
0 Germany	351	1.203%
0 Guatemala	1	0.003%


Figure 11: The live Amadey control panel.

During our analysis, we also discovered that Amadey was actively pushing the Remcos RAT via its control panel by assigning the same task to all units (or bots) marking '*' under the Unit tab. We have also seen instances of Amaday C&C servers recently that are actively pushing DoublePulsar backdoor and EternalBlue exploit payloads on the victim machine.



Figure 12: The live Amadey control panel task list.

We also looked at the distribution of Windows operating systems of the infected hosts and found that a vast majority of them (76 percent) were running Windows 7.



0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% 80.00% 90.00%

Figure 13: A graph represents bots running on different OS.

Indicators of Compromise

49599EAF424176BEC33B0181C9A9610B - parent file

5d0ec68ac027c96282e15bc1a0da0e39 - cred.dll

05e99dcad9cacace66e8ee555e0916e4 - scr.dll

Cbfafbff9749901afabc0f8d163a4442- Remcos RAT

5d9e6089a7f7a7056161ae6ee2e7f5ff- Remcos RAT

C&C server

sh1091505.a.had[.]su

- 217.8.117[.]76/tools/ports/apps/login.php
- 217.8.117[.]42/newCC/login.php
- 217.8.117[.]76/cort.exe //Remcos RAT
- 217.8.117[.]76/rev.exe //Remcos RAT

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