"Nice decorating. Let me guess, Satan?" - Dot / MZP Ransomware

dissectingmalwa.re/nice-decorating-let-me-guess-satan-dot-mzp-ransomware.html

Thu 02 January 2020 in Ransomware

Happy new year y'all. And with it there's new Ransomware to analyze, so come along for the ride :D



Dot "MZP" Ransomware @ AnyRun | VirusTotal | HybridAnalysis --> sha256bebf5c12e35029e21c9cca1da53eb43e893f9521435a246ea991bcced2fabe67

This sample was first discovered by AmigoA and AkhmendTaia on the 31st of December 2019. AV Detections and Ransomnote contents didn't seem to match any previously present strain. The Note is delivered via a *.txt* File with a strange numeric victim ID and only one contact email address. The extension appended to encrypted Files seems to be a random 8 character lowercase string.


New <u>#MZP</u> <u>#Ransomwarehttps://t.co/YCY8NXzJZw</u> It seems nothing special, but early AV-detections is uninformative. Thanks to <u>@AkhmedTaia pic.twitter.com/qS1YapH8jW</u>

- Amigo-A (@Amigo_A_) December 31, 2019

Because of the "MZP" (4D 5A 50) Magic at the beginning of the executable file they dubbed the Malware "MZP" Ransomware. As I explained before with the MZRevenge/MaMo Ransomware the "P" after the MZ Magic String indicates that the binary was built with Borland Delphi and *P* stands for Pascal (the programming language).

0000:0000 4D 5A 50	0 02 00 00 00	04 00 0F 00 FF FF 00 00	MZPÿÿ
0000:0010 B8 00 00	0 00 00 00 00	40 00 1A 00 00 00 00 00	,@
0000:0020 00 00 00	0 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
0000:0030 00 00 00	0 00 00 00 00	00000000 00010000	
0000:0040 BA 10 00	E 1F B4 09 CD	21 B8 01 4C CD 21 90 90	´.Í!,.LÍ!
0000:0050 54 68 69	3 20 70 72 6F	67 72 61 6D 20 6D 75 73	This program mus
0000:0060 74 20 62	5 20 72 75 6E	20 75 6E 64 65 72 20 57	t be run under W
0000:0070 69 6E 33	2 0D 0A 24 37	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	in32\$7
0000:0080 00 00 00	0 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
0000:0090 00 00 00	0 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
0000:00A0 00 00 00	0 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
0000:00B0 00 00 00	0 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
0000:00C0 00 00 00	0 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
0000:00D0 00 00 00	0 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
0000:00E0 00 00 00	0 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
0000:00F0 00 00 00	0 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
0000:0100 50 45 00	0 4C 01 08 00	19 5E 42 2A 00 00 00 00	PEL^B*

In my Opinion the Name "MZP Ransomware" is too generic to be useful for future reference, so I'd like to propose the name "Dot Ransomware" because of the File Icon found with the Malware Samples. It shows the character "Dot" from the Warner Bros Cartoon Series "Animaniacs" popular in the mid-1990s.



Two things to note about the Output of "Detect it easy" for this sample:

1. It confirms that the Ransomware was built with Borland Delphi (Version 4).

2. This sample seems to be packed with UPX 3.91. Running upx -d 01.exe yields us the unpacked Version. The Hashsums can be found in the IOC Section down below

Туре:	PE	Size: 42	2496	Entropy	FLC	S H
	Import	Resource				PE
EntryPoint	t: 0001e	1f0 >	Ima	ageBase:	0040	0000
NumberO	fSections	0003 >	Size	eOfImage:	0002	0000
packer		UPX(3.9	1)[NRV,best	t]	s	?
com	Borland Delphi(-)[-] S ?				?	
linker	Turbo Linker(2.25*,Delphi)[EXE32]				s	?
Detect It	Easy		▼ Signatur	res Info		Scan
	10	0%		> 71 ms		

Let's try something new :D Up until now I pretty much neglected memory dump analysis as a whole, but since I attended the Workshop on Volatility at 36c3 I noticed what I'm missing out on. With volatility -f IE9WIN7-20200102-171509.dmp --profile=Win7SP1x86_24000 pstree we can dump the process tree at the time of the capture. We can see that 01.exe is running as a subprocess of explorer.exe.

0x8413a908:System	4	Θ	78	490	2020-01-03	01:13:32	UTC+0000
. 0x85006d28:smss.exe	244	4	2		2020-01-03		
0x858e28d8:explorer.exe	1416	1368	43	1058	2020-01-02	17:13:36	UTC+0000
. 0x85817168:cmd.exe	3500	1416	7	111	2020-01-02	17:14:57	UTC+0000
0x85be4568:DumpIt.exe	3820	3500	5	90	2020-01-02	17:15:09	UTC+0000
. 0x855193f0:01.exe	2980	1416	2	42	2020-01-02	17:14:11	UTC+0000
. 0x859d02a8:VBoxTray.exe	1984	1416	14	172	2020-01-02	17:13:37	UTC+0000
. 0x85b21a70:taskmgr.exe	3004	1416	7	124	2020-01-02	17:14:17	UTC+0000
0x85771030:winlogon.exe	408	344	6	117	2020-01-03	01:13:35	UTC+0000
0x841a0a40:csrss.exe	352	344	8	234	2020-01-03	01:13:35	UTC+0000

With the *privs* plugin Volatility can show which process privileges are present, enabled, and/or enabled by default. Below you can see a screencapture of the output for the Ransomware. The Plugins *cmdscan* and *consoles* sadly did not return any output for 01.exe.

2980	01.exe	2 SeCreateTokenPrivilege		Create a token object
2980	01.exe	3 SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege		Replace a process-level token
2980	01.exe	4 SeLockMemoryPrivilege		Lock pages in memory
2980	01.exe	5 SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege		Increase quotas
2980	01.exe	6 SeMachineAccountPrivilege		Add workstations to the domain
2980	01.exe	7 SeTcbPrivilege		Act as part of the operating system
2980	01.exe	8 SeSecurityPrivilege		Manage auditing and security log
2980	01.exe	9 SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege		Take ownership of files/objects
2980	01.exe	10 SeLoadDriverPrivilege		Load and unload device drivers
2980	01.exe	11 SeSystemProfilePrivilege		Profile system performance
2980	01.exe	12 SeSystemtimePrivilege		Change the system time
2980	01.exe	13 SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege		Profile a single process
2980	01.exe	14 SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege		Increase scheduling priority
2980	01.exe	15 SeCreatePagefilePrivilege		Create a pagefile
2980	01.exe	16 SeCreatePermanentPrivilege		Create permanent shared objects
2980	01.exe	17 SeBackupPrivilege		Backup files and directories
2980		18 SeRestorePrivilege		Restore files and directories
2980		19 SeShutdownPrivilege	Present	Shut down the system
2980	01.exe	20 SeDebugPrivilege		Debug programs
2980		21 SeAuditPrivilege		Generate security audits
2980		22 SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege		Edit firmware environment values
2980	01.exe	23 SeChangeNotifyPrivilege	Present,Enabled,Default	Receive notifications of changes to files or directories
2980		24 SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege		Force shutdown from a remote system
2980		25 SeUndockPrivilege	Present	Remove computer from docking station
2980		26 SeSyncAgentPrivilege		Synch directory service data
		27 SeEnableDelegationPrivilege		Enable user accounts to be trusted for delegation
		28 SeManageVolumePrivilege		Manage the files on a volume
		29 SeImpersonatePrivilege		Impersonate a client after authentication
		30 SeCreateGlobalPrivilege		Create global objects
		31 SeTrustedCredManAccessPrivilege		Access Credential Manager as a trusted caller
		32 SeRelabelPrivilege		Modify the mandatory integrity level of an object
		33 SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege	Present	Allocate more memory for user applications
		34 SeTimeZonePrivilege	Present	Adjust the time zone of the computer's internal clock
2980	01.exe	35 SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege		Required to create a symbolic link

Let's check out what IDR (Interactive Delphi Reconstructor) can tell us about the binary. First off: Strings.

00100208	<ansistring> 'D:\126\Delphi\HiAsm3\compiler\Kol.pas'</ansistring>
	Ansistring> 'D:\126\Delphi\Hinsm3\compiler\Kol.pas'
00407020	Ansistring <u>) Unsupported</u> bitmap format'
	(Pansichar> rcometi32.dll
	<pre>CPAnsiChar> ' TrackMouseEvent'</pre>
	(Pansichar) User32'
	<pre><pre><pre>Characterize</pre> / SetLaueredWindowAttributes'</pre></pre>
	(Ansistring) 'Tahoma'
	<pre>(Ansistring) 'Form'</pre>
	<pre>(Ansistring) '.ini\'</pre>
	<pre></pre>
	AnsiString> '.ini\'
	<pre><ansistring> 'Left'</ansistring></pre>
	<ansistring> 'Top'</ansistring>
	AnsiString> 'Width'
	<pre></pre>
	<pansichar> 'inner message'</pansichar>
	<ansistring> #0</ansistring>
	<ansistring> '%%'</ansistring>
	<ansistring> '%'</ansistring>
	<ansistring> #1</ansistring>
	<ansistring> #1</ansistring>
0040CD08	<ansistring> 'YMWDhms'</ansistring>
0040CF4C	<ansistring> '\'</ansistring>
0040CF58	<ansistring> '*'</ansistring>
	<ansistring> '*.*'</ansistring>
0040D1E4	<ansistring> ''</ansistring>
0040D1F0	<ansistring> '\'</ansistring>
0040F85C	<ansistring> #13+#10</ansistring>
0040F8D0	<ansistring> #0</ansistring>
0040F944	<ansistring> #0</ansistring>
00410A9C	<pansichar> #13+#10</pansichar>
0041193C	<ansistring> 'MS Sans Serif'</ansistring>
	<pansichar> 'Form'</pansichar>
	<pansichar> <u>'ICONA'</u></pansichar>
0041195C	<pansichar> 'DECRYPT FILES.TXT'</pansichar>
00411970	<pansichar> '.'</pansichar>
0041197C	<pansichar> '*'</pansichar>
	<pansichar> <u>'D.M.Y h:m'</u></pansichar>
	<pansichar> '\HOW TO RESTORE ENCRYPTED FILES.TXT'</pansichar>
	<pansichar> <u>'*.*'</u></pansichar>
	<pansichar> 'C:\Users'</pansichar>
	<pansichar> 'QWAHNJZCOF'</pansichar>
	<pansichar> '0=1;'+#13+#10+W=2;'+#13+#10+A=3;'+#13+#10+H=4;'+#13+#10+N=5;'+#13+#10+J=6;'+#</pansichar>
	<pansichar> '='</pansichar>
	<pansichar> ';'</pansichar>
	<pansichar> <u>'<#13#10>'</u></pansichar>
00411A24	<pansichar> 'gwertyuiopasdfghiklzxcvbnm'</pansichar>

The first String related to the Compiler tells us that the criminals likely used *HiASM* (an old russian IDE for Delphi Development) to build the Malware. The DLL mentioned below *comctl32.dll* is often targeted for UAC Bypasses. It also seems to track Mouse events to some extent this could either be used as an evasion mechanism or entropy collection (the first option is a lot more plausible). **"HOW TO RESTORE ENCRYPTED FILES.txt"** is the filename of the dropped ransomnote, although I'm not sure about the use of **"DECRYPT FILES.txt"** since this file was not present on any infected system (Speculation: Does is select one out of multiple Filenames to make tracking more difficult?). Lastly we have a filepath and a string that looks like the criminal dragged his face across the keyboard once.

Alright, let's move along. Because Delphi is notoriously weird and difficult to disassemble/decompile it is time to try a new tool again. Today I will be using Ghidra with *Dhrake* developed by Jesko Hüttenhain. You can find the Git repository below and if you would like to know more about the inner workings of the two scripts you should definitely read his article about them <u>here</u>.

A short tl;dr: Dhrake is short for "Delphi hand rake" and tries to fix missing symbols and borked function signatures by matching to the symbols extracted through IDR beforehand. This will not only clean up the decompilation results in Ghidra but also automatically create structs and virtual method tables for you instead of doing it by hand (as if reversing Delphi wasn't already painfull enough). It's pretty cool, give it a try!


The first step to success (lol who am I kidding) is firing up Ghdira and loading the sample. Tell it to auto-analyze the file.

جي	Analyze	\sim	$\sim \otimes$
?	01.exe has not been analyzed. Would you like to analyz	e it i	now?
	Yes No		


Next we need to extract the *.IDC* Symbol file with the Help of IDR. For this it is sufficient to clone the Git Repo and paste the Knowledge Base files from the Dropbox linked at the end of the Readme into it. After that is done just run IDR.exe, import the binary and choose *IDC Generator* under **Tools**.

	ctive Delphi Reconstructor by crypto	: C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\	01.exe (Delphi-4)		
File To Units	ools Tabs Plugins Program		CodeViewer (F6) Clas	a) Gaussa (E7) Chin	gs (F8) Names (F9) SourceCode (F10) Map (F11
	Process Dumper		Codeviewer (r o) Clas	sviewer (F7) Suin	gs (Fo) Names (F3) SourceCode (F10) Map (F11
004	MAP Generator		EP <> Src	EntryPoint	
004	Comments Generator		EntryPoint		
004 004	IDC Generator		00411D54	push	ebp
004	IDC Generator		00411D55	mov	ebp,esp
004	HIEW Generator		00411D57	add	esp,0FFFFFF0
004	Lister		00411D5A	xor	eax,eax
004			00411D5C	mov	dword ptr [ebp-10],eax
004	Class Tree Builder		00411D5F	mov	eax,411BDC
004	KB TypeInfo Viewer		00411D64	call	@InitExe
004	Citadel Password Finder		00411D69	xor	eax,eax
004	Citadel Password Finder		00411D6B	push	ebp
004	Hex->Double		00411D6C	push	411DFC
004 URE	8E8 #014 _Unit14	-	00411D71	push	dword ptr fs:[eax]
0040AC	C48 #015 I _Unit15		00411D74	mov	dword ptr fs:[eax],esp
0040B7	76C #017 _Unit17		00411D77	lea	edx,[ebp-10]
	7A4 #018 IF _Unit18		00411D7A 00411D7F	mov call	eax,1 00406078
	4D8 #016 _Unit16		0041107F		
	520 #019 _Unit19		00411084	MOV MOV	eax,dword ptr [ebp-10] edx,411E10;'/ih'
	730 #020 _Unit20		00411D87	call	@LStrCmp
	86C #021 _Unit21		00411091>	jne	00411DAB
	ABC #022Unit22		00411D93	push	004110HD
	BC8 #023 _Unit23		00411D95	push	411E14:'HiAsm Info'

After copying the two Dhrake scripts into your ghidra_scripts folder (e.g. ~/ghidra_scripts) you can refresh the list in the Script Manager once and switch to the Delphi Category. Run Dhrakelnit and select the IDC file you created earlier.



Filtering for "VMT" in the Symbol Tree gives you all the Symbols relevant to Dhrake. Just click the Name in the Listing view once and run DhrakeParseClass (set the checkbox "In Tool" and press F8 to run). The Script will now automatically create the corresponding class and vtable struct.



So I guess we should continue with the analysis now :D As 90% of ransomware strains do "Dot" will read the Keyboard Layout as well. *GetKeyboardLayout(0)* returning 7 would be equivalent to a Japanese Keyboard Layout (wtf?). Passing 1 to GetKeyboardType will return the Subtype which is OEM specific, but will tell you how many function keys there are. Weird. Here's the <u>Documentation</u>.

```
undefined4 FUN_0040278c(void)
```

```
{
    int iVar1;
    uint uVar2;
    undefined4 uVar3;

    uVar3 = 0;
    iVar1 = GetKeyboardType(0);
    if (iVar1 == 7) {
        uVar2 = GetKeyboardType(1);
        if (((uVar2 & 0xff00) == 0xd00) || ((uVar2 & 0xff00) == 0x400)) {
            uVar3 = 1;
        }
    }
    return uVar3;
}
```

Dot also queries the current cursor position on the screen and passes it on to another function. Haven't investigated further yet.

```
if (*(int *)(param_2 + 4) - 0x200U < 0xb) {
    local_34 = *(char *)((int)param_1 + 0x481);
    if (*(short *)((int)param_1 + 0x47b) == 0) {
        user32.GetCursorPos((LPPOINT)&local_3c);
        FUN_0040804c((int)param_1,(LONG *)&local_3c,(LPPOINT)&local_20);
        local_3c.x = local_20.x;
        local_3c.y = local_20.y;
        func_0x00408068(param_1,local_18);
        cVar1 = func_0x004051c8(&local_3c,local_18);
    }
</pre>
```

Here we are again: weird DLLs that may or may not be a UAC Bypass. UACme mentions two Methods (#21 and #22) employing comctl32.dll. Unsure what to make of this at the moment.

```
Void FUN_004050a0(void)
{
    FARPROC pFVar1;
    InitCommonControls();
    if (DAT_00413508 == (HMODULE)0x0) {
        DAT_00413508 = LoadLibraryA("comctl32.dll");
    }
    pFVar1 = GetProcAddress(DAT_00413508,"InitCommonControlsEx");
    if (pFVar1 != (FARPROC)0x0) {
        (*pFVar1)();
    }
    return;
}
```

In one of the Szenarios I ran Regshot to see whether the Ransomware adds/modifies/deletes Registry Keys, but there weren't any changes that I can attribute to it. Dot tries to read *SOFTWARE\Borland\Delphi\RTL* FPUMaskValue.

```
void FUN 004027bc(void)
{
 LSTATUS LVar1;
 undefined4 *in_FS_OFFSET;
 undefined4 uVar2;
 DWORD local 10;
 uint local c;
 HKEY local 8;
 local c = (uint)DAT 00412000;
 LVar1 = RegOpenKeyExA((HKEY)0x80000002,"SOFTWARE\\Borland\\Delphi\\RTL",0,1,(PHKEY)&local 8);
 if (LVar1 == 0) {
   uVar2 = *in FS OFFSET;
   *(undefined **)in FS OFFSET = &stack0xffffffe4;
   local_10 = 4;
   RegQueryValueExA(local 8, "FPUMaskValue", (LPDWORD)0x0, (LPDWORD)0x0, (LPBYTE)&local c,&local 10);
   *in FS OFFSET = uVar2;
   RegCloseKey(local 8);
   return;
 }
 DAT_00412000 = DAT_00412000 & 0xffc0 | (ushort)local_c & 0x3f;
 return;
}
```

This is another work in progress article as I've come down with the "Congress Flu", so check back in a few days for an update. Probably the most important thing this "report" is still missing is a look at the crypto implementation. A look at the Imports reveals that it is not using the Windows Crypto API but rather a weird Delphi one. We'll see.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1107> File Deletion>	· Defense Evasion
-----------------------	-------------------

T1045 --> Software Packing --> Defense Evasion

T1012 --> Query Registry --> Discovery

T1076 --> Remote Desktop Protocol --> Lateral Movement

IOCs

Dot Samples

01.exe --> SHA256: bebf5c12e35029e21c9cca1da53eb43e893f9521435a246ea991bcced2fabe67 SSDEEP:

768:Qa8bmv7hNAMbgYT6hQdPLC7TasOKS/3U7fzd4tA9yenQ779Zo2lPnoCLnS9QtRbY:Ebmvs71+DKoKS/kjz

01.exe --> SHA256: aa85b2ec79bc646671d7280ba27f4ce97e8fabe93ab7c97d0fd18d05bab6df29 SSDEEP:

98304:mt+HWV4nwA+8PgzCRfjMlFBiZhfcrQSav//dH768Qy04YXoftvFUmgaJml9iUybR:NddPgzC+lFkZhER

unpacked:

01.exe --> SHA256: 814e061d2e58720a43bcb3fe0478a8088053f0a407e25ff84fb98850d128f81c SSDEEP: 1536:CCq2EikJZdZ529nEaqQ0yergddb6apjAwzHx4D:7IZYxEHJrIdFjAwzHx4

Registry Changes

Inconclusive as Regshot didn't show anything suspicious, only Delphi related Keys at most

E-Mail Addresses

```
recover_24_7@protonmail[.]com
```

Ransomnote

If you want to return your .[REDACTED: random 8-letter lowercase extension] files, contact us and we will send you a decryptor and a unique decryption key. recover_24_7@protonmail[.]com

All your files have been encrypted! Your personal identifier:

[REDACTED: 606-digit numeric ID]