

# KeyPass ransomware

SL [securelist.com/keypass-ransomware/87412/](https://securelist.com/keypass-ransomware/87412/)



Incidents

Incidents

13 Aug 2018


minute read



## Authors

-  **Expert** [Orkhan Mamedov](#)
-  **Expert** [Fedor Sinitsyn](#)

In the last few days, [our anti-ransomware module](#) has been detecting a new variant of malware – KeyPass ransomware. Others in the security community have also noticed that this ransomware began to actively spread in August:



*Notification from MalwareHunterTeam*

## Distribution model


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According to our information, the malware is propagated by means of fake installers that download the ransomware module.

## Description

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
The Trojan sample is written in C++ and compiled in MS Visual Studio. It was developed using the libraries MFC, Boost and Crypto++. The PE header contains a recent compilation date.



PE header with compilation date

When started on the victim's computer, the Trojan copies its executable to %LocalAppData% and launches it. It then deletes itself from the original location.

Following that, it spawns several copies of its own process, passing the encryption key and victim ID as command line arguments.



Command line arguments

KeyPass enumerates local drives and network shares accessible from the infected machine and searches for all files, regardless of their extension. It skips files located in a number of directories, the paths to which are hardcoded into the sample.

```

.rdata:00642DE4 43 00 3A 00 5C 00 57 00+      text "UTF-16LE", 'C:\Windows\',0
.rdata:00642DFC 00 00 00 00                align 10h
.rdata:00642E00                                aCProgramFilesX:      ; DATA XREF: sub_416030:loc_4161DC↑0
.rdata:00642E00 43 00 3A 00 5C 00 50 00+      text "UTF-16LE", 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\',0
.rdata:00642E50                                aCProgramFilesX_0:   ; DATA XREF: sub_416030:loc_416223↑0
.rdata:00642E50 43 00 3A 00 5C 00 50 00+      text "UTF-16LE", 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\',0
.rdata:00642EA4                                aCProgramFilesX_1:   ; DATA XREF: sub_416030:loc_41626A↑0
.rdata:00642EA4 43 00 3A 00 5C 00 50 00+      text "UTF-16LE", 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\',0
.rdata:00642EE2 00 00 00 00 00 00                align 8
.rdata:00642EE8                                aCProgramFilesM:     ; DATA XREF: sub_416030:loc_4162B1↑0
.rdata:00642EE8 43 00 3A 00 5C 00 50 00+      text "UTF-16LE", 'C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\',0
.rdata:00642F2C 00 00 00 00                align 10h
.rdata:00642F30                                aCProgramFilesI:     ; DATA XREF: sub_416030:loc_4162F8↑0
.rdata:00642F30 43 00 3A 00 5C 00 50 00+      text "UTF-16LE", 'C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\',0
.rdata:00642F78                                aCProgramFilesG:     ; DATA XREF: sub_416030:loc_41633F↑0
.rdata:00642F78 43 00 3A 00 5C 00 50 00+      text "UTF-16LE", 'C:\Program Files\Google\',0
.rdata:00642FAA 00 00                align 4
.rdata:00642FAC                                aDWindows:           ; DATA XREF: sub_416030:loc_416386↑0
.rdata:00642FAC 44 00 3A 00 5C 00 57 00+      text "UTF-16LE", 'D:\Windows\',0
.rdata:00642FC4 00 00 00 00                align 8
.rdata:00642FC8                                aDProgramFilesX:     ; DATA XREF: sub_416030:loc_4163CD↑0
.rdata:00642FC8 44 00 3A 00 5C 00 50 00+      text "UTF-16LE", 'D:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\',0
.rdata:00643018                                aDProgramFilesX_0:   ; DATA XREF: sub_416030:loc_416414↑0
.rdata:00643018 44 00 3A 00 5C 00 50 00+      text "UTF-16LE", 'D:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\',0
.rdata:0064306C                                aDProgramFilesX_1:   ; DATA XREF: sub_416030:loc_41645B↑0
.rdata:0064306C 44 00 3A 00 5C 00 50 00+      text "UTF-16LE", 'D:\Program Files (x86)\Google\',0
.rdata:006430AA 00 00 00 00 00 00                align 10h
.rdata:006430B0                                aDProgramFilesM:     ; DATA XREF: sub_416030:loc_4164A2↑0
.rdata:006430B0 44 00 3A 00 5C 00 50 00+      text "UTF-16LE", 'D:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\',0
.rdata:006430F4 00 00 00 00                align 8
.rdata:006430F8                                aDProgramFilesI:     ; DATA XREF: sub_416030:loc_4164E9↑0
.rdata:006430F8 44 00 3A 00 5C 00 50 00+      text "UTF-16LE", 'D:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\',0
.rdata:00643140                                aDProgramFilesG:     ; DATA XREF: sub_416030:loc_416530↑0
.rdata:00643140 44 00 3A 00 5C 00 50 00+      text "UTF-16LE", 'D:\Program Files\Google\',0

```

*The list of excluded paths*

Every encrypted file gets an additional extension: “.KEYPASS” and ransom notes named “!!!KEYPASS\_DECRYPTION\_INFO!!!.txt” are saved in each processed directory.

```
!!!KEYPASS_DECRYPTION_INFO!!! - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
Attention!
All your files, documents, photos, databases and other important files are
encrypted and have the extension: .KEYPASS
The only method of recovering files is to purchase an decrypt software and
unique private key.
After purchase you will start decrypt software, enter your unique private
key and it will decrypt all your data.
Only we can give you this key and only we can recover your files.
You need to contact us by e-mail keypass@bitmessage.ch send us your
personal ID and wait for further instructions.
For you to be sure, that we can decrypt your files - you can send us a 1-3
any not very big encrypted files and we will send you back it in a original
form FREE.
Price for decryption $300.
This price available if you contact us first 72 hours.

E-mail address to contact us:
keypass@bitmessage.ch

Reserve e-mail address to contact us:
keypass@india.com

Your personal id:
6se9RaIxXF9m70zWmx7nL3bVRp691w4SNY8UCir0
```

*The ransom note*

## Encryption scheme

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The developers of this Trojan implemented a very simplistic scheme. The malware uses the symmetric algorithm AES-256 in CFB mode with zero IV and the same 32-byte key for all files. The Trojan encrypts a maximum of 0x500000 bytes (~5 MB) of data at the beginning of each file.

```

0040384F      call     sub_5A6580
00403854      mov     [ebp+var_988], offset const CryptoPP::BlockCipherFinal<0,CryptoPP::Rijndael::Enc>::`vftable'
0040385E      mov     [ebp+var_984], offset const CryptoPP::BlockCipherFinal<0,CryptoPP::Rijndael::Enc>::`vftable'{for `CryptoPP::BlockTransformation'}
00403868      push   1
0040386A      lea    ecx, [ebp+var_98C]
0040386D ; } // starts at 403835

00403870 ; try {
00403870      mov     byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 2
00403874      call   sub_59EF60
00403879      push   0
0040387B      mov     [ebp+var_988], 0
00403885      mov     [ebp+var_980], 0
0040388F      call   Alloc_988
00403894      add    esp, 4
00403897      mov     [ebp+var_98C], 0
00403897 ; } // starts at 403870


004038A1 ; try {
004038A1      mov     byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 3
004038A5      push   0
004038A7      mov     [ebp+var_9A0], 0
004038B1      call   Alloc_9A0
004038B6      add    esp, 4
004038B9      mov     [ebp+var_99C], 0
004038B9 ; } // starts at 4038A1

004038C3 ; try {
004038C3      mov     byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 4
004038C7      lea    eax, [ebp+var_988]
004038CD      lea    ecx, [ebp+var_9C0]
004038D3      mov     [ebp+var_9C0], offset const CryptoPP::CipherModeFinalTemplate_CipherHolder<CryptoPP::BlockCipherFinal<0,CryptoPP::Rijndael::Enc>
004038D9      mov     [ebp+var_98C], offset const CryptoPP::CipherModeFinalTemplate_CipherHolder<CryptoPP::BlockCipherFinal<0,CryptoPP::Rijndael::Enc>
004038E7      mov     [ebp+var_988], offset const CryptoPP::CipherModeFinalTemplate_CipherHolder<CryptoPP::BlockCipherFinal<0,CryptoPP::Rijndael::Enc>
004038F1      mov     [ebp+var_988], eax
004038F7      call   sub_5A5FF0

```

*Part of the procedure that implements data encryption*


Soon after launch, KeyPass connects to its command and control (C&C) server and receives the encryption key and the infection ID for the current victim. The data is transferred over plain HTTP in the form of JSON.



If the C&C is inaccessible (e.g. if the infected machine is not connected to the internet or the server is down), the Trojan uses a hardcoded key and ID, which means that in the case of offline encryption the decryption of the victim's files will be trivial.

## GUI

From our point of view, the most interesting feature of the KeyPass Trojan is the ability to take 'manual control'. The Trojan contains a form that is hidden by default, but which can be shown after pressing a special button on the keyboard. This capability might be an indication that the criminals behind the Trojan intend to use it in manual attacks.




*GUI of the trojan*

This form allows the attacker to customize the encryption process by changing such parameters as:

- encryption key
- name of ransom note
- text of ransom note
- victim ID
- extension of the encrypted files
- list of paths to be excluded from the encryption





*Paths excluded from encryption by default*

```

LRESULT __stdcall sub_413780(int code, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam)
{
    int v3; // eax
    int v4; // eax
    HWND hWnd; // esi


    if ( !code && (wParam == WM_KEYDOWN || wParam == WM_SYSKEYDOWN) && *(_DWORD *)lParam == UK_F8 )
    {
        v3 = sub_453BED();
        if ( v3 && (v4 = (*(int (__thiscall **)(int))(*(_DWORD *)v3 + 116))(v3)) != 0 )
            hWnd = *(HWND *)(v4 + 32);
        else
            hWnd = 0;
        if ( IsWindowVisible(hWnd) )
        {
            ShowWindow(hWnd, SW_HIDE);
        }
        else
        {
            ShowWindow(hWnd, SW_SHOW);
            SetForegroundWindow(hWnd);
        }
    }
    return CallNextHookEx(hhk, code, wParam, lParam);
}

```

*Pseudocode of the procedure that shows the GUI by a keypress*

## Geography

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## IOC

901d893f665c6f9741aa940e5f275952 – Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Encoder.n  
hxxp://cosonar.mcdir.ru/get.php

- [Encryption](#)
- [Malware Descriptions](#)
- [Ransomware](#)

## Authors

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KeyPass ransomware

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GReAT webinars

13 May 2021, 1:00pm

## **GReAT Ideas. Balalaika Edition**

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26 Feb 2021, 12:00pm

17 Jun 2020, 1:00pm

26 Aug 2020, 2:00pm

22 Jul 2020, 2:00pm

From the same authors




## **Evolution of JSWorm ransomware**

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## RansomEXX Trojan attacks Linux systems

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## Life of Maze ransomware

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## WastedLocker: technical analysis

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
## Sodin ransomware exploits Windows vulnerability and processor architecture

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Reports

### **APT trends report Q1 2022**

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This is our latest summary of advanced persistent threat (APT) activity, focusing on events that we observed during Q1 2022.

### **Lazarus Trojanized DeFi app for delivering malware**

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We recently discovered a Trojanized DeFi application that was compiled in November 2021. This application contains a legitimate program called DeFi Wallet that saves and manages a cryptocurrency wallet, but also implants a full-featured backdoor.

### **MoonBounce: the dark side of UEFI firmware**


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At the end of 2021, we inspected UEFI firmware that was tampered with to embed a malicious code we dub MoonBounce. In this report we describe how the MoonBounce implant works and how it is connected to APT41.

## **The BlueNoroff cryptocurrency hunt is still on**

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It appears that BlueNoroff shifted focus from hitting banks and SWIFT-connected servers to solely cryptocurrency businesses as the main source of the group's illegal income.



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