Unpacking the spyware disguised as antivirus

blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/08/unpacking-the-spyware-disguised-as-antivirus/

Malwarebytes Labs

August 25, 2016



Recently we got access to several elements of the espionage toolkit that has been captured attacking Vietnamese institutions. During the operation, <u>the malware was used to dox</u> <u>400,000 members of Vietnam Airlines</u>.

The payload, distributed disguised as <u>antivirus</u>, is a variant of Korplug RAT (aka PlugX) – a <u>spyware</u> with former associations with Chinese APT groups, and known from <u>targeted</u> <u>attacks at important institutions</u> of various countries.

In this article we will describe the process of extracting the final payload out of it's cover.

Analyzed samples

Set #1:

- <u>884d46c01c762ad6ddd2759fd921bf71</u> McAfee.exe (harmless: <u>reference</u>)
- <u>c52464e9df8b3d08fc612a0f11fe53b2</u> McUtil.dll (shellcode loader)

Execution flow:

McAfee.exe -> McUtil.dll -> McUtil.dll.mc -> payload (DLL)

A look at the package

This <u>spyware</u> has an interesting, modular package. As a whole, it tries to pretend to be McAfee antivirus:

ang ang	2015-06-26 14:54	File	1 KB
McAfee.exe	2013-08-29 08:50	Application	138 KB
🚳 McUtil.dll	2013-08-29 08:50	Application extens	4 KB
McUtil.dll.mc	2013-08-29 08:50	MC File	115 KB
📄 tjuiiarpujhx	2016-05-19 04:47	File	2 KB
vekmfmujufficwveip	2013-08-29 08:50	File	59 KB

If we take a look at the executable, we see that is has been signed by the original certificate:

☆ Authenticode signature block and FileVersionInfo properties										
Copyright	Copyright © 2006 McAfee, Inc.									
Product	McAfee Oem Module									
Original name	mcoemcpy.exe									
Internal name	тсоетсру									
File version	2,1,115,0									
Description	McAfee OEM Info Copy Files									
Signature verification	Signed file, verified signature									
Signing date	12:47 AM 6/13/2008									
Signers	[+] McAfee [+] VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2004 CA [+] VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary CA									
Counter signers	[+] VeriSign Time Stamping Services Signer - G2 [+] VeriSign Time Stamping Services CA [+] Thawte Timestamping CA									

It is not fake – the executable is a legitimate product. However, it is bundled with the DLL that is not signed – and this it the point that attackers used in order to hijack the execution.

Note that the app used in the attacks is very old (compiled in 2008). The current versions of McAfee Antivirus that we managed to test are no longer vulnerable to this type of abuse.

Behavioral analysis

After being deployed, the application runs silently. We can see the main component executing svchost.exe, and then terminating itself. It is caused by the fact that the malicious code has been injected into svchost, and will continue operating from there. Looking at the

current directory of svchost.exe we can find that it inherits default directory of the malicious app:

svchost.exe:	3008 Properties			- • •										
TCP/IP	Security Environment Job Strings													
Image	Performance	Threads												
Image File	Image File													
	Host Process for Windows Services Microsoft Corporation													
Version:	Version: 6.1.7600.16385													
Build Time	: Tue Jul 1401:1	19:28 2009												
Path:														
C:\Windo	ows\System32\sv	chost.exe		Explore										
Command	line:													
C:\Windo	ows\system32\svo	chost.exe												
Current di	rectory:													
C:\Users	\tester \Desktop \	McAfee\												
Autostart	Location:													
HKLM\Sy	stem\CurrentCon	trolSet\Services\m	hosts	Explore										

The bot makes reconnaissance in the LAN by scanning for other computers. It enumerates full range of local addresses, from the lowest to the highest:

	0.00	001		1001				
💷 svehostlexe 👘	3468	TCP	testmachine	49219	10.0.2.52	1357	SYN_SENT	
🗾 svchostlexe 👘	3468	UDP	testmachine	63512	×	×		
🗉 svehostlexe 👘	1200	UDP	testmachine	64217	×	×		
📑 svchostlexe 👘	1200	UDPV6	testmachine	62714	×	×		
_								
💷 svchost.exe	3468	UDP	1357	×	×			
Svchost.exe	3468	UDP	55183	×	×		3	120
Svchost.exe	3468	UDP	54879	×	×		1	31
svchost.exe	3468	TCP	49236	10.0.2.69	1357	SYN SENT		

It also tried to connect with it's C&C (<u>air.dscvn.org</u>), however, at the moment of tests the domain was down:

8.8.8.8	DNS	75	Standard query 0x31b8 A air.dcsvn.org
8.8.4.4	DNS	75	Standard query 0x31b8 A air.dcsvn.org
89.108.195.20	DNS	83	Standard query 0xe586 PTR 1.2.0.10.in-addr.arpa
46.112.81.27	DNS	133	Standard query response 0xe586 No such name
46.112.81.27	DNS	139	Standard query response 0x31b8 No such name


Unpacking

The application have several layers of loaders before it reach the final functionality. The exe file, as well as the DLL are harmless. All the the malicious features lies in the external file, that is a blocks of obfuscated shellcode. Within the shellcode, another DLL is hidden – that is the core spy bot.

Loading the shellcode

The payload is loaded in an obfuscated way containing some interesting tricks. The authors took great care that it will not be easy to analyze the modules separately.

Execution starts from the harmless *McAfee.exe*. Malware utilized the fact that this application loads a library called *McUtil.dll* from the startup directory. It doesn't make any integrity check, so in fact, if we rename any library to the desired name, the executable will just load it:



McUtil.dll is supposed to deploy the next file: *McUtil.dll.mc* – however, to make the flow more difficult to follow, it doesn't run it directly. Instead, it patches the caller executable (*McAfee.exe*) and makes it execute the function responsible for reading and loading the next file. Below we can see the fragment of code, that writes the hook into the memory:

ZSFELLACE . CALL EAX	McAfee.00400000						
73FF11AE LEA ECX, [LOCAL.1] 73FF11B1 PUSH ECX	poldProtect = 0012C8D0						
73FF11B2 . PUSH 0x40 73FF11B4 . LEA ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+0x2F0C]	NewProtect = PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE						
73FF11BA PUSH 0x10	Size = 10 (16.)						
73FF11BC . PUSH ESI 73FF11BO . CALL_DWORD_PTR_DS:[<&KERNEL32.VirtualProtect>	Address = McAfee.00402F0C VirtualProtect						
73FF11C3 . MOV ECX,0x1 73FF11C8 . TEST_BYTE_PTR_DS:[0x73FF3010],CL							
73FF11CE .V JNZ SHORT MCUtil.73FF11E6							
73FF1106 . MOV EDX, MoUtil.73FF1000 73FF1106 . SUB EDX, MoUtil.73FF1000	load_shellcode McAfee.00402F0C						
Z3EE11DD SUB EDX 0v5							
73FF11E0 . MOV DWORD PTR DS: L0x73FF3000J, EDX 73FF11E6 > MOV BYTE PTR DS: LESI].0xE9	kernel32.76AE0000 opcode: JMP						
73FF11E9 . MOV EAX, EAX 73FF11EB . MOV AL, BYTE PTR DS: [0x73FF3000]	McAfee.00400000						
73FF11F0 . MOV BYTE PTR DS:[ESI+0x1],AL	McAfee.00400000						
73FF11F5 MOV EDX. DWORD PTR DS: [0x73FF3000]							
73FF11FB . SHR EDX,0x8 73FF11FE . MOV BYTE_PTR DS:[ESI+0x2],DL							
73FF1201 . MOV EAX, EAX 73FF1203 . MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS: [0x73FF3000]	McAfee.00400000						
73FF1208 . SHR EAX, 0x10 73FF1208 . MOV BYTE PTR DS:[ESI+0x3],AL							
73FF120E MOV EAX,EAX 73FF1210 MOV EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[0x73FF3000]	McAfee.00400000						
73FF1216 SHR EDX, 0x18 73FF1219 MOV BYTE PTR DS:[ESI+0x4],DL							
73FF121C MOU EAX.EAX	McAfee.00400000						
73FF121E MOV EAX,ECX 73FF1220 POP ESI	McAfee.00402F0C						
73FF1221 . MOV ESP,EBP 73FF1223 . POP EBP	McAfee.00402F0C						
73FF1224 L. RETN							
SI=00402F0C (McAfee.00402F0C)							
Address Hex dump Disassembly	Comment						
00402F0C . 85C0 TEST EAX, EAX	McAfee.00400000						
00402F0E . 8947 08 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+0x8],EAX 00402F11 .~ 74 17 JE SHORT McAfee.00402F2A	McAfee.00400000						
00402F13 . 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX	McAfee.00400000						
00402F1C . 33CC XOR ECX,ESP							
00402F1E . E8 810F0000 CALL McAfee.00403EA4 00402F23 . 81C4 0C02000 ADD ESP.0x20C							
00402F29 . C3 00402F29 > FF15_3CF0400 CALL_DWORD_PTR_DS:[<&KERNEL32.Get	LastEr: CGetLastError						
00402F30 . 8B8C24 08020 MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+0x208] 00402F37 . 33CC XOR ECX,ESP							
00402F39 . E8 660F0000 CALL McAfee.00403EA4							
00402F3E . 81C4 0C02000 ADD ESP.0x20C							
00402F3E . 81c4 0C02000(ADD ESP,0x20C 00402F44 . C3							

That's how the above fragment of caller's code looks after patching. Instead of the first two lines we can see a jump into the *McUtil.dll*:

Keturn to	0 731	FIZ48 UNCUTI	1./3FF1248)	
Address	Hex	dump	Comment	
00402F0C		E9 EFE0BE73	JMP McUtil.73FF1000	
00402F11	·~	74 17	JE SHORT McAfee.00402F2A	
00402F13	1.	3300	XOR EAX,EAX	
00402F15	1.		MOV ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+0x208]	
00402F1C	1.	33CC	XOR ECX, ESP	
00402F1E	1.	E8 810F0000	CALL McAfee.00403EA4	
00402F23	1.		ADD_ESP,0x20C	
00402F29	1:	C3	RETN	
00402F2A	>		CALL DWORD PTR DS: [<&KERNEL32.GetLastEr:	<pre>GetLastError</pre>
00402F30	1.		MOV ECX, DWORD PTR SS: [ESP+0x208]	
00402F37	1.	3300	XOR ECX, ESP	
00402F39	1.	E8 660F0000	CALL McAfee.00403EA4	
00402F3E	1.		ADD ESP,0x20C	
00402F44	· · ·	C3	RETN	

Patching function is in DIIMain of the *McUtil.dll* – so, it is called on load. The patched line is just after the call that loaded the library:

00402EFA 00402EFF	:	CALL McAfee.00404115 ADD ESP,0xC	
00402F02	I •	LEA EDX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP]	
00402F05	I •	PUSH EDX	r McUtil.dll
00402F06	•		
00402F0C		JMP McUtil.73FF1000	<pre><-patched line</pre>
00402F11	• ×	JE SHORT McAfee.00402F2A	
00402F13	I •	XOR EAX, EAX	
00402F15	I •	MOV ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+0x208]	
 001005101	•	USB FOU FOR	

So, the hook will be executed as soon as the loading function returns.

Inside the function called by the hook, the external file is open:




It is read into the memory and then execution is redirected there:

73FF10DD PUSH Moutil 73FF10E2 CALL DWORD 73FF10E3 MOV DWORD WOVD 73FF10E4 PUSH Moutil PUSH Moutil 73FF10F5 PUSH EAX PUSH EAX 73FF10F5 CALL EBX PUSH 0x0 73FF10F6 PUSH 0x0 PUSH 0x0 73FF10F7 LEA EDX.LLO PUSH 0x0 73FF10F8 PUSH 0x1000 PUSH EDI 73FF10F9 PUSH EDI PUSH EDI 73FF1101 PUSH EDI PUSH EDI 73FF1102 CALL EAX P3FF1104 73FF1105 MOV ECX.0x0 PUSH EX	DUtil.73FF10ED .73FF2018 PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.LoadLibraryA>] TR DS:[0x73FF300C],EAX .73FF206C CAL.1] 78	<pre>CFileName = "kernel32.dll" LoadLibraryA ASCII "ReadFile" kernel32.GetProcAddress ntdll.KiFastSystemCallRet</pre>			
73FF110B . MOV ECX, LO	CAL.23	the read content (shellcode)			
73FF110E · CALL ECX 73FF1110 · POPAD		<-call the shellcode			
ZOFFILLS I FEET FOU FOU	RD PTR DS:[0x73FF300C]				
73FF1118 J V JNZ SHORT M	oUtil.73FF112A				
73FF111A . PUSH McUtil 73FF111F . CALL DWORD	.73FF2018 PTR_DS+F4&KERNEL32_LoadLibraryD>1_	FileName = "kernel32.dll"			
73FF1125 MOV DWORD P	PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.LoadLibraryA>] TR DS:[0x73FF300C],EAX				
73FF112A > PUSH McUtil	.73FF2078	<pre>ProcNameOrOrdinal = "Sleep"</pre>			
•					
Stack SS:[0012CBDC]=01230	300				
Address Hex dump	Disassembly	Comment			
01230000 - E9 01000000 01230005 - E9 4FF7C12D	UMP 01230006 UMP 2EE4F759				
0123000A ED 0123000B 5B	IN EAX, DX POP EBX	I/O command kernel32.GetProcAddress			
0123000C 0E	PUSH CS	Kernetoz.detrioonddress			
0123000D 81C1 1B37ECAE 01230013 B9 08817D4F	ADD ECX,0xAEEC371B MOV ECX,0x4F7D8108				
01230018 F7C2 FFCA0EF0	TEST EDX, 0xF00ECAFF				
0123001E 81C7 ED149F90	ADD EDI,0x909F14ED				
01230024 BF DB5E3031	MOV EDI,0x31305EDB				

Unpacking the final payload

The shellcode is heavily obfuscated:



This is not the main stage, but an unpacker and loader of the main spyware. It decompresses the following content into a buffer:

0F26E4F0 PUSH EAX 0F26E4F1 MOV EAX, DWOR 0F26E4F4 SUB EAX, 0x4 0F26E4F7 PUSH EAX 0F26E4F8 MOV EAX, DWOR 0F26E4F8 MOV EAX, 0w0R 0F26E4F8 PUSH EAX 0F26E503 PUSH 0x2	D PTR SS:[EBP-0x4C] D PTR DS:[ESI+0xC] D PTR DS:[ESI+0x8] TR SS:[EBP-0x18] TR SS:[EBP-0xC]	ntdll.RtlDecompressBuffer
Address Нек dump 00130000 58 56 00 <th>90 <td< th=""><td>ASCII XU </td></td<></th>	90 90 <td< th=""><td>ASCII XU </td></td<>	ASCII XU


Then it reserves additional memory and starts remapping this content, chunk by chunk. By the way in which it parses it, we can notice similarity with process of remapping raw PE file into a virtual image. And indeed, the unpacked content is a PE file – only the headers are distorted. Delimiters XV were used to substitute the typical "MZ".. "PE" values:

📓 _00130000.n	nem																
Offset(h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	OF	
00000000	58	56	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	XV
00000010	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000020	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000030	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	D8	00	00	00	Ř
00000040	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000050	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000060	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000070	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000080	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000090	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
0A00000A0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
000000B0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
000000000	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	<u></u>
00000D0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	58	56	00	00	4C	01	05	00	XVL
000000E0	D9	Α5	6D	54	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	E0	00	02	21	ŮĄmTŕ!
000000F0	0B	01	0A	00	00	E8	01	00	00	DC	00	00	00	00	00	00	čÜ
00000100	ЗA	12	00	00	00	10	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	10	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

Reconstructing the header is not difficult – we must just substitute back those values by their real meaning:

🔝 _00130000.m	nem	FD	_00	1300	00.ex	e											
Offset(h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	OF	
00000000	4D	5A	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	MZ
00000010	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000020	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000030	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	D8	00	00	00	Ř
00000040	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000050	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000060	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000070	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000080	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000090	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
000000A0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000B0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000000	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	<u></u>
00000D0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	50	45	00	00	4C	01	05	00	PEL
000000E0	D9	A 5	6D	54	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	E0	00	02	21	ŮĄmTŕ!
000000F0	0B	01	0A	00	00	E8	01	00	00	DC	00	00	00	00	00	00	čÜ

After this small modification, the dumped image can be parsed as a normal PE file (<u>321a2f0abe47977d5c8663bd7a7c7d28</u>). Sections are not named, but all the content is valid:



File characteristics describes the payload as a DLL, however, it doesn't have any export table, so we cannot read it's original name.

Looking at the imports loaded by this piece we can suspect that it is the final payload. It loads and uses many functions related to the network communication, i.e:

🗾 🚄 🖼		
1001DE6E push	offset aWsasocketa ; "WSASocketA"	
1001DE73 call	load_ws32	
1001DE78 push	eax ; hModule	
1001DE79 call	ds:GetProcAddress	
1001DE7F mov	ds:hWSASocket, eax	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
🗾 🚄 🖼		
1001DE84		
1001DE84 loc_	1001DE84:	
1001DE84 push	edi	
1001DE85 push	edi	
1001DE86 push	edi	
1001DE87 push	3	
1001DE89 push	3	
1001DE8B push	2	
1001DE8D call	eax ; hWSASocket	

We can also find the fragment responsible for retrieving the local IP of the current machine and performing LAN scanning that we observed during behavioral analysis.

Authors took care so that the payload will not be run independently. That's why they checks if all the elements are called in the expected order. We can find hardcoded names of the main elements, used for the check:

1000101 T 1CU	cavi feshiooui.vai tal
10001BF8 push	eax
10001BF9 mov	ebx, offset unk_10028E8C
10001BFE call	sub_100113A7
10001C03 lea	esi, [esp+6Ch+var_20]
10001C07 mov	[esp+6Ch+var_6C], offset aMcafee_exe ; "McAfee.exe"
10001C0E call	sub_100019E9
10001C13 mov	esi, eax
10001C15 call	sub_10001614

Conclusion

<u>Malware</u> authors often use fake icons and descriptions in order to disguise as a legitimate product, but this type of attack is going a step forward. Authors used an original McAfee application and hijacked the DLL that it uses, in order to run the malicious code. To make detection more difficult, they tangled elements with each other. None of them can do malicious actions on it's own. That's why, tools that scan each module separately may fail to detect the malicious behavior.

Users are more vigilant about executables – but this time, neither EXE nor DLL file contained the malicious code – they were just used as loaders of the shellcode.

Malwarebytes Anti-Malware detects this threat as 'Trojan.Korplug'.

Appendix

http://e.gov.vn/theo-doi-ngan-chan-ket-noi-va-xoa-cac-tap-tin-chua-ma-doc-a-NewsDetails-37486-14-186.html – info from Vietnamese CERT

http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-wave-of-plugx-targetslegitimate-apps/ – similar attack from 2013

<u>http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/11/12/korplug-military-targeted-attacks-afghanistan-tajikistan/</u> – about the Korplug RAT targeting military of Afganistan and Tajikistan

<u>https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Haruyama/Asia-14-Haruyama-I-Know-You-Want-Me-Unplugging-PlugX.pdf</u> – Korplug RAT analysis (presentation from BlackHat)

https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/nanhaishu_whitepaper.pdf – about NanHaiShu APT

This was a guest post written by Hasherezade, an independent researcher and programmer with a strong interest in InfoSec. She loves going in details about malware and sharing threat information with the community. Check her out on Twitter @<u>hasherezade</u> and her personal blog: <u>https://hshrzd.wordpress.com</u>.