

Sakula Malware Family

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Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ Threat Intelligence



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Summary

Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU™) researchers analyzed multiple versions of a remote access trojan (RAT) named Sakula (also known as Sakurel and VIPER). The RAT, which according to compile timestamps first surfaced in November 2012, has been used in targeted intrusions through 2015. Sakula enables an adversary to run interactive commands as well as to download and execute additional components.

Sakula uses HTTP GET and POST communication for command and control (C2). Network communication is obfuscated with single-byte XOR encoding. Sakula also leverages single-byte XOR encoding to obfuscate various strings and files embedded in the resource section, which are subsequently used for User Account Control (UAC) bypass on both 32 and 64-bit systems. Most samples maintain persistence through a registry Run key, although some samples configure themselves as a service.

Analysis

CTU researchers performed detailed analysis on 346 Sakula samples, including the installer and all dropped files used by the malware to run. The earliest compilation timestamp is November 21, 2012. As of this publication, the most recent sample observed by CTU researchers was compiled on January 1, 2015. Some installers compiled in 2013 are configured to drop samples compiled in 2014, suggesting that the initial installer has been successful and that the adversary has a build process that permits them to easily re-use components. Multiple samples include their debug information, which yielded properties like LANG_NAME and SUBLANG_NAME (whose values are 'LANG_CHINESE' and 'SUBLANG_CHINESE_SIMPLIFIED', respectively).

Delivery

CTU researchers observed a copy of Sakula being delivered in a strategic web compromise (SWC) that exploited CVE-2014-0322, which was a zero-day vulnerability in Internet Explorer at the time of compromise. A subset of Sakula variants are digitally signed, allowing them to bypass security controls and providing users with a false sense of security that the software is legitimate. Table 1 lists the publisher names, thumbprints, and serial numbers used by Sakula to digitally sign its installer component.

Publisher	Thumbprint	Serial number
Career Credit Co	3203BA1693B76FCB68D33BE0B9E8F312EE97A9B9	01 A5 D9 59 95 19 B1 BA FC FA D0 E8 0B 6D 67 35
DTOPTOOLZ Co.	6E752358D18B8B401A764ABE1AB9D6D5B42332C8	47 D5 D5 37 2B CB 15 62 B4 C9 F4 C2 BD F1 35 87
MICRO DIGITAL INC.	3E49A89005AA19A9294F919ACE81169A33789638	31 06 2E 48 3E 01 06 B1 8C 98 2F 00 53 18 5C 36
NexG	554C8DDCDD782FA3102D750D94551EDC9B8A608F	5E 3D 76 DC 7E 27 3E 2F 31 3F C0 77 58 47 A2 A2
SJ SYSTEM	918BF759D590CC2D2240938C1A4310B49DB2ACCO	20 D0 EE 42 FC 90 1E 6B 3A 8F EF E8 C1 E6 08 7A
U-Tech IT service	AF7D3EC0D442C555E8E7337C571C2A72B32217D4	3A C1 0E 68 F1 CE 51 9E 84 DD CD 28 B1 1F A5 42

Table 1. Signature properties of certificates used to sign Sakula malware.

Some installers masqueraded as the following applications and used social engineering to convince users that the applications were required to do business:

- Adobe Self Extractor
- CITRIX Access Gateway Secure Input
- Juniper SSL VPN ActiveX Plugin

- Microsoft Hotfix
- Security Exchange Mail Exchange ActiveX Control

Figures 1 through 5 show the status windows that the Sakula installers display to victims.




Figure 1. Screenshot of Sakula installer purporting to be installing Adobe software. (Source: Dell SecureWorks)




Figure 2. Screenshot of Sakula installer purporting to be installing Juniper software. (Source: Dell SecureWorks)



Figure 3. Screenshot of Sakula installer purporting to be installing Exchange software. (Source: Dell SecureWorks)




Figure 4. Screenshot of Sakula installer purporting to be installing Juniper software. (Source: Dell SecureWorks)



Figure 5. Screenshot of Sakula installer purporting to be installing a Microsoft ActiveX Control. (Source: Dell SecureWorks)

Installation

In most of the samples collected by the CTU research team, Sakula maintains persistence by setting the registry Run key (SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\) in either the HKLM or HKCU hive. The hive decision is based on the installer's ability to write to the %TEMP% directory. Through 2013, registry persistence was set using standard Windows APIs. In the samples compiled in 2014, the adversary switched to adding the Run key by invoking cmd.exe:

```
cmd.exe /c reg add %s\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v "%s" /t REG_SZ /d "%s"
```

The registry value and filename vary by sample. CTU researchers extracted the following parameters:

Values:

- MicroMedia
- JuniperACX
- MicroSoftMedia
- CCPUpdate
- SenseSvc

Filenames:

- MediaCenter.exe
- AdobeUpdate.exe
- JuniperSafeACX.exe
- MicroPlayerUpdate.exe
- CitrixReciever.exe
- SensrSvc.exe
- SensrSvc2013.exe
- MicroSoftSecurityLogin.ocx
- Utm.m.ocx
- Sweep.exe
- pdfforie.exe
- shiape.exe

In the cases where Sakula does not use a registry key for persistence, it attempts to set itself up as a service (see Table 2). It invokes itself by calling WinExec with the "net start %s" argument (without quotes), where "%s" is the service name.

Service name	Service description	Filename and location
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AppleService	Apple Application Service.	C:\WINDOWS\system32\AppleService.exe
Office Auto Update	Microsoft Office Auto Update.	C:\WINDOWS\system32\Sweep.exe

Table 2. Properties used by Sakula when setting itself up as a service.

Other than the service setup, the resident file location is fairly consistent across all samples. Most Sakula samples install their components within a directory under %TEMP%. The actual value of the environment variable is identified by an API call to ExpandEnvironmentStringsA. Three of the analyzed samples placed files in %APPDATA%, while the remaining Sakula samples placed files in a directory under %ALLUSERSPROFILE%. A small number of samples did not use an additional subdirectory. CTU researchers discovered Sakula files being installed under the following directory paths:

- %TEMP%\MicroMedia\
- %TEMP%\JuniperACX\
- %TEMP%\MicroMedia\
- %TEMP%\MicroSoftMedia\
- %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\MicroMediaCCP\
- %TEMP%\
- %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\
- %APPDATA%\

The 2014 samples maintain persistence with the same SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ registry key, but Sakula leverages DLL side-loading, which involves running a legitimate, typically digitally signed, program that loads a malicious DLL. The legitimate application is a digitally signed sample of Kaspersky Anti-Virus (AV) 6.0 for Windows Workstations. When the Kaspersky application is run, it loads a file named msi.dll, which is located within the same directory. The msi.dll file is configured to read and XOR-decode setup.msi, also located in the same directory, and run it in memory. The XOR-decode process, which skips zeroes, uses the single-byte key 0x88.

The 2015 sample differs from the 2014 samples in the files used and how the persistence mechanism is executed. Instead of the Kaspersky application, the 2015 sample uses a legitimately signed file from McAfee's Outlook Scan About Box application. Sakula names this file either MicroWhoknow.dll or Emabout.dll. There are two additional files within the same directory. The first, shutil.dll, is loaded by MicroWhoknow.dll or Emabout.dll and is configured to read and XOR-decrypt Thumbs.db using the same XOR key value as setup.msi. The other is the registry key used for persistence, which uses VBScript to call cmd.exe to run a DLL via the rundll32 application, passing the Plugupdate export within the MicroWhoKnow.dll as its entry point:


```
HKU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\MicroWhoknow: "mshta
vbscript:CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run("cmd /c cd
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\MicroWhoknow && rundll32 MicroWhoknow.dll
Plugupdate",0)(window.close)"
```

Multiple samples contain UAC bypass code for both 32 and 64-bit systems. The UAC bypass code is stored as 'DAT' in the file's resource section. The two DLLs are stored in separate items, identified as 101 and 102. The files are single-byte XOR-encoded with the value 0x24. The decode process skips hex bytes identical to the XOR key and zeroes. Based on whether the compromised system is 32-bit or 64-bit, the appropriate file is written and run using cmd.exe calling rundll32 on the DLL with the PlayWin32 or PlayWin64 export.

Persistence for the UAC bypass DLL file is maintained via a SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ registry key in the HKLM or HKCU hive, with the value "CCPUpdate". Other Sakula variants temporarily write the files to disk and execute each time the main Sakula application is called. In these cases, the temporary file is written to the %TEMP% directory, and the filename is a combination of numbers generated from a call to GetTickCount and the '.dat' extension (e.g., 2225260.dat). In some instances, the filename is prefaced with the word "Center" (e.g., Center509671.dat).

In a small group of Sakula samples from 2013, the install process also modified the hosts file to point some of the victim's subdomains to various IP addresses within the victim's own organization. The malware also registered a file as a command component within the registry.

In the Sakula samples where the install process performed cleanup, the malware invoked cmd.exe. This process was instantiated by first performing a ping request to localhost to ensure the install process completed before the temporary file was deleted:

```
C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe" /c ping 127.0.0.1 & del /q %TEMP%\Center73946.dat
```

On a subset of samples compiled in 2014, Sakula invoked the default web browser, which loaded a hard-coded URL. This action occurred after the seemingly legitimate application (discussed in the [Delivery](#) section) finished installing. Of the following URLs hard-coded within the malware, only the first three appeared to be under the adversary's control:

- [http:// www . qzbcwq . com/cookie.html](http://www.qzbcwq.com/cookie.html)
- [http:// sharepoint-vaeit . com/login.php?ref](http://sharepoint-vaeit.com/login.php?ref)
- [http:// extcitrix . we11point . com/vpn/index.php?ref=1](http://extcitrix.we11point.com/vpn/index.php?ref=1)
- [https:// portal . caci . com/](https://portal.caci.com/)
- [https:// webmail . mfa . gov . mn/](https://webmail.mfa.gov.mn/)
- [http:// cabinet . gov . mn/mfa-gov/Success.html](http://cabinet.gov.mn/mfa-gov/Success.html)
- [http:// www . bisononthevinayerd . org/BisonOntheVineyard.pdf](http://www.bisononthevinayerd.org/BisonOntheVineyard.pdf)

Capabilities

Sakula obfuscates many of its strings using single-byte XOR obfuscation. Samples with a 2012 compile timestamp use a key value of either 0x88 or 0x56. Samples compiled in 2013 and 2014 use a key value of 0x56, while the lone 2015 sample uses 0x57.

Core functionality across all Sakula samples is fairly consistent. While there are some minor differences among the samples, Sakula typically implements eight commands (see Table 3).

Case	Description
1	Invoke a remote shell via named pipe with optional command
2	Download and execute (randomly named file in %TEMP%)
3	Upload a file by path
4	Call WinExec on file
5	Update C2 OR C2 beacon interval
6	Uninstall and exit
7	Get information about self (PID/filename)
8	Invoke a remote shell OR sleep

Table 3. Command functionality available in Sakula samples analyzed by CTU researchers.

The "OR" in Table 3 indicates that the feature for that case varied by sample. For Case 2, the randomly named file is generated each time the command is used. It is sourced from a call to GetTickCount and is appended with ".exe". Case 8 was observed in samples compiled in mid-2013, with the Sleep command introduced in the only 2015 sample identified as of this publication.

Command and control

Sakula uses HTTP GET and POST for command and control, with most samples configured with only one C2 server. The network communications are encoded with the single-byte XOR keys listed in Table 4.

XOR key value	Observed sample year (based on compile time)
0x59	2012 and 2013
0x56	2013 and 2014

0x66	2014
0x5C	2014
0x7C	2015

Table 4. Single-byte XOR keys used to decode network traffic.

The URI patterns used to communicate with the C2 server are fairly consistent across all samples regardless of compile time. Table 5 lists a breakdown of format by HTTP method in the analyzed Sakula samples.

HTTP method	URI request format
POST	/check.asp?imageid=%s&type=%d
POST	/newimage.asp?imageid=%s&type=%d&resid=%d
POST	/news/view.asp?cookie=%s&type=%d&vid=%d
POST	/script.asp?imageid=%s&type=%d&resid=%d&nmsg=up
POST	/update.asp?cstring=%s&tom=%d&id=%d
POST	/view.asp?cookie=%s&type=%d&vid=%d
GET	/news/photo/%s.jpg?vid=%d
GET	/photo/%s.jpg
GET	/photo/%s.jpg?id=%d
GET	/photo/%s.jpg?resid=%d
GET	/script.asp?resid=%d&nmsg=del&photoid=%s
GET	/view.asp?cstring=%s&tom=0&id=%d
GET	/viewphoto.asp?photoid=%s
GET	/viewphoto.asp?resid=%d&photoid=%s
GET	/x0x/%s.jpg?id=%d

Table 5. Sakula URI formats by HTTP method. URIs using %s insert a string of characters, and %d insert digits.

Sakula uses hard-coded User-Agents in its C2 communications but did not mimic standard browser User-Agents until 2014:

- iexplorer
- Mozilla/4.0+(compatible;+MSIE+8.0;+Windows+NT+5.1;+SV1)
- Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0)

Conclusion

The Sakula RAT has been in use since 2012 with very few changes to the code base, which indicates that it is effective in targeted intrusions. Simplistic in nature, the small command set for Sakula allows its operator to actively control a compromised system, download and execute additional components, and hide in plain sight with single-byte XOR-encoded HTTP GET and POST C2 communications.

Threat indicators

The threat indicators in Table 6 can be used to detect activity related to Sakula. The IP addresses and domains may contain malicious content, so consider the risks before opening them in a browser.

Indicator	Type	Context
104.128.233.4	IP address	Sakula C2 server
115.47.35.117	IP address	Sakula C2 server
180.210.206.246	IP address	Sakula C2 server
23.27.112.143	IP address	Sakula C2 server
secure.devpia.com	Domain name	Sakula C2 server
login.qzbwqc.com	Domain name	Sakula C2 server
oa.ameteksen.com	Domain name	Sakula C2 server
sinmoung.com	Domain name	Sakula C2 server

extcitrix.we11point.com	Domain name	Sakula decoy page
sharepoint-vaeit.com	Domain name	Sakula decoy page
citrix.vipreclod.com	Domain name	Sakula C2 server
update.microsoft.co.kr	Domain name	Sakula C2 server
web.vipreclod.com	Domain name	Sakula C2 server
www.huchin.com	Domain name	Sakula C2 server
www.northpolarroute.com	Domain name	Sakula C2 server
www.polarroute.com	Domain name	Sakula C2 server
www.qzbwcq.com	Domain name	Sakula decoy page
www.savmpet.com	Domain name	Sakula C2 server
www.we11point.com	Domain name	Sakula C2 server
iexplorer	User-Agent	Hard-coded Sakula User-Agent
Mozilla/4.0+(compatible;+MSIE+8.0;+Windows+NT+5.1;+SV1)	User-Agent	Hard-coded Sakula User-Agent
/check.asp?imageid=%s&type=%d	URI	Sakula hard-coded POST request format

<code>/newimage.asp?imageid=%s&type=%d&resid=%d</code>	URI	Sakula hard-coded POST request format
<code>/news/view.asp?cookie=%s&type=%d&vid=%d</code>	URI	Sakula hard-coded POST request format
<code>/script.asp?imageid=%s&type=%d&resid=%d&nmsg=up</code>	URI	Sakula hard-coded POST request format
<code>/update.asp?cstring=%s&tom=%d&id=%d</code>	URI	Sakula hard-coded POST request format
<code>/view.asp?cookie=%s&type=%d&vid=%d</code>	URI	Sakula hard-coded POST request format
<code>/news/photo/%s.jpg?vid=%d</code>	URI	Sakula hard-coded GET request format
<code>/photo/%s.jpg</code>	URI	Sakula hard-coded GET request format
<code>/photo/%s.jpg?id=%d</code>	URI	Sakula hard-coded GET request format

/photo/%s.jpg?resid=%d	URI	Sakula hard-coded GET request format
/script.asp?resid=%d&nmsg=del&photoid=%s	URI	Sakula hard-coded GET request format
/viewphoto.asp?photoid=%s	URI	Sakula hard-coded GET request format
/view.asp?cstring=%s&tom=0&id=%d	URI	Sakula hard-coded GET request format
/viewphoto.asp?resid=%d&photoid=%s	URI	Sakula hard-coded GET request format
/x0x/%s.jpg?id=%d	URI	Sakula hard-coded GET request format
Career Credit Co	Publisher name	Used to digitally sign Sakula malware
DTOPTOOLZ Co.	Publisher name	Used to digitally sign Sakula malware

MICRO DIGITAL INC.	Publisher name	Used to digitally sign Sakula malware
NexG	Publisher name	Used to digitally sign Sakula malware
SJ SYSTEM	Publisher name	Used to digitally sign Sakula malware
U-Tech IT service	Publisher name	Used to digitally sign Sakula malware
HKU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\MicroWhoknow: "mshta vbscript:CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run("cmd /c cd C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\MicroWhoknow && rundll32 MicroWhoknow.dll Plugupdate",0)(window.close)"	Registry key	Used by Sakula to maintain persistence
%TEMP%\MicroMedia\	Path	Sakula malware installation path
%TEMP%\JuniperACX\	Path	Sakula malware installation path
%TEMP%\MicroMedia\	Path	Sakula malware installation path
%TEMP%\MicroSoftMedia\	Path	Sakula malware installation path

%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\MicroMediaCCP\	Path	Sakula malware installation path
031832adb059c8a30bf06e3036813a05	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
034b2d2c7b1b6812d242771fbc382183	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
04f17c37259533e301b01a8c64e476e6	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
065aa01311ca8f3e0016d8ae546d30a4	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
07af666d2117296a7814c86839ee2ae0	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
07b62497e41898c22e5d5351607aac8e	MD5 hash	Sakula installer
0a8a4cfa745b6350bea1b47f5754595e	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
0ae8ace203031f32e9b1ac5696c0c070	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
0b6a0ca44e47609910d978ffb1ee49c6	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
0c693b4ee77c1ebb646334ce28331d5c	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
0db52e612d904f4d4212beee4bd5c35c	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
0e5d1b941dcb597eb9b7dc1f0694c65f	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
0f218e73da96af2939e75e7c958dc	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
0ff96f4dbfe8aa9c49b489218d862cd7	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
1098e66986134d71d4a8dd07301640b1	MD5 hash	Sakula malware

11587f16f3129cad17222498eadc84f2	MD5 hash	XOR- encoded UAC bypass code for Sakula
124089995494be38d866de08c12f99ef	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
1240fbbabd76110a8fc29803e0c3ccfb	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
127cd711193603b4725094dac1bd26f6	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
1377e513f872a062c6377d1e240225a8	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
13e99782f29efa20a2753ac00d1c05a0	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
15ccb0918411b859bab268195957c731	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
1893cf1d00980926f87c294c786892d2	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
191696982f3f21a6ac31bf3549c94108	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
194f79e5f043efecb5707ebc4f9d0573	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
1a6c43b693bb49dad5fe1637b02da2c6	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
1ab782431ed9948bf68196e1aa27cbc9	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
1affacbe9e5889d2e1b7045a828c7252	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
1d016bb286980fd356cab21cdfcb49f4	MD5 hash	Sakula installer
1d80af301994f9b6bf3fa2389ff125da	MD5 hash	XOR- encoded UAC bypass code for Sakula

1de5db7cef81645f3f0e7aabdb7551a8	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
205c9b07c449a9c270aabe923123c0c1	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
230d4212692c867219aba739c57f0792	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
230d8a7a60a07df28a291b13ddf3351f	MD5 hash	Sakula installer
2567d2bbcce5c8e7dcabcd2c1db2a98a	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
259ea5f6f3f1209de99d6eb27a301cb7	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
2798fa07d5708f7be69ba525e5452d13	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
28771cb939b989e2ab898408ccaf5504	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
2d619b2c648d095fa2fb2e0864dbc7c9	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
2ffea14b33b78f2e2c92aead708a487a	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
34db8fb5635c7f0f76a07808b35c8e55	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
352411e5288b2c6ea5571a2838c8f7f3	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
360273db9ac67e1531257323324d9f62	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
3759833848a8cd424bf973d66e983e91	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
379d4a0f24bb56569d6139946b7ccf88	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
388a7ae6963fd4da3ec0a4371738f4e0	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
391c01bdbbeb5975c85cee0099adb132c	MD5 hash	Sakula malware

3b70ab484857b6e96e62e239c937dea6	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
3cd598e8e2fd033134d8784251eff59e	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
3ce08f804c5986856a85e16a4e211334	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
3d2c2fdd4104978762b89804ba771e63	MD5 hash	Sakula installer
3e0016d728b979b7f8fd77a2738047eb	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
3f0ba1cd12bab7ba5875d1b02e45dfcf	MD5 hash	Sakula installer
3fc6405499c25964dfe5d37ee0613a59	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
41093a982526c6dc7dbcf4f63814d428	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
419ce8f53d5585abd144e9e76113639d	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
4297e98e6d7ea326dee3d13e53aa8d70	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
42d3e38db9f1d26f82ef47f0a0ec0499	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
4315274a5eda74cd81a5ec44980876e8	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
442f10bfc2a02831b6a733d6c01b0c59	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
45468c2450e6451cf63d2b9b2b70c632	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
49c5da72aafabcc0b6896fec637ed167	MD5 hash	Sakula installer
4a6f45ff62e9ab9fe48f1b91b31d110e	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
4a7b4635af040cba1851b2f57254ba5e	MD5 hash	Sakula installer

4c15781cb47d4a7604788e188fc722de	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
4dc526eb9d04f022df9fa2518854bbb4	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
4e239b731a0f1dbf26b503d5e2a81514	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
4ea3afbed7a0c7d0013f454060243fba	MD5 hash	Sakula installer
4f545dff49f81d08736a782751450f71	MD5 hash	Sakula installer
51ee4ef7f326e90d391ee9d1c5238b34	MD5 hash	Decoded UAC bypass DLL file for Sakula
5382efbeccccf8227c7adc443e229542f	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
5482deee917c374bab43dd83a4a6c722	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
586c418bf947a0ef73afd2a7009c4439	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
5acc539355258122f8cdc7f5c13368e1	MD5 hash	Sakula installer
5b27234b7f28316303351ea8bcfaa740	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
5d04457e3d4026a82ac3ec9b1c0819ec	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
5d54c0756fbe33aae5dc8a4484a7aee5	MD5 hash	Decoded UAC bypass DLL file for Sakula
5dbdc2839e3f5c2dd35f3def42002663	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
5e1c170d96b0faea3a1281d182c29e02	MD5 hash	Sakula malware

606b9759de1aa61a76cf4afa4ccf8601	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
61fe6f4cb2c54511f0804b1417ab3bd2	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
63ae83244a8d7ca1eef4e834eb0eb07f	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
63c0978e2fa715a3cad6fb3068f70961	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
64201ec97467910e74f40140c4aaa5ce	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
67112866e800b9dce2892cf827444d60	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
67fceab90a142e1e286bca0922dbffd3	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
68e13422b9a5d280f4a19235d8bf7da5	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
69314300da7a4a0e95be545b804565dd	MD5 hash	Sakula installer
6a2ea24ed959ef96d270af5cdc2f70a7	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
6bd7fb8f4565866ff032f236f0a29ee2	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
6ccb6d1b964f115f8c7215c6ab67b1cc	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
740561c8d5d2c658d2134d5107802a9d	MD5 hash	Sakula installer
74eb66027ac6fa5a59632383e09915e2	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
7b2677c7215fab4e42f4507eb01c4326	MD5 hash	XOR- encoded Sakula malware
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8ee244ad6b6f2b814d34d26dae880f12	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
8f523f7fc73e52d54bb4e94dc44768b0	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
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928579b6fd1162c3831075a7a78e3f47	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
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98721c78dfbf8a45d152a888c804427c	MD5 hash	Sakula installer
9a63f72911b385a0c17427444c968ed0	MD5 hash	Sakula installer
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bb4bb0d7a794f31129cdb55025ea847b	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
bc74a557e91597d8b37ed357c367643e	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
bc99d3f41dfca74f2b40ce4d4f959af0	MD5 hash	Sakula command component
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c66b335fb606b542206b5a321beb2a76	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
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dfea1e69d2f5d84a1b6c6b67b01b7ff8	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
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fd69439c6e2bac79e490b9572b6c91ad	MD5 hash	Sakula malware
ff1d5c6a476a56eb7ca4e38b57761a4e	MD5 hash	Sakula malware

Table 6. Threat indicators for Sakula.